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ABSTRACT

The history of American medicine and public health
is a relatively new field of endeavor for the academic
historian; countless areas remain thus far almost complete
ly unexplored.

The subject of epidemic disease and its

impact, for example, deserves a more thorough investigation
and consideration as a significant aspect of social and
intellectual history.

Representing an essay into that

particular area, this dissertation involves a study of
yellow fever in Louisiana from the first recorded epidemic
in New Orleans in 1796 through the final outbreak in the
state in 1905.
Contemporary sources have supplied the bulk of
material utilized.

The abundance of references to yellow

fever and its effects in virtually every type of historical
source is itself a good commentary on the pervasive influ
ence of the disease.

Manuscript material such as personal

and business correspondence, diaries and medical treatises,
revealed individual reactions to epidemic yellow fever.
Newspapers, medical journals, travel accounts, government
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documents, and contemporary works on yellow fever and
health furnished ample information about epidemic conditions
as well as an insight into medical and lay ideas, attitudes,
and reactions regarding the pestilence and its behavior.
Secondary sources included works on Louisiana history,
medicine, and public health.
Introduced by infected persons or mosquitoes on
vessels from Latin American centers of yellow fever endemicity, the disease appeared in New Orleans almost every
summer and frequently erupted into a severe outbreak,
extending its ravages along the lines of trade and travel
to other communities throughout Louisiana and the South.
Between 1796 and 1850, New Orleans experienced a few cases
every year and some twenty serious epidemics; the 1850's
witnessed the climax of yellow fever's activity in Louisi
ana when the scourge struck violently four times during the
decade (1853, 1854, 1855, and 1858).

During the second

half of the nineteenth century, yellow fever outbreaks
diminished in frequency and virulence, appearing in severe
epidemic form only on three or four occasions.

Neverthe

less, the constant threat of the disease occupied the
attention of Louisianians until its final conquest in 1905.
Vi
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Until the discovery of yellow fever's transmitter,
the Aedes aegypti mosquito, in 1900-1901 by the United
States Army Commission in Cuba, the erratic spread of the
disease remained a mystery.

Throughout the nineteenth

century medical men and laymen attempted to adapt the ageold epidemiological theories, and later the germ theory, to
the peculiar workings of the Saffron Scourge.

The evolu

tion of yellow fever etiology and epidemiology itself
reflects an important phase in the history of medical
thought.
The diversity of ideas regarding yellow fever's
causation and transmission resulted in disagreement over
means of prevention.

As the battle raged among those who

favored sanitation, quarantine, both, or neither, the con
cept of public responsibility for community health gradu
ally emerged, found public acceptance, and was crystallized
into such institutional forms as the Louisiana State Board
of Health, quarantine, and other regulatory health laws. A
consciousness of the federal government's role in preserving
4T-

the nation's health also began to develop.
In its yearly appearances and at least thirty exten
sive outbreaks spread over a century of Louisiana's history,
vii
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Yellow Jack destroyed thousands of lives, cost millions of
dollars, and affected almost every aspect of human affairs
with:.r< its sphere of influence --economic, social, political,
intellectual, medical, and religious.

Ultimately, medical

science and public health operations triumphed over the
pestilence in this country in the systematic campaign based
on the newly-formulated mosquito theory and waged against
the New Orleans epidemic of 1905.

Protected by federal

quarantine regulations, the United States since that date
has been free of epidemic yellow fever.

viii
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The history of yellow fever in Louisiana is a long
and dramatic story with many interwoven themes, colorful
and controversial characters, much tragedy, some irony, and
ultimately a happy ending.

Perhaps the fundamental theme

involves man's struggle to understand, to explain, to fight,
and to conquer this pestilence which harassed Louisiana for
more than a hundred years.
From the late eighteenth century down to the early
twentieth century, almost every question relating to yellow
fever became a subject of major controversy, in Louisiana
and in every other place where the disease appeared.

Was

yellow fever contagious or non-contagious, of local origin
or imported, a specific entity or the most malignant grade
of a related class of fevers?

Should quarantine measures,

sanitary reform, a combination of both, or nothing at all
be employed against the disease?

Which proved more dis

astrous, the economic losses occasioned by the fever or

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

those resulting from quarantine itself?

Which of the many

forms of treatment seemed most effective in curing the
malady?

These and a host of other issues furnished topics

for endless debate among physicians and laymen alike.
Throughout the entire nineteenth century countless theories
were advanced and debated.

Still nothing was settled about

the nature and action of the complicated disease until
1901, when the United States Army Commission in Cuba headed
by Walter Reed clearly demonstrated the transmission of
yellow fever from man to man by the Aedes aegypti mosquito.
Not until after that discovery was man in a position to
combat the pestilence successfully.

For all but the last

few years of its history in Louisiana yellow fever remained
a mysterious malady--erratic, unpredictable, and deadly.
Even with the considerable increase of knowledge regarding
the disease which has slowly been uncovered during the
course of the twentieth century, yellow fever still with
holds many secrets from the probing intellect of scientific
man.

Yet in the light of present-day knowledge about the

pathology, etiology, and epidemiology of yellow fever, the
disease can be controlled to a high degree.

Furthermore,

armed with that knowledge, one can more readily understand
the activities of yellow fever in epidemics of the past.
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those activities which so often seemed inexplicable to
eighteenth and nineteenth-century observers.
One of the more complicated maladies of man, yellow
fever is an acute infectious disease occurring primarily in
tropical and subtropical zones and produced by a filtrable
virus.

The virus is transmitted from person to person by

the female Aedes aegypti mosquito.

In order to become

infected, the mosquito must feed on the blood of a yellow
fever patient within the first three or four days of his
illness.

After the Aedes aegypti acquires the virus, an

incubation period of ten to twelve days is required before
that mosquito can transmit the disease when biting another
person; the mosquito then remains infective for the re
mainder of its life, perhaps a month or more.
infected mosquito bites

When the

a susceptible individual, the

period of incubation before the onset of the fever is
usually from three to six days.l
Obviously, then, a rather delicate balance of cir
cumstantial factors is necessary for the development of an

^Charles E. Lyght, et al, (eds.). The Merck Manual
of Diagnosis and Therapy (9th ed., Rahway, N. J., 1956),
966-67; Richard P. Strong, Stittfs Diagnosis, Prevention and
Treatment of Tropical Diseases (7th ed., 2 vols., Philadel
phia, 1944), II, 872-73, 879-82, Hereinafter cited as
Tropical Diseases.
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epidemic within an area where yellow fever is not endemic
(that is, present at all times),

First of all, the Aedes

aegypti must be present in sufficient numbers to perform
the act of transmission, and the weather must be warm
enough to allow for mosquito activity.

Further, an epi

demic requires that a considerable number of susceptible
persons be concentrated in a given area where the Aedes
aegypti is active and that the virus be introduced into that
area either by an infective mosquito or by a person in the
incubation period or the earliest stage of the disease. The
introduction of one infective mosquito or one case, unno
ticed or unrecognized, may set off the chain reaction and
result in a full-scale epidemic--or it may not, depending
on the circumstances. If the imported mosquito bites only
immune persons or dies before biting susceptibles, the virus
does not become operative.

Or if the imported case is not

bitten by a female Aedes aegypti within the first three or
four days of the attack, that case results in no others.
In the usual pattern of urban yellow fever (as opposed to
jungle yellow fever, which is another story), the continued
existence of the virus itself requires the constant trans
mission back and forth from man to mosquito to man, and so
on.

Otherwise the disease will disappear completely.
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Only

in areas where the climate is war" enough to permit year
round activity of the mosquito can yellow fever be main
tained as an endemic disease.

In New Orleans, with the

coming of cool weather and frost each winter, the mosquito
ceased to be able to transmit the virus, and the disease
spontaneously died out.

But the close connections with

Latin America facilitated its réintroduction in the summer
of each year.
Unaware of the mosquito vector and its relation to
the virus and man, medical thinkers before the twentieth
century found it virtually impossible to account for the
strange behavior of the disease in spreading from person to
person and place to place without apparent rhyme or reason.
Yellow fever's activity during warm weather and its cessa
tion with the appearance of frost led to the belief that
climate was somehow a factor in its development.

Native-

born persons in an area where yellow fever prevailed
exhibited an immunity to the disease, while strangers pro
vided the majority of victims.

It was long believed that

Creoles or natives were immune because they were accustomed
to the climate.

The real explanation, however, lies in

their having contracted in childhood mild cases of yellow
fever, of which they were never aware; and one attack, no
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matter how mild, confers lasting immunity.
The symptoms and signs of yellow fever include a
long list of physical reactions which may be present in
different combinations and exhibit great variability in
different cases.

Some of the symptoms are essentially

similar to those of other diseases (malaria, hepatitis,
influenza, dengue, etc.) so that confusion in diagnosis,
especially in mild cases, is highly possible.

The illness

begins with fever, together with slight or rigorous chills.
The temperature early reaches 102° to 103°F,

In the first

two to five days of the disease, nausea, vomiting, con
stipation, headache and muscular pain, especially in the
legs and back, extreme prostration, and restlessness are
characteristic.

Within a few days the fever may rise to

a maximum of 104°F«, seldom higher.

In the acute stage of

the disease, jaundice or yellowness of the skin ordinarily
appears, along with passive hemorrhages from almost any
part of the body--eyes, ears, nose, mouth, bladder, uterus.
A serious sign, but one which does not invariably occur, is
the so-called black vomit.

The blood from hemorrhages with

in the stomach is acted upon by stomach acids and the
resulting product is the black vomit, which in appearance
resembles coffee grounds.

This material seems to gush
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forth without any effort by the patient.

Preceded by con

vulsions or coma, death may result from the damage to the
liver and kidneys, the organs principally affected by the
disease.

Or recovery may begin from one to two weeks after

the beginning of the attack; convalescence ordinarily re
quires several weeks.%

Although the foregoing description

is admittedly an oversimplification of yellow fever’s
action, the general picture should provide a basis for
understanding the terrifying nature and revolting symptoms
of the deadly disease.

Parson Theodore Clapp, who lived

through a succession of yellow fever epidemics in
nineteenth-century New Orleans, remarked that he found it
almost impossible to sleep during the periods of pesti
lence, so disturbed were his dreams by the agonizing sights
of patients he had visited.

His graphic description of a

yellow fever victim could induce insomnia even today:
Often I have met and shook hands with some
blooming, handsome young man today, and . . .
[later] I have been called to see him in the
black vomit, with profuse hemorrhages from the
mouth, nose, ears, eyes, and even the toes;
the eyes prominent, glistening, yellow, and
staring; the face discolored with orange color
and dusky red.

Zphilip H. Manspn-Bahr (ed.). Manson's Tropical Dis
eases , A Manual of the Diseases of Warm Climates (8th ed.,
London, 1925), 169-73; Merck Manual, 967-68.
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The physiognomy of the yellow fever corpse is
usually sad, sullen, and perturbed; the counten
ance dark, mottled, livid, swollen, and stained
with blood and black vomit; the veins of the
face and whole body become distended, and look
as if they were going to burst, . . .3
The characteristic jaundice or yellow tint of the
skin gave rise to the now universally accepted name of the
disease, yellow fever.

But no other ailment has ever had

so many different terms applied to it.

In his classic

work on the disease, George Augustin set forth a list of
152 synonyms for yellow fever, compiled from American,
English, Spanish, Italian, and Portuguese sources.

His

list included such interesting appellations as American
fever, American typhus, ardent fever, bilious putrid fever,
bilious malignant fever, black vomit or vomito negro,
m a ladie de la saison, maladie du diable, Yellow Jack, and
Stranger's fever.^

In New Orleans there was a tendency to

think of the pestilence in anthropomorphic terms as the
disease became more and more common during the first half
of the nineteenth century.

Hence, popular names for yellow

3John Duffy (ed.), Parson Clapp of the Strangers
Church of New Orleans (Baton Rouge, 1957), 95-97.
^George Augustin, History of Yellow Fever (New
Orleans, 1909), 70-84.
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fever developed, and newspaper editors and others frequently
referred to that malady as "Bronze John on his Saffron
Steed," "His Saffron Majesty," "The Saffron Warrior," and
"The Saffron Scourge."
Whatever it might have been called at any given time,
yellow fever always baffled the physicians in their attempts
at treatment.

Throughout the nineteenth century physicians

employed various techniques and drugs for a time, and dis
carded them one by one for still other patterns of therapy.
Numerous observers remarked that some patients died and
others recovered under every conceivable form of treatment.
That form of therapy which worked rather well in one epi
demic often failed completely in the next, and in various
cases the same therapeutic method had different results.^
Still there is no specific treatment for yellow fever.
Complete bed rest and good nursing care are considered of
vital importance.

Additional therapy may be employed, but

it is designed primarily to alleviate the symptoms

^New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, XV
(November, 1858), 731; William L. Robinson, The Diary of a
Samaritan (New York, 1860), 77-78; Erasmus Darwin Fenner,
History of the Epidemic Yellow Fever, at New Orleans,
Louisiana, in 1853 (New York, 1854), 57-58. Hereinafter
cited as Fenner, Epidemic Yellow Fever.
^Merck Manual, 969; Strong, Tropical Diseases, 900901.
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The long-standing medical issues regarding yellow
fever have been partially solved in the twentieth century,
but with the increasing knowledge of the disease has come
an awareness of more and more unknowns relating to the nature
of the virus and its sometimes inexplicable activity.

In

addition to the medical questions relative to yellow fever,
some of which have been answered and others not, certain
historical difficulties encountered by earlier yellow fever
historians continue to present themselves.

The origin and

early history of the disease is by no means clear.

Ap

parently, it was unknown to Europeans before the discovery
of the New World,

Epidemics, later supposed to have been

yellow fever, occurred in Vera Cruz and Santo Domingo
between 1493 and 1496.

Nineteenth-century opinion inclined

toward accepting the southern portion of the western hemi
sphere as the native clime of the disease.

Even George

Augustin, in his History of Yellow Fever published in 1909,
declared that Mexico, Central America, and the West Indies
might be considered "the original cradle of the awesome
scourge."

He had no patience with the opinion that Africa

was yellow fever's place of origin, a hypothesis advanced
from time to time in the nineteenth century.

Nevertheless,

the most recent studies of the disease indicate a high
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probability that yellow fever originated in Africa and that
the disease, along with the Aedes aegypti, its transmitter,
was introduced into the western hemisphere by vessels
engaged in the Negro slave trade.^

That yellow fever in

Negroes generally exhibits mild and rarely fatal effects
is a factor which may be related to the African origin of
the disease.
Transplanted to the New World from Africa, the
yellow fever mosquito and the virus eventually gained a
foothold in their new habitat.

Exactly at what point this

transfer was accomplished can never be determined, but
apparently the first clearly recognized and definitely re
corded yellow fever epidemics in the New World were those
which occurred in Yucatan, Cuba, and Barbados in 1648,
During the latter seventeenth century the disease establish
ed itself in the West Indies, Central America, and South
America. By the 1690's it began to appear in North America,

^Charles-Edward A. Winslow, The Conquest of Epidemic
Disease, A Chapter in the History of Ideas (Princeton, N.J.,
1943), 193; Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 85-130', 649;
Strong, Tropical Diseases, 873; Josiah C. Trent (ed.), "The
Men Who Conquered Yellow Fever," in Ashbel Smith, Yellow
Fever in Galveston, Republic of Texas, 1839 . . . (Austin,
1951), 85-86; see also Henry Rose Carter, Yellow Fever, An
Epidemiological and Historical Study of its Place of
Origin, edited by L. A. Carter and W. H. Frost (Baltimore,
1931).
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and from time to time throughout the eighteenth century
yellow fever was transmitted from Latin America to certain
Atlantic port cities, particularly Charleston, New York,
and Philadelphia,®
Occurrences of yellow fever in early colonial Louisi
ana, as well as the date of the disease's first appearance
in New Orleans, long have been subjects for historical
speculation and disagreement,

Joseph Jones, an eminent

nineteenth-century Louisiana physician and prolific medical
historian, carefully sifted through the evidence in an
attempt to determine yellow fever's earliest history in
Louisiana.

He believed that the disease had been trans

mitted occasionally in the very late seventeenth and early
eighteenth centuries to points on the American Gulf Coast
through contacts with the West Indies where yellow fever
prevailed.

But he noted several factors which might have

served to postpone the appearance of epidemic yellow fever
in New Orleans:

the long and tedious trip up the Missis

sippi to the city, the sparse population, and the limited

8John Duffy, Epidemics in Colonial America (Baton
Rouge, 1953), 138-63; Wilson G. Smillie, Public Health, Its
Promise for the Future, A Chronicle of the Development of
Public Health in the United States, 1607-1914 (New York,
1955), 37-38,
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commercial activity during the French colonial period.
Nevertheless, Dr. Jones found it impossible to declare
positively that the Saffron Scourge had never visited New
Orleans under French rule.

The record of disease in that

city for a half-century after its establishment (1718) was
"very imperfect."

No medical journal or native medical

work, which might have detailed the nature of prevailing
diseases, ever appeared in French colonial Louisiana.
Jones wisely concluded that the mere absence of medical
records failed to demonstrate the total absence of yellow
fever.^
Admitting that little could be learned from the
records about eighteenth-century epidemics, Alcee Fortier,
one of Louisiana's major historians, asserted that the first
trace of yellow fever in connection with Louisiana history
was in the report of Governor Sauvolle's death at Fort
Maurepas near Biloxi in August of 1701.^^

It is entirely

possible, however, that the governor died of "tertian
fever" (malaria) or some other unknown malady among the

9n . 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., New Series, VII (July,
1879), 132-33, 146.
l^Alcee Fortier, Louisiana (3 vols., n.p., 1914),
II, 661.
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sicknesses present in the settlement that summer.
A disease later supposed to be yellow fever appeared
in epidemic form at Biloxi in 1702 and 1704 and at Mobile
12

in 1704 and 1705.

For a sixty-year period thereafter, no

specific information is available on the subject of yellow
fever in colonial Louisiana.

Variable nomenclature and

vague symptomatic descriptions of diseases in early records
complicate the historian's problem of evaluating any par
ticular epidemic.

For example, in the interior of Louisiana

a disease referred to as "Calenture" erupted in 1779 and
made great ravages in the Spanish settlement of Galveztown
on the Amite R i v e r . L i k e yellow fever, this disease did

lljohn Duffy (ed.), The Rudolph Matas History of
Medicine in Louisiana (Baton Rouge, 1958), I, 11-12. Here
inafter cited as Medicine in La.
l^Bennet Dowler, "Tableau of the Yellow Fever of
1853, with Topographical, Chronological and Historical
Sketches of the Epidemics of New Orleans," Cohen's New
Orleans Directory . . . of 1854 (New Orleans, 1854), 7;
N. 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., New Series, VII (July, 1879), 132;
Alcee Fortier, A History of Louisiana (4 vols.. New York,
1904), I, 51.
In relating yellow fever to Louisiana history, it
should be noted that in Havana, Cuba, in 1706, that disease
claimed the life of Pierre le Moyne, Sieur d'Iberville, one
of Louisiana's founding fathers. Fortier, A History of
Louisiana, I, 48-49.
13v. M. Scramuzza, "Galveztown, A Spanish Settlement
of Colonial Louisiana," Louisiana Historical Quarterly,
XIII (October, 1930), 576-77.
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not decline until cool weather; unlike yellow fever, it
first appeared in late April--a bit early for the Saffron
Scourge.

According to an army surgeon writing in 1899,

calentura was a name applied by Cubans to a specific fever,
symptomatically similar to yellow fever, sometimes existing
simultaneously with it, but essentially different.

He

noted that a severe case of calentura might easily be con
fused with yellow f e v e r . G e o r g e Augustin, on the other
hand, listed calentura as one of yellow fever's many
synonyms, one which probably had originated from the notion
that heat was a basic cause of the fever.

Actually, the

term, which described a symptom rather than a disease, could
have referred to any one of a number of infectious diseases
characterized by unusually high fever and

d e l i r i u m .

Hence, we are left in doubt as to the exact nature of the
illness in Galveztown in 1779.
The various years suggested by medical men and
historians for the arrival of yellow fever in New Orleans
include 1765, 1766, 1767, 1769, 1791, 1793, and 1796.

That

l^N. 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., LIT (September, 1899),
144-45.
l^Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 73; Duffy (ed.).
Medicine in La., I , 200.
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1796 represents the first unquestionable yellow fever epi
demic in the Crescent City has been generally conceded by
most writers on the subject.
officially recorded one.

Certainly it was the first

Whether that epidemic also marks

the initial appearance of the disease in New Orleans is
the debatable issue.
In 1765 Mobile and Pensacola suffered yellow fever
attacks, and New Orleans experienced an exceedingly un
healthy fall season that year.

Yellow fever might well

have been present, but there is no record of the specific
diseases involved in that sickly season.

In 1766, the

year Antonio de Ulloa arrived with troops from Cuba to
take over the colony for Spain, New Orleans suffered from
an epidemic said to have closely resembled yellow fever.
At least one historical work, without stating the source
or supplying details, set forth 1767 as the date of yellow
fever’s first appearance in New

Orleans.

l^N. 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., New Series, VII (July,
1879), 146; Charles Gayarre, History of Louisiana (4th ed.,
4 vols.. New Orleans, 1903), II, 133; George W. Cable,
The Creoles of Louisiana (New York, 1889), 291; John
Smith Kendall, History of New Orleans (3 vols., Chicago,
1922), I, 174.
17james Alexander Robertson (ed.), Louisiana Under
the Rule of Spain, France, and the United States, 17851807 (2 vols., Cleveland, 1911), I, 175n.
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A sketch of epidemics appearing in De Bow's Review
in 1846 stated:

"The Yellow Fever, according to tradition,

was first introduced into New Orleans in 1769, by a British
vessel from Africa with slaves."^®

Dr. Joseph Jones, how

ever, found no evidence to indicate that yellow fever had
been introduced into the city by slave s h i p s , B e n n e t
Dowler, another outstanding nineteenth-century medical man
and student of yellow fever's history, doubted that the epi
demic of 1769 had been yellow fever.

It was impossible, he

declared, to determine the character of the disease in
question from available records.

Furthermore, said Dowler,

within a single generation after 1769, the scourge had
appeared in the unquestionable 1796 epidemic, and those
persons writing soon after that epidemic who called it the
first appearance of that disease could have questioned
living witnesses about any previous occurrences.

And, he

continued, they "would have been contradicted, had they
made erroneous statements as to the period of its in
vasion."^0

Although Dowler was apparently willing to settle

ISDe Bow's Commercial Review, II (July, 1846), 73.
l^N. 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., New Series, VII (July,
1879), 132.
Z^Dowler, "Tableau of the Yellow Fever of 1853," loc.
cit., 8.
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for 1796 as the date of yellow fever's first appearance as
well as the first epidemic, Joseph Jones, writing some
twenty years later, felt that a careful consideration of
all available testimony indicated that 1796 definitely was
not the first occurrence of the fever, but rather that it
certainly had been present to some degree in 1791, 1794,
and 1795.21
Around 1840 Dr. Daniel Drake, eminent mid-western
physician and medical author, visited New Orleans, made
personal inquiries about the first yellow fever invasion,
and decided upon 1791 as the fateful year, basing his con
clusion on the testimony of "a venerable citizen” of the
city.

As John Duffy has pointed out in The Rudolph Matas

History of Medicine in Louisiana, the testimony in this
case, based on memory forty or fifty years after the fact,
is hardly

i

n

f

a

l

l

i

b

l

e

.

^ 2

The researches of Erasmus Darwin

Fenner, active nineteenth-century Louisiana physician,
editor, and medical historian, led him to conclude that

21n . 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., New Series, VII (July,
1879), 146.
22Joseph Jones, Medical and Surgical Memoirs (3
vols, in 4, New Orleans, 1876-1890), III, pt. 1, cxxxv;
Duffy (ed.). Medicine in La., I, 206.
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the yellow pestilence first prevailed in New Orleans in
1793.

In the 1840's he discussed the problem-with five

elderly gentlemen who had settled in the Crescent City
between 1797 and 1804, and all commented that the disease
was "spoken of familiarly" when they first arrived.

One of

them told Fenner that he distinctly remembered having heard
an eminent physician frequently remark in the early 1800's
that 1793 was the first yellow fever year.^3

Here again

one must raise the question of human memory's possible
unreliability many years after the event.

On the other hand,

Berquin-DuvalIon, who traveled through Louisiana in 1802,
wrote:

"This disease has now for seven years, made every

summer, great ravages at New-Orleans. . . . "

On the basis

of his inquiries, he stated that yellow fever previously
had been unknown in that city,^^ that is, before 1796.
Varying accounts and opinions, conflicting evidence

^^Erasmus Darwin Fenner, "The Yellow Fever Quaran
tine at New Orleans," Transactions of the American Medical
Association, II (1849), 624.
Z^Berquin-Duvallon, Vue de la Colonie Espagnole du
Mississippi ou des Provinces de la Louisiane . « . en
1'Annee 1802 (Paris, 1803), trans. by John Davis as Travels
in Louisiana and the Floridas, in the year, 1802 . . . (New
York, 1806), 114, 118. Hereinafter cited as BerquinDuvallon, Travels.
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and testimony could be cited further; the foregoing should
be sufficient to demonstrate the basic problem.

In the

final analysis, it can only be said that some yellow fever
cases undoubtedly occurred at various points along the
Gulf Coast and in the city of New Orleans in the years
before 1796,

The fact that the epidemic of that year at

tacked newcomers in preference to native or long-resident
New Orleanians indicates a fairly extensive period prior
to 1796 during which immunity might have been acquired
through mild attacks of the disease.

Nevertheless, in the

absence of clear records on the subject before that date,
the appearance of the Saffron Scourge in previous years
must remain a matter for speculation.

Suffice it to say

that 1796 marks the first visitation of yellow fever in
New Orleans widespread enough to attract much attention,
to call forth official mention, and to be identified with
the pestilence of Philadelphia and other eastern and
southern Atlantic seaport cities, where it had prevailed
intermittently since the late seventeenth century.
For the most part, the history of yellow fever in
Louisiana is synonymous with the history of yellow fever
in New Orleans. Any study of the disease in Louisiana must
necessarily concentrate on the Crescent City as the center
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of its pestilential activity.

Always the most populous

community in the state, New Orleans also served as the
natural port of entry for the malady, introduced by infect
ed persons or infected mosquitoes in ships coming from
centers of yellow fever endemicity in Latin America.
Essentially an urban disease transmitted by a household
mosquito, yellow fever did not spread easily in rural areas.
A certain concentration of population was required to sup
port a full-fledged outbreak.
After Louisiana became an American territory and
later a state, its population steadily increased during the
first half of the nineteenth century as Americans and
European immigrants came in to settle the area.

From time

to time, the villages along the waterways of Louisiana in
constant communication with New Orleans experienced visita
tions of the pestilence as it spread from the Crescent City
through the medium of infected persons or mosquitoes.

In

the second half of the nineteenth century, the development
of railroad transportation facilitated the dissemination
of the infection to various points around the state.
Unquestionably, the impact of a yellow fever epidemic on a
small or medium-sized community resulted in terror, con
fusion, disorder, and destruction, perhaps to an even
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greater extent than in the Crescent City itself, with a
sizeable immune population and an acceptance of the disease
as a customary foe.

Nevertheless, for the state of Louisi

ana, New Orleans served as the original host to the tropical
fever.

If that city enjoyed a relatively disease-free

summer and autumn, the remainder of the state had almost no
cause for worry; if New Orleans experienced a severe epi
demic, other Louisiana towns might or might not be affected,
depending largely on circumstantial factors involved in the
transmission of the disease.
Hence, New Orleans was the yellow fever capital of
the state, and in a very real sense, the yellow fever
capital of the entire South because of its position as the
center of trade with Latin America.

Frequently, the wide

spread outbreaks of yellow fever -in the southern states
could be traced to an initial epidemic in the Crescent City.
On this basis alone, it seems justifiable to devote the
greatest attention to the fever’s activity in New Orleans.
But there is still another fundamental reason.

Source

material on the epidemics of the Crescent City is available
in abundance; whereas, for the outbreaks in the small
interior communities of Louisiana, definite information is
sparse and often lacking altogether.

New Orleans served as
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the center of the articulate medical community, associated
with the early medical schools and medical journals; and
although the journals, particularly the New Orleans Medi
cal and Surgical Journal, received and published com
munications concerning yellow fever's activities in
localities throughout Louisiana and in other states as
well, the bulk of material related to the disease in New
Orleans.

Furthermore, the contributions from medical men

of the interior often failed to include the specific de
tails that are so vital to the historian.
In this study, then, an attempt has been made to
relate the history of yellow fever throughout the state,
to introduce material on epidemics in smaller communities
whenever such pertinent information has been available,
and to achieve some insight into the reactions of various
Louisiana towns to the outbreaks of the yellow pesti
lence; New Orleans, however, provides the focal point for
the telling of Louisiana's story of yellow fever.
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CHAPTER II

A HALF-CENTURY OF PESTILENCE, 1796-1847

During the first half-century of yellow fever's
history in Louisiana, the Saffron Scourge clearly held the
advantage in the age-old conflict between man and disease,
and the pestilence seemed to gain in virulence with each
succeeding epidemic.

With epidemiological thought bogged

down in theories sixteen-hundred years old and medical
science in its infancy, physicians were scarcely able to
cope with a disease whose nature, causation, and trans
mission they failed to comprehend.

The germ theory and

the mosquito doctrine were yet to come.
Furthermore, as the fever was reintroduced into the
Crescent City summer after summer in the years following
1796, a fatalistic acceptance of its frequent recurrence
became the prevailing attitude in New Orleans,

The policy

of the city government in matters of health was generally
characterized by indifference and neglect.

Physicians,

commercial interests, and New Orleans newspapers fostered
the delusion that New Orleans, in comparison with other
24
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cities was relatively healthy, and in the absence of ac
curate mortality records, that delusion readily gained
widespread acceptance within the community.

Under such

circumstances, one could hardly expect an enlightened pro
gram of public health.

In the darkness of ignorance and

indifference then, periodically yellow fever ruled the
city in a summer and autumn carnival of horrors.
Although the earliest history of the disease in
Louisiana, as everywhere else, is virtually impossible to
unravel and reconstruct with absolute certainty, one may
accept the New Orleans epidemic of 1796 as the first
definitely recorded yellow fever outbreak in that city.
Yet the apparent imn.unity of many Creoles exhibited in that
epidemic indicates that the malady had been present to some
degree in the area during previous years.

In a series of

letters to his wife, Baron Joseph Xavier Pontalba set forth
an informative account of the epidemic of 1796, which to
gether with the brief reports of the Spanish Attorney-gen
eral and the Intendant, constitute the only available con
temporary records of that first widespread visitation of
yellow fever in the Crescent City. According to Intendant
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Juan Ventura Morales, the epidemic broke out in late
August.1

On September 6 Pontalba wrote his wife that "the

maladies are increasing here, and they are now more danger
ous than e v e r T h r o u g h o u t September, October, and early
November his daily letters were filled with commentary on
the raging pestilence.

On several occasions the Baron

noted an apparent abatement of the epidemic only to cor
rect himself a few days later when the disease flared again.
From the very beginning Pontalba observed that the
fever singled out the unacclimated, the newcomers--espec
ially Americans and Englishmen--in preference to the
Creole and long-resident population.

Repeatedly he reas

sured his wife that the disease presented little danger
except to strangers, its principal victims.^ Intendant
Morales also commented on the fever's peculiarity in pre
ferring foreigners to the natives.^

Such an obvious

^Gayarre, History of Louisiana, III, 375.
^Joseph X. Pontalba to wife, September 6, 1796, in
"Letters of Baron Joseph X. Pontalba to his Wife, 1796"
(W.P.A, trans, typescript, Louisiana State University
Library, Baton Rouge), 274,
3jbid., September 6, 11, 24, 30, November 3, 1796,
pp, 274, 284, 312, 323, 393.
^Gayarre, History of Louisiana, III, 375.
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preference is a fairly good sign that yellow fever was not
entirely new to the area.
As to the nature and origin of the fever, there
seemed to be a considerable amount of doubt and uncertain
ty, indicating that its appearance in epidemic form was
something new.

Pontalba asserted that "the maladies"

resulted from an overflow of the river on the opposite
shore, which caused "subsequent fetid exhalations to be
given off by the earth" as it dried out.
eral Don Gabriel Fonvergne,

Attorney-gen

in a report to the council,

blamed "the stagnated waters that remain in the gutters
. . . the little cleanliness and care given to them, the
dead animals abandoned on them, and on the margin of the
river" for the contamination of the atmosphere and the
spread of infection.^ , This concept of "fetid exhalations"
or noxious effluvia arising from animal and vegetable de 
composition was a common epidemiological tenet of the
period, and would be echoed in medical and lay philosophy
of fever causation for almost a century to come.

^Pontalba to wife, September 6, 11, 1796, loc. c i t .,
274, 284; Records of the City Council of New Orleans, Book
4079, Document 259, October 21, 1796 (W.P.A. trans. type
script, Louisiana State Museum Library, New Orleans).
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In mid-September Pontalba reported to his wife the
opinion of New Orleans physicians that the sickness was
"the yellow fever of Philadelphia," but expressed his dis
agreement with that explanation,

A few days later he wrote:

"In common accord, people now believe that it is the same
yellow fever that has been breaking out every year in
Philadelphia, and which the Americans have brought along
with them,"

Apparently, tontalba remained unconvinced,

for in late October he remarked, "I do not understand the
nature of that deadly malady, but I think it to be a kind
of pestilent f e v e r , i n a dispatch of October 31 the
Intendant summed up the several views of the epidemic which
"has terrified and still keeps in a state of consternation
the whole population of this town,"

Some called it "a

malignant fever," others, "the black vomit," and still
others believed it to be the yellow fever of Philadelphia,^
Confronted by a relatively new and terrifying malady,
the people of New Orleans employed a variety of measures in
the hope of staving off the disease,

Pontalba commented on

the great fear among the people, especially the women, who

^Pontalba to wife, September 19, 24, October 30,
1796, loc. cj^., 300,312, 385.
^Gayarre, History of Louisiana, III, 375.
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carried bits of garlic in their clothing, and burned anunal
skins, horns, hoofs, and tar to ward off the pestilential
effluvia.

In one letter he gave a full description of his

precautionary measures:

”I always had camphor on m e , ” he

wrote, "and also much vinegar; two demi-johns of the latter
were used to sprinkle my apartments,

, , , My servants,

themselves, were soaked all over with the vinegar.
chewed the quinquinia

I often

. . ." and, he added thoughtfully,

"I was doing all this for you.

..."

The Baron attributed

his own immunity and that of several friends to their
chewing of "quinquinia" or quinine, which he thought helped
to hold off the infection.®
In October Pontalba told about a recipe by Dr. Masdevall, physician to the King of Spain, which was being
circulated among the people of New Orleans as a preventive
against the sickness.
cessful.

He felt it had been largely unsuc

Intendant Morales, on the other hand, credited

the recipe with "marvellous effects," attributing to it the
relative immunity of the Spaniards and the Negroes.^

^Pontalba to wife, September 15, 28, October 30,
1796, loc. cit., 291, 321, 386.
9lbid., October 10, 1796, p. 344; Gayarre, History
of Louisiana, III, 375.
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Baronne Carondelet, the Governor's wife, placed her faith
in the preventive powers of herb-tea compound and sarsa
parilla .
Apparently Pontalba had little regard for the phy
sicians' efforts at treating the fever's victims.

When it

seemed on one occasion that the epidemic was abating, he
wrote:

"The doctors pretend having found a remedy. . . ."

Pontalba, however, attributed the declining force of the
disease to "the change in the weather."

The physicians con

tended that only "the emetics and the vesicatories" had
arrested the epidemic, but the Baron refused to give any
such credit to those gentlemen.

He then cited several

cases of successful recovery without any of the "so-called
succors."

Attorney-general Fonvergne reported to the city

council that the "most up-to-date care and remedies" had
been without results.
The epidemic of 1796 was without question a severe
one.

However, exact mortality figures are not available;

no bureau of vital statistics, no board of health, no

lOpontalba to wife, October 15, 1796, loc. cit., 358
l^Ibid., September 14, 1796, p. 290; Records of the
City Council of New Orleans, Book 4079, Document 259,
October 21, 1796.
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systematic measures existed at that time for keeping such
records. Prevailing from late August until early November,
the Saffron Scourge levied a fairly heavy tribute on the
Crescent City,

In the second week of September Pontalba

reported eight or nine victims per day.

Later he wrote:

"The doctors and the monks had been keeping the true num
ber of deaths secret," For a time the death toll amounted
to fifteen or seventeen deaths per day.

In the last week

of September the Baron reported that after an apparent
decline the malady had continued to rage, claiming the
!'ives of nine or ten Englishmen in a single day.

By mid-

October the main force of the epidemic was spent, but as
late as November 6 the fever still caused "some ravage,"
The following day, November 7, Pontalba wrote that "we are
now predicting the near end of the epidemic," and after
that date he made no further mention of the pestilence in
his l e t t e r s , T h e arrival of cold weather obviously cur
tailed the activities of the yellow fever mosquito.
On October 31 the Intendant stated that the parish
registry listed nearly 200 deaths from all causes since

IZpontalba to wife, September 12, 15, 24, October
13, November 6, 7, 1796, loc. cit., 285, 291, 312, 353,
399, 402.
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the outbreak of the epidemic.

This figure did not include

those who died outside the town limits or "the protestants
who perished (and they were n u m e r o u s ) S i n c e

the fever

preferred strangers to Creoles, the number of Protestant
victims probably outnumbered the Catholics by a consider
able margin.

According to the Attorney-general in a report

dated October 21, the "cruel epidemic" had "led to the
grave more than 250 persons.
The population of New Orleans in 1796 probably was
about 6,000, representing a two-fold increase over the
figure of 1769, and including large numbers of strangers
particularly liable to the f e v e r . E v e n if the Creole
population possessed a degree of acquired immunity. New
Orleans still provided a fertile field for a virulent epi
demic of the Saffron Scourge.

Raging from late August

until early November, the epidemic covered a period of at
least ten weeks, during which there must have been several
deaths each day.

On one occasion, Pontalba mentioned a

l^Gayarre, History of

Louisiana,III, 375.

l^Records of the City Council of New Orleans, Book
4079, Document 259, October 21, 1796.
l^Dowler, "Tableau of the Yellow Fever of 1853,"
loc. cit., 9; N,0. Med. & Surg. Jour., New Series, VII
(July, 1879), 147.
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daily death count of eight or nine victims, and on another,
as many as fifteen to seventeen per day.

Even if this

rate prevailed for only a short period, one might con
jecture at least two to five fatalities per day for the
remaining time.

On that basis, a total of 350 to 400

yellow fever deaths for the entire period is probably a
fair estimate.
This first great visitation of the pestilence in
its side-effects on the life of the community set a pat
tern which would become a repetitive process during a
century of epidemics to come.

A general exodus from the

city, a moratorium on business, a vain appeal for sani
tary measures, and the expression of man's depravity as
well as his humanitarianism invariably accompanied Yellow
Jack's ravages in New Orleans.
As the fever gradually spread through the city in
1796, many persons hoping to escape its attack fled the
community.

The émigrés sought refuge in the back country

or left the colony entirely for regions far to the north.
Pontalba, in commenting on this flight of the unac
climated, revealed the sorry plight of business in New
Orleans:

"The city is almost deserted; my storehouses.
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which had all been rented, are now left v a c a n t . I n
the following years New Orleans commercial interests suf
fered untold losses from Yellow Jack's visits, losses so
acute that every effort was put forth to conceal the
existence of the disease from the people of the city and
the outside world until the epidemic could no longer he
hidden.
Those persons who did not wish to leave the city
altogether but desired some measure of safety for them
selves and their families, or who simply wanted a tempo
rary respite from the depression of a city in despair,
retired to resorts across the lake or to homes in the
country or across the river.

Along with his account of

the grim aspects of the epidemic of 1796, Baron Pontalba
also described his social activities during the pesti
lence, which included frequent houseparties at a friend's
plantation across the river.

Escaping from the plague, a

large group of people amused themselves with pranks, jokes,
and games.

It is all slightly reminiscent of Boccaccio's

ten who sought diversion in the telling of tales while
hiding from the Black Death,

In one letter the Baron

IGpontalba to wife, October 13, 1796, loc, cit.,
353.
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described a party so noisy and wild that on retiring to
his room he found it necessary to barricade the door with
a large table to keep the crowd from dragging him out.
He justified the pranksters by pointing out that they
"needed the air of the country, the maladies in town having
driven them all into a state of deep melancholy,"

While

in the city one heard nothing but talk of the epidemic,
he continued, but across the river "all news of that sort
is taboo, and they give themselves up to play," which in
cluded riding, racing, and "other extravagant things,
In another letter Pontalba described more specifi
cally some of the amusing "pleasantries" engaged in at one
of the houseparties:

"The ladies, on one side, found

pleasure in knotting my bed sheets together, [and] in
throwing water at me , , , while I, on the other, smudged
their bed clothes with lamp-black, so that they became
smeared all over with it."

In further retaliation he

applied a foul-smelling drug powder to their pillows, threw
water at them, dropped pieces of wood down their chimneys
at night, made holes in their chamber-pots, and engaged
in other forms of devilment.

Probably realizing that such

l^Ibid., October 9, 1796, p, 342.
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goings-on with the ladies might provoke a spark of jeal
ousy in his wife, who was absent from the scene, the Baron
added that after paying them back in kind he became bored
with such things and ceased to participate--"since all
such pranks, mon-amie, cannot fill the void of my days,
being only amusing for a time.*'^®

Undoubtedly in the

course of every epidemic which occurred there were groups
of individuals who sought relief from the pressures of
fear and desolation by some means of divers ion--drinking,
joking, or playing games.

Certainly no account of such

diversion is quite as lively as Pontalba'sl
New Orleans' unsanitary condition, noted so often
in travel accounts, was linked with the prevalence of dis
ease from an early period, in conformity with the theory
of atmospheric contamination.

Filth was blamed repeatedly

as a basic cause of disease, and from time to time through
out most of the nineteenth century, appeals for sanitary
reform came from newspapers, medical societies, and medi
cal journals.

Almost nothing was accomplished, however,

until the latter nineteenth century.

Yellow fever is not

a filth disease, but sanitary improvements relating to

IBlbid., October 15, 1796, p. 358.
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drainage and water supply, when they finally came, cer
tainly helped to eliminate the disease by removing the
conditions conducive to mosquito breeding.

Suffice it to

say here that the Attorney-general in 1796 associated the
epidemic with the filthy gutters and decaying animal
bodies on the river bank, and, moreover, he suggested
that the city council ameliorate those conditions to pre
vent future

e p i d e m i c s .

Theu, as in later years, the

recommendations resulted in little effective action.
The epidemic of 1796 and every epidemic which
followed presented the opportunity for this question to
be raised:

Is man inherently good or bad, altruistic or

depraved?

Epidemics created conditions which gave men the

chance to rise

to the heights of heroism or to sink to

the depths of callousness.

And as might be expected from

the paradox that is man, there were examples of both
extremes.

In the over-all picture it seems that the people

of New Orleans generally rose to the occasion and evidenced
a high degree of benevolence, almost strikingly in con
trast to the stereotyped picture of moral disintegration in
a

plague-stricken city.

In the very first yellow fever

19Records of the City Council of New Orleans, Book
4079, Document 259, October 21, 1796.
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epidemic, Pontalba recorded an incident which can be scored
to the dark side of man's nature.

He told about the dis

covery of five bodies "in the backways merely covered with
leaves, the trouble not having been taken to even bury
them."

The Baron commented indignantly:

"Such terrible
20

negligence is enough to bring on the plague. . . ."

Similar cases in which bodies of yellow fever victims were
abandoned, sometimes even by relatives, also occurred in
later epidemics.

However, one may safely say that these

cases represented the exception rather than the rule.
On the other side of the ledger, Pontalba indirect
ly recorded some examples of strength and
He himself in ministering to the needs

humanitarianism.

of several friends

victimized by the malady showed a considerable amount of
benevolence and fearlessness.

And Governor Carondelet,

believing it might intensify the general panic if he left
town, courageously resisted for a time the demands of his
friends and his wife that he retire tothe other

s h o r e .

There is no evidence that any official or organized mea
sures were adopted for the care and relief of indigent

ZOpontalba to wife, September 21, 1796, loc, cit.,
306.
^^Ibid., September 22, October 7, 30, 1796, pp.
307, 338, 385-88.
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victims in this initial surppise attack.

Later, as the

population increased and yellow fever became a familiar
enemy, both official and unofficial emergency measures
occasionally were adopted for the relief of the indigent
sick during an epidemic season.
Some few cases of yellow fever probably occurred
during the next two years, but not until 1799 did it recur
in epidemic form.

Virtually no evidence exists relative

to this particular outbreak, but that it was a severe one
is indicated by a letter to the city council from Attorneygeneral Don Pedro Dulcidio Barran written in January, 1800.
The public had been terribly frightened by the dreadful
epidemic of the previous summer, he reported, and they
feared a possible repeat performance.

Imploring the aid

of the administration to prevent or at least "to minimize
the dreadfulness of the calamity that justly terrifies
this community,” he recommended certain "pressing and
essential" precautions, including sanitary reforms and
quarantine measures.

29

No mortality statistics are

22Records of the City Council of New Orleans and
Documents Pertaining to the Government of Louisiana, 1800
to 1803, Book 4088, Document 337, pp. 9-16 (W.P.A, trans.
typescript, Louisiana State Museum Library, New Orleans).
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available for the epidemic of 1799, but apparently it was
serious enough to provoke an even greater public reaction
than the epidemic of 1796, if the Attorney-general's
letter is a fair indication.
Although the records of yellow fever's visits in
the early 1800's are rather sketchy and sometimes contra
dictory, during the first two decades of the century New
Orleans experienced at least five major outbreaks of the
disease:

1804, 1809, 1811, 1817, and 1819,

Practically

all the nineteenth-century doctor-historians, some of
whom had access to records no longer extant, listed these
years in their outlines of epidemics.

Various writers

have cited other dates as years in which the fever pre
vailed, but these outbreaks do not seem to rank in the
same category with the more devastating ones.

Sufficient

evidence, however, does exist for considering 1808 another
rather critical year.

Some cases probably occurred in

New Orleans every single year from 1796 to 1817; and no
year between 1817 and 1861 passed without a few recorded
cases.
In August of 1804, less than eight months after
the American acquisition of Louisiana, yellow fever again
appeared in New Orleans, and, finding a bountiful supply
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of unacclimated individuals, subjected the city to a
three-month period of death and desolation.

In his of

ficial letters Governor William C, C, Claiborne outlined
the course of the epidemic and thus may be credited with
providing the most comprehensive account of the pesti
lence of 1804.

By August 10 the fever had appeared, but

the city was not yet considered "generally unhealthy."
On August 25 Claiborne's secretary, who fell victim to
the scourge a few weeks later, wrote that the disease had
carried off a number of "Americans, Strangers to the
climate."23

The fever continued to increase its ravages

during late August and September, and in his letters the
Governor commented repeatedly on the malignant disease
called yellow fever which was "particularly fatal" to
Americans and other strangers.

Having suffered a violent

attack of the scourge early in the epidemic, Claiborne
remarked, ". . . I am represented as the only American who

23william C. C. Claiborne to James Wilkinson,
August 10, 1804, Dunbar Rowland (ed,). Official Letter
Books of William C. C. Claiborne , 1801-1816 (6 vols.,
Jackson, Mississippi, 1917), II, 306; Joseph Briggs to
James Madison, August 25, 1804, i bi d . , 306-307; Claiborne
to Madison, September 17, 1804, ibid. , 337,
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had yet r e c o v e r e d , A p p a r e n t l y the disease did not con
fine itself solely to strangers, for in mid-September the
physicians of New Orleans began to observe cases of the
prevailing fever among the "old Inhabitants,"^^
As if the problems of coping with the epidemic were
not enough, another disturbing element appeared on the
scene, perhaps as a corollary to the disorder occasioned
by widespread disease.

In September Claiborne wrote Presi

dent Jefferson that the general distress of the city had
been "considerably heightened by an alarm of Insurrection
among the Negro's."

Whether or not sufficient cause

existed for such alarm, a "general Spirit of Insubordina
tion" had been manifested, he added, and several armed
Negroes had been found traveling about at night, intensi
fying the element of fear already present in New Orleans,
Although the Governor did not believe there was adequate

24ciaiborne to Thomas Jefferson, August 29, 30,
1804, Clarence E, Carter (ed.). The Territory of Orleans,
1803-1812 (Vol, IX of The Territorial Papers of the United
States, Washington, 1940), 279-80, 286; Claiborne to
Albert Gallatin, August 31, 1804, Rowland (ed,), Claiborne
Letter Books, II, 314; Claiborne to Madison, September 8,
1804, ibid,, 328.
25claiborne to Jefferson, September 13, 1804,
Carter (ed.). Territory of Orleans, 294.
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basis for alarm, he strengthened the night patrols and
ordered the city militia and volunteers to be prepared for
action.26

Apparently the insurrection failed to material

ize as the letters contain no further mention of the
subject.

On at least one other occasion, during the

yellow fever epidemic of 1837 in Alexandria, a slave up
rising planned in the midst of the pestilence was thwarted
by the early discovery of the plot and the lynching of its
leaders.27
The epidemic of 1804 was indeed a source of heavy
affliction for the American governor of the territory.
Not only did Claiborne suffer a debilitating attack of
yellow fever himself, but in late September he lost both
his wife and his young daughter to the dreadful

m a l a d y .

^8

Although no mortality records are available for this
period, the extent of the fatalities must have been exceed
ingly great.

Claiborne believed that "more than a third

26ciaiborne to Jefferson, September 18, 1804, ibid.,

298.
27r , f . McGuire, Diary (Louisiana State University
Archives, Baton Rouge), September-October, 1837.
28ciaiborne to Jefferson, September 27, 1804, Carter
(ed.). Territory of Orleans, 299.
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of the Americans who emigrated thither in the course of
the last 12 months have perished, and nearly every Person
from Europe who arrived in the City during the Summer
Months.

"29

A New Orleans physician observed that "almost

every person arriving from the country" experienced an
attack.

He also noted that with few exceptions the dis

ease confined its activities to strangers,

"Had it been

otherwise," the doctor continued, "the distress would have
been dreadfull

indeed.

"^0

Another observer in New Orleans

wrote in late October that the "calamitous Sickness goes
on as direful in its effects as ever,"

Confirming the

high fatility rate among strangers, he reported seven
deaths among one group of nine persons who had come down
river to the city,^^
On a brief excursion into the country in mid-October,
Governor Claiborne had occasion to observe "the Humanity of
several Planters who by detaining at their Houses several

29ciaiborne to Jefferson, October 5, 1804, ibid.,
309,
30o, H, Spencer to Nathaniel Evans, October 5, 1804,
Nathaniel Evans Family Papers (Louisiana State University
Archives, Baton Rouge),
31James Sterrett to Nathaniel Evans, October 23,
1804, ibid.
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Americans destined for this City . . , probably rescued
them from sudden death,”

During the last days of October

the malady still raged in New Orleans, but by November 4
the Governor reported to President Jefferson his belief
that "the Fever had entirely Abated in this City, and
Industry & Commerce seem to have revived.
Until the latter nineteenth century, newspapers,
not only in New Orleans but in any town stricken with
epidemic disease, adopted a policy of ignoring its pres
ence as long as possible, then minimizing its importance
if commenting at all, and finally declaring the epidemic
30

ended--often prematurely.

In the early period the jour

nals frequently avoided direct commentary altogether and
only indicated the existence of the disease in published
bills of mortality and obituary notices.

Such a policy

was of course designed to prevent or at least to hinder

32ciaiborne to Madison, October 16, 1804, William
C. C. Claiborne Letterbook, 1804-05 (Louisiana State Uni
versity Archives, Baton Rouge); Sterrett to Nathaniel
Evans, October 29, 1804, Nathaniel Evans Family Papers;
Claiborne to Jefferson, November 4, 1804, Carter (ed.).
Territory of Orleans, 319.
33see John Duffy, "A Sidelight on Colonial News
papers," The Historian, XVIII (Spring, 1956), 230-48,
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the isolation of the community by other towns, which
ordinarily cut off communications and commerce with the
infected center as soon as the news of an epidemic leaked
out.

Usually it was only a matter of time until the word

spread through the city, whence it was carried to other
areas by the fleeing émigrés.

The subterfuge of the jour

nals, instead of actually helping the situation, ultimately
created for them a widespread reputation of hypocrisy and
unreliability.,
The Louisiana Gazette of New Orleans, following the
accepted journalistic practice in 1804, avoided the subject
of the pestilence.

From August to November the newspaper

occasionally noted the death of an individual from "the
Prevailing sickness" and published several poems in memory
of its victims.

In the issue of September 28, which re

ported the death of Mrs. Elizabeth Claiborne, the Governor’s
Lady, the editors explained the temporary suspension of
the Gazette, attributing it to "sickness" and expressing
the hope that as the healthy season approached regular pub
lication could be resumed.
In December of 1804 Governor Claiborne presented to

3^New Orleans Louisiana Gazette, August-November,
1804; September 28, 1804.
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the Legislative Council a plan submitted to him by Presi
dent Jefferson for the prevention of future epidemics.
Observing that the geographical position of New Orleans,
the gateway to the great Mississippi Valley, destined it
to become a major commercial center, the President feared
that epidemic disease would constitute a serious drawback
to its growth and prosperity.

Since the fever failed to

spread to the "thin-built parts" of town, Jefferson suggest
ed that the expansion of the city proceed along the lines
of a checkerboard with the white squares left open and
planted with trees.

Although never effected, his suggestion

does indicate that New Orleans' reputation as a yellow
fever center was established almost from the beginning of
its existence as an American city.^^

Another commentary

on its growing reputation for insalubrity came from a resi
dent of Bayou Sara who wrote in early 1805 that he would
not even consider moving with his family to New Orleans-"The Yellow fever which annually has visited that place for
bade an idea of that kind."^^

The pestilence had rapidly

35Cayarre, History of Louisiana, IV, 36-37; Duffy
(ed.). Medicine in L a . , I, 348.
3&David Bradford to David Redick, July 1, 1805,
David Bradford Letters (Louisiana Sfate University Archives,
Baton Rouge).
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made a name for itself in the Crescent City as a visitor
to be expected annually, and during certain years unpredictably to spread a blanket of malignancy across the city,
In spite of the attendant dangers, the lure of the Louisi
ana frontier continued to attract large numbers of immi
grants from other portions of America and from Europe as
well.

In the seven years between 1803 and 1810, the popu

lation of the territory increased from approximately
50.000 to more than 76,000, and that of New Orleans from
8.000 to nearly 25,000.^7
The Crescent City seems to have escaped a drastic
ally widespread flare-up of yellow fever during the years
between 1804 and 1811, although 1809 is listed in most
historical accounts as a year in which the fever prevailed
to a greater extent than usual.

Except for reporting the

loss of the second Mrs. Claiborne to the "Same dreadful
malady" which had claimed the lives of his first wife, his
daughter, and his private secretary in 1804, Governor
Claiborne had little to say about the disease in his cor
respondence of 1809.

On the occasion of his second wife's

^7n . 0. Med. & Surg, Jour., New Series, VII (July,
1879), 152.
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death, he complained to President Madison that the "Govern
ment House," provided for the governor's accommodation, was
located in an exceedingly unhealthy area on the river front
where accumulations of filth along the water's edge gave
off a most offensive and pestilential atmosphere.

In ad

dition to his own personal losses, he noted that Governor
Carondelet's brother and Governor Gayoso both had died
there of yellow fever in previous years.

These fatalities,

he thought, clearly demonstrated the need for a more
salubrious location.^8
In early December of 1809 a New Orleans resident
wrote that "people die here this year without almost any
warning," and he mentioned several persons who had fallen
prey to yellow f e v e r , O f

some 2,000 United States troops

concentrated in New Orleans in 1809, nearly 800 died,
probably a large proportion from the yellow pestilence.
Possibly the disease was introduced that year by French
refugees from Cuba, Jamaica, and other West Indian islands.

88ciaiborne to Madison, December 17, 1809, Carter
(ed.). Territory of Orleans, 859-60.
89sterrett to Nathaniel Evans, December 2, 1809,
Nathaniel Evans Family P apers.
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whence they poured into New Orleans by the hundreds in
June and July.40
Yellow fever had wrought a considerable amount of
damage the previous year, although it appeared so late in
the season that a full-scale three-month rampage was
averted.

The unseasonably hot weather throughout November

and early December in 1808 apparently allowed a vagrant
case of the fever to set off a late chain reaction.

Dr.

Oliver Spencer, a New Orleans physician, wrote on November
5 that the weather had continued "hot, beyond example for
this season of the year" and that the city was becoming
unhealthy.

He observed that the fever of the season had

been characterized by an unusual number of cases terminat
ing in "black vomit," a positive sign of yellow fever.

On

November 13 the doctor wrote a friend that he had been
unusually busy since "disease, and death have of late been
with us almost synonymous terms."

Admitting he would like

nothing better than to "forsake this scene of trouble and
anxiety," he felt nevertheless that "honor and good faith"

40cayarre, History of Louisiana, IV, 214-20, 222,
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made it necessary for him to remain "until this eventful
period is past."^^
Indicating further the extent of the disease in
1808, another New Orleanian wrote in mid-November :

"I

wish I was out of town--for its very sickly--people are
running into the Country very fast."

As late as November

20 he remarked again that "the Yellow fever is raging
much in town."^^

Had the infection appeared earlier in

the season, a major disaster would doubtless have resulted.
During every sickly season which occurred, New Orleanians
hoped and prayed for an early frost, the one factor which
experience had demonstrated capable of terminating Yellow
Jack’s activities.
The next major epidemic of the early nineteenth
century occurred in 1811.

In mid-August Governor Claiborne

noted that the "Fevers of New-Orleans" had already com
menced with "Symptoms which forbode much m o r t a l i t y . A

41gpencer to Nathaniel Evans, November 5, 13, 1808,
Nathaniel Evans Family Papers,
^^Samuel Philips to John M. Pintard, November 13, 20,
1808, John M. Pintard Papers (Louisiana State University
Archives, Baton Rouge).
43ciaiborne to Gallatin, August 19, 1811, Carter
(ed.). Territory of O rleans, 944.
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French physician theorized in early September that the
prevailing fevers were not contagious but rather were due
to the extremely hot weather and an imprudent "mode of
living" among certain individuals.

The common usage of

"Strong and irritating m e d i c i n e s h e thought, helped to
increase the death toll.^^

This criticism of harsh medi

cine was directed against American physicians following
the heroic practice, who administered large quantities of
mercurials in an attempt to purge the fever from the
system.

The French on the other hand preferred a milder

regimen.
In a letter of October 8 the Governor informed
President Madison that New Orleans continued under the
influence of "that dreadful Scourge, the Yellow Fever,"
and, as usual, the newcomers suffered the greatest losses,
although the old settlers were not entirely exempt from
attack.

To the Secretary of the Navy in late October he

wrote that the fever, still raging, had proved highly
destructive to the Marine Corps, having carried off two

James Mather to Claiborne, September 9, 1811,
ibid., 947.
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valuable officers and more than a third of the privates,
A New Orleanian, commenting on the sad state of affairs in
the fall of 1811, complained:

"We have blue times of it

here--every kind of produce dull & no sale--and in expecta
tions of a War with Eng--Cotton will not sell--and to crown
all our City Continues very sickly--and a great scarcity
of money."46
As usual, the Louisiana Courier and the Louisiana
Gazette neglected the subject of yellow fever throughout
the course of the epidemic.

After nearly two months of

sickness in the city, the Courier noted briefly on October
2 that two young mothers had fallen victim the day before
to the "autumnal fevers" raging in "our unfortunate
country."

Both the Courier and the Gazette alluded indi

rectly to the disease in reporting on the constitutional
convention, which was to draft the document in preparation
for Louisiana's statehood.

Assembling in New Orleans in

early November, the convention members had agreed to

45ciaiborne to Madison, October 8, 1811, ibid., 948;
Claiborne to Paul Hamilton, October 28, 1811, Rowland (ed.),
Claiborne Letter Books, V, 369.
46william Montgomery to Nathaniel Evans, October 4,
1811, Nathaniel Evans Family Papers.
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adjourn until November 18 because of the city's unhealthy
condition.
Reports from the Protestant sexton, the manager of
Charity Hospital, and Father Antoine added up to a total
mortality of 210 in August and 262 in September, and the
city recorder listed 241 deaths during the month of October.
Of the 713 fatalities during the three-month epidemic
period of 1811, probably 500 or more represent yellow
fever deaths.
It is noteworthy that the pestilence of 1811 was
disseminated from New Orleans to St. Francisville, apparent
ly the first time the disease had spread in Louisiana
beyond the confines of the Crescent City.^^

In subsequent

epidemics yellow fever gradually made inroads into other
Louisiana towns, traveling along the lines of commerce
from New Orleans.

4?New Orleans Louisiana Courier, October 2, November
6, 1811; Louisiana Gazette, November 5, 1811.
^^Mather to Claiborne, September 9, October 12, 1811,
Carter (ed.), Territory of Orleans, 946, 949; Duffy (ed.).
Medicine in La ., I, 350.
49j. M. Toner, "Reports Upon Yellow Fever, The Dis
tribution and Natural History of Yellow Fever as it has
Occurred at Different Times in the United States," Reports
and Papers of the American Public Health Association, I
(1873), 373; Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 899.
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After a respite of five years, the yellow pestilence
once again devastated New Orleans in the violent epidemic
of 1817, and still again only two years later in the even
more destructive visitation of 1819.

At the close of the

epidemic of 1817, Drs, Adrien Gros and N. V. A. Gérardin
presented a report on the disease to La Société Médicale,
the first association of physicians in Louisiana,

They

stated that the fever had become fully epidemic in July,
increased its intensity during August, and finally dis
appeared in October, earlier than usual in both its arrival
and its departure.

As causes of the malady they listed the

topographical situation of the city, abundant rainfall,
stagnant water, excessive summer heat, and an aggregation
of unacclimated strangers.

Furthermore, they observed that

frost and cold weather seemingly destroyed the deleterious
gas in the atmosphere.

In concluding the report. Gros and

Gérardin suggested that the state of Louisiana, with its
population and commerce increasing daily, should undertake
the responsibility for screening out the morbific influ
ences likely to be introduced by commerce, and that the
state should double its efforts to maintain the public
health without which there could be no lasting prosperity--
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an enlightened attitude indeed
Increasing sentiment in favor of state action
against the pestilence led to the passage of an act by the
state legislature early in 1818, creating a board of health
for New Orleans and providing for quarantine regulations.
When cases of yellow fever appeared in the summer.of 1818
in spite of the attempt at quarantine, a reaction set in
and the legislature repealed the law in March of 1819, The
violent epidemic of 1819 and a moderate one in 1820 oc
casioned another experiment with health regulations and
quarantine, which were provided for in a state law of 1821.
Again the defenses proved inadequate to stem the tide of
the pestilence which continued to appear regularly each
summer.

Having lost all faith in quarantine and under

pressure from commercial interests, Louisiana lawmakers re
pealed that measure in 1825.^1

The theory of importation

A. Gros et N. V. A. Gérardin, Rapport fait a
la Société Médicale sur la Fiivre Jaune qui a régné cPune
Maniéré Épidémique pendant l'dté de 1817 (NouvelleOrleans, 1818), 5-6, 59-62.
51"An Act to Establish a Board of Health and Health
Office, and to Prevent the Introduction of Malignant,
Pestilential and Infectious Diseases into the City of New
Orleans,” Acts Passed at the Second Session of the Third
Legislature of the State of Louisiana . . . 1818 (New
Orleans, 1818), 124-52; "An Act to Repeal an Act Entitled
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fell into disrepute and the idea of local causation con
tinued to dominate yellow fever philosophy until the
Great Epidemic of 1853 forced a re-evaluation.
Having escaped a drastic outbreak of the fever in
1818 (only 115 v i c t i m s ) , t h e citizens of New Orleans
probably anticipated a few years of relative freedom be
fore the next virulent wave of pestilence.

Yellow fever,

demonstrating its truly unpredictable nature, overwhelmed
the city again in 1819.

One resident said of the fever

that season, "it's worse than I have ever known it."^3
When the city returned to normal, a committee of
the medical society again prepared a report on the scourge

'An Act to Establish a Board of Health and Health Office,
and to Prevent the Introduction of Malignant, Pestilential
and Infectious Diseases into the City of New Orleans,'"
Acts Passed at the First Session of the Fourth Legislature
of the State of Louisiana . . . 1819 (New Orleans, 1819),
70-72; "An Act to Provide Against the Introduction of In
fectious Diseases . , ,
Acts Passed at the First Session
of the Fifth Legislature of the State of Louisiana . . ,
1821 (New Orleans, 1821), 68-92; "An Act to Repeal an Act
Entitled 'An Act to Provide Against the Introduction of in
fectious Diseases,*" Acts Passed at the First Session of
the Seventh Legislature of the State of Louisiana , . .
1824 (New Orleans, 1824 & 1825), 210-12.
S^N. 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., New Series, VI (March,
1879), 699.
53Kenny Laverty to A. P. Walsh, September 22, 1819,
A. P. Walsh Papers (Louisiana State University Archives,
Baton Rouge).
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of New Orleans.

The report compared the epidemics of 1817

and 1819, noting their similarities and their differences.
Both years witnessed the first cases in May, but in 1817
the epidemic period extended from July to late October,
and in 1819, from August to mid-December,

In both epi

demics the fever centered its attacks mainly upon Euro
peans or Americans fresh from the North, but its victims
each time included some long-time residents and a few
Creoles as well.

Not a single Negro was affected by the

fever of 1817; some died in 1819,^4

what absolute gen

eralizations could one make about such a disease?

From

the earliest attempts at analysis until its ultimate con
quest by science, yellow fever evidenced its variability
and its apparent unpredictability.
Mortality statistics are available in abundance for
the epidemics of 1817 and 1819; however, many conflicting
sets of figures exist.

The recording of deaths and

burials then left much to be desired in regard to system
atic procedure and accuracy.

Even when fairly accurate

burial lists are available, it is virtually impossible to

54&apport publié au nom de la Société Médicale de
la Nouvelie-Orleans sur la Fièvre Jaune, qui ^ a régné
S^idémiquement, durant l ^ t é et l'Automne de 1819
(Nouvelie-Orleans, 1820), 7, 35-36.
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determine the number of deaths caused by any one particular
disease.

Burial certificates too frequently failed to

state the exact cause of death, and the problem is compli
cated further by the difficulties of inexact diagnosis and
haphazard nomenclature.

From records of the various ceme

teries, reports of the medical society, and other data
available to him, Dr. Bennet Dowler in the mid-nineteenth
century estimated some 800 deaths from yellow fever in
1817, probably a conservative

f

i

g

u

r

e

.

^ 5

Calculating the death toll of the even more destruc
tive epidemic of 1819 presents similar stumbling blocks.
Benjamin Latrobe, the great American architect, writing
his Impressions during the epidemic, noted that "no exact
register is any where kept of deaths and burials, & un
certainty on this subject is inevitable on many accounts."
He estimated the fatalities from August to mid-September
at ten or twelve to forty-six per day, and considered a
report he heard of fifty-three in one day as not at all
improbable.56

The Louisiana Courier, rising to the defense

55jones, Medical and Surgical Memoirs, III, pt. 1,
cxliv,
5^Benjamin Latrobe, Impressions Respecting New
Orleans, edited by Samuel Wilson, Jr. (New York, 1951),
xxii, 146. Latrobe himself fell victim to yellow fever in
the mild epidemic of 1820.
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of the city's reputation in mid-November, attempted to
counteract the so-called exaggerations circulating inside
and outside New Orleans.

The editor denied the report of

over fifty burials in one day and asserted that days of as
many as twenty-five were hardly common.

Furthermore, he

felt the need to point out that, except for a few cases,
the disease attacked only those persons having recently
arrived in the area--as if this factor greatly lessened the
seriousness of the situation.^7

Newspapers, medical jour

nals, and other defenders of New Orleans' inherent
salubrity often employed this kind of reasoning to justify
the "seeming" unhealthiness of the Crescent City through
out much of the nineteenth century.
Estimates of the yellow fever mortality in 1819
vary from 425 to 6,000.

58

A cautious conjecture based on

the total mortality during the year would place the number
of yellow fever deaths at less than 1,000.

Since the

available mortality reports listed only those deaths within

57i,ouisiana Courier, November 15, 1819.

58Yellow Fever Statistics (undated pamphlet in
Rudolph Matas Medical Library Pamphlet Collection, Tulane
University Medical Library, New Orleans), 57; Jones,
Medical and Surgical Memoirs, III, pt. 1, cxliv.
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the incorporated limits of the city, however, additional
yellow fever victims in the suburbs conceivably might have
increased the figure to 1,500 or even 2,000.^9
In 1817 the scourge again had visited St, Francis
ville in West Feliciana Parish, and on the way up the
Mississippi stopped off at Baton Rouge as well.

In 1819,

in addition to New Orleans, Baton Rouge, and St, Francis
ville, Yellow Jack victimized still another city--Alexandria on the Red River,

During both of these epidemics

the seeds of pestilence traveled up the Mississippi to
Natchez, and frequently thereafter that city served as
host to the

f e v e r .

60

In the course of the 1820*s yellow fever appeared
in New Orleans without fail every summer,

If one includes

the mild outbreaks, which by this time mean those claiming
from 100 to 400 victims, seven years of the decade wit
nessed epidemics of varying degrees.61

Their sensitivities

59ouffy (ed,), Medicine in La,, I, 360; Jones, Medi
cal and Surgical Mem o i r s , III, pt, 1, cxliv,
60Toner, "Reports Upon Yellow Fever," l o c , c i t ,,
369-73; Augustin, History of Yellow F e v e r , 845, 899; N, 0,
M e d , & S u r g , J our ,, V (September, 1848), 227,

61n ,0, Med, & Surg, Jour,, XV(November, 1858), 81819; XXIII (January, 1870), 25,
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dulled by the tremendous human losses sustained in 1817
and 1819, New Orleanians were scarcely impressed by a toll
of 400, and an annual tribute to the fever of a mere hun
dred, more or less, generally came to be expected as one
of the inexorable facts of life.

Two epidemics of this

decade stand out as particularly severe ones:

1822 and

1829.
By August of 1822 a number of cases had occurred,
and at the beginning of September the disease suddenly
reached epidemic proportions.

Raging violently until the

end of October, the pestilence for a time carried off as
many as thirty persons per day.^^

A Frenchman, residing

in the vicinity of New Orleans, wrote his sister in midSeptember:

"The terrible yellow fever has made ravages in

the city since the first of the month, the unfortunate
strangers being the principal victims."

In his opinion,

the malady had been transmitted from Pensacola to New
Orleans by the Americans.

"The foreigners who can are

leaving," he remarked, "and the fight will end for lack of

62pierre Frederick Thomas, Essai sur la Fi&vre Jaune
d'Amérique . . . avec l'Histoire de 1*Épidémie de la
Nouvelle-OrléanF en 1822 . . . (Paris, 1823), 110.
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fighters,At

the beginning of the outbreak the mayor

of New Orleans proclaimed that the necessary means would
be provided for evacuating indigent unacclimated strangers
to the other side of Pontchartrain until the conclusion of
the sickly season,^4
The Louisiana Gazette in mid-September advised all
strangers to leave the Crescent City until the fever sub
sided.^5

Although continuing the standard policy of

delayed reporting and understatement, some newspaper edi
tors had recognized the fact that when an epidemic was well
under way and could no longer be ignored, a diminution of
the unacclimated in the city meant less fuel for the fever
and hence a more rapid dying out of the pestilential fire.
Sometimes, however, the dispersion of the strangers only
served to spread the disease.

At any rate, the fever found

ample fuel to keep it raging in New Orleans through October,
and sporadically through November,

63perdinand de Feriet to Janica de Feriet, September
15, 1822, Ferdinand de Feriet Letters, I (1816-1825)
(Manuscripts Section, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, New
Orleans),
G^Thomas, Essai sur la Fiivre Jaune d'Amérique, 111.
65Louisiana Gazette, September 14, 1822,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

64
Ferdinand de Feriet, residing just outside New
Orleans, described the diversionary activities which took
place in his home during the epidemic of 1822;

"To pass

away the time, the neighborhood assembles sometimes at
our house and play a comedy in a little theater which I
have had arranged."

There were two "troupes" of actors,

"the children and company for the French pieces, and some
American neighbors for the English pieces."
"this little distraction . . .

He considered

an antidote against the

cursed yellow fever.
Mortality estimates for 1822 ranged from 800 to
2,000.

67

Niles' Weekly Register reported in October that

700 to 800 persons had died of the fever in September
alone.

68

The final tally

of Dr. Pierre F. Thomas, on

the scene at the time, set the total yellow fever mortality
at 1,400, a figure concurred in by the Louisiana Gazette.

66perdinand de Feriet to Janica de Feriet, October
7, 1822, loc. cit.
G^N. 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., XXIII (January, 1870),
25.
G^Niles’ Weekly Register, October 26, 1822.
G9ouffy (ed.). Medicine in La., I, 367.
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The willingness of the journal editor to accept this total
probably indicates that several hundred should be added to
it.
After 1822 a six-year intermission ensued, broken
only by relatively mild outbreaks of the disease.
the pestilence again went on the rampage.

In 1829

The Louis iana

Courier incurred the wrath of other New Orleans newspapers
by printing as early as July 10 a letter to the editor
announcing the appearance of yellow fever in the city and
advising strangers to evacuate.

A journalistic battle

developed as the Price-Current and the Mercantile Adver
tiser insisted the city was unusually healthy in spite of
attempts to discredit its salubrity.

Undaunted, the

Courier editor continued his frank reporting and on August
12 commented at length on the pestilence which "threatens
entire desolation to our city."
climated to disperse.

Again he warned the unac

The fever continued its ravages

throughout August and September, but by October 12, accord
ing to the Courier, the early arrival of cool weather had
terminated the epidemic.

Absent citizens were assured

that they might return home in perfect safety.70

The

70Louisiana Courier, July 10, 11, 13, August 12,
September 7, 23, October 5, 12, 1829.
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epidemic of 1829 resulted in at least 900 fatalities and
probably more.^l
In the decade of the 1820's yellow fever traveled
in Louisiana beyond New Orleans practically every year,
varying its itinerary from season to season, sometimes
appearing in Opelousas, Donaldsonville, Natchitoches, and
Thibodaux, as well as its most frequently visited points-Alexandria, Baton Rouge, and St, Francisville
During the 1830's and 1840's the scourge of New
Orleans followed the same ill-defined pattern which vaguely
characterized its activities in the three preceding
decades:

no year passed without the occurrence of at

least a few cases; five to seven years of each decade wit
nessed outbreaks of the disease, varying from mild to

7lN. 0. Med, & Surg. Jour., New Series, VI (March,
1879), 699.
^^Toner, "Reports Upon Yellow Fever," loc. cit.,
369-73; Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 845, 852, 893,
899; N. 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., V (September, 1848), 227;
G. P. Whittington, "Rapides Parish, Louisiana--A History,"
Louisiana Historical Quarterly, XVI (July, 1933), 431;
Erasmus Darwin Fenner, "Report on the Epidemics of Louisi
ana, Mississippi, Arkansas, and Texas in the year 1853,"
Transactions of the American Medical Association. VII
(1854), 512; McGuire Diary, 41; St. Francisville Asylum and
Feliciana Advertiser, September 12, October 17, 24, 1822;
Alexandria Louisiana Herald, September 7, 1822, September
17, 1823; Louisiana Courier, October 5, 1827,
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violent; and of the five to seven outbreaks in each tenyear period, at least two or three wrought an extraordinary
amount of damage in relation to the others.

The major

visitations of the thirties and forties occurred in 1833,
1837, 1839, 1841, and 1847.
Although not particularly severe, the yellow fever
epidemic of 1832 is noteworthy for its association with
the first appearance of Asiatic cholera in New Orleans,
A mild outbreak of the Saffron Scourge was in progress
when Asiatic cholera arrived on the scene in late

October,

73

and for a time the Crescent City suffered the simultaneous
activities of two pestilences.

When cool weather set in,

yellow fever subsided, while the cholera continued its
ravages unhindered throughout the winter months.

According

to Dr. Joseph Jones, the combined force of the two plagues
raised the total mortality of New Orleans in 1832 to more
than 8,000 in a population of about 55,000, and "marked
this year as the most terrible in the annals of this city,"
a year in which one-seventh of the entire population died!
Of the 8,000 deaths that year from all causes, Asiatic

73houisiana Courier, September 29, October 20, 27,
1832.
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cholera claimed over 4,000 and yellow fever carried off
about 400.74
Again in the following year New Orleanians bore the
burden of the two deadly maladies, with Asiatic cholera
taking 1,000 additional victims and Yellow Jack even more
In an account of the yellow fever epidemic of 1833 written
Immediately thereafter. Dr. Edward H. Barton of New Orleans
described it as the "most violent and malignant of the Epi
demic Yellow Fevers with which this city has ever been
visited.”

Following a general pattern which had become

all too common, the fever commenced in early August and
continued until early November.

Dr. Barton made a rather

interesting observation which could have furnished a clue
for the solution of the perennial puzzle of yellow fever
causation and transmission.

He noticed the unusual quanti

ty of flies and mosquitoes in New Orleans preceding the
epidemic and remarked that ”the latter continued throughout

74jones, Medical and Surgical Memoirs, III, pt. 1,
cccvi; see also Leland A. Langridge, "Asiatic Cholera in
Louisiana, 1832-1873" (M. A. Thesis, Louisiana State Uni
versity, Baton Rouge, 1955).
75jones, Medical and Surgical Memoirs, III, pt. 1,
cccvi.
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the s e a s o n , O t h e r s before Barton had noticed this
phenomenon and others would do so in years to come, but
not until 1900 was the connection between the Aedes aegypti
mosquito and yellow fever definitely established.
In late August of 1833 the Louisiana Courier declared
that the raging fever presented a more malignant type than
i

it had for many years, and the editor advised strangers and
absent citizens to stay away from the city.

The interment

reports published through September and October indicated
a death toll ranging from twenty to fifty per day for at
least six weeks,

77

Drs, Barton and Jones both estimated

1,000 yellow fever deaths for 1833,78

if this calculation

is approximately correct, the yellow fever mortality in
1819 and 1822 actually reached a higher figure within a
smaller population.

Possibly the allusion made by Barton

and the Courier editor to the violent and malignant nature

76Edward Hall Barton, Account of the Epidemic Yellow
Fever, which prevailed in New Orleans during the Autumn of
1833 (Philadelphia, 1834), iii, 7, 9,
^^Louisiana Courier, August 31, September 10, 12,
October 10, 1833,
78n , 0, Med. & Surg. Jour., New Series, VI (March,
1879), 699,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

70
of the disease referred to an unusually high case fatality
rate.

This rate may vary in different epidemics and under

different circumstances from seven to sixty per cent, and
sometimes it may even go as high as eighty-five per

c

e

n

t

.

79

Three summers went by before the next drastic visi
tation of the Saffron Scourge,

In late July of 1837 the

New Orleans Picayune optimistically reported the city free
of any widespread sickness and predicted the season would
pass without an epidemic.

“At present no city in the union

is more healthy or more pleasant than New Orleans,” the
editor proudly asserted.

Nevertheless, he urged the city

authorities to execute the “wholesome ordinances” pre
viously enacted for the improvement of sanitary con
ditions
In early August of 1837 the Picayune admitted the
existence of a few scattered cases of fever in the city
"as there is every summer,” but expressly denied any
"general sickness."

In late August and early September

Crescent City newspapers finally admitted the epidemic

79Ceorge M. Sternberg, Report on the Etiology and
Prevention of Yellow Fever (Washington, 1890), 73; Merck
Manual, 968. ,

SÜNew Orleans Daily Picayune, July 25, 1837.
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proportions of the disease, and reported from seventy-five
to a hundred deaths per day,®^

The editor of the Picayune

in the first week of September set forth a graphic des
cription of the unhappy situation:
The levee is dull, dreary and lifeless at this
time. No business doing, and the few ships in
port are losing money.for the want of cargoes.
Steamboats arrive but seldom, and bring neither
news, money or goods. Every person feels like
sleeping or running away for the next three weeks
and a half--but most of those now in the city are
bound to stay, to fulfil engagements, live or die.
We make out to bury our dead, drink juleps, or
brandy toddies . . . talk to each other, [and]
read letters and the news of the day. . . .82
Also noting the dullness of the market in early September,
the editor of the New Orleans Price-Current asserted opti
mistically that the pestilence would eventually come to a
halt, crops would seek the great market of the southwest,
and the wheels of trade would move again.

By early November

his prophecies came to pass as the epidemic waned, strang
ers and absent citizens poured into the Crescent City, and
business operations gradually showed improvement.^3

Bljbid., August 4, 31, 1837; New Orleans Bee,
August 24, September 5, 1837.
3^Picayune, September 6, 1837.
83New Orleans Price-Current and Commercial Intelli
gencer , September 9, 23, November 4, 1837; Picayune,
November 10, 1837.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

72
The recurring and vexatious problem of obtaining
accurate mortality statistics attracted the attention of
the Picayune editor, who considered the graveyard reports
of doubtful accuracy and noted that five or six cemeteries
in the city did not issue reports at all,

"Until a Board

of Health is organized," he complained, "and regular re
ports kept . . .

we may expect a wide difference of opinion

as to the mortality of our city at this season, , .
Later estimates of the yellow fever mortality of 1837 set
the figure at 1,300,^5

But with the newspapers reporting

a daily average of seventy-five to a hundred deaths early
in the epidemic and thirty to forty when the malady had
abated considerably,^^ it seems that the total should be
much higher.
The sickly season of 1839 started off as usual in
July with the Picayune's vehement denial of the reports and
exaggerations circulating among the river towns on the

84picayune, September 13, 1837.
8^N. 0. Med. & Surg, Jour., New Series, VI (March,
1879), 699,
86picayune, August 31, September 13, 1837; PriceCurrent . October 2, 1837,
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subject of disease in New
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On August 3, the Bee

announced that yellow fever existed in the Crescent City,
but not "to an alarming extent,"

Three days later the Pica

yune also acknowledged its presence, while expressing full
confidence that the disease would not assume an epidemic
form.

Pointing out that the victims thus far had been con

fined to the laboring class, the editor felt certain that
those persons following a program of moderation and pru
dence had little to fear.

Again on August 9 he reassured

the readers that the malady preferred strangers, sailors,
and laboring men.

"To those who live regularly and pay

attention to cleanliness," the Picayune editor declared,
"we think there is little cause for apprehension."

Like

wise, the editor of the Bee consoled the good citizens of
New Orleans with the fact that the epidemic of 1837 had
been much more "calamitous" and that the laboring classes
and strangers were bearing the brunt of the current
attack.88

Yellow Jack, no respector of persons, seemed to

indicate class-consciousness only because the more settled

87picayune , July 13, 24, 26, 1839.

Q^Bee, August 3, September 3, 10, 1839; Picayune,
August 6, 9, 11, 1839,
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well-to-do portions of the population, for the most part,
belonged to the ranks of the acclimated.

Whenever the

fever did spread to the better sections of town, any
nonimmune, no matter how wealthy, was fully liable to
attack.

The epidemic of 1839 reached its peak by mid-Septem
ber, probably because of the relatively small number of
unacclimated persons remaining in the city who had not
already suffered an attack.

Still the Picayune warned

strangers and "our absent friends” against flocking into
New Orleans until the danger was clearly over, and not
until late October did that journal declare New Orleans
healthy once again and assure the absent citizens a safe
return.

By November 5 the Crescent City was characterized

by brisk activity as strangers and returning citizens pour
ed in and steamboats and vessels arrived at the wharves for
a resumption of the normal hustle and bustle of city life,&9
According to available records, inaccurate as they might
be, the fever of 1839, somewhat less malignant than that
of 1837, claimed about 800 victims,

89picayune, September 13, 15, 19, October 22,
November 5, 1839,
90N,0,Med. & Surg. Jour,, New Series, VI (March,
1879), 699,
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Demonstrating its capricious nature, the Saffron
Scourge seems to have confined its activities to New Orleans
during most of the 1830's, except in the major outbreaks of
1837 and 1839 when it again visited some of its old haunts
and extended its ravages to several new points.

On one

other occasion during that decade it appeared in Louisiana
outside the Crescent City:

in Alexandria in 1831, when

only two cases were reported in the Crescent City.

During

the epidemic of 1837 the fever spread to Baton Rouge,
Plaquemine, Opelousas, Washington, and Alexandria.

The

year 1839 witnessed Louisiana’s most extensive outbreak of
yellow fever up to that time, when the pestilence committed
its ravages not only in New Orleans but appeared also in
Thibodaux, Plaquemine, Port Hudson, St. Francisville and
Bayou Sara, St. Martinville, Washington, New Iberia,
Opelousas, Franklin, Donaldsonville, Baton Rouge, Alex
andria, and N a t c h i t o c h e s . I n November of 1839 a New
Orleanian wrote his brother:

"The sickness has not been

^^Toner, "Reports Upon Yellow Fever," loc. cit.,
369-73; Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 776, 844-902;
Edwin A, Davis (ed.), Plantation Life in the Florida Par
ishes of Louisiana, 1836-1846, as Reflected in the Diary
of Bennet H. Barrow (New York, 1943), 163-69; François
Charles Delery, Précis Historique de la Fièvre Jaune
(Nouvelie-Orléans, 1859), 20; Picayune, October 3, 1839,
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half so bad this Season as in 1837 (when I had it)--not in
the City but the country has been more troubled with it
than ever it was before.

& in most of the Towns on the

coast and Rivers it has been very f a t a l . R i v e r and
coast towns outside Louisiana stricken with yellow fever
that year included Vicksburg, Natchez, Fort Adams, Biloxi,
Houston, Galveston, Mobile, Tampa, Savannah, Augusta, and
Charleston.93
Having satiated its appetite in 1839, the pestilence
gave the citizens of New Orleans a breathing spell in the
summer of 1840 when only three yellow fever deaths were
reported,

94

but

deluged the city again the following

summer with a wave of virulence.

Although New Orleans was

supposed to be one of the healthiest cities in the Union
throughout most of the summer of 1841, the Bee conceded
on August 3 that several fatal cases of yellow fever had

92a . D, Gove to Lewis Gove, November 8, 1839, A. D.
Gove Letters (Louisiana State University Archives, Baton
Rouge).
93oelery, Precis Historique de la Fièvre Jaune, 21.
9‘
^N. O.Med. & Surg. Jour., New Series, VI (March,
1879), 699.
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occurred in the city.^5

on August 18 the Board of Health

announced an increase of "the acclimating fever," stated
their "serious apprehensions in regard to the future,"
and requested that physicians report daily to

the board

the number of new cases under treatment,
The epidemic grew steadily worse as August passed,
and the fever continued to rage in September.

In early

October a temporary abatement occurred, but an influx of
strangers furnished fresh fuel, and the pestilence flared
again.

Finally on October 26 the Picayune proclaimed:

"The Yellow Fever is dead-dead-dead!"

Joyfully, the edi

tor noted that only nine fever deaths had occurred the day
before!^?

The Bee waited until November 3 before report

ing the conclusion of the epidemic.

Graphically depicting

the city in the act of casting off its blanket of gloom and
dejection, the editor wrote :
Business dawns once more upon us; strangers
begin to arrive, old friends are flocking in;

95picayune, June 27, July 22, August 1, 4, 7, 1841;
Bee, July 20, August 3, 1841.
9Gpicayune, August 18, 1841.
97price-Current, August 28, September 11, 25, Oct
ober 9, 1841; Bee, September 9, 16, 1841; Picayune, August
20, 31, September 9, 22, October 3, 8, 9, 12, 20, 26, 1841.
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the streets are refilling; the thorough-fares
wear a busy and thronged aspect; the cares,
bustle, pleasure of the present, and anticipa
tions of the future, occupy every mind, and
the horrors of the past will soon be remem
bered no more. Forgetfulness is sometimes a
beneficent faculty.98
The pestilence of 1841 had raged "with a virulence
rarely equalled during the most deadly seasons,"^9

The

official count set the number of yellow fever deaths at
1,325; Dr. Joseph Jones estimated 1,800.^00

Considering

the fact that the editor of the Bee on November 3 set
forth an estimate of 1,500 fatal cases^^l a^d realizing
that editors had a tendency to minimize rather than to
exaggerate such matters, one is inclined to accept Dr.
Jones’ figure as a fair approximation of the actual
mortality.
New Orleans enjoyed a five-year period of relative
freedom from the fever between 1841 and 1847.
malady claimed nearly 700
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^^2

In 1843 the
^

population

^^Bee, November 3, 1841.
99price-Current, September 25, 1841.
lOO^ew Orleans Directory for 1842 (New Orleans,
1842), II, 16; N. 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., New Series, VI
(March, 1879), 699.
lOlBee, November 3, 1841.
lO^N. 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., Mew Series, VI (March,
1879), 699.
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of over 100,000, and after epidemics which carried off
nearly 2,000, the outbreak of that year could only be con
sidered a rather moderate one.
Yellow Jack began to appear early in July of 1847
in various parts of the city, and the number of cases
steadily increased.

On August 2 the Board of Health

announced the arrival of the epidemic.

As usual, the dis

ease attacked "the lower class" first, but by late August
its influence had extended to "all ranks of society."^03
On August 31 the editor of the Bee, observing the loss of
five "gentlemen of the community," commented that "neither
rich nor poor can now claim exemption."^^4

The pestilence

increased in virulence throughout the weeks of August and
ultimately reached its summit during the first week of
September, after which a gradual decline followed.

By

October 18 the Board of Health felt safe in declaring the
cessation of the epidemic, but cautioned that some cases
might be expected to occur for at least another month.
Cases continued to appear as late as December, and the

103ibid., IV (September, 1847), 274,
lO^Bee, August 31, 1847.
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last fatality occurred during the week ending December

25.105
As the nineteenth century progressed, practically
every major outbreak of yellow fever seemed more devastat
ing than the last, as if the disease were gradually gain
ing momentum for the incredibly destructive epidemics of
the 1850's.

In terms of the increasing population of New

Orleans, which almost tripled from 1830 to 1850,106 the
pestilence encountered a constantly growing field for
exploitation.

Nevertheless, population growth does not

furnish a complete explanation for the mounting impact of
epidemics during the first half of the century.

The

mysterious and essentially erratic nature of epidemic dis
ease cannot always be explained fully, even by modern
science.

During the second half of the nineteenth century,

without apparent rhyme or reason, yellow fever epidemics
diminished in frequency and virulence--even before the
inauguration of truly effective sanitation and quarantine

l-05picayune, August 10, 29, September 5, 12, 19, 26,
October 3, 10, 17, 19, 22, 1847; N. 0, Med. & Surg. Jour.,
V (September, 1848), 202.
lOÔQardner's New Orleans Directory for 1861 (n.t.p.),
5.
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measures and well before the discovery and control of the
insect vector.
All observers present on the scene of destruction
considered the visitation of 1847 the most widespread epi
demic that had ever occurred in New Orleans•

A New

Orleans correspondent wrote in late October of that year:
” , . . w e have had a season of deep distress--6e in all my
experience I never saw the like.”^^?

According to Dr.

Erasmus Darwin Fenner in his account of the outbreak, the
older physicians of New Orleans agreed that the fever of
1847 was "the most extensive that ever prevailed” in that
city, but considered it less "malignant” than that of 1841
or 1839.

He cited statistics from Charity Hospital in sup

port of the latter opinion, showing the case fatality rate
as less than one-third in 1847, whereas ordinarily it ran
as high as fifty per cent or more.

An estimated 20,000 to

25,000 cases occurred in the city.

The number of yellow

fever deaths reported to the Board of Health by sextons of
New Orleans cemeteries totaled 2,306, not including the 613
yellow fever interments reported from the Lafayette

lO^Charles Harrod to Mrs, S. B. Evans, October 23,
1847, Nathaniel Evans Family Papers.
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cemetery by late October,

Fenner felt that 3,000 would not

be far from the number who died of the pestilence in New
Orleans and Lafayette.
The theory of blending fevers so prevalent at the
time undoubtedly added to the ordinary difficulties of
medical diagnosis and hence contributed to the problem of
ascertaining the exact yellow fever mortality.

A medical

concept of the period explained various kinds of fevers as
degrees of one basic fever.

During the course of an epi

demic, it was believed that the milder grades blended
together and sometimes merged into the most malignant
form, yellow fever.

The editor of the New Orleans Medical

and Surgical Journal noted the presence of all forms and
degrees of fevers during the epidemic of 1847--mild inter
mittent, remittent, dysentery, congestive, and pernicious
intermittent, as well as mild and grave yellow fever-which occasionally blended together in various combina
tions,The

terms employed refer to vaguely understood

symptom-complexes rather than to specific diseases ade
quately diagnosed.

Diagnoses based on superficial symptoms.

108#. 0. Med, & Surg. Jour., V (September, 1848),
203-206.
lO^Ibid., IV (September, 1847), 274.
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so similar in a great variety of disorders, could not
always pin-point accurately the nature of a patient's ill
ness,

Many cases of mild or severe yellow fever might well

have been listed on the records under some other vague
appellation.

The problems of diagnosis and nomenclature

are well illustrated by a list of "fevers" compiled from
the Board of Health mortality reports for 1847, which in
cluded twenty-seven different variations of fever, in
addition to the yellow pestilence:

"Fever," adynamic,

ataxic, bilious, bilious remittent, congestive, idiopathic,
gastric, hectic, icterodes, intermittent, intermittent
pernicious, intestinal, malignant, malignant putrid, ner
vous, pernicious, pernicious congestive, puerperal,
remittent, putrid, scarlet, scarlet malignant, traumatic,
typhoid, typhoid congestive, and

t

y

p

h

u

s

.

gg the more

than 600 deaths attributed to the twenty-seven fevers,
probably at least 200 should be added to the yellow fever
total.

On the other hand, it is somewhat less likely

that deaths attributed to the Saffron Scourge were due to
other causes, since so many physicians insisted on the
appearance of the "black vomit" (which did not invariably

llOibid., IV (January, 1848), 540-41.
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occur) and other obvious symptoms of yellowness and invol
untary hemorrhage before pronouncing a case yellow fever.
In discussing the extent of the 1847 outbreak, Dr,
Fenner and others commented at length on the fact that no
extensive epidemic had occurred since 1841 and that the
population had steadily increased during the period, pro
viding new supplies of unacclimated individuals.

According

to one estimate, over 20,000 Europeans had settled in New
Orleans in the four or five years prior to 1847, and the
immigration in 1847 was said to have been particularly
heavy, consisting mainly of "the poorer sort."

In addition,

large numbers of discharged soldiers returning from the
Mexican War stopped in New O r l e a n s , T h e editor of the
New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal noted that, al
though yellow fever was prevailing in Vera Cruz, very few
cases had been brought from there to the Crescent City,^^^
Adhering to the theory of local causation, he failed to
comprehend that one imported case from that city might well

llljbid., V (September, 1848), 205; De Bow’s Commercial Review, III (March, 1847), 250; Picayune, August 1,
1847.
0, Med. & Surg. Jour., IV (September, 1847),
274.
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have set off the explosion.
The poverty of the class most liable to the disease
intensified the suffering and distress occasioned by the
epidemic.

The Howard Association, a benevolent society

first organized during the epidemic of 1837 to afford
relief to the indigent sick, served to alleviate in some
measure the suffering of the destitute victims in 1847,
Its members worked diligently that season, attending to
the needs of about 1,200 yellow fever patients and pro
viding sustenance for their families.
Almost every year in the 1840's the pestilence
attacked one or two points in Louisiana outside New
Orleans.

Only in two outbreaks, however, did it spread

extensively.

In 1843 it appeared in Baton Rouge, St.

Francisville, Port Hudson, and Thibodaux; in 1847 it
visited Lafayette, Carrollton, Algiers, Covington,
Madisonville, Mandeville, Plaquemine, Baton Rouge, Bayou
Sara, and Alexandria.

llSportier, Louisiana, I, 515; Picayune, September
5, 1847; Robinson, Diary of a Samaritan, 86,
114Toner, "Reports Upon Yellow Fever," l o c . c i t .,
369-73; Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 844-902; Davis
(ed.), Plantation Life in the Florida Parishes , 306;
Fenner, "Report on the Epidemics . . . in the year 1853,"
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The spread of yellow fever through the normal chan
nels of trade and travel was undoubtedly facilitated by
émigrés fleeing New Orleans, many of whom carried the
seeds of pestilence with tiem.

For example, during the

epidemic of 1847, several German and Dutch families left
New Orleans for Covington, hoping to escape the disease.
Three persons among them became ill and died of the fever
shortly after arriving in Covington.

From that beginning

yellow fever eventually spread to the townspeople, result
ing in 160 to 180 cases, of which about ten died,^^^
Covington physician said of the outbreak:

One

"I do not think

it genuine yellow f e v e r , P e r h a p s he thought the
"genuine yellow fever" should have resulted in a much
higher case fatality rate.
The fever of 1847 prevailed to a considerable extent
in the vicinity of New Orleans at Lafayette, Carrollton,
and Algiers.

Although some cases occurred in Plaquemine,

Baton Rouge, and Bayou Sara, Dr. Fenner stated that the

loc. cit., 512; Corrine L, Saucier, History of Avoyelles
Parish, Louisiana (New Orleans, 1943), 112; N. 0, Med. &
Surg. Jour., V (September, 1848), 216,
^^^N, 0, Med,& Surg, Jour., IV (November, 1847),
409.
llGibid., V (September, 1848), 216,
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disease did not assume epidemic proportions in those
towns.

117

Alexandria, on the other hand, suffered a rather

serious attack.

On October 9 the editor of the Alexandria

Red River Republican attempted to discount the severity of
the outbreak.

In declaring an epidemic in progress about

ten days before, the physicians of Alexandria had alarmed
the populace, he complained, and induced many persons to
leave town.

Admitting that a number of cases had occurred,

especially among the destitute, he considered the fever
rather mild in its effects and expressed the hope that no
more cases would appear.

Undue optimism failed to affect

the activities of the pestilence, which steadily increased
its ravages.

In mid-October the editor described the town

as gloomy and desolate; all those able to do so had re
moved themselves and their families from the scene.

Final

ly, by early December the disease had completely run its
course in Alexandria,
If epidemic yellow fever resulted in part from local
unsanitary conditions, as it was widely believed, sanitary

I17lbid., 204, 213.
ll^Alexandria Red River Republican, October 9, 16,
December 4, 1847.
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reform would seem the logical approach to the problem.
During the first half of the nineteenth century boards of
health existed intermittently in New Orleans, several
created by the state, the others by the city council.
one operated with any degree of efficacy.

Not

Dependent upon

a generally uncooperative city council for funds and legal
enforcement of health regulations, the boards, no matter
how enlightened, could scarcely inaugurate a program of
public health.

Although willing to appoint a board, the

council was seldom willing to appropriate funds for its
use or to effect its suggestions.

The prevailing laissez-

faire philosophy provided little basis for positive action
by such a bureau.

Public health had not yet become a

matter of public concern, and the highly individualistic
citizen of early nineteenth century New Orleans consider
ed it his inalienable right to clean his premises if and
when he chose.

The development of a public health con

sciousness required still more time, more deaths, and more
reformers.
A half-century of visitations established for yellow
fever an accepted role in the Crescent City as an unfor
tunate but inevitable scourge to be endured, but one which
limited itself fortunately to two or three major
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flagellations per decade.

As the disease carried off

hundreds of victims, a fairly constant stream of immigra
tion furnished more than sufficient replacements, and the
population of New Orleans continued to grow in spite of
the attendant dangers.

Although the business season suf

fered a temporary postponement during epidemic years, the
vigorous activity which followed each time rapidly dimmed
the memory of the earlier distress.

As the population

increased and the fever expanded its field of activity,
raising the death count year by year, acclimated New
Orleanians experienced a diminishing sensitivity to its
ravages.

The definition of a mild epidemic changed as

the visitations became increasingly severe.

For example,

the outbreak of 1843, claiming only about 700 victims, was
a moderate one in comparison with the yellow fever mortal
ity in 1841, while in 1817 a mortality of 800 had con
stituted a major disaster.

The worse the epidemics became,

the more loudly editors, physicians, and others protested
that New Orleans was the healthiest city in the Union
except during epidemic years.
was not true at all.

Unfortunately, that claim

The delusion regarding the salubrity

of the Crescent City, while generally accepted within the
city itself, failed to gain credence in other parts of the
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country.

Regardless of its protests to the contrary, New

Orleans, largely because of the Saffron Scourge, had
acquired for itself a widespread reputation as the "Necro
polis of the South."
Medical men throughout the nineteenth century, and
earlier, continually attempted to analyze and explain the
nature, causation, and transmission of the yellow pesti
lence,

Unaware of the insect vector, physicians found it

difficult to account for the unpredictable spread of the
fever; its vagaries seemed to defy all attempts at clear
analysis.

Ample evidence existed to prove almost any

point of view, depending upon what evidence one chose to
select.

Under the circumstances widespread controversy

developed over the various possible answers to problems
which remained essentially unsolved:

Was the fever con

tagious or non-contagious, imported or locally caused?
What was its relationship to other fevers?
treatment proved most effective?

What form of

Why did the disease

appear in certain places rather than others, and why in
some years did it prove more malignant than in others?
Medical controversy until the late nineteenth century
resembled a philosophical debate in which the participants
moved deductively from premise to premise, committed one
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logical fallacy after another, leaped to hasty conclusions,
rationalized their own particular predilections, and in
the process generated more heat than light.
On a subject about which no agreement existed among
medical men, laymen felt equally qualified to argue and
make pronouncements.

In terms of the limited medical

knowledge of the period, yellow fever could only remain a
puzzle with which to exercise the intellect, a puzzle with
several basic pieces missing.

Until the discovery of the

cause of transmission, little could be done toward prevent
ing the recurrence of the disease, and at the close of
yellow fever's first half-century in New Orleans, men had
little more understanding of the pestilence than when it
had first occurred.
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YELLOW FEVER MORTALITY IN NEW ORLEANS
1796-1847
Year
*1796
1797
1798
*1799
1800
1801
1802
1803
*1804
1805
1806
1807
-1808
*1809
1810
*1811
1812
1813
1814
1815
1816
*1817
1818
*1819
1820
1821
*1822
1823
1824
1825
1826
1827
1828
*1829
1830
1831
1832
*1833
1834

Estimated Deaths
250 to 400
?

Population (Approx.)
6,000 to 8,000

No record

No record

No record
?

500

18,000

800
115
425 to 2,000
400
7+
800 to 2,000
1+
108
59+
5+
109+
130+
900
117+
2+
400

24.000

1,000

26.000

32,000

48,000

58,000

95+
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(Continued)
Year

Estimated Deaths

1835
1836
*1837
1838
*1839
1840
*1841
1842
-1843
1844
1845
1846
*1847

284+
5+
1,300
17+
800
3+
1,325 to 1,800
211+
500 to 700
148
2
100 to 160
2,300 to 3,000

Population (Approx.)

68,000
74.000
79.000
84.000

109,000

*Major epidemics.
+For many years, the only figures available for
yellow fever mortality in the city are the figures for
yellow fever deaths in Charity Hospital, indicated by a
plus after the number. Presumably there were other
deaths in New Orleans in private practice during those
years.
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Alexandria
X
X X
X
X
Algiers
Baton Rouge
X X X X X
X
X
Bayou Sara
Carrollton
Covington
DonaIdsonville
?
X
Franklin
Lafayette (N.O.)
Mandeville
Madisonville
Natchitoches
?
New Iberia
Opelousas
X
X X
Plaquemine
Port Hudson
St. Francisville X X X
? X
X X X
St. Martinville
Thibodaux
X
Washington___________________________________________________

X

X

X
X

X

X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X X
X
X
X X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X X
X X

*This chart does not represent an all-inclusive view of yellow fever's appearances
in Louisiana. To compile such a chart on the basis of available records would be impos
sible. It is designed merely to indicate at least the major points affected by the dis- ^
ease during this period, and by no means to exclude others not listed where yellow fever
might well have occurred on many occasions.

CHAPTER III

THE GREAT EPIDEMICS OF THE FIFTIES;
1853, 1854, 1855, 1858

In a series of visitations spread over a century of
Louisiana's history, the Saffron Scourge achieved a peak
of virulence in the 1850's, striking four severe blows in
the space of six years;

in 1853, 1854, 1855, and 1858,

The survivors scarcely had time to forget one epidemic
before the appearance of still another.

In the four major

attacks of the 1850's, the pestilence swept away over
18,000 persons in New Orleans alone, a sufficient number
to populate several small towns.
Between the extensive outbreak of 1847 and that
most malignant of all epidemics in 1853, New Orleans was
not exempt entirely from the fever.

During that five-year

period, the disease claimed a total of more than 2,000
lives.

In the absence of a violent epidemic, however. New

Orleanians allowed themselves to hope and then to believe
that yellow fever was no longer a disease to be feared.

95
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In May of 1852 the editor of the New Orleans Medical and
Surgical Journal confidently asserted that "the Yellow
Fever--the dread of the stranger and sojourner in our midst,
has long since been banished [from] the city. . . . "

Later,

in another editorial, he noted a considerable improvement
in the health of New Orleans and attributed that happy
development to the recent attention given to street clean
ing, paving, and the drainage of swamp land surrounding the
city.

Five years had passed, the editor observed, without

the occurrence of epidemic yellow fever, and he felt con
fident that the disease could be completely eliminated by
a "crash" program of sanitary improvements.^
The ideal of cleanliness and the reality of effect
ing such a condition in New Orleans remained unreconciled,
and in the summer of 1853, with frequent rains and the
sun's excessive heat, the sanitary condition of the city
steadily worsened.

The Crescent City newspapers complain

ed indignantly of the filthy streets and repeatedly de
nounced the city government and the Street Commissioner
for neglecting their duties.

In view of the unsanitary

In . 0.
& Surg. Jour., VIII (May, 1852), 819;
IX (November, 1852), 415-16.
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condition of the city, Dr. Erasmus Fenner thought it
rather strange that anyone should look beyond New Orleans
for the cause of the pestilence.

"Indeed it was so bad,"

said Dr. Fenner, "that if it had given rise to Egyptian
Plague instead of yellow fever, it ought not to have surn
prised anyone. . . ."
In May of 1853 the earliest cases appeared and were
pronounced yellow fever by' the attending physicians at
Charity Hospital, but other physicians, who also viewed
the cases, disagreed with the original diagnosis.

Accord

ing to Dr. Fenner, the discussion and debate proceeded
along these lines:
Some thought the subjects were too yellow,
Others that the yellowness was not exactly of
the right hue . . . some said what was pro
nounced black vomit was not dark enough, others
that it was too black; others, again that it was
not black vomit because it was of a reddish hue ;
whilst others, admitting a resemblance, still
could not find 'the old fashioned Black Vomit.'
Some would not admit the cases were Yellow Fever,
because they occurred 'too early in the season,'
--they had never known Yellow Fever to break out
so early in this city, and therefore did not
think it possible.
Finally, on June 10, an "unquestionable case" entered
Charity Hospital; an Irish girl from Tchoupitoulas Street

^Fenner, Epidemic Yellow Fever, 10-15.
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who turned quite yellow, provided large quantities of "unmistakeable, old-fashioned, coffee-grounds black vomit,"
and thereby ended the medical controversy.

"The skeptics

all gave it up after seeing this," said Fenner.

From

late May and early June the fever made steady progress,
but received little publicity until mid-July.
had no Board of Health at the time.

New Orleans

Lacking sufficient

authority to enforce its regulations and denied support
by the city fathers, the last board had adjourned sine
die in 1852, leaving only a secretary.

Weekly interment

reports then were issued under the direction of the mayor
and the secretary of the late board.

"This was all the

correct information that was published," Fenner stated,
"and even this was complained of by some who thought it
better to suppress the truth than cause a panic.
The Crescent City journals published the interment
lists and an occasional report from Charity Hospital, but
avoided commentary on the disease.
count steadily increased.

Meanwhile the death

Finally on July 13 the Orleanian

admitted the existence of yellow fever in the city but dis
counted its importance.

On the same day, several

3lbid., 15-25, 35; Picayune, June 28, 1853.
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newspapers printed a notice calling a meeting of the Howard
Association, the organization which ministered to the needs
of the poor during an epidemic.

This should have furnished

a clue to many readers that the situation was a serious one,
By July 16 the pestilence had claimed over 300 lives, and
as the word spread through the city along with the disease,
citizens fled the scene by the thousands.

During the week

ending July 23, more than 400 persons died of the fever.^
Under pressure from the newspapers, which at last
had begun to comment on the situation, and urged on by the
Mayor, the City Council finally appointed a temporary board
of health on July 25.

Within two weeks* time, the board

had established four infirmaries for the indigent sick and
two temporary asylums for children orphaned by the epi
demic. ^

At this point, horrible scenes of suffering and

death could be witnessed throughout the city.

Entire

families fell victim to the raging pestilence, and "tenants
for the cemeteries" multiplied faster than graves could be
provided.

In order to speed up the process, the grave-

^De Bow's Commercial Review, XV (December, 1853),
597-611.
^Picayune, July 26, August 6, 1853; D£ Bow's Commer
cial Review, XV (December, 1853), 613-14.
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diggers soon resorted to long ditches, eighteen to twentyfour inches deep, into which they tossed the coffins and
threw on a "few shovelfuls of dirt."

The daily rains

soon washed away this thin covering and bared the coffins
to the blistering heat of the sun which followed each
brief downpour.

Frequently the putrefying bodies burst

through the hastily-built coffins and filled the air "far
and near, with the most intolerable pestilential odors.
In August the mortality reached incredible heights:

over

900 the first week, 1,200 the next, and two full weeks of
over 1,300 each.

Describing the plague-striken community

in August, one observer wrote;

"The whole city was a

hospital, and every well man, woman, and child were instru
mental, in one way or another, in relieving the sick."^
The streets were deserted except for "the hasty
pedestrian on an errand of mercy" or physicians charging
rapidly along in their gigs.

Funeral trains in the morn

ing and the evening lined the roads to the cemeteries.

^New Orleans Daily Crescent, August 11, 1853; De
Bow's Commercial Review, XV (December, 1853), 614, 620-21.
^Fenner, Epidemic Yellow Fever, 38-44; Robinson,
Diary of a Samaritan, 150.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

101
But the usual happy noises of busy activity, the sounds
of shoppers, sellers, and workers, had been strangely
silenced by death, disease, or fear.

The wharves were all

but deserted; virtually all business had ceased, and most
of the shops were closed down,®
In the last week of July, after delegating their
powers to the Finance Committee and creating a temporary
board of health, the City Council had adjourned until
October, leaving the city without a government for two
months in the midst of a disaster.

Some of the council

members fled to places of safety in the North, some to
resorts along the Gulf where the epidemic pursued them;
some stayed on and extended their services during the
crisis.

One New Orleans newspaper commented disgustedly:

"What a humiliating position I A City Council, in the
midst of an unprecedented epidemic, adjourning for their
own health, convenience, and comfort. , , , What a burles
que on municipal government!*'^
Even the native and long-resident New Orleanians

8pe Bow*s Commercial Review, XV (December, 1853),
615; Robinson, Diary of a Samaritan, 150-52,
9pe Bow's Commercial Review, XV (December, 1853),
609-11, 620,
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became alarmed during the terrible month of August.

Up

to this point they had felt relatively secure in believing
that only the newcomer, the imprudent, and the unclean
fell victim to the raging fever.

When several of New

Orleans' oldest citizens were swept away by the pestilence,
a new dread seized the city.

Even the French inhabitants,

always the last to fear the disease, became alarmed.

Edi

tors of the French newspapers attributed the fever's
increasing virulence to the noxious effluvia emanating
from the gutters and from the graveyards filled with
rotting, half-buried corpses.
In mid-August the Mayor, on the recommendation of
the Board of Health, ordered that 400 rounds of cannon be
fired daily at sunset in the various public squares of the
city in an attempt to purify the atmosphere and clear away
the disease.

Toward the same end, he ordered the burning

of barrels of tar in the streets and in the cemeteries at
nightfall.

Since the noise was found to be disturbing as

well as injurious to the sick, the cannon firing was dis
continued after two days, but the tar-burning program
remained in effect for some time.

The roar of the guns

lOlbid., 621.
lllbid., 626-27; Fenner, Epidemic Yellow Fever, 38.
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and the fires in the night, together with the horrors of
the creeping pestilence, which spread so insidiously and
so mysteriously, must have presented a truly unnerving
spectacle to those who were forced to endure it.
In addition to the four infirmaries established by
the Board of Health, the Howard Association opened four
more temporary hospitals for the indigent sick and one
especially for convalescents.

As all the public schools

had been closed for the duration of the epidemic, the
Howards obtained the Washington School building on Maga
zine Street for use as a temporary hospital.

A portion of

the school house became a place of refuge for children who
had lost both parents to the fever.

Contributions to the

Howard Association poured in from all over the country to
the amount of over $200,000.

The long list of contribu

tors from Washington, D. C ., included the name of President
Franklin Pierce.

Before Baton Rouge fell victim to the

disease, a deputation of citizens from that city came to
aid the New Orleans Howards in relieving the sick.^^
The week ending August 27 had witnessed the peak of

12pe Bow's Commercial Review, XV (December, 1853),
626, 633; Fenner, Epidemic Yellow Fever, 42-43.
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the epidemic.

Yellow fever had claimed almost 1,400

victims in the space of seven days.

By September 1 Dr.

Fenner reported that the epidemic was rapidly declining,
"deaths from it now only amounting to about 100 a day,"
Through September and early October, the weekly death toll
decreased steadily;

700, 400, 200, 125, 85, 42,

By

October 31 the Board of Health felt safe in declaring the
epidemic at an end and assured absentees and strangers a
safe entry to New O r l e a n s . a few scattered cases
occurred after that date, but for all intents and purposes
the crisis was over, and the city could begin the work of
regeneration for the delayed business season, while phy
sicians could start the task of explaining New Orleans'
most malignant plague, which also had made great ravages
throughout the entire Gulf States area.
Writing soon after the epidemic. Dr. Bennet Dowler
estimated a yellow fever mortality of 8,400 in New Orleans
alone.

"The bloodiest

battle-fields of modern-time

scarcely can compare with the New Orleans epidemic of
1853," said Dr. Dowler, "which destroyed five times more

13penner, Epidemic Yellow Fever, 45-47.
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than the British Army lost on the field of Water loo.
Created at the close of the epidemic to investigate the
facts of the siege, the Sanitary Commission set forth a
total of 8,101 yellow fever fatalities.

Dr. Edward H.

Barton, head of the commission, made an extensive statis
tical study of the epidemic.

He estimated a total popula

tion of almost 159,000 in New Orleans in 1853, including
some 5,000 transients.

Supposedly, almost one-fourth of

the population fled when the Saffron Scourge arrived,
leaving approximately 125,000 in the Crescent City during
the visitation.

Hence, the fever claimed about one of

every fifteen persons remaining in the city.

A total of

approximately 29,000 cases and 8,000 deaths indicated a
case fatality rate of almost twenty-eight per cent,^^

On

the other hand. Dr. Fenner estimated only about 100,000
persons in the city during the epidemic, of which about
eight per cent, or one in twelve, died of the fever; and
of the total population in the city at the time, over

l^Dowler, "Tableau of the Yellow Fever of 1853,"
loc. cit., 31, 60.
l^Edward Hall Barton, The Cause and Prevention of
Yellow Fever, Contained in the Report of the Sanitary Com
mission of New Orleans (Philadelphia, 1855), 41-44.
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one-fourth suffered attacks.
The pestilence of 1853 covered a more extensive area
in Louisiana, and the South generally, than ever before.
According to Dr. Fenner, it attacked every town along the
Mississippi River as far north as Napoleon (Arkansas) at
the mouth of the Arkansas River, practically every village
in Mississippi and Louisiana south of Vicksburg, and almost
every plantation along the Mississippi River south of
N a t c h e z .

Pensacola, Mobile, Biloxi, Galveston, and

Houston also experienced severe visitations, and in each
case the fever spread to the interior where it had never
appeared before.

It seemed to rage with equal force in

clean and unclean areas, in high and dry regions and low
and wet localities, in piney woods as well as filthy
streets, a phenomenon which posed new problems for medical
theorists.18

Some held firm to the concepts of local

IGpenner, Epidemic Yellow Fever, 71-72,

1853,"

l?Fenner, "Report on the Epidemics . . .
ci^., 424.

in the year

IBpe Bow's Commercial Review, XV (December, 1853),
631-33; History of the Yellow Fever in New Orleans, during
the Summer of 1853 . . . by a Physician of New Orleans. .
(Philadelphia & St. Louis, 1854), 30.
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causation and "epidemic constitution of the atmosphere"
In explaining the fever's origin and transmission.

Others

were converted to the Idea of Importation, If not congatlon Itself.
In many Louisiana towns where the first case was
directly traceable to a previous center of Infection, It
was difficult to avoid the conclusion that the disease had
been Imported from New Orleans, or from a neighboring town.
There were, however, just enough exceptions where contacts
had failed to spread the fever from one town to another,
or where an Imported case failed to touch off an epidemic,
to keep the local causatlonlsts In business.

Points within

the state of Louisiana outside of New Orleans where the
fever appeared In 1853 Included Algiers, St. John Baptiste,
DonaIdsonv11le, Plaquemine, Baton Rouge, Bayou Sara and St.
Francisville (and nearby Clinton), Vldalla, and Lake
Providence along the Mississippi River; Alexandria,
Natchitoches, Grand Encore, and Shreveport on the Red
River; Cloutlervllle on Old River, a branch of the Red
River; Pattersonvllle, Franklin, Centrevllle, and Washing
ton on Bayou Teche, together with Opelousas only a few
miles away; Thibodaux on Bayou La Fourche; Trenton on the
Ouachita River; Covington and Madisonville across Lake
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Pontchartrain from New Orleans; and several other towns in
close proximity to one of the above centers,
There is every indication that the pestilence of
1853 raged even more severely in some of the small towns
than it did in New Orleans itself.

In Baton Rouge, for

example, out of a population of about .2,000, according to
Bennet Dowler, about 200 died of the fever; a later esti
mate set the figure as high as 400.^0

in early September

a report from Thibodaux described a desolate situation
there.

The town had been largely abandoned, and almost

every person remaining had the fever.

In one day, twenty-

two persons had fallen victim to the fever and about 160
new cases had occurred.

According to Dowler's figures,

yellow fever claimed nearly 150 persons, or fifteen per
cent of the Thibodaux resident p o p u l a t i o n , i n his

19Tonet, "Reports Upon Yellow Fever," loc, cit.,
369-73; Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 844-902; De Bow's
Commercial Review, XV (December, 1853), 631-63; Dowler,
"Tableau of the Yellow Fever of 1853," loc. cit., 26-27,
20oowler, "Tableau of the Yellow Fever of 1853,"
loc, cit., 26; John McGrath, Scrapbook (Louisiana State
University Archives, Baton Rouge), 32 left, 39 right.
2lDe Bow's Commercial Review, XV (December, 1853) ,
631-32; Dowler, "Tableau of the Yellow Fever of 1853,"
loc. cit., 26,
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well-known account of travels through "The Cotton King
dom," Frederick Law Olmsted mentioned the epidemic in
commenting on Alexandria, which city he visited in December
of 1853,

He noted that the coiranunity ordinarily had a popu

lation of 1,000, but had been almost entirely deserted by
its citizens when the pestilence struck.

Of some 300 who

had remained in town, he was told that 120 had died,^^
Dr. Dowler estimated that one-fifth to one-sixth of Alex
andria's population had been wiped out by the disease and
that Lake Providence, where yellow fever had never appeared
before, had lost over half its small populationP
An experience such as the Great Epidemic of 1853
could scarcely be forgotten by those who lived through it,
not even by New Orleanians long accustomed to epidemic
disease.

This time, however, no intermission followed, no

summer or two in which the memory of epidemic yellow fever
might begin to fade.

The very next year the disease again

appeared in New Orleans and carried off almost 2,500

22prederick Law Olmsted, The Cotton Kingdom, edited
by Arthur M, Schlesinger (New York, 1953), 278,
23oowler, "Tableau of the Yellow Fever of 1853,"
loc, c i t ., 27,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

110
additional v i c t i m s , A l t h o u g h a rather destructive epi
demic in terms of fatalities, the pestilence of 1854
claimed less than a third of the number lost in 1853,

A

resident of New Orleans wrote in his diary in September:
"This is considered among the old residents one of the bad
'epidemic years' yet coming after the frightful pestilence
of last summer it seems to excite but little attention-such is the power of 'contrast.'"

In early November he

noted that "the epidemic just closing is pronounced the
worst that has ever existed in New Orleans except those of
1847 and 1853, . .
Not once throughout the entire season did the
Picayune admit the existence of a full-scale outbreak.
While publishing the weekly interment figures and Charity
Hospital reports, the editor repeatedly commented on the
freedom of the city from anything resembling epidemic dis
ease, apparently taking the disaster of 1853 as the new
standard for epidemics,^6

And by comparison to the

24garton, Cause and Prevention of Yellow Fever,
comparative table, preceding p, 1.
^^Thomas K, Wharton, Diary (Louisiana State Univer
sity Archives, Baton Rouge), September 21, November 6, 1854.
26picayune, August 4-December 4, 1854,
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epidemic of 1853, the visitation of 1854 was actually a
rather mild one, According to a report in the New Orleans
Medical and Surgical Journal, "in no former epidemic for
eighteen years has yellow fever yielded more readily to
timely medication."^7
The City Council reassembled in early October-after their recess during the sickly season.

Sardonically,

the Mayor informed the council members that in the absence
of a Board of Health during the epidemic, he had been un
able to obtain any information to present to them on the
subject of the fever.

However, he told them that it "was

similar to the awful calamity of the previous year."

In

regard to the "lamentable inefficiency" of a city govern
ment which failed to act in the interest of public health,
one citizen of New Orleans felt that "the ever patient,
enduring public has had enough of it--a change must come,
and that soon."^®
Even as the pestilence of 1854 was considerably
less virulent in New Orleans than its predecessor, so was
its spread through the state less extensive.

It did,

27n . 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., XI (November, 1854), 416,
28wharton Diary, October 4, 1854.
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however, revisit Bayou Sara, Franklin, Pattersonville,
Washington, Thibodaux, Alexandria, and Cloutierville.
Places apparently experiencing yellow fever for the first
time included Jeanerette and Judge Baker's plantation in
St. Mary Parish and three small settlements in Plaquemine
Parish below New Orleans:
Hache, and Jesuit's

Bend.

Buras Settlement, Point a la
29

The first two major epidemics of the 1850's result
ed in an intensified investigation of the facts relating
to yellow fever, its cause, transmission, and possible
prevention.

Thousands of words filling hundreds of pages .

poured forth from the pens of physicians, newspapermen,
and others on the subject of the disease.

With so much

new experiential data, the old theoretical fight became
more intense than ever.

There were those who still

believed the fever to be non-contagious, locally-caused,
and spread by that indefinable essence, the "epidemic
constitution of the atmosphere."

Others had come to

believe that the disease was imported to New Orleans from
Latin America and transmitted elsewhere, if not by

Z^Toner, "Reports Upon Yellow Fever," loc. cit.,
369-73; Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 844-902; Pica
yune , September 29, 1854.
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infected persons then by goods or baggage infected in some
yet unknown manner.
The old attitude of fatalistically accepting the
inevitable recurrence of the pestilence received a fairly
severe blow from the unparalleled impact of the disease
in 1853.

In the midst of the fever's worst ravages, the

Picayune published a letter to the editor expressing the
beginning of a change in public opinion.

The writer com

plained that New Orleans had suffered too long without
exerting any real effort to thwart the recurring evil.
Aware of the fact that many medical men ridiculed the
idea of quarantine measures and that commercial interests
opposed any such restrictions, he also knew, on the other
hand, of reliable physicians who favored inspection and
quarantine of incoming vessels as a possible means of hold
ing out yellow fever.

Furthermore, he noted, "public

opinion is daily growing more and more strong in favor of
such . , . regulations."30

The New Orleans Picayune pre

sented a steady stream of editorials demanding both
quarantine and sanitation measures against the Saffron
Scourge.

While the importationists and the local

3Qpicayune, August 11, 1853,
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causationists carried on the interminable argument, the
two proposed weapons against yellow fever might be tested.
"Amid all the uncertainty . . .

we think it may safely be

assumed, that either they [the epidemics] are of local
generation, or they are of foreign importation; or they
are both," the editor reasoned.

Hence, both internal and

external sanitary measures should be established "to meet
all the postulates."3*1
The Louisiana legislature considered the quarantine
issue early in 1854, but reaching no agreement, postponed
the final resolution of the problem until the following
session.

The epidemic visitation which occurred in the

summer of 1854 strengthened the public demand for protec
tive measures, and finally on March 15, 1855, the law
makers passed "An Act to Establish Quarantine for the
Protection of the State," therewith creating a board of
health to administer the quarantine--Louisiana's first
State Board of Health and the first state board in the
country as well,^^

31lbid«, September 25, 1853.
^^Ibid,, March 9, 14, 18, 19, 1854; "An Act to Estab
lish Quarantine for the Protection of the State," Acts
Passed by the Second Legislature of the State of Louisiana,
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Unfortunately, Yellow Jack arrived in New Orleans
in the summer of 1855 before the Board was able to make
all the necessary arrangements for establishing the quaran
tine stations,33

For the third time in three successive

years the Crescent City experienced a yellow fever epi
demic.

In August the editor of the New Orleans Medical

and Surgical Journa1 wrote:

"The Yellow Fever of 1853-4-

5, a triune or triennial epidemic, though temporarily
suspended during the winter season, rages still in New
Orleans."

And, he added:

"The illusory hopes and flat

tering prognostications which many persons indulged, that
the unparalleled epidemic of 1853 had exhausted itself or

at Its Second Session . . . 1855 (New Orleans, 1855), 47177; see also Gordon E, Gillson, "The Louisiana State Board
of Health: The Formative Years" (Ph.D. Dissertation,
Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, 1960),
33Report of the Board of Health of the State of
Louisiana to the Honorable Senate and House of Representa
tives [for 1855] (New Orleans, 1856), 10. The reports of
the Louisiana State Board of Health, which vary slightly
in title form frcwf year to year, will be cited hereinafter
as Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health with the
year for which the report was made.
The Act of 1855 provided for three quarantine
stations: down the Mississippi River from New Orleans;
at the mouth of the Atchafalaya River; and at the Rigolets, the entrance from the Gulf to Pontchartrain.
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rather the food on which it fed, have ended in disappoint
ment,”

The high point of the epidemic occurred in the

third week of August, when the fever claimed almost 400
victims.

In gradually building up to that point from late

June, the fever had caused a total mortality of almost
1,300, and in its gradual decline from late August to late
October, it destroyed approximately 1,300 more.

At the

close of the epidemic the editor of the New Orleans Medical
and Surgical Journal commented rather poetically on the
"pestilential storm" which once again had swept through New
Orleans.

In spite of all, he asserted proudly, "The be-

leagured city, after a three years' pestilential siege,
stands forth like a scarred veteran, yet strong, hopeful,
undismayed, unconquered and ready to meet the inexorable
decrees of fate quietly and without r e t r e a t i n g . A c c o r d 
ing to the report of Louisiana's first State Board of
Health, the Crescent City had suffered a total loss of
2,670 yellow fever deaths that season,

3S

A resident of New Orleans, writing in his diary in

^^N. 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., XII (September, 1855),
285; XII (November, 1855), 432.
35Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for
1856, 25.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

117
late September of 1855, expressed the opinion that the
"worst feature" of the epidemic was "its general diffusion
thro* this State and lower Mississippi,"

He noted that in

previous years **the timid found a safe retreat from the
scourge of the city in the country towns and on the Planta
tions of the coast--[but] now the country is no longer
safe."

Since the epidemic of 1853, "the whole Southern

portion of the United States seems to have become the home
of 'the fever,'" he wrote,

. particularly , , , along

the water courses and in the marshy Bays and inlets of the
sea and Gulf Coasts."

36

In spreading through the state of

Louisiana the pestilence of 1855 touched more points than
the previous one of 1854, but neither could rank with the
outbreak of 1853 in extensiveness.

The 1855 fever extended

up the Mississippi to Baton Rouge, Plaquemine, and Point
Coupee Parish; up the Red to Alexandria; all along the
Ouachita and Black rivers ; and to various points in the
southern part of the state, including Pattersonville,
Centerville, and St, Martinville on the Teche, and also New
Iberia,37

36wharton Diary, September 30, 1855,
3?Toner, "Reports Upon Yellow Fever," loc. cit.,
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The next two years passed without epidemic incident.
According to the Board of Health reports, only 74 yellow
fever deaths occurred in New Orleans in 1856, and only 199
in 1857.38

in the summer and fall of 1858, however, the

Crescent City experienced another violent epidemic, out
ranked only by the great visitation of 1853.
In the August issue of the New Orleans Medical News
and Hospital Gazette, the editor reported that the fever
of 1858 had first appeared in the middle of June.

At that

point, he said, it was yet impossible to predict its future
progress.

Almost entirely confined to the working classes,

especially along the waterfront, the disease had not yet
become "anything like epidemic."

But, he noted, the mass

exodus from New Orleans was already under way.

In the

September issue the editor admitted the impossibility of
accurately predicting the course of yellow fever "until
more is known of the coming and going of this terrible
scourge."

An epidemic was clearly in progress in the city

369-73; Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 844-902; Pica
yune , September 20, 25, 1855.
38Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for
1856, 34; New Orleans Medical News and Hospital Gazette, V
(March, 1858), 42.
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and had been for some time.^^
In early August of 1858 a New Orleanian wrote in
his diary:

"The subject of Yellow Fever is beginning to

excite attention.

The rapid increase of deaths in the

Hospital , . . shows its epidemic character, and there is
no doubt that it bears the genuine West India type."^®
He continued to write of its increasing prevalence, noting
that "the fever this year is of a very vicious type."

In

late August he commented on the extent of the epidemic:
". . . it is everywherel--in the houses of the rich and
the houses of the poor."

This diarist, a keen observer,

also recorded his impressions of the city, which seemed
"subdued and still--more like a village in summertide as
far as human action is concerned.
In late September and early October, the fever con
tinued to carry off hundreds of victims weekly.

In spite

of repeated warnings in the newspapers, a steady stream of
strangers poured into the city, "furnishing fresh food to

39n . 0. Med. News & Hosp. Gaz., V (August, 1858),
390-91; V (September, 1858), 481.
^O^harton Diary, August 6, 1858.
41lbid., August 30, September 3, 1858.
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the destroyer,”

Finally, by mid-November the worst was

over.42
Although disseminated widely through the South,
apparently the fever of 1858 did not attack Louisiana
extensively outside of New Orleans,

It seems to have

appeared only in Plaquemine, Baton Rouge, Algiers, Gretna,
McDonoughville, and Franklin; however, there may have been
outbreaks in many other small towns which were simply not
recorded in the medical journals and larger newspapers.
The Saffron Scourge hit many points outside Louisiana that
year, including Galveston, Houston, Brownsville, Pass
Christian, Biloxi, Vicksburg, Natchez, Woodville, Mobile,
Savannah, and Charleston,
Having failed to prevent a highly malignant epidemic,
Louisiana's quarantine system came under attack from many
quarters in 1858,

The quarantine act had enemies from its

very inception, particularly among the shipping and com
mercial interests who opposed its economic effects and
physicians who adamantly insisted that yellow fever was

42picayune, October 10, November 16, 23, 1858,

43xoner, "Reports Upon Yellow Fever," loc, cit,,
369-73; Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 844-902; N, 0.
Med, & Surg, Jour,, XV (November, 1858), 811.
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not, and could not be, imported.

The epidemic of 1858

undoubtedly turned many New Orleanians against quarantine,
many who had counted on the new system to protect the city
from yellow fever's ravages.

The editor of the New Orleans

Bee in September of 1858 criticized the system as both use
less and costly and insisted that the disease was obviously
"of indigenous

o

r

i

g

i

clusions at this point;

n

.

xhere were two possible con

either yellow fever was an import

ed disease, and the quarantine system had not been effective
in screening it put; or yellow fever was of native origin,
and quarantine an unnecessary expense.
The Board of Health chose the first alternative as
the explanation for the epidemic of 1858.

Insisting that

the fever was an imported disease, the Board's Report for
1858 stated that quarantine failed because legislative
amendments to the original act had rendered it ineffective.
In amending the act in March of 1858, the legislature had
reduced the detention period of those vessels coming from
infected ports which presented a clean bill of health on
arrival.

Denouncing this amendment as a concession to

commercial interests, the Board of Health felt that it

44 Bee, September 4, 1858.
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seriously compromised the practicality of the original act.
Furthermore, they recommended a series of new amendments
to increase the effectiveness of the quarantine program.
The epidemic of 1858, together with the three other
serious visitations in the 1850's, represents the climax of
yellow fever's activities and marks a turning point in its
history in Louisiana.

The Great Epidemic of 1853, so

devastating in its effects, so widespread in extent, and
followed by three more outbreaks within a five-year period,
led to a revived interest in an old issue relating to
yellow fever, an issue which had never been solved, although
it had been shelved from time to time:

what exactly was

the cause of the yellow pestilence, and how could it be
prevented?

Was it a gaseous substance spontaneously gen

erated from filth and spread through the atmosphere?
Influenced by heat and wet weather?

A specific living

entity transmitted from person to person?
sanitation, by quarantine, by both?

Preventable by

Or what?

No one knew.

Hundreds of questions could be posed; none could be

45Report of the Louisiana State
1858, 20, 28-32 ;~*TAn Act Supplementary
'An Act relative to Quarantine,'" Acts
Legislature of Louisiana, at its First
(Baton Rouge, 1858), 187-89.

Board of Health for
to an Act entitled
passed by the Fourth
Session . . . 1858
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answered with any finality.

One New Orleanian, writing in

1853, summed up the problem in this manner:

"The truth is,

that nothing--absolutely nothing--is known of its [yellow
fever's] cause, although it has been studied attentively
for more than a century, with all the aids that modern
science could a f f o r d . T h e battle between local causationists and importationists raged fiercely through the
decade of the fifties.

Although a quarantine system had

been effected in 1855, and continued with various modifi
cations from then on, by no means was there anything like
a unanimity of opinion of the subject.

For the remainder

of the nineteenth century, the issue of quarantine pro
vided a continual topic for debate.

At any rate, nothing

short of absolute nonintercourse during the hot months, or
a long detention period for vessels, together with a
fumigation process thorough enough to destroy the yet
unsuspected mosquito, could have proved effective in hold
ing out the disease.

Nevertheless, the new State Board of

Health, operating under tremendous handicaps, tried des
perately to effect measures designed to preserve the health
of the Crescent City.

46oe Bow's Commercial Review, XV (December, 1853),
632.
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The State Board of Health Itself, created originally
to administer the quarantine system, was, in a sense, a by
product of the Great Epidemic, and with the addition of
further duties and powers, would in time evolve into a
vital state institution.

Furthermore, the epidemics of

the fifties shocked the people of New Orleans into a reevaluation of their mortality statistics, which would
ultimately result in a great awakening on the subject of
the city's insalubrity.

Still the sanitary revolution

was a long time coming.
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YELLOW FEVER MORTALITY IN NEW ORLEANS,
1848-1858

Year

Estimated Deaths

Population (Approx.)

1848

872

116,000

1849

769

1850

107

1851

17

1852

456

*1853

7,849 to 8,400

154.000

*1854

2,300 to 2,500

157.000

*1855

2,670

1856

74

1857

199

*1858

4,855

159.000

166,000

*Major epidemics.
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DISTRIBUTION OF YELLOW FEVER IN LOUISIANA
OUTSIDE OF NEW ORLEANS, 1848-1858*
Places

1852

1853

1854

1855

1858

Alexandria
X
X
X
Algiers
X
X
Baton Rouge
X
X
X
Bayou Sara
X
X
Carrollton
?
X
Centerville
X
X
Clinton
X
Cloutierville
X
X
Covington
X
Donaldsonville
X
Franklin
X
X
X
Grand Encore
X
Gretna
?
X
Harrisonburg
X
Lake Providence
X
McDonoughville
X
Madisonville
X
Natchitoches
X
New Iberia
X
Opelousas
X
Paincourtville
X
Pattersonville
X
X
X
Plaquemine
X
X
X
Plaquemines Parish
X
Point Coupee Parish
X
St. Francisville
X
St. John Baptiste
X
St. Martinville
X
St. Mary Parish
X
Shreveport
X
Thibodaux
X
X
Trenton
X
X
Vidalia
X
Washington
x
X
X
Waterproof______________________________________X_________
*Drawn up on the basis of scattered evidence and
testimony. The disease probably occurred in many other
small towns not listed here, and might well have prevailed
to some degree in the listed points during years not checked.
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CHAPTER IV

AN INTERREGNUM, 1859-1866

After the succession of epidemics in the fifties,
unparalleled both in frequency and malignancy. New Orleans
enjoyed a respite from epidemic yellow fever, the like of
which had not been experienced since the initial visita
tion of 1796.

In eight years, between the outbreaks of

1858 and 1867, Yellow Jack claimed a total of only about
300 victims, and in 1861, for the first time in over a halfcentury, not a single death from the yellow pestilence was
reported in the Crescent City.

For the better portion of

that period in which yellow fever seemed to have abdicated
its throne in New Orleans, the American nation suffered the
agonies of its great Civil War, and New Orleans itself
underwent the experience of military occupation by the
forces of the Northern enemy.
The relationship between the Civil War and the health
of New Orleans attracted the attention of the Louisiana
State Board of Health even before the capture of the Cres
cent City by the Yankees.

Late in 1861 the Board reported
127
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a total mortality of only about 5,500 for the entire year,
without a single death from yellow fever.

They attributed

this incredible phenomenon to the indirect benefits of the
Federal blockade, "partial though it may have been," which,
together with Louisiana's quarantine restrictions, had cut
down the possibilities of introducing disease from a
foreign port.

It had been suggested, the Board stated,

that the diminution of the usual summer population by the
numbers then in military service would account for the
decrease in mortality.

However, the Board of Health con

sidered this theory fallacious.

They pointed out that the

very conditions which had led away many to the army had
resulted in the continued presence in New Orleans of those
who ordinarily spent the summer in the North or in Europe,^
At least one resident of the Crescent City agreed with the
Board's position on the indirect advantages resulting from
the Yankee blockade, for he wrote in his diary in July of
1861:

, , the impudent 'Lincoln blockade' is acting in

our favor by keeping out the yellow fever, and stimulating
our heretofore dormant industry and self-reliance.

^Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for
1861, 4,
^Wharton Diary, July 28, 1861,
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The city of New Orleans fell to the Union forces in
late April of 1362 and remained under military occupation
for the duration of the war.

Yellow fever, a subject much

in the minds of both the conquerors and the conquered, was
a source of great fear and dread to the one, of hope and
encouragement to the other.

General Benjamin F, Butler, in

command of the Federal occupation forces during the first
year, later wrote:

”1 learned that the rebels were actual

ly relying largely upon the yellow fever to clear out the
Northern troops, the men of New England and the Northwest
. , , whom they had learned from experience were usually
the first victims of the scourge.”

Furthermore, he had

also heard "that in the churches [of New Orleans] prayers
were put up that the pestilence might come as a divine
interposition on behalf of the b r e t h r e n . A l t h o u g h he
found this difficult to believe, Butler noticed "many
things that render[ed] it almost probable,"

It seemed to

him that New Orleanians deliberately cultivated a "condition
of perfect nastiness" as if in the hope of generating the
fever.

But if they did offer up prayers, he said, they

^Benjamin F. Butler, Butler's Book (Boston, 1892),
396.
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did not do so aloud in the churches because Federal soldiers
attended their services.

However, "in the course of the

liturgy the clergyman always gave out at a certain point
...

an opportunity for silent prayer," the General noted,

"and then the people either prayed for the yellow fever, or
Jefferson Davis to come there victorious; neither of which
was comforting to the Yankee worshiper. , ,
The hopeful expectation of an epidemic which would
wipe out the Yankees in the Crescent City was apparently
not confined solely to New Orleanians.

One newspaper in

Virginia consoled the people of the Confederacy over the
Union capture of New Orleans with this thought:

"They

have got the elephant, it is true, but it is a prize which
will cost them vastly more to keep than the animal is
worth, if his Saffron Majesty shall make his usual annual
visit to the city and wave his sceptre in the hospitals
there."5

^Benjamin F, Butler, "Some Experiences with Yellow
Fever and its Prevention," North American Review, CXLVII
(November, 1888), 530.
^Howard Palmer Johnson, "New Orleans under General
Butler," Louisiana Historical Quarterly, XXIV (April,
1941), 478.
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Northern soldiers, aware of the terrors of the fatal
pestilence for which New Orleans was infamous, also knew
about its obvious preference for the unacclimated stranger.
And not for one moment were the forces of occupation
allowed by the acclimated residents of New Orleans to for
get this terrifying fact.

Wishing to intensify this fear

among the troops, one citizen took a measuring tape, a
notebook, and a compatriot along on a sardonic mission.
Approaching a group of Federal soldiers, he began to
measure their height with the tape and jot down notations
of the same.

When asked the meaning of this action, he

replied that a contract had been obtained for making 10,000
coffins, which would be needed ultimately for the steady
stream of Yankee replacements sent in as yellow fever
carried them off, one by one.

Even the children of the

Crescent City participated in the harassment of the United
States troops.

In late May and early June of 1862 they

jeered at the soldiers in the streets:
Yellow Jack will grab them up
And take them all away.&

^Elisabeth Joan Doyle, "Civilian Life in Occupied
New Orleans, 1862-65” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Louisiana State
University, Baton Rouge, 1955), 56-57.
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The citizens of New Orleans would have welcomed the
arrival of the Saffron Scourge in the summer of 1862,

They

would have accepted gladly the aid of their old enemy
against the new adversary from the North.

According to

General Butler, all their conversations in the presence of
his officers included descriptions of past epidemic horrors,
especially the disaster of 1853.

Under a constant barrage

of this demoralizing propaganda, Butler's men soon began
to evidence its effects.

Many of the officers were panic-

stricken and depressed; some requested a transfer to a
different area; others offered every conceivable excuse
for a leave.

But the General held firm and proceeded to

study the problem of yellow fever in order to circumvent
the coming of an epidemic.

First of all, he asked an old

New Orleans physician about ways and means to keep out the
fever.

No means existed, he was told, and no way to pre

vent its spread once under way.

The physician admitted

that quarantine of incoming vessels might be useful, but
the presence of unacclimated troops together with the un
sanitary condition of the city made it likely that the dis
ease, if it broke out at all, would rage with great fury.
Butler then obtained some books on the subject and a map of
New Orleans indicating the localities where yellow fever
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usually prevailed.

Upon investigation of those places, he

found them uniformly "filthy with rotting matter,
After much reading, investigating, and thinking on
the subject of the yellow pestilence. General Butler devel
oped his own theory of the fever.

He concluded that exhala

tions from putrid animal matter produced typhus fever and
that exhalations from rotting vegetable matter produced
congestive fevers.

But with morbific matter from both

animal and vegetable sources present in an atmosphere and
the seeds or germs of yellow fever added to it, the Saffron
Scourge would be propagated in epidemic form and would
spread through that portion of the atmosphere contaminated
by both animal and vegetable effluvia.

In Butler's con

sidered opinion, yellow fever was not indigenous to New
Orleans; its "seeds" had to be imported.

It was possible,

he thought, for the seeds to last through the winter hidden
away in woolen clothing and protected from the frost.
Without the dual contamination of the atmosphere, however,
he believed the seeds, whether imported fresh or preserved
through the winter, would be unable to propagate.

Having

settled upon three indispensable factors involved in the

^Butler*s Book, 398-400,
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production of an epidemic, Butler set out to deal with
them.

First of all, since he believed yellow fever seeds

to be imported, he instituted a strict quarantine on the
Mississippi River below New Orleans.

Secondly, he rea

lized it would be impossible to dispose of all decaying
vegetable matter because of the dense growth around the
city.

But if a combination of animal and vegetable ele

ments was required to produce an epidemic atmosphere, the
disposal of either one of the two would suffice.

He was

convinced that putrid animal matter and filth could be
cleared away.

Having clearly outlined the problem in his

mind. General Butler set to work to accomplish the two
indicated objectives;

instituting an effective quarantine

g
system and cleaning up the city of New Orleans.

Interest

ingly enough, his theory represented a composite of
practically all the epidemiological concepts which had been
floating around for centuries, and his program of prevention
combined the two suggestions so long debated by yellow
fever philosophers:

quarantine and sanitation.

Although previous attempts had been made to institute
such measures, never before had sanitation and quarantine

Sibid., 400-401, 407-408.
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been so rigorously enforced in New Orleans as they were
under Butler,

He established a very strict quarantine

system at the regular station seventy miles below New
Orleans where, in his words, "thirty-two and sixty-eight
pound shots should be the messengers to execute the health
orders,"

All vessels coming up river were required to

stop below Fort St, Philip, about five miles down river
from the quarantine station, for inspection by the health
officer, who then reported to the General the condition of
the vessel, its passengers, crew, and cargo.

If the quaran

tine physician reported a clean bill of health and Butler
in turn telegraphed his consent, then and only then could
the vessel proceed up river to the Crescent City,

"If any

vessel attempted to evade quarantine regulations and pass
up without being examined," said General Butler, "the vessel
was to be stopped if there was power enough in the fort to
do it."

Unlike Louisiana's lawmakers who had drafted the

state's quarantine legislation, Butler accepted the literal
meaning of the term quarantine and required any ship with
any infectious sickness on board to remain at the station
for forty days, after which another thorough inspection was
necessary.

Furthermore, all vessels from ports where

yellow fever was prevailing had to spend forty days in
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quarantine, whether they arrived with a clean bill of
health or not.*
General Butler obtained the services of a competent
physician to administer the inspection and report on the
condition of incoming vessels and paid him well for perform
ing these duties.

The General threatened to invoke the

death penalty, however, should this physician make false
reports and allow an infected ship to come up to New
Orleans.

According to Butler's account, only on one

occasion during his command in 1862 did yellow fever slip
through the stringent quarantine, and this was not because
of negligence on the part of the quarantine physician.
Butler himself had allowed a tug carrying much-needed pro
visions from New York to come up river without undergoing
the forty-day detention, accepting the captain's oath that
coal, and only coal, had been taken on at the Nassau stop
where yellow fever prevailed.

Several days later two cases

of fever appeared in the French quarter in the persons of
two passengers from Nassau who had come in on the tug.
military took over immediately and surrounded the square
where the cases were located.

Under Butler's order

9lbid., 401.
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certain acclimated persons went in to attend the patients
and came out only after being thoroughly cleansed.

Fires

fed with tar and pitch burned day and night at the four
corners of the square.

When the two patients died, every

thing in and around the building which Butler thought
might harbor yellow fever seeds were burned; even the
bodies were cremated.

No other cases developed, but the

deceitful captain of the tug spent three months in jail and
paid a fine of $ 5 0 0 .
On first assuming control of New Orleans, General
Butler had not intended to undertake the problem of sanitary
reform, but rather expected to leave the administration of
sanitary laws, together with other ordinary civic functions,
in the hands of the duly constituted municipal government.
He soon realized, however, the necessity of positive action
on his part against what he considered the causative forces
of yellow f e v e r . A f t e r having established quarantine

IQibid., 403; 408-10. Writing on another occasion,
Butler mentioned only one case of yellow fever imported
from Nassau. See Butler, "Some Experiences with Yellow
Fever and its Prevention," loc. cit., 531, 536-37; and The
Medical and Surgical History of the War of the Rebellion,
Part III, Vol. I (Washington, 1888), 675-76.
11James Parton. General Butler in New Orleans (New
York, 1864), 295.
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regulations, Butler proceeded to the "Herculean task" of
cleaning up the city of New Orleans, early in June of 1862.
In a message to the Military Governor and the New Orleans
City Council, General Butler directed that the city employ
a force of two thousand men, fully equipped with the
necessary tools and under adequate supervision, for a
period of at least thirty working days, to clean the
streets, squares, and unoccupied lands of the city.

Seek

ing the full cooperation of the council, Butler played
upon their sentiment in this manner:

"The epidemic so

earnestly prayed for by the wicked will hardly sweep away
the strong man, although he may be armed, and leave the
weaker woman and child untouched."

Reminding them of the

presence of many women and children who ordinarily left New
Orleans during the summer months, he said, "The miasma
which sickens the one [the troops] will harm the

other.

"^2

One squad from the cleansing force was sent to the
French Market with an order "accompanied by a few bayonets"
that the area be cleaned.

The superintendent in charge of

the market said he could not have it done; nevertheless,
the clean-up crew went ahead with the task, scraped up the

l^Butler's Book, 403-404.
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filth, sent it down the river, and charged him with the
expense.

It is not surprising that General Butler gave top

priority to the cleansing of this particular area.

On first

inspecting the place, he had been shocked by its filthy
state.

"In the French market," he wrote, "the stall women

were accustomed to drop on the floor around their stalls
all the refuse made in cleaning their birds, meat, and
fish."
in.

Furthermore, he added, "Here it was trodden in and

This had been going on for a century more or less."^^
The sanitary forces then went through the streets,

clearing away all putrefying animal matter, scraping and
sweeping out every drain and ditch in the city.

The city

water-works was ordered to flush the streets with all its
pumps, and as the water flowed through the freshly cleaned
drains and ditches into the canals leading to Lake Pontchartrain, the accumulated filth was forced out into the
Lake and eventually into the Gulf.
Strict orders were issued to the people of New
Orleans on the subject of cleanliness.

The head of every

l^ibid., 400, 406; Butler, "Some Experiences with
Yellow Fever and its Prevention," loc. cit », 536.
l^Butler's Book, 406-407; Butler, "Some Experiences
with Yellow Fever and its Prevention," loc. cit., 536.
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household was forced to have his premises cleaned inside
and out to meet the approval of military inspectors.

It

was directed that all refuse from each household be depo
sited in a box or barrel acceptable to the inspector, and
on two or three specified days a week that the receptacle
be placed at the end of the street.

From that point the

receptacle's contents would be picked up and hauled off by
mule teams.

Those in charge of the wagons would disinfect

the containers with chloride of lime if necessary.

Further

more, all persons were expressly forbidden to throw any
thing of any kind into the streets, alleys, or any open
spaces, including their own back yards.
One might expect that such strict regulations would
be most difficult to enforce.

Not at all, declared Butler,

and he provided several examples to illustrate his point.
One citizen, deliberately testing the order, walked along
the street and called a policeman to watch him throw down
a small piece of white paper.

Informed of this willful

disobedience, Butler sent for the man, who admitted the
act and insisted it was his privilege to toss paper.
General replied that "the streets were made to pass

l^Butler's Book, 404.
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through, and when he took his privilege I would take mine
and pass him through the streets into the parish prison to
stay three months."

Another case involved a "high-toned

woman" who tried to ignore the sanitary regulations.

A

"fashionable lady" of New Orleans adamantly refused to
clean her back yard, which contained a box of excrement
not yet hauled off from the privy.
military inspector

that her back yard was "as I choose to

have it, and it won't be altered
Yankee."

When theofficer told her

clothes she wanted

She informed the

at the order of any
to gather up whatever

to take along to jail, she burst into

tears and agreed to accept another opportunity to comply
with the regulations.

By the next afternoon, "the yard

was in apple-pie order.
Even Butler with all his efforts apparently was un
able to attain a perfect state of purity in New Orleans,
In August of 1862 the editor of the Daily True Delta com
plained of the filthy gutters.

Having observed several

with green scum on the water "thick enough to bear the
weight of a small-sized bird," he recommended that the
authorities attend to the removal of all such pestilential

IGibid,, 405-406,
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influences.17

Nevertheless, General Butler must be given

credit for whipping New Orleans into what was perhaps a
better sanitary condition than it had ever enjoyed before.
In November of 1862 the Picayune stated that only once
before had the Crescent City been so clean; a relatively
pristine condition had prevailed immediately after the dis
aster of 1853 when the city government had been aroused
temporarily to action.

After the Civil War, even the most

acrimonious rebel was willing to admit that General Benja
min F, Butler had been "the best scavenger we ever had
among us."l®
When the Union forces assumed control of New Orleans
in the spring of 1862, none of Butler's surgeons had ever
seen a case of yellow fever or possessed any knowledge about
combatting the "hideous foe,"

In July, after the inaugura

tion of sanitation and quarantine measures, a pamphlet was
prepared, with the assistance of several New Orleans phy
sicians, for the instruction of the Union surgeons in the
Department of the Gulf,

It outlined in detail the symptoms

for diagnosis and prognosis, in addition to a course of

l^New Orleans Daily True Delta, August 20, 1862,
Johnson, "New Orleans under General Butler," loc,
c i t ,, 478.
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treatment for yellow fever.

The pamphlet stated that every

precaution had been taken to prevent the fever’s occurrence,
but emphasized the ever-present possibility of an outbreak,
as well as the duty of an army surgeon to be prepared for
all emergencies.19

Fortunately for the Yankees, the first

year of the Federal occupation of New Orleans passed with
only two known deaths from yellow fever.

Since the records

are imperfect, it is possible that several other deaths
occurred.

The significant fact is, however, that in spite

of the appearance of a few cases, the pestilence did not
spread to any noticeable extent.20
In November of 1862 General Nathaniel P. Banks was
appointed to replace "Beast” Butler as Major-General Com
manding the Department of the Gulf,

When Butler left New

Orleans in December, he stated in his Farewell Address to
the citizens of the Crescent City:

"I have demonstrated

that the pestilence can be kept from your borders.

. , , I

have cleansed and improved your streets, canals, and public

19Butler’s Book, 398; Some Practical Observations
on Yellow Fever, Published for the Use of Surgeons of the
Volunteer Forces ïn The Department of the Gulf (NewUrleans,
1862).
2%.

0, Med. & Surg. Jour., XXIII (July, 1870), 569,
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squares.

?1

, .

One Creole of New Orleans took a slight

ly different view of the subject, according to a story
printed in the Picayune several years later.

When asked

to admit that Butler had demonstrated great ability in pre
serving the Crescent City from pestilence while in command
there, the New Orleanian supposedly said:
take me vor?
is mercie?

You no believe in a God?

"By gar, vat you

You no believe zere

Yellow fever and G-e-n-e-r-e-1 Butler at the

same time 11!"^^
During the remainder of the war period, sanitary
regulations were administered and enforced through the co
operative efforts of General Banks (in command of the Depart
ment) , the Military Governor, the Mayor of the city, the
Provost-Marshal, the Medical Director of the Department,
and specially appointed Sanitary Inspectors,

Quarantine

regulations continued in force, although never quite as
strictly administered as under General Butler.^3

Among the

Zlparton, General Butler in New Orleans, 605.
22picayune, November 14, 1867.
Z^Elisha Harris, "Hygienic Experience in New Orleans
during the War:
Illustrating the Importance of Efficient
Sanitary Regulations," Southern Journal of the Medical
Sciences, I (May, 1866), 25-30; Doyle, "Civilian Life in
Occupied New Orleans, 1862-65," 66-67.
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civilian population of New Orleans, only two yellow fever
deaths were reported in 1863, six in 1864, and one in 1865.
In 1863 and 1864 yellow fever cases appeared on several
vessels of the river fleet, spreading frcwn there to the
Naval Hospital.
sive:

But even there the spread was not exten

about 100 cases in 1863 and 200 in 1864.^4
Under war-time occupation, the Board of Health had

been converted into a military bureau with the Medical
Director of the Department of the Gulf serving as presi
dent.

Not until April of 1866 was the Louisiana State

Board of Health reorganized on its pre-war basis, with six
members appointed by the Governor and three by the New
Orleans City Council.

Almost immediately the Board en

countered its traditional problems:

no power, no funds,

no cooperation from the municipal authorities.^5

In July

of 1866 the Picayune editor commented on the need for more
energetic enforcement of sanitary measures to remove the
potential sources of pestilence.

The editor felt that the

city authorities should pay more attention to "this cause

24n . 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., XXIII (July, 1870),
569-74.
ZSpeport of the Louisiana State Board of Health for
1866-67, 3-4.
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of complaint and of danger,
Provost-Marshal James Bowen, who served in New
Orleans for two years during the war, had predicted that
with the return of the "usual lax administration" of sani
tary regulations by the civil authorities New Orleans would
again be visited by the yellow

p
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l

e
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c

e

.

ful

fill his prophecy, both yellow fever and Asiatic cholera
appeared in New Orleans in 1866.

While cholera claimed

more than 1,200 victims, the Saffron Scourge struck lightly
that year, causing only 185 fatalities.

But the following

year, 1867, witnessed a two-fold increase in the city's
total mortality over that of 1866 and a yellow fever epi
demic which caused more than 3,000

deaths.

In the spring of 1866 Dr. Erasmus Darwin Fenner
reviewed the subject of health in New Orleans under military
rule to determine what lessons might be learned for future
application.

He praised the tremendous efforts exerted by

26picayune, July 24, 1866.
Z^Harris, "Hygienic Experience in New Orleans during
the War," loc. c i t ., 30.
28Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for
June 1866-January 1867, 6, 12-13; Report of the Louisiana
State Board of Health for 1867, 18, 20.
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the authorities throughout that period toward the problem
of sanitary reform,

"Such efforts were never made here

before," he stated,"although so often urged by the medical
profession in previous years."

But, Dr. Fenner added,

"perhaps, it may be said such motives were never presented
before."

In spite of the war and the dark side of its

balance sheet, he felt that New Orleans should be grateful
for "this great sanitary experiment."

Compared to its pre

vious condition, the city had been kept unbelievably clean
throughout the period.

"It was a Herculean task," Fenner

declared, "and, in our humble opinion, nothing short of
military despotism would have accomplished it."^9
To Dr. Fenner the great lesson of the episode con
sisted in the validation of his theory of fever causation.
He had long held the opinion that filth and atmospheric con
tamination produced diseases of all sorts, including yellow
fever.

Following the premise of local causation, he had

always reasoned that sanitary measures would prove the best
means for preventing disease.

In contrast to this, many

29e , D. Fenner, "Remarks on
of the City of New Orleans, during
Military Occupation, from May 1862
Journal of the Medical Sciences, I

the Sanitary Condition
the period of Federal
to March 1866," Southern
(May, 1866), 22-23.
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persons attributed the freedom of New Orleans from epi
demic pestilences during war-time occupation to the
stringent quarantine measures.

But Fenner disagreed.

Although quarantine had been enforced rather strictly
through much of the period, he knew definitely about one
case imported from Key West; there were probably others.
Admitting the likelihood of several imported cases of
yellow fever each year during the period, he thought it
extraordinary that the disease had not become epidemic in
the city.

It could only be explained, of course, by the

strict enforcement of sanitary regulations.

And, as he

reasoned further, how could quarantine be expected to
afford complete protection against a disease which was
indigenous to New Orleans?^®
The "sanitary experience" of the period between
1862 and 1866 had provided "useful instruction," and Dr.
Fenner felt it should not be overlooked by the citizens of
New Orleans.

Suggesting that Generals Butler and Banks

deserved much credit for their achievements in the Crescent
City, he remarked:

"We may yet have occasion to mingle

some thanks among the many curses that have been heaped

30lbid., 23-24.
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upon their heads for their unnecessary severity upon the
citizens of New Orleans,"

For twenty years or more, some

physicians of the Crescent City had preached the gospel of
cleanliness without appreciable effect.

But, said Fenner,

"In the mysterious course of events the hand of the tyrant
has been brought to our aid, and the results are marvelous."
Now that the true path had been clearly demonstrated, not
only by logic but also by the Yankee experiment in not-sogentle persuasion. Dr. Fenner hoped that New Orleanians
would not fall by the wayside.
Dr. Stanford E. Chaille, eminent New Orleans phy
sician, editor, and medical educator, studied the facts
relating to yellow fever, and sanitation during the mili
tary occupation of New Orleans and arrived at conclusions
somewhat different from Dr. Fenner's.

Writing in 1870,

Chaille noted that many persons attributed the relative
freedom from yellow fever during the war to effective sani
tation measures.

He felt that the conclusion was "not

logically deducible from the true premises."
syllogism went something like this:

The faulty

For years New Orleans

had been visited by yellow fever epidemics which carried

31lbid., 24-25.
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off thousands of victims, and during those years the city
was incredibly filthy.

During the four-year period from

1862 through 1865 no epidemic occurred, and New Orleans was
one of the cleanest cities in the country.

Therefore, the

exemption from epidemics was due to the unusually clean
condition of the city.

Chaille then proposed to state the

"correct syllogism with the true premise" in this manner:
New Orleans enjoyed during eight years, 1859-66,
an exemption, unexampled in her history, from
yellow fever epidemics. During four of these
eight years, viz., 1859-60-61-66, the city suf
fered notoriously with its habitual filth, and
during the four remaining years, viz., 1862-65,
it enjoyed an unusual degree of cleanliness.
--- ----- what?
Therefore,
If sanitary measures protected the city during the war
years, what factor operated in the other non-epidemic
years before and after the war, when New Orleans was as
09

filthy as ever?

Chaille*s question is a significant

one, and not entirely answerable even in the light of
modern medical knowledge.
The mortality from various diseases among the occupa
tion forces in the Crescent City was great enough as it
was; had the Saffron Scourge raged, as New Orleanians for

32 n . 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., XXIII (July, 1870).
589-92.
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once hoped it might, the death toll would have been exceed
ingly great.
Yankees!

One can safely say that luck was with the

It is impossible to determine just how much the

rigid enforcement of quarantine and sanitary measures had
to do with the city's exemption from a yellow fever epi
demic during war-time occupation.

Quarantine, when

literally enforced, would have held out the disease, but
after Butler, the detention period was generally reduced
from forty days to ten.

Moreover, yellow fever was defi

nitely imported on several occasions, but failed to spread
extensively.

Sanitary regulations might have reduced the

incidence of certain endemic diseases and certainly eli
minated some of the offensive, if not pestilential, odors
of the city.

Such measures would hardly have affected the

yellow fever mosquito, however, which chose cisterns and
indoor water receptacles as breeding places in preference
to gutters, stagnant pools, and swamps.

Many factors, some

affected by chance, are necessary for the production of a
full-scale yellow fever epidemic.

In addition, there is

the problem of the not-yet-fully understood virus itself,
known only by its activities, and evidencing a considerable
amount of variability in those activities over a long
period of time.

For whatever reason, yellow fever had
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already begun its gradual retreat from the New Orleans
sector after reaching the height of its activity in the
1850's.

Although the disease continued to excite much

interest in the second half of the century, except for two
or three major outbreaks its appearances were mild in
nature,
Unlike Dr. Chaille, many people tended to overlook
the years immediately before and after the war when no epi
demic had occurred.

A tremendous impression had been

created by the simultaneity of three factors during the war
years:

strictly enforced sanitary measures, rigid quaran

tine, and the absence of a yellow fever epidemic.

As a

result, many were thoroughly convinced that either quaran
tine or sanitation or both had prevented the occurrence of
an epidemic.

Medical opinion, although still divided,

began to incline toward the support of quarantine, as well
as sanitation.33

Public opinion moved one small step

closer toward recognizing the validity of regulatory mea
sures to preserve the health of the city.

In spite of the

faulty logic involved, an attitude slightly more favorable
to the idea of public health had undoubtedly developed out
of the events of the Civil War period.

33lbid., 563-64.
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YELLOW FEVER MORTALITY IN NEW ORLEANS,
1859-1866

Year

Estimated Deaths

Population (Approx,)

1859

92

167,000

1860

15

1861

0

1862

2

*1863

2

*1864

6

1865

1

1866

185 to 192

178,000

*During 1863 and 1864, some 100 and 200 cases, res
pectively, occurred in the United States river fleet,
resulting in a number of deaths, but the disease failed to
spread to the city.
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CHAPTER V

INTERMITTENT VISITATIONS, 1867-1899

Yellow fever's activity in Louisiana in the last
third of the nineteenth century presented a picture remark
ably different from its earlier pattern.

Prevailing ideas,

attitudes, and reactions toward the fever also underwent
some rather striking changes.

On the other hand many

characteristics of its earlier history, remained the same.
Problems and controversies involving quarantine, sanita
tion, the Board of Health, coranercial interests, and the
New Orleans City Council continued throughout, with varia
tions on old themes and the introduction of several new
ones.

The mystery of yellow fever causation and trans

mission persisted to the end of the century.

Although in

the early 1880's Carlos Finlay of Cuba advanced the idea
of yellow fever's transmission by the mosquito, that hypo
thesis attracted little attention at the time.

The germ

theory, however, gained widespread acceptance in the 1870's
and 1880's and led to an intensive but fruitless search
for the yellow fever germ in the blood and excretions of
154
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patients.
In the thirty-three years from 1867 through 1899,
New Orleans and Louisiana experienced five epidemics:

only

two, in 1867 and 1878, which could compare with earlier
visitations in terms of mortality, and three relatively
mild outbreaks, in 1870, 1873, and 1897.

During seventeen

of

the thirty-three years, the annual yellow fever mortality

in

New Orleans ranged

fromone to sixty, and eleven years

passed without a single yellow fever death,^

On a number

of occasions the Saffron Scourge spread from the Crescent
City to other points around the state.

Except in 1867,

1873, and 1878, however, the disease exhibited a less
virulent character than it had in an earlier period.
One of the two most
in

the post Civil War

construction.

serious yellow fever epidemics

period occurred in 1867, during Re

The bitter conflict of the American Civil

War, terminated in the spring of 1865, was followed by a
long and turbulent period during which Union troops remain
ed in the South to oversee the work of Reconstruction.
Although the last of the troops were not removed from

Isee Chart, "Yellow Fever Mortality in New Orleans,
1867-1899," at the end of this chapter.
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Louisiana until the spring of 1877, the Board of Health
had been returned to civilian control in the spring of
1866, and the execution of sanitary regulations again be
came the responsibility of local authorities.

Without the

incentive provided by bayonet and military arrest. New
Orleans again succumbed to the elements of filth.

In May

of 1867 the editor of the New Orleans Picayune called
attention to the crowded and unsanitary tenement houses
and the drainage canals and gutters filled with garbage,
giving off ”a stench so rank it smells to heaven.”
Furthermore, he recommended that the Board of Health and
the municipal authorities take action before an epidemic
occurred, pointing out that after one started, there was
A

little anyone could do.^
After yellow fever appeared in the Crescent City in
July of 1867 and carried off a few victims, the Board of
Health then provided for the cleansing and disinfecting
of the fever localities.

Temporarily it seemed that the

disease had been halted, but early in August a malady
strongly resembling yellow fever erupted "with great
violence” at military headquarters.

Even then the

^Picayune, May 26, 1867.
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pestilence made slow progress for on August 14 the Board
of Health reported only a slight increase in fever cases
and declared New Orleans relatively healthy.

Neverthe

less, the Board strongly reccnnmended the use of carbolic
acid and sulphur as disinfectants,^
On August 22 General Philip S, Sheridan, United
States army commander in Louisiana, telegraphed to head
quarters in Washington that yellow fever had assumed an
epidemic character in New Orleans.

He requested that the

Chief Surgeon at New Orleans be authorized to employ
nurses to attend the stricken troops; his request was
granted immediately.

In spite of Sheridan's concern,

neither the Board of Health nor New Orleanians in general
yet considered the disease epidemic.

According to the

Crescent City's accepted usage of the term, a disease be
came epidemic only when its victims exceeded the total
number of fatalities from all other causes in a given
period.

On August 27 the Picayune editor observed that

most fever cases had occurred among the unacclimated
Europeans and Northerners, and he noted calmly:

"Seventy-

seven deaths in a week does not create much alarm in a

Sfbido, July 30, 31, August 3, 7, 14, 1867
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community that has suffered in the same space of time to
the number of nearly twelve

hundred.

In the September issue of the New Orleans Medical
and Surgical Journal the editor commented on yellow fever's
steady increase during August,

He admitted that an epi

demic might yet develop because of the high percentage of
unacclimated persons in the population, but insisted that
the malady thus far had been an unusually mild form of
fever.

At any rate, the editor remarked:

"New Orleans

has long enjoyed the distinction of preeminence in sickli
ness, as well as wickedness, among the cities of this
happy country, and we are not disposed now to take these
points up for controversy,"

Furthermore, he added

sarcastically, "As we are a people governed by majorities,
it is probably becoming to admit the logic and 'accept the
situation,
In spite of all hopes to the contrary, "Bronze John
on his Saffron Steed" continued to increase his ravages,
visiting virtually every street, and leaving "the evidence

4lbid., August 23, 27, 1867,
0, M e d , & Surg, Jour., XX (September, 1867),
284-86.
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of his malevolence” strewn about the city in September and
October>-200, 300, 400 fatalities per week.

On September

22 one New Orleans newspaper commented on the city's u n 
happy lot:

"How sad to think, laboring for months as we

have pertinaciously to recover from our political adversi
ties, that the trying ordeal of a terrible plague as we are
now suffering from should be inflicted upon us,”

Military

occupation, Reconstruction, and Yellow Jack seemed a bitter
potion to swallow simultaneously.

But, the editor reasoned,

the dispensations of the omniscient Almighty are undoubted
ly all for the best, whatever they may be.

By late

October the fever mortality had declined considerably.

On

November 1 a light frost occurred, resulting in a prediction
that the "Bronze Warrior” on his "saffron steed” soon
would be charging away.

The Board of Health declared the

epidemic over on November 5.^
In the epidemic of 1867 the Saffron Scourge claimed
3,107 victims in New Orleans, not including the fatalities
among the United States forces stationed there.

The Medi

cal Director reported 213 yellow fever deaths among the

^Picayune, September 16, 21, 22, 24, October 8, 21,
28, November 1, 3, 6, 1867.
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1,000 to 1,100 troops, making a total fever mortality of
3,320 in the Crescent City.

With an estimated case

fatality rate of eight per cent, the disease had attacked
about 41,500 persons, or about one-fourth of the popula
tion in the city during the outbreak.^
Once again the scourge of New Orleans had broken
through the barriers erected by Louisiana's quarantine
regulations.

Although they failed to prevent the fever’s

entry, the Board of Health undertook an active campaign to
limit its spread through the city.

At the very onset of

the pestilence, the Board placed every house where a fever
case was reported under the direction of specially appoint
ed health officers to attend to the cleansing of the
premises and to fumigate the place with sulphurous acid
gas and carbolic acid.

Significantly, these measures

represent the first systematic official action to combat
the disease in a house-to-house campaign of disinfection.
A more positive approach to the yellow fever problem was
in the making, faulty as the procedure might have been.

^Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for
1867, 18; N. 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., XXI (April, 1868), 41314.
^Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for
1867, 4-5,
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In the attempt to disinfect houses, the Board accidentally
chose a weapon also destructive to mosquitoes, sulphurous
acid gas.

Unfortunately, by the time the health officers

arrived on the scene, undoubtedly countless mosquitoes had
already been infected from the patient.

Nor is it likely

that the Board was able to attend to every single house
during an epidemic involving over 40,000 cases.

Neverthe

less, the efforts of the Louisiana State Board of Health
represented a praiseworthy attempt to fight the pestilential
foe.
But disinfection failed to arrest the progress of
the epidemic in 1867, which was said to have been the most
widespread epidemic ever in the history of the Crescent
City,

No class was exempt from its ravages; even a few

Negroes and native New Orleanians, ordinarily less likely
victims, were listed among the fatalities.

The Board of

Health tried to account for the tremendous number of cases
in proportion to the number of deaths.

Observing that the

absence of epidemic yellow fever since 1858 had rendered
all children under eight years of age susceptible to the
disease, the Board also noted the influx of many emanci
pated Negroes to New Orleans after the Civil War.

Since

both Negroes and children exhibited a strong tendency
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toward recovery from yellow fever attacks, the Board con
sidered these factors partially responsible for the large
number of cases and the low case fatality rate.^
Suffering among the poor during the summer and
autumn of 1867 was terribly acute.

One observer called

that period "one of the most distressing to those of
limited means ever experienced in New Orleans."

The pesti

lence disrupted summer business and delayed the fall
business season about two months.

In the midst of the

crisis, high rents and high prices for the basic necessi
ties of life intensified the distress of the indigent.

When one of the New Orleans banks failed during the epi
demic, many persons among the laboring classes lost what
ever savings they might have had at the time of greatest
n

e

e

d

.

As in previous epidemic disasters, the Howard

Association came to the aid of the destitute fever victims
and their families, and numerous physicians freely offered
their services to those who could not pay.

Even the recent

9n . 0. M e d . & Surg. Jour., XX (November, 1867),
419; Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for
1867. 6.
lOçardner*s New Orleans Directory for 1868 (New
Orleans, 1868), 9, 11.
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enemy of the North supplied some assistance to the unfor
tunate city.

In November of 1867 the editor of the New

Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal expressed "the grati
tude of this impoverished community" to all those Northern
friends who had "with free hand and open purse, promoted
the efforts of our self-sacrificing citizens,
Other communities in Louisiana also suffered the
affliction of the yellow pestilence in 1867.

The disease

appeared in Plaquemine, Alexandria, Shreveport, Clarenton,
Jeanerette, New Iberia, St. Martinville, Opelousas, Wash
ington, Lafayette, Vermillionville, and Lake Charles, as
well as other hitherto unvisited towns in the southwestern

portion of the state.

12

The fever did not prevail with

equal severity in all places where it appeared; some towns
escaped with only a few cases, while others experienced
serious epidemics.

Two of the worst visitations in Louisi

ana outside of New Orleans occurred in New Iberia and
Washington.

^^N. 0. M e d . & Surg. Jour., XX (November, 1867), 420,
l%Toner, "Reports Upon Yellow Fever," loc. cit., 37173; Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 861, 893, 902;
Picayune, September 15, 18, October 16, 31, 1867; Plaque
mine Weekly Iberville South, October 19, 26, December 21,
1867; Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for
1867. 7-8.
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New Iberia, a small town in south Louisiana, about
fifteen miles from the coast and over one hundred miles
west of New Orleans, was in the throes of a serious out
break long

before the fever reached epidemic proportions

in the Crescent City.

Allegedly introduced from Galveston,

the disease commenced its attacks in the latter part of
July and raged violently in that small town for well over
a month.

In the second week of August the Mayor of New

Iberia reported the illness of several of the town's phy
sicians and requested that nurses and doctors be sent from
New Orleans,

Two faculty members of the New Orleans School

of Medicine, a resident medical student from Charity Hos
pital, and several Sisters of Charity went to the aid of
the desperate community, where they immediately establish
ed a temporary hospital.

The New Orleans, Opelousas and

Great Western Rail Road and the Attakapas Navigation Com
pany both offered to transport nurses and supplies to New
Iberia without charge,

E, F, Schmidt, President of the New

Orleans Howard Association, went in and helped organize a
Howard Association of New Iberia, which immediately em
ployed a number of nurses from the Crescent City.
Business came to a standstill, about half of the towns
people were unemployed, and "the most complete destitution"
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prevailed.

In addition to their work with the sick, the

newly formed Howard Association attended to the needs of
the most unfortunate citizens with assistance provided by
contributions from Franklin, Lafayette, Opelousas, and New
Orleans.

The Shakespeare Club of New Orleans gave a bene

fit performance for the relief of New Iberia; one New
Orleanian shipped over two casks of ice weekly ; even the
New Orleans City Council appropriated a thousand dollars
as a contribution to the afflicted community.

By the end

of August the fever began to subside, and the New Iberia
epidemic was virtually over when the New Orleans visita
tion really got under way.

In a population of 1,600 to

1,800, considerably reduced by the flight of many citizens,
no less than 700 cases and seventy deaths had occurred by
August 31,

One observer on the scene wrote:

rending . . .

"It is heart

to see and realize the affliction and desola

tion of our community--scarce a family but is in mourning,
and in many instances almost entire families have been
swept to the grave by the 'fell destroyer.

The

devastation of a small community by the Saffron Scourge

13picayune, August 6, 8, 10, 12, 13, September 3,
1867; Bee, August 28, 1867; Iberville South, September 7,
1867.
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presented a tragedy perhaps even more intensely personal
than the large-scale disaster produced within a metropolis.
Another Louisiana town even smaller than New Iberia
experienced a particularly severe yellow fever epidemic in
1867.

During September and October Yellow Jack attacked

over 500 persons and claimed at least seventy-three vic
tims in the small community of Washington, Louisiana,
about forty miles north of New Iberia,
letter from Washington stated:

In late October a

"All business is suspended.

, , , Our town has a deserted appearance.

Provisions are

getting scarce, and sometimes are not to be had."

Among

the citizens taking flight when the disease appeared were
three of the four town council members and two of the
town's three physicians.

The one doctor remaining in

Washington truly had more than he could handle, but it was
said that he carried the burden well.

Obviously, New

Orleans, by this time fighting its own battle, was unable
to send as much assistance to Washington as it had sent to
New Iberia,

Nevertheless, the New Orleans Howard Associa

tion contributed one thousand dollars of its funds to aid
the small community.

14picayune, October 28, 1867.
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Following the epidemic of 1867, Louisiana enjoyed
two summers almost completely free of the yellow pestilence.
In the Crescent City only three yellow fever deaths were
reported in 1868 and three in 1 8 6 9 . With few exceptions,
when New Orleans escaped an epidemic, so did the rest of
the state.

In the late summer and autumn of 1870, New

Orleans suffered a mild outbreak, causing only 587 deaths
in a population of more than 1 9 0 , 0 0 0 , Since the quaran
tine had been applied to all vessels arriving from infected
ports (counting days at sea as part of the detention period),
the editor of the New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journa1
believed that yellow fever had originated in New Orleans in
1870.

By this time many physicians and laymen had combined

both of the old opposing views into a belief that the fever
was imported in some years and indigenous in others.

It

seemed that the pestilence had originated and for a time
remained in the area of the French Market among a class
"whose hygienic condition in their domiciles is about the
most unfavorable in the whole city,"

Although the epidemic

15n . 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., XXIII (April, 1870),
398.
^Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for
1870, 74, 80,
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of 1870 had not been nearly as severe as he had feared it
might be, the medical journal editor remarked:

”, , .

this hostile incursion has brought dismay upon our unac
climated population, has revived the evil reputation of
our city, and has done incalculable damage to its commer
cial i n t e r e s t s . T h e

two preceding epidemic-free

summers made the outbreak of 1870, although a mild one,
seem rather unfortunate.

The fever did not spread to any

considerable extent in Louisiana that year.

Apparently,

New Iberia, Ville Platte, and Port Barre were the only
points outside the Crescent City which experienced note
worthy vis itations.
In 1871 New Orleans reported only fifty-four yellow
fever fatalities; in 1872, only thirty-nine.^^

Then came

the unique occurrence in 1873 when Shreveport suffered a
more serious epidemic than the Crescent City, the only
time that a sizeable interior community of Louisiana

17n . 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., XXIII (October, 1870),
874-76.
l^Toner, "Reports Upon Yellow Fever," loc, cit.,
369-73; Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 844-902,
19Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for

1871, 98; Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for
1872, 135.
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outranked New Orleans in terms of yellow fever mortality.
In New Orleans the disease claimed only 226 victims; in
Shreveport, about 759,

The State Board of Health attribut

ed the difference in malignancy between the two outbreaks
to the widespread use of disinfectants in New Orleans, a
doubtful hypothesis at best.

The Saffron Scourge probably

caused more deaths in New Orleans than the reports indi
cate.

According to the Board’s report, about half the

population suffered cases of "Dengue" during the epidemic
season, some of which finally "assumed the appearance" of
nr\

yellow fever and terminated in death.

Although seldom

fatal, dengue fever is easily confused with the yellow
pestilence in its early stages.

Probably a number of cases,

and especially the deaths, reported as dengue fever were
actually caused by yellow fever.

Nevertheless, the New

Orleans disease was completely overshadowed by the
devastating plague in Shreveport,
The numerous cases began to attract considerable
attention in late August, and by the first of September the
Shreveport epidemic was well under way.

Of a population

20n . 0, Med. & Surg. Jour., L (May, 1898), 636; Re
port of the Louisiana State Board of Health for 1873, 9, 55.
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numbering from 10,000 to 12,000, it was estimated that
over half fled the city.

By mid-September most business

establishments had shut down and the streets were almost
empty.

The community had been completely quarantined by

all neighboring towns, and the telegraph served as the
only means of communication.^^
A Howard Association of Shreveport was organized
and in mid-September established an infirmary for the
indigent sick.

Contributions poured in from New Orleans,

Philadelphia, Cincinnati, and all over the country.

The

Western Union Telegraph Company offered free use of its
lines for the transfer of financial assistance to Shreve
port.

Since the town was isolated by the quarantine regu

lations of neighboring communities with the consequent
tie-up of railway transportation, special arrangements had
to be made for getting nurses, physicians, and supplies
into the stricken center.

The Southern Express Company

contracted with the New Orleans Howard Association to ship
without charge all supplies destined for Shreveport as far

ZlReport of the Committee appointed by the Shreveport
Medical Society on the Yellow Fever Epidemic of 1873 at
Shreveport, Louisiana (Shreveport, 1874), 12-13; Henry
Smith, Report of the Yellow Fever Epidemic of 1873, Shreve
port, Louisiana . . , (New Orleans, 1874), 3,
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as their terminus at Monroe, Louisiana*

The agent in Mon

roe promised that the goods would be "as promptly forwarded
as practicable" and presumably by whatever means were pos
sible,

The Texas and Pacific Railroad provided relief

trains twice a week throughout the epidemic to carry
poultry, eggs, and other provisions to a point outside the
city where they might be picked up and hauled into town by
persons from within the contaminated area.

Money, sup

plies, and experienced nurses thus were channelled into
Shreveport.

New Orleans in particular empathized with the

desperation of the victimized community.

As its own small

epidemic was almost eclipsed by the suffering of the town
in northwest Louisiana, the Crescent City provided assist
ance freely and generously.

In addition to the contribu

tions of individuals, businesses, and the Howard Association,
the Shakespeare Club and the Orleans Dramatic Association,
as they had done on previous occasions, again provided a
"dramatic entertainment," this time to raise funds for the
Shreveport sufferers.

22

In late September as the fever continued to rage in

22smith, Report of the Yellow Fever Epidemic of
1873, 3; Picayune. September 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 1873.
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Shreveport, the editor of the New Orleans Picayune remark
ed that the same mortality rate In New Orleans would
amount to about a thousand deaths per day.

In addition to

the fierce mortality rate, the destitute circumstances of
the citizenry were "as terrible as the disease."

The

Howard Association of Shreveport not only attended to
yellow fever patients, but also fed the poor and opened an
asylum for children made orphans by the epidemic.

The ex

penses of that association totalled $1,000 to $2,000 per
day.%3
Conditions grew worse In late September and early
October of 1873.

The New Orleans Picayune considered the

"terrible fever In Shreveport" at least four times worse
than the "fearful epidemic that scourged this city In
1853."

On the last day of September the news telegraphed

from Shreveport read:

"We no longer have funerals.

The

hearses, followed by one or two carriages, dash through the
streets like a section of artillery In a battle seeking a
position. . . o the coffins [are] shoved In the hearses
and driven rapidly to the cemetery.

This Is the case

even with the most prominent citizens.'^

By this time the

23picayune, September 23, 26, 27, 1873.
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Howard Association was feeding about two-thirds of the resi
dent population. Including white and Negro alike.

Hundreds

of citizens were without money, without work, without pros
pects,

Rapidly going through their resources, the Howards

of Shreveport made a new appeal to the country for addition
al aid, declaring:

, the well are broken down, the

poor are threatened with actual starvation, the sick and
dying are about to be deprived of the commonest comforts
humanity can offer them.”

On October 3 the commander of

the United States troops In New Orleans, General W. H.
Emory, telegraphed President U, S, Grant requesting per
mission to send 5,000 rations to the Shreveport victims;
an immediate reply directed the commanding general to send
the supplies at once.^^
The disorder of the disease-ridden city obviously
provided a greater than usual opportunity for the criminal
ly Inclined,

In early October, dally reports of robberies

led to the formation of a citizens committee of public
safety, which posted a notice on the street corners stat
ing:

Z^ibld., September 28, 30, October 1, 4, 1873,
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The committee of citizens
on
the safety of
town hereby warn all parties concerned, that any
persons found depredating upon the property of our
citizens will be summarily dealt with. It is our
purpose to protect our city at all hazards, and
evil [sic] disposed persons are warned to leave.

the

Although unable to prove the charge, the committee suspect
ed

four persons from New Orleans

priest "while on his

of

having robbed

a Catholic

deathbed," Of the four, two men were

driven out of town and warned to stgy away; the third man
was allowed to remain temporarily with his wife, who was
then a victim of the

fever,

^5

Finally as cold weather arrived in late October and
early November, the pestilence gradually subsided.

Busi

ness establishments reopened one by one, cotton began to
trickle in by the wagonload, and the atmosphere of utter
hopelessness began to dissipate.

Still the Howard Associa

tion continued to feed the poor until positions of employ
ment materialized.

By November 4 all points had removed

their quarantines against Shreveport, and after a suspen
sion of two months the trains of the Texas and Pacific
Railroad once again were able to run freely to and from

25lbid,, October 7, 11, 1873,
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the recently plagued city.^^
The serious obstructions to railroad transportation
posed by town, parish, and out-of-state quarantine regula
tions became an increasingly acute problem from the 1870's
throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century.

In an

earlier period sporadic attempts had been made by local
authorities of some towns and parishes to seal themselves
off from persons and goods coming from infected areas, but
seldom had the regulations been enforced stringently or
absolutely.

The cessation of trade in previous years had

been more a matter of voluntary individual action than of
official policy.

But after the Civil War as railroad

lines began to span the state and the country, and as the
belief in yellow fever’s transmission by infected persons,
baggage, and goods gained widespread acceptance, people
throughout Louisiana and neighboring states became in
creasingly afraid of its spread from New Orleans by way
of the railroads.
When the news of the Shreveport epidemic spread far
and near in early September of 1873, a train from the

^^Smith, Report of the Yellow Fever Epidemic of
1873, 11; Picayune, October 30, November 4, 1873,
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Infected city to Dallas was halted at the Dallas city
limits by a posse of policemen and citizenry, who threaten
ed to shoot the engineer if he tried to proceed.

After

detaining the train until the following morning, the posse
allowed it to return whence it came.

Temporarily, the

Texas and Pacific obtained permission from the Mayor of
Marshall, Texas, to make regular trips to that town from
Shreveport provided that a physician attested to the
passengers' freedom from yellow fever.
a Dallas newspaper remarked;

On that occasion,

"Things have come to a

pretty pass when the Texas Pacific Railroad corporation
have to apply to the Mayor of a one-horse town for permis
sion to run their t r a i n s , S u c h commentary seems rather
strange coming from

a city which had assumed the privilege

of denying rather than granting permission for trains to
enter its jurisdiction.

At any rate, railroad companies

either complied with the quarantine demands of towns,
whether large or small, or ran the risk of burned bridges,
torn tracks, and dead engineers.

By late September of

1873 there were only two mail routes out of Shreveport,
both by stage:

one to Monroe and another through

27picayune, September 10, 15, 1873.
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T r e n t o n . P r o b l e m s of quarantine and the transportation
of passengers, freight, and the United States mail, would
become increasingly entangled in the next three decades.
At the close of Shreveport’s epidemic of 1873, the
Shreveport Medical Society appointed a committee to investi
gate the origin and course of the recent scourge.

The com

mittee concluded that the disease had been imported from
Havana to New Orleans, and thence transported to Shreve
port by boatmen employed on the Red River packets.

Since

the population of Shreveport, approximately 12,000, had
tripled since the last yellow fever epidemic in 1867, most
of the citizens were susceptible to the disease.

It was

estimated that only about 4,500 persons remained in the
city during the epidemic.

Of that number at least 3,000

suffered attacks of the fever and about 759 died.

Hence,

the case fatality rate was almost twenty-six per cent.

Of

the population in the city at the time, approximately
seventeen per cent died of yellow fever.

In the opinion

of the medical committee, "No epidemic in America has yet
occurred to show more plainly that we are not yet masters
of this fearful disease, its proper treatment and the

28ibid., September 23, 1873.
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laws that govern it,”^^
In 1873 the fever spread from Shreveport to Green
wood, Louisiana, a few miles from the Texas border; to
Marshall, Texas, about forty miles west of Shreveport;
and to Mansfield and Coushatta, Louisiana, south of
Shreveport.30

According to a resident of Coushatta, the

pestilence had made "sad havoc" in the entire area of the
Red River Valley,

"The country looks desolate," he wrote;

"worse than ever it looked during and after Bank's raid
through Red River,"

For a distance of at least fifty

miles through the valley south of Coushatta, the area was
practically deserted,31
Yellow fever traveled up the Mississippi River as
high as Memphis, Tennessee, striking that city in what was
undoubtedly the most destructive epidemic in the country
in 1873,

Only twice previously had Memphis experienced

yellow fever epidemics, in 1855 and 1867,

In 1873 out of

29Report of the Committee . , , on the Yellow Fever
Epidemic of 1873 at Shreveport, 10, 12, 14, 20,
30n , 0, Med. & Surg, Jour,, New Series, I (January,
1874), 626-28; Picayune, October 10, 16, 1873,
31picayune, October 2, 1873,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

179
a winter population of 50,000 only about 15,000 persons
remained in the city during the epidemic, of which 7,000
had the fever and from 1,800 to 2,000 died.3%
The pestilence seemed content with only a handful of
victims in New Orleans each year from 1874 through 1877,
but returned in 1878 to scourge New Orleans, the Gulf
States, and the entire Mississippi Valley in the most
extensive epidemic the country had ever known.

The

visitation of 1878 also marks a real turning point in news
paper policy on reporting epidemic disease.

As early as

July 24 the editor of the New Orleans Picayune set forth a
significant statement of policy.

He admitted that both

the authorities and the press heretofore had "generally
refrained from specially mentioning" sporadic cases of
yellow fever because of the exaggerations ordinarily re
sulting from such an announcement.

Nevertheless, informa

tion about those cases had always been transmitted by
letter-writers and by persons traveling from the city,
"Hence what is not announced here has been known abroad,"
he said, "and the very precaution taken to avoid needless

32n . 0, Med. & Surg, Jour., New Series, I (May,
1874), 791-93; L (May, 1898), 636.
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alarm and to prevent exaggerated and injurious reports has
had a result the reverse of what was intended."

Therefore,

he believed that the Board of Health should publish all
information relative to the city's health, including every
death and every disease.

The editor then announced that

seven yellow fever deaths had occurred in the past few
days, that the disease seemed to be an extremely virulent
type, and that the Board of Health intended to fight its
spread by disinfecting each locality where it

a

p

p

e

a

r

e

d

.

^3

Those early "sporadic" cases soon developed into a giant
of an epidemic, yet the Picayune continued to provide com
plete coverage on all aspects of the disaster.
Apparently the fever had been introduced in late
June by the steamship, Emily B. Souder, which had stopped
at Havana on the way to New Orleans. According to the
quarantine physician, the vessel had a clean bill of
health, except for one crew member with intermittent fever
(malaria).

Under those circumstances the ship was permitt

ed to pass up to New Orleans without being detained the
usual ten days.

Shortly after its arrival at the city,

several crew members sickened and died of yellow fever.

33picayune, July 24, 1878.
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Some two weeks later fever cases began to appear among the
New Orleans population.

As the news went out, various

points inside and outside Louisiana instituted rigid
quarantines against the Crescent City.^^

Still the news

papers continued to provide what undoubtedly was the fullest
reporting on any epidemic thus far; they filled their
columns with yellow fever news, reports and statements
from the Board of Health, the activities of the Howards
and other benevolent associations, letters from readers,
lists of charitable contributions from outside the state,
and much editorial commentary.

The journalistic revolu

tion had finally come.
From July to mid-November the pestilence ravaged the
Crescent City, resulting in well over 15,000 cases and
4,046 deaths.35

Estimates of what the epidemic cost New

Orleans varied from twelve million to a hundred million
dollars, including such factors as the potential economic
worth of persons lost to the plague and of labor diverted
from productive endeavor by sickness or attendance to the

34ibid., July 25, 26, 27, 1878.
35&eport of the Louisiana State Board of Health for

1878, 158-59; Picayune, November 10, 1878.
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sick; losses due to derangement of business, unused capital,
and neglect of crops; the cost of medical attention and
nursing, of funerals, of the extraordinary sanitary work
of disinfection; as well as funds spent for charitable
operations.

The Board of Health calculated a cost to New

Orleans of about twelve million dollars.

Noting that the

estimated profits of New Orleans' summer trade with yellow
fever ports to the south only amounted to $1,500,000, the
Board lashed out at the anti-quarantinist commercial
interests by commenting that New Orleans undertook a
sizeable risk for the paltry sum realized from the tropi
cal trade.36
In its rampage along the Gulf coast and through the
Mississippi Valley, the fever of 1878 attacked Florida,
Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, Tennessee, and
Kentucky.

Some cases even appeared in Cairo, Illinois;

St. Louis, Missouri; Cincinnati, Ohio; and New York City.
The disease spread extensively in the southern portion of
Louisiana, particularly in the southeastern quarter.

3&United States Board of Experts, Proceedings of
the Board of Experts Authorized by Congress to Investigate
the Yellow Fever Epidemic of 1878 . . . (New Orleans, 1878),
31-35; Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for
1878, 13.
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affecting New Orleans, Gretna, Buras Settlement, Port Eads,
St. Bernard Parish, St. John the Baptist Parish, Pontchatoula, Hammond, Tangipahoa, Clinton, Port Hudson, Bayou
Sara, Plaquemine, Baton Rouge, DonaIdsonville, Thibodaux,
Patterson, Napoleonville, Paincourtville, Labadieville, and
Morgan City.

Apparently the only points in the northern

part of Louisiana visited by the pestilence were Lake
Providence and Delta on the Mississippi River, and Delhi,
linked by railroad to Delta (and to Vicksburg across the
river where yellow fever prevailed severely).3?

In 1878

the railroad, together with the Mississippi River and
other waterways, provided transportation for the fever in
its dispersion through the state and through the country.
Remembering the earlier visitation of Shreveport and the
Red River Valley in 1873, some of the parishes in that
area applied stringent quarantine measures in 1878, which

^^Commercial and Statistical Almanac, Containing a
History of the Epidemic of 1878, with the Best Known
Remedies and Treatments of Yellow Fever . . . (New Orleans,
1879), 56; Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 844-902; N.
0. Med. & Surg. Jour., New Series, VI (November, 1878),
410; ibid.. New Series, XI (September, 1883), 162; ibid.,
LVII (October, 1906), 291-92; Baton Rouge Advocate, Novem
ber 15, 1878; Thibodaux Sentinel, September 14, October 5,
November 30, 1878; Picayune, August 24, September 10, 20,
21, October 11, 1878.
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might have had something to do with holding the fever out
of that portion of the state.
Estimates of the yellow fever death toll in the
entire country in 1878 varied from 13,000 to 20,000, out
of at least 120,000 cases of the disease.

Of the total

death count. New Orleans supplied 4,046, and all other
points in Louisiana, 1,000 to 1,500.

The Board of Ex

perts authorized by the United States Congress to investi
gate the epidemic of 1878 calculated the various expendi
tures and losses suffered from the visitation throughout
the country and arrived at a sum exceeding thirty million
dollars.

In addition, they called attention to all the

incalculable factors, such as the disturbance to business
conditions and loss of capital investment in lands, houses,
boats, railroads, machines, and other property unused and
unproductive because of the epidemic.

According to their

final estimates, New Orleans alone suffered a loss of
over fifteen million dollars; the nation itself, something

38police Jury Minutes, Avoyelles Parish, September
3, November 11, 12, 1878 (W.P.A. Transcriptions of Parish
Records of Louisiana, Louisiana State University Archives,
Baton Rouge); ibid., Rapides Parish, August 26, 27, October
9, 1878; ibid., Caddo Parish, August 23, 1878.
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between one hundred and two hundred million dollars
Not only was the visitation of 1878 the most exten
sive and the most costly epidemic the country had ever
known, but it was also the last "Great Epidemic" in the
United States.

Later outbreaks destroyed only a small

fraction of the number struck down by the plague of 1878,
That epidemic had several important results.

It stimulated

a widespread public demand for the national government to
enter the business of quarantine; it led to the establish
ment of an abortive National Board of Health, provoking
an outburst of state-rights arguments; it influenced the
Gulf States toward a policy of cooperation in regard to
quarantine and the free exchange of information; and it
intensified the scientific investigation of the disease.
On the other hand, the epidemic of 1878 also heightened
the fear and dread of the fever in a more extensive area
than ever before, resulting in increasingly acute problems
for the railroads in coping with local quarantine barriers.
Although no yellow fever epidemic worthy of the name

39Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for
1878, 158-59; Commercial and Statistical A lmanac, Contain
ing a History of the Epidemic of 1878, 56; Proceedings of
the Board of Experts Authorized by Congress . , , 1878,

31-35.
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occurred for eighteen years afterward, the memory of ’78
together with the alarm aroused over occasional cases in
Louisiana or elsewhere in the South kept the interest in
yellow fever intensely alive.
The summer following the disaster of 1878 witnessed
an exceedingly mild flare-up of the pestilence in Louisiana,
Although touching twenty-six different points in the state,
mainly in the southern portion, the fever of 1879 resulted
in only 162 deaths in all Louisiana, nineteen of which
occurred in the Crescent

C i t y , ^ 0

New Orleans it was

generally believed that the work of cleaning and disin
fection performed by the State Board of Health and the
Citizens Auxiliary Sanitary Association limited the
virulence of the disease that year.

In October of 1879

the editor of the New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal
suggested optimistically:

", , , our profession should

feel hopeful that the day is near at hand when we will be
able to effectually banish this great arch enemy to our
public health, commerce and p r o s p e r i t y , T h e editor’s

^®N. 0, Med, & Surg, Jour,, New Series, XI (Septem
ber, 1883), 198; Report of the Louisiana State Board of
Health for 1879, 8.
4lN, 0, Med, & Surg, Jour,, New Series, VII (October,
1879), 495,
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hopes seemed almost realized when during the 1880's and
much of the 1890's Louisiana enjoyed an unprecedented
exemption from the Saffron Scourge.

From 1880 through

1896 yellow fever claimed a total of only ten victims; in
eleven of those seventeen years not a single yellow fever
death was reported.^2
Although the yellow pestilence remained in abeyance
during that seventeen-year period, insofar as Louisiana
was concerned, many significant developments relating to
the disease occurred in the areas of public health, quaran
tine, and scientific activity.

The Louisiana State Board

of Health acquired further duties and powers and pursued a
more active program of sanitation and disinfection in New
Orleans,

The Board also engaged in a lengthy and ultimate

ly successful court battle with shipping lines over the
payment of quarantine fees.

The quarantine system itself

was modified to provide for "Maritime Sanitation," that
is, the thorough disinfection and fumigation of incoming
vessels by a specially designed apparatus.

The United

States government, through the National Board of Health,

42see Reports of the Louisiana State Board of Health,
1880-1896,
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created in 1879, and the long-established United States
Marine Hospital Service, exhibited an active interest in
problems relating to yellow fever, maritime quarantine,
and interstate quarantine.

Special scientific commissions

were appointed by the United States government to investi
gate the nature, origin, and transmission of yellow fever
in the South and in Latin America,

Designed to cooperate

with state and local boards in maintaining adequate mari
time quarantine, the National Board of Health encountered
many obstacles, not the least of which was the Louisiana
State Board of Health.

In a bitter fight to the finish,

the National Board went down, partly because of intense
opposition to federal interference with state quarantine
powers, partly because of administrative difficulties.
After the failure of the National Board, the federal
government did not retreat completely from the scene, but
rather entrusted to the United States Marine Hospital
Service the duty of cooperating with state and local
boards in the work of preventing or fighting epidemic dis
ease.

In 1897 that agency would render a valuable service

in providing for inspection of passengers and merchandise
on railroads and helping to untie transportation entangle
ments ,
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In an attempt to remove the need for federal
action in the realm of quarantine, conferences were held
among representatives of various state and local boards of
health in the yellow fever areas.

The local and state

boards attempted to provide for strict maritime regula
tions to hold out the disease and agreed upon the free
exchange of information regarding health conditions to pre
vent unnecessary interstate quarantines based on groundless
rumors of disease.

In addition, attempts were made to

establish a set of rules permitting certain types of
merchandise, considered incapable of bearing yellow fever
germs, to flow freely through the channels of interstate
commerce during epidemic seasons.

In the 1880's several

bitter controversies developed in the Gulf States over the
diagnosis of cases resembling yellow fever.

Sometimes the

fight broke out among members of a local or state board
examining the case; sometimes between the National Board
representative and the state board; sometimes among the
representatives of various state and local boards sent into
an area to investigate suspicious cases.

Under circum

stances characterized by confusion and recriminations, the
problems of interstate and intrastate quarantine were by
no means settled.
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During the 1880's and 1890's several different men
discovered several different germs, each of which was pro
claimed as the cause of yellow fever.

An intense medical

controversy developed as physicians lined up in support of
their favorite germ, or attempted to discount the entire
lot.

In the midst of all the interest in germs and disin

fection, the hypothesis advanced by the eccentric Cuban
physician and scientist, Carlos Finlay, naming the culex
mosquito as yellow fever's transmitter, was largely over
looked- -until 1900 when the Reed Commission established its
validity.

The period between the epidemics of 1878 and

1897 was without question a lively era, when the subject
of yellow fever sparked much activity in the public health,
quarantine, and scientific fields.
After a lengthy respite from epidemic yellow fever,
in 1890 the editor of the New Orleans Medical and Surgical
Journal remarked:

"It is now so long a time since the last

epidemic that many of our younger medical men who have
practiced in this city during the past decade have never
seen a case of yellow fever in their lives."

During the

past twelve years, he said, the few cases that slipped
through quarantine had been discovered, isolated, and dis
infected rapidly and effectively by the Board of Health,
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thereby preventing the fever's spread.

Although praising

New Orleans for its success in combating yellow fever, the
editor strongly emphasized the necessity of constant vigi
lance.
From 1890 through 1896 not a single case appeared
in the Crescent City; then in 1897 the infection slipped
in through a side door.

Early in August of 1897 an epi

demic disease resembling dengue and malaria broke out in
Ocean Springs, Mississippi.

Later in the month when

several deaths resulted, the Louisiana State Board of
Health sent over a commission to investigate the nature of
the malady.

The commission first declared it dengue fever.

Shortly thereafter, more deaths occurred, and several
cases exhibited black vomit.

A second commission from the

Louisiana State Board went over and this time pronounced
the prevailing disease yellow fever, in concurrence with
representatives from several other state boards.

Immedi

ately, a Louisiana quarantine was proclaimed against the
Mississippi coast resorts, but it came a few days too
late to prevent the alarmed summer visitors at Ocean

43N. 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., New Series, XVIII
(December, 1890), 483-84.
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Springs from boarding the first trains home to New Orleans
and e l s e w h e r e , O n September 6 the Louisiana State Board
of Health recorded the first yellow fever death in New
Orleans in six years, a boy who had returned to the Cres
cent City from Ocean Springs, Mississippi,^^
By September 10 several cases of fever, all trace
able to Ocean Springs, had appeared in one city block.
The Board of Health arranged for the isolation of the area,
stationed sanitary guards in front of the infected houses
with orders to permit no person to enter or to leave, and
arranged for the inspection and disinfection of the entire
neighborhood where the disease had occurred.

As cases con

tinued to break out, the Board ultimately commissioned
nearly 700 sanitary officers to enforce a policy of house
quarantine, never before employed in a yellow fever epi
demic.

The officers were ordered to allow no person to

enter or leave the infected premises without explicit per
mission from the Board, to forbid pedestrians to gather
about the area, and to arrest and send them to jail if
necessary.

Furthermore, the sanitary guards were

4 4 ibid., L(October,

1897), 263-64,

45picayune, September 7,' 1897,
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Instructed to remain constantly at the post until relieved,
to transmit all orders from the household for groceries and
other necessities, and to insist upon absolute non-inter
course.^^
Enforced throughout the epidemic, the Board's policy
of house isolation aroused considerable opposition among
many citizens of New Orleans,

Some persons even consulted

their lawyers on the possibility of enjoining the Board or
securing a writ of habeas corpus to obtain release from
"enforced imprisonment," on the grounds that no one could
be deprived of his liberty without a fair trial.

The

Picayune editor strongly supported the position of the
Board, believing that the public health of the many should
predominate over the unreasonable demands of the few.

At

a meeting of the Board of Health, one member, Dr, Felix
Formento, proposed that house quarantine regulations be
modified to apply only to the sick and their immediate
attendants and not to every individual in the house,

"The

right of free ingress and egress of every citizen to his
own home should not be denied," he insisted.

Nevertheless,

the Board rejected his proposal and decided in favor of

46lbid., September 10, 18, October 9, 1897,
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continuing the system as originally conceived.

When many

New Orleanians persisted in violent attempts to defy the
health regulations, the attorney of the Board issued a pub
lic statement on the matter.

The policy was based on an

ordinance dating back to 1879, he said, which provided for
the regulation of entry to and departure from infected
buildings, vessels, or areas, as well as for their fumiga
tion and detention.

Infected houses had been isolated and

marked with flags many times before in dealing with diphth
eria, scarlet fever, smallpox, leprosy, and other infec
tious diseases.

The attorney thought it strange that those

diseases, although less malignant than yellow fever,
inspired more fear in the New Orleans populace than the
Saffron Scourge.

"Men will walk four squares to get out of

the way of a smallpox flag who would not pay any attention
to a yellow fever flag," he said.

Apparently the New

Orleans public failed to "share the universal belief about
its [yellow fever’s] danger."

According to the attorney,

their attitude proved the old saying that familiarity
breeds contempt,^7

still the opposition continued.

In

their determination to avoid house quarantine, many persons

47lbid,, October 1, 2, 6, 1897,
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concealed yellow fever cases among their families and ada
mantly refused to call in medical aid.

Frequently, the

inhabitants of quarantined houses successfully defied the
AQ

guards by sneaking out through rear exits.
On October 10 the Picayune published a letter to the
editor which read:

**I am an old resident of this city,

having gone through all the epidemics, and have never
seen such tomfoolery carried on, as flagging houses and
having old politicians stationed in front of doors, as if
their presence could prevent the spread of fever,”

Further

more, the reader felt that "reckoning the new cases” day
by day made conditions seem worse than they actually were.
He asked, ” , , « why demoralize a whole community, because
a few people have fever?”

The Picayune editor answered

that conservatism in certain areas represented "the highest
sort of civilization,” but he considered it nothing less
than foolish to turn down the benefits of scientific
vancement,

ad

After thirty-four days of yellow fever in the

city, only fifty-six deaths and about 500 cases had occurr
ed; still a few "conservatives" wanted a return to the

48New York Times, October 26, 1897,
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"good old days" when the fever raged without obstruc
tion.^9
At one point, the Board decided to abandon the post
ing of the red and yellow quarantine flags at infected
houses because of the tremendous prejudice against them.
However, their attorney reminded them that the flags were
mandatory by a city ordinance of 1896 and a state law of
1882,

Continuing his vehement opposition to the whole

operation. Dr. Formento demanded that the house guards be
removed, even if the flags had to remain.

The other Board

members admitted that persons within the enclosures were
forced to abandon their jobs for several weeks, but they
pointed out that credit was readily available and that it
was completely justifiable to inconvenience some 1,200
persons in the interest of 260,000.

In spite of the

tremendous pressures brought to bear on the Board, it held
firm until the second week of November.

When cold weather

ended further danger from the disease, the Board withdrew
the quarantines, but continued to disinfect premises
where the fever had occurred.^0

49picayune, October 10, 1897.
SOlbid., October 22, 23, 28, 29, 31, November 1, 2,
12, 1897.
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Although some New Orleanians violently opposed the
practice of house isolation, many persons in the city
accepted the idea of cleansing and disinfection as preven
tive measures.

Early in the epidemic a Citizens Committee

on Sanitation organized and made plans for residents in
each block to organize and cooperate in cleaning their
premises and the streets.

The Board of Health agreed to

supply the disinfectants free of charge if the citizens
furnished the labor.

According to plan, citizens in

various wards throughout the city established voluntary
sanitary associations to cooperate with the Board in the
work of inspection, cleaning, and d i s i n f e c t i o n . W h i l e
commending these voluntary efforts, the editor of the New
Orleans Times-Democrat called attention to the slum areas
where appeals for voluntary cleansing brought slight
response.

Long accustomed to filth, unaware of its pos

sible dangers, and overworked to earn a bare subsistence,
the slum inhabitants could scarcely be expected to parti
cipate enthusiastically in a voluntary clean-up campaign.
The editor strongly recommended that the city authorities

51lbid., September 19, 28, 29, 1897.
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undertake the task of cleaning those danger spots.^2
On one occasion during the epidemic, in trying to
execute a public health measure, the health authorities
and the mayor encountered extreme opposition in the form
of mob violence.

On the one hand, the incident seems to

contradict the idea that New Orleanians had little fear
of yellow fever; on the other, it may indicate something
entirely different.

It all started on September 17 of

1897 when the Board of Health decided to establish a
yellow fever hospital in the old marine hospital building
on Tulane Avenue, offered for such use by the city govern
ment.

Appalled by the idea, the residents in the neigh

boring area presented a petition to the Board requesting
that some location outside the city be selected instead.
Agreeing to reconsider, the Board decided on September 19
to use the old hospital building as a detention hospital
instead where indigent persons from crowded, infected
localities might be kept for a time, and if yellow fever
failed to develop they could be released.

The new plan

was no more satisfactory to the protesting citizens than

SZ^few Orleans Times-Democrat, September 22, 1897.
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the old had been.

That night "an Indignation meeting" of

over a thousand persons, called by the ex-councilman from
the third ward, gathered on the corner of Tulane Avenue and
Broad Street.

The group elected officers, listened to

several "incendiary" speeches, and passed resolutions to
be presented to the mayor on the following morning.

They

protested the proposed detention hospital, which "would
not only ruin all property interests in that section,"
but would probably spread the disease through the area.
The resolutions warned the public officials that such a
project tested "the patience of many good citizens."
Mayor Walter C. Flower received the resolutions on the
morning of September 20 together with the suggestion of
Oakland Park as a detention area.

He was able to obtain

the temporary use of Oakland Park, thereby appeasing the
third ward citizens and at the same time attaining the
detention area desired by the Board of Health.53

Thus a

fortunate compromise had soothed the ruffled feelings and
kept the peace, but not for long.
Although a detention camp had been provided for, a
yellow fever hospital was still needed to keep indigent

53picayune, September 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 1897.
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yellow fever patients from spreading the disease to other
patients in Charity Hospital.

Several days after the

original crisis. Mayor Flower secured the Beauregard School
Building, a large airy structure located in the center of
an otherwise vacant square, for use as a temporary hospi
tal for destitute yellow fever patients.

The announcement

of this project provoked another uproar.

A crowd of four

or five hundred persons, consisting of "some substantial
citizenry" and many of the "rabble," assembled in front of
the school around 6 P.M. on the evening of September 23,
At the time, a physician from Charity Hospital and several
Sisters of Charity were preparing the school for use as a
hospital.

According to the Picayune, several politicians

were involved in the gathering, just as the ex-councilman
had led the earlier protest, obviously for reasons that
had little to do with yellow fever.

The unruly crowd

listened to speeches and heard arguments advanced against
the hospital.

Various speakers suggested that it was an

attempt to make that portion of the city "the dumping
ground for every sort of undesirable thing that came along,"
that it was not only an outrage but a threat to the entire
vicinity, and that the lives of the nearby residents and
their families were at stake.

A committee from the
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assembly entered the school building to request that prepa
rations be halted until the mayor could be consulted.
Attempting to placate the "indignant populace," the Charity
physician in charge and the Sisters agreed to evacuate the
building for the night, but even after they left the scene
most of the crowd stayed on.

Some left, others arrived,

and late into the night they milled about on Canal Street
in front of the school, built bonfires in the street, and
continued to talk angrily about the proposed hospital.
Some eight or ten policemen hovered around the area, watch
ing the group of demonstrators.

Some of the comments over

heard by a Picayune reporter mingling with the group
reflected an undercurrent of class-consciousness; for
example, "IVhy don't they make a hospital out of some of
those schools up in the rich and stylish neighborhood?"
According to the reporter, some "responsible" persons
remained in the crowd, although it consisted mainly of
"toughs"

of the third and fourth wards.

The physician who

had been persuaded to leave the building said later that
most of the people in the mob resided some distance from
the school, and why they should be afraid of the infection

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

202
was a mystery. 54
Eventually someone suggested that the place be
burned down, and for a while this idea was passed about and
discussed within the clusters of angry citizens.

Shortly

after midnight several unidentified persons, unnoticed by
the few scattered policemen, managed to sneak onto the
school ground and set fire to two outbuildings behind the
school, the kindergarten and the residence of the portress.
Firemen rushed to the scene, but encountered the obstruc
tion of the mob, which cut the fire hoses and posed
every possible hindrance to keep the fire wagons from
reaching the burning buildings.

Police reinforcements

finally arrived, and the firemen ultimately put out the
flames, but not before the two outbuildings had burned to
the ground.
only slight

Happily, the school building itself suffered
damage.

^5

On the following day when the committee of "respon
sible” citizens representing the not-so-peaceable assembly

S^Report of the Board of Administrators of the
Charity Hospital to the General Assembly of the State of
Louisiana for 1897 (New Orleans, [1898]), 11-12; Picayune,
September 24, 1897; N, 0. Med, & Surg. Jour., L (October,
1897), 262.
^^Picayune, September 24, 1897,
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of the preceding night arrived at the mayor's office to
register a protest against the hospital, Mayor Flower
chastised them severely for not having used their influ
ence to call a halt to the mob activity and concluded the
interview with this statement:
School will be used,"

"Gentlemen, Beauregard

In a conference with the police

chief, the mayor made special preparations to handle any
further mob action.

By the evening of September 26 the

temporary fever hospital was ready for patients, guarded
by police forces both day and n i g h t . O n the surface,
this incident seems to reflect a violent fear motivating
large numbers of people to rise up in protest.

Actually,

it seems that ward politicians had something to do with
engineering the gatherings, perhaps as a forum for demagoguery and reputation-building.

Playing upon a fear of

the fever, however great or slight, playing upon the classconsciousness of that section of the city, politicians
provided an outlet for whatever tensions or frustrations
might have existed because of the epidemic and created a
situation which, like all mob scenes, escaped their ulti
mate control.

S^Ibid., September 25, 26, 1897.
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In many parts of the state outside of New Orleans
other incidents of violence or threatened violence
occurred in maintaining local quarantines, episodes in
which fear was definitely a factor.

The year 1897 was

truly the year of the shot-gun quarantine.

Between intra

state and interstate quarantine barriers, the railroads
were caught in an incredibly complex predicament.

At the

onset of the epidemic, neighboring states as well as the
Louisiana interior raised absolute quarantine barriers
against persons and merchandise from New Orleans and other
infected points.

Many areas would not even allow trains

to run through at their highest possible rate of speed.^7
People throughout the Gulf States area and the Mississippi
Valley feared that this first epidemic since 1878 might
turn into a repeat performance of that widespread disaster;
panic-stricken, they were determined to prevent the intro
duction of the disease if at all possible.
Providing full news coverage of the exciting 1897
epidemic, the New York Times reported on September 15 that
New Orleans was "so tightly tied up" that "there is no
longer any commotion created when this, that, or another

^7Ibid,, September 17, 1897,
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town institutes quarantine."

Within a radius of one

thousand miles, "every town and hamlet has emphatically
refused to have any intercourse with the city."^®

The

New Orleans Times-Democrat, like other New Orleans papers,
complained indignantly of the quarantine imbroglio and
suggested the advantages of state control of quarantine
regulations in preference to local action.

By the third

week in September, some of the interior towns had begun to
suffer shortages of food and other supplies because of
their self-imposed isolation.

Finding it impossible to

run trains profitably while complying with the multitudi
nous regulations of intrastate and interstate quarantines,
many railroads temporarily abandoned some of the lines.
On September 18 the Texas and Pacific managed to run a
train through from New Orleans to Shreveport, but was
allowed to stop only at a few points along the way. Most
villages would not even accept mail from the train.^9
Representatives of the United States Marine Hospital
Service in cooperation with the railway mail service at
tempted to institute measures for clearing the mail routes.

58New York Times, September 15, 1897,
59Times-Democrat, September 13, 20, 1897.
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They set up a formaldehyde apparatus in New Orleans to
fumigate letters and parcels for the purpose of killing
the "yellow fever germs,"

Dr, Henry R, Carter of the

Marine Hospital Service came to New Orleans to establish
an inspection service on the railroads and attempt to raise
the barriers against freight and passengers from New
Orleans.

In his own words, "My orders are to organize

train inspections to the borders of Texas, Arkansas, Tennes
see and Georgia, passing through Alabama and Mississippi,
It is useless to attempt anything in the latter two states,
for the people are wild, panic-stricken."

The Mississippi

Board of Health would permit no train passenger to get off
at any point within the state.

Persons wanting to get on

a train might do so, but once aboard they had to continue
beyond the borders of Mississippi.

Dr, Carter planned to

appoint physicians as railroad inspectors to indicate to
local authorities at each point along the way which passen
gers had been given health certificates.

He hoped this

measure would bring about a relaxation of the prevailing
shot-gun quarantines.60

Within a week a number of Louisiana

towns had agreed to accept freight from New Orleans, if

GOpicayune, September 17, 1897.
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declared non-infected by the United States Marine Hospital
Corps, although, for the most part, passengers from the
Crescent City continued to be r e j e c t e d . W i t h the lack
of uniformity in local regulations, however, and with many
towns prohibiting trains passage through their jurisdic
tions, traffic was still hopelessly entangled.
In late September Dr. S. R, Olliphant, President of
the State Board of Health; Drs. John Guiteras and Henry R,
Carter of the United States Marine Hospital Service; and a
representative of the Southern Pacific Railroad set out
from the Crescent City on the Southern Pacific road in an
attempt to clear a path westward to Lake Charles.

They had

invited local health authorities to board the train as it
passed through their towns and a health officer from Texas
to join them in Lake Charles, not far from the Texas
border.

Once in Lake Charles, the various health officials

would attempt to open the Southern Pacific line for freight
shipments from New Orleans to Texas, with inspection and
supervision to be provided by the United States Marine
Hospital Service,

It had been planned that after completing

the arrangements at Lake Charles, the group would travel

^^Times-Democrat, September 26, 1897,
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north to Shreveport and return to New Orleans on the Texas
Pacific line in an attempt to clear the barricades from
those roads.

Unfortunately, the whole project failed.

From New Orleans through Lafayette, the plan worked well.
Proceeding west of Lafayette, however, the train was met
and halted at the Acadia Parish line by a party of armed
citizens from the town of Rayne.

They allowed no one to

step off the train, they threatened to tear up the tracks,
and they forced the train to return whence it came.

Mean

while, a message from Lake Charles had declared it impos
sible for the health conference to meet in that area, and
telegrams from Opelousas and from the parish authorities
along the Alexandria branch of the Southern Pacific denied
permission for the train's progress northward from Lafay
ette along that route.

Hence, the well-intentioned con

gregation of officials found it necessary to return to New
Orleans without having accomplished their mission on the
western or the northwestern railroad channels.

Dr. John

Guiteras commented later that in all his travels throughout
the civilized world he had never met "a more demented set
of people" than the armed posse from Rayne,

"They were
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scared to the very confines of stupidity,” he said.&2
Unlike many other newspapers, the Baton Rouge Advo
cate did not condemn the action of the Rayne citizens as
mob violence.

Since the group had been led by the mayor,

said the editor, it was simply a delegation with every
legal right to enforce the town quarantine powers autho
rized by previous legislative enactment.

Although uphold

ing the legality of the action, the editor questioned the
necessity of turning back the expedition.

The train could

have "thundered through" the area at the tremendous speed
of forty miles per hour, he declared, without danger of
infection to any citizen of the parish, and the projected
conference of health authorities might have accomplished
something of value to science and commerce.

Nevertheless,

the Baton Rouge paper continued to support the right of
local quarantine, denouncing certain businesses in New
Orleans for calling country people cowards if they refused
to buy New Orleans goods.

Since early in the outbreak, the

capital city itself had instituted rigid barriers against
persons, baggage, and freight from all infected districts.
Volunteer guards were posted on every road leading into

62picayune, September 30, October 1, 1897,
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the city, at the ferry landing, the steamboat wharf, and
the railroad depot.

Late in October a few cases appeared

in Baton Rouge, but rigid isolation of cases and all those
exposed to them was immediately effected, and no serious
epidemic ever materialized.
Even where local health authorities had opposed
quarantining against New Orleans, public pressure was fre
quently such that the measures had to be instituted.

For

example, when the news of the first few yellow fever cases
in New Orleans reached Natchitoches in 1897, the town
board of health wanted to postpone quarantine for a time,
but the citizenry, plagued by the memory of 1853 and 1878,
demanded that the barriers be established immediately,
In late September the Picayune editor described the
impossible situation created by the "wild and furious panic
that has stopped the currents of trade, prevented the trans
sit of passengers and the mails from one part of the Union
to another, and has armed the population with deadly
weapons and has set them at ferocious enmity against every

G^Baton Rouge Advocate, September 18, October 2, 23,
30, November 6, 1897,
64ghreveport Journal, September 13, 1897,
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man, woman and child found outside their cordons of shot
g u n s .

"65

Eventually some people began to blame the econo

mic blockade on the reporting of New Orleans papers.

They

suggested that if the journals had remained silent on
yellow fever, business would have continued without inter
ruption,

The Picayune editor thought it incredible that

anyone could entertain "such an erroneous and out-of-date
notion in this age of telegraphing and eager search for
and dissemination of news."

Twenty years before, no

federal health supervision had existed, "nor was the South
gridironed with railways and spiderwebbed with telegraph
wires as at p r e s e n t . W i t h the New York Times carrying
full accounts of the various incidents of the epidemic
one day after their occurrence, it is unlikely that the
fever could have been concealed for long,
A time had existed, said the New Orleans Times-Demo
crat , when it was universally believed that nothing could
stop the United States mail.

Now the mail was quarantined

by "the pettiest village and hamlet," excluding not only
their own mail, but also keeping the mail from passing

65picayune, September 29, 1897^
66lbid,, October 13, 1897,
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through their limits for destinations elsewhere.

Although

a "bonanza” to Western Union, such a situation was truly
deplorable.

The fumigation and disinfection process help

ed matters somewhat, but failed to solve the problem

entirely,67

Late in October when conditions remained

essentially unchanged, the Picayune noted that the damage
of the epidemic of 1897 came not from the mild type of pre
vailing fever, but from "the arbitrary and illegal stopping
by wayside villagers of the United States mails, and the
trains of great trunkline railways carrying interstate
travel and commerce,"

Such action, said the editor, was

clearly against the law; communities might forbid trains
to unload passengers or goods in their jurisdictions, but
had absolutely no right to prevent trains from proceeding
to some point beyond.

In the editor's opinion, the proper

remedy was to be sought in the Federal courts--a radical
stand for the states-rights Picayune. Earlier the New
Orleans Board of Trade had requested first the President
of the United States, then the Governor of Louisiana, to
employ force to break the blockades.

Both had replied

that they lacked authority to use force for that purpose.

67Times-Democrat, September 22, 1897,
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The Picayune editor suggested that the first appeal should
have been made to the United States courts for action
against the illegal obstructions to mail and interstate
commerce.

When the courts issued injunctions and the in

junctions were disregarded by the shotgun quarantinists,
then the power of the army might be used to enforce the
court orders.

Apparently this approach was never employed.

By late October the restrictions gradually began to ease
up and it became possible to ship certain kinds of mer
chandise to a number of places in Louisiana, but not
before another outrage had occurred,

A bridge on the

Southern Pacific Railroad line east of Lake Charles burned
one night shortly after an assembly of citizens in Calcas
ieu Parish had resolved that Southern Pacific trains would
not be allowed under any circumstances to enter the parish
--"a significant coincidence,’*^^
On November 12, 1897, the State Board of Health
declared all danger of infection over and removed the
fever flags and house guards, setting an example for other
areas to follow.

On November 15 a newspaper headline read,

"Quarantines Still Tumbling,"

Texas had removed all

GSpicayune, October 22, 24, 29, 1897,
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restrictions and various points in Louisiana gradually
followed suit.

By mid-November mail disinfection was dis

continued, and the Marine Hospital Service made plans for
terminating its inspection and freight fumigation service
within a short time.

As late as November 24 when the

Marine Hospital Service finally ended its work, several
parishes still maintained quarantines against the railroad
lines, but they too would soon be removed.^9
In further cooperation with the state authorities
in coping with problems arising from the epidemic, the
United States Marine Hospital Service had established
several detention camps in the neighborhood of New Orleans.
By early October, a camp at Fontainebleau, across Pontchartrain from New Orleans, began to accept fifty people a day
approved by the State Board.

In this manner, any person

wanting to leave the Crescent City might go to Fontaine
bleau, remain ten days, and obtain a health certificate
from the Marine Hospital Service.

By this time the certi

ficates were acceptable in Mississippi, Alabama, and
T e n n e s s e e .

70

-jo facilitate the transportation of skilled

69lbid., November 12, 15, 24, 1897.
70lbid., October 2, 1897.
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and unskilled laborers from New Orleans to the sugar plan
tations of the state, the Marine Hospital Service authori
ties provided for their detention and certification at
Camp Hutton in nearby Jefferson Parish.

Late in October

with a clean bill of health, many workers set out by boat
for plantations in Lafourche, Ascension, Iberville,
Assumption, and West Baton Rouge p a r i s h e s . W h e n the
United States Marine Hospital Service brought its work to
a close in late November of 1897, its officers had perform
ed a number of valuable services for New Orleans, Louisiana,
and other parts of the country as well, including passen
ger and freight inspection and fumigation services on the
railroads, mail fumigation, as well as the supervision of
detention camps.

Although many local quarantines failed

to give an inch throughout the entire season, others had
been modified to some extent at the suggestion of the
government agency.
Never before in yellow fever's history had so mild
an epidemic created so much panic and confusion.

The

pestilence appeared in forty-one different places through
out the South, but the total deaths in all places amounted

71lbid., October 20, 21, 22, 24, 1897.
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to the paltry sum of 454.

New Orleans reported 1,908 cases

and 298 fatalities, almost three-fourths of the total
yellow fever mortality in the country.

Although several

cases appeared in Baton Rouge, Clinton, Franklin, and
Patterson in Louisiana, only about ten yellow fever fatal
ities occurred in the entire state outside of New Orleans.
Compared with previous epidemics, the outbreak of
1897 was unusually tame, yet it aroused more terror through
the countryside than ever before.

Even in New Orleans

greater fear than usual found expression in the opposition
to a yellow fever hospital--to whatever degree the mob
incidents represent fear rather than other frustrations.
In countless epidemics before, yellow fever hospitals had
been established in New Orleans without provoking notice
able opposition.

But nineteen years had passed, almost

free from the disease, and perhaps as it became a less
familiar foe, it also became a more dreaded one.

On the

other hand, as it has been suggested, city politics and
class-consciousness might well have played the major role

72n . 0.
& Surg. Jour., L (May, 1898), 635;
Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for 18961897, 85; Picayune, October 19, November 23, 1897;
Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 845, 853, 894.
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in that expression of mob protest.

The violent opposition

in some quarters to the Board's policy of house isolation
and quarantine flags and the concealment of cases rather
than submitting to health regulations seem to indicate
greater fear of official measures than of the disease it
self.

However New Orleanians might have felt about the

disease, other parts of the state and country were obvious
ly terrified.

Nineteen years had gone by since the Great

Epidemic of 1878, so well-remembered by many; those too
young to remember had heard the story told and re-told
until the legend became even more dreadful than the reali
ty.

Hence, the one abiding thought outside the originally

infected areas was to prevent the entry of the fever if at
all possible.

Although some of the restrictions were un

necessarily harsh, undoubtedly the absolute quarantine
against passengers kept the pestilence away from many small
towns along the railroad lines where otherwise it might
have spread.
An elderly physician of New Orleans, Dr, Just
Touatre, called attention to an extraordinary feature of
the 1897 epidemic:

"For the first time in the history of

yellow fever, it came, [to New Orleans] this year, via the
railroad,"

Always before it had come by way of the
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river.73

While the Louisiana State Board of Health main

tained a firm grip on the quarantine door of the Missis
sippi River and other Louisiana points of entry from the
south, the yellow fever of 1897 had crept into the country
at some other port of entry, and into New Orleans from
Ocean Springs, Mississippi, by the railroad.

At least two

loopholes were later suggested as the means by which the
fever entered American territory:' the Ship Island quaran
tine off the Mississippi coast where Cuban refugees some
times slipped through, or Mobile's lax quarantine system,
allegedly designed to divert the Central and South
American trade from the port of New Orleans.
Although praiseworthy for its cleansing and fumiga
tion system, Louisiana's quarantine program still was not
based on those principles necessary to prevent the intro
duction of the fever.

Placing their faith in disinfection

and fumigation rather than adequate detention, the Board un
wittingly left open the gate to cases of yellow fever.
Although apparently in perfect health at the moment of
arrival, a crewman or passenger might well be carrying the

73picayune, October 24, 1897.
7^N. 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., L (October, 1897), 265.
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yellow fever virus within his system only to come down
with the fever within a day or so after reaching the Cres
cent City.

At any rate, the Saffron Scourge reappeared in

Louisiana in 1898 and 1899.

Both outbreaks, however, were

even less destructive than the mild epidemic of 1897.
In mid-September of 1898 when the first case was
reported in New Orleans, the State Board of Health tele
graphed the information to the health boards of neighbor
ing states and to the United States Marine Hospital
Service.

Absolute quarantines again were established

against New Orleans,

However, since some areas accepted

the set of regulations agreed upon by an interstate
assembly of health officials at Atlanta in April of 1898,
freight traffic was not entirely suspended.

The people of

the southern states exhibited less panic than in the pre
vious year; perhaps because the fever of 1897 had not
lived up to their original expectations.

In 1898 New

Orleans reported 118 cases in all, with fifty-seven deaths.
Although mild, the fever of 1898 spread extensively in
Louisiana.

Cases appeared in Franklin, Houma, Baton Rouge,

Wilson, Clinton, Plaquemine, Lutcher, St. James Parish,
Jackson, East Feliciana Parish, West Feliciana Parish,
Alexandria, Bowie, Iberville Parish, St. Charles Parish,
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Lake Charles, Slaughter, Morrow, and other towns and
parishes, mainly in the southern portion of the

state.

^5

The fever of 1899 claimed only twenty-three lives in
New Orleans, and a few cases occurred in Plaquemines Parish,
St. Charles Parish, and Baton Rouge,

Again the familiar

quarantines were applied within and without the state.
For the most part, however, freight shipments continued
under the Atlanta Regulations of 1898,

Northern and cen

tral Louisiana quarantined against New Orleans, but almost
the entire southern and eastern portion manifested confi
dence in the State Board to handle the situation properly
and withheld their local restrictions,^6
The first half of the nineteenth century had wit
nessed a steady increase in the frequency and virulence of
yellow fever; the 1850's marked something of a climax of
its activities.

In the last forty years of the century,

although expected each year, the scourge struck rarely,
and with two exceptions (1867 and 1878), lightly.

The

75Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for
1898-1899, 45, 46; N. 0, Med, & Surg, Jour., LI (October,
1898), 209.
76Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for
1898-1899, 47, 242.
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decline of the pestilence coincided with increasingly
positive action by Louisiana health authorities in the
areas of sanitation, disinfection, and fumigation, as well
as "Maritime Sanitation"--that is, the modified quarantine
program.

Although fallacious insofar as yellow fever was

concerned, the conclusion that the sanitary efforts de
served credit for reducing the incidence of the pestilence
undoubtedly won increased support for a stronger and more
active Board of Health and indirectly resulted in a more
favorable climate of opinion for the concept of public
health.

For whatever reason, known only to the virus it

self, by the 1890's the fever exhibited a less virulent
character than in previous years.

A Louisiana historian,

writing in 1903, dismissed the visitation of 1897 with this
brief statement:

"There was an epidemic, called by some

yellow fever, in New Orleans in 1897; but the fever was so
mild and the mortalities so few that the disease was known
by the name of 'yellowoid.'"??

By 1899, not only had yellow

fever diminished in virulence, but its secret mode of trans
mission by the familiar pest, the Aedes aegypti mosquito.

77portier, A History of Louisiana, IV, 232-33.
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was soon to be discovered and proved beyond any reasonable
doubt.

The final conquest of the scourge of New Orleans,

the South, and Latin America was just around the corner
when the twentieth century arrived.
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YELLOW FEVER MORTALITY IN NEW ORLEANS, 1867-1899

Year

Number of D

*1867
1868
1869
-1870
1871
1872
-1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
*1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
*1897
1898
1899

3,320
3
3
587
54
39
226
11
61
42
1
4,046
19
2
0
4
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
298
57
23

[hs**

Population (Approx.)
181,000

192.000

199.000

211,000

285,000

*Major epidemics.
**From Board of Health figures.
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DISTRIBUTION OF YELLOW FEVER IN LOUISIANA OUTSIDE OF NEW ORLEANS, 1867-1899*
Places
Alexandria
Baton Rouge
Coushatta
Delhi
Delta
Donaldsonville
East Feliciana Parish
Greenwood
Gretna
Hammond
Houma
Jackson
Jeanerette
Labadieville
Lafayette
Lafourche Crossing
Lake Charles
Lake Providence
Mansfield
Napoleonv i1le
New Iberia
Opelousas
Pa inc our tville
Plaquemine
Plaquemines Parish
Ponchatoula
Port Barre
Port Hudson

1867

1870

1873

1878

1879

1897

1898

X

X

X
X

X
X
X
X

X

X

X

1899

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X

X

X
X
X
X
X
ro
X
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Places
St. Bernard Parish
St. Charles Parish
St. James Parish
St. John the Baptist Parish
St. Martinville
St. Mary Parish
Shreveport
Tangipahoa
Thibodaux
Vermillionville
Ville Platte
Washington
West Feliciana Parish
Wilson

1867

1870

1873

1878

1879

1897

1898

X
X

1899

X

X
X
X
X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X
X
X

*Yellow fever also occurred in many small towns in Louisiana not included in the list.
This chart is intended as a representative picture of the major areas affected, and not an
exhaustive listing.
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CHAPTER VI

THE LAST EPIDEMIC, 1905

Yellow fever appeared in New Orleans only once
after 1899--for the last time.

The epidemic of 1905 was

not only the last outbreak of the yellow pestilence in the
Crescent City, but also the last yellow fever epidemic in
the United States.

By this time the Saffron Scourge was

operating under a grave disadvantage:

its heretofore

secret mode of transmission had been discovered.

In the

latter nineteenth century the United States government had
commissioned several individuals and expeditions to investi
gate the yellow fever mystery, but without positive results,
The Spanish-American War in 1898 and the subsequent mili
tary occupation of Cuba brought the American forces in
contact with the yellow foe in its own territory, where it
had prevailed as an endemic disease for many years.

In

1900 a commission of United States Army surgeons went to
Cuba on a special assignment:

Operation Yellow Jack.

Chairman Walter Reed and his associates (James Carroll,
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Jesse W, Lazear, and Aristides Agramonte) followed the path
suggested long before by Carlos Finlay,

By using the

Aedes aegypti mosquitoes which Finlay made available to
them, they successfully demonstrated the role of the mos
quito as the vector of yellow fever.

In October of 1900

they made a tentative announcement of their findings,

and

after further experimentation issued a full report in the
spring of 1901, stating that yellow fever was transmitted
by the Aedes aegypti mosquito and only in that manner,^
One might have expected that the announcement of
this significant discovery would have stimulated the people
of New Orleans and elsewhere in the South to embark immedi
ately upon an anti-mosquito crusade to eliminate the
possibility of future outbreaks.

Such was not the case.

Many persons refused to believe that the small, familiar
pest, offensive and annoying though it might be, was
actually the agent of the dreaded pestilence.

Even the

medical profession was divided; many who accepted the
theory did so with reservations.

The editor of the New

Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal in April of 1901 felt
that it was too soon to consider the mosquito the only

^Winslow, Conquest of Epidemic Disease, 352-54.
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means of yellow fever transmission, although he did believe
in the "urgent necessity" for eradicating the culprit and
recommended a public campaign toward that end.

2

In its report for 1900 and 1901 the State Board of
Health discussed the conclusions of the Reed Commission,
Although admitting that the mosquito had been demonstrated
as one factor in the conveyance of yellow fever, the Board
stated that "we Southern Health Officers, charged with the
grave duty of protecting our people against this most
dreaded of all diseases, are unwilling to accept the
dictum of the experimenters that yellow fever can be con
veyed by no other agency."

They were not yet prepared to

give up the theory of the fever's spread by means of
foraites, that is, substances capable of absorbing germs,
such as woolen fabrics or articles of clothing.^
On the other hand, the New Orleans City Board of
Health (created in 1898) and the Orleans Parish Medical
Society exhibited considerable interest in the mosquito
theory and shortly after the announcement of the theory

2n . 0.

& Surg. Jour., LXII (April, 1901), 595.

3Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for
1900-1901, 77-79.
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began to take steps to investigate breeding places of the
Aedes aegypti in New Orleans for the purpose of eradicat
ing the species.

Dr, Quitman Kohnke, chairman of the City

Board of Health, had been thoroughly impressed by the
striking results of William Gorgas' anti-mosquito campaign
in Havana in 1901, and under Kohnke's leadership the City
Board spearheaded a similar movement in New Orleans as
early as July of 1901,

Circulars were printed in the news

papers and copies widely distributed giving information and
advice on the Aedes aegypti and how to combat it.

Confer

ences were held and lectures given to educate the house
holders on the necessity of screening and oiling their
cisterns to eliminate the favorite breeding places of the
yellow fever mosquito.

In August the City Board undertook

an experiment in a selected locality of the city, with the
intention of visiting every house within a particular area
and of oiling all cisterns in order to destroy mosquitoes
while in the process of development.
refused to participate in the program.

Many householders
Others allowed the

oiling process the first time around, but refused on the
second, insisting that they could taste and smell oil in
their drinking water.

Hence, what was designed as a demon

stration which might be repeated throughout the city failed
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completely.

Convinced that in the face of apathy and

opposition the program could never be effected without
special supporting law, the City Health Board attempted to
secure an ordinance on the subject, but to no avail.^
From time to time between the summer of 1901 and the
summer of 1905, the New Orleans Medical and Surgical Jour
nal, the city newspapers, the State Board of Health, and
the Orleans Parish Medical Association recommended the
screening and oiling of cisterns in a war against the mos
quito.

Dr. Kohnke of the City Board kept up his agitation

throughout the period, but because of ignorance, indiffer
ence, or skepticism, New Orleanians failed to arouse them
selves to the task.

Not a single yellow fever death

occurred in the Crescent City in the years 1900 through
1904.5

While the disease was not present, few could bother

to become disturbed about an unseen enemy.

The challenge

was not met until it occurred in the form of a yellow fever
epidemic; then and only then were the health authorities

^Sir Rubert William Boyce, Yellow Fever Prophylaxis
in New Orleans, 1905 (London [1906]), 8, 16; Report of the
Louisiana State Board of Health for 1900-1901, 46-5ll
Picayune, August 30, 1901,
^Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for
1900-1901, 7; Boyce, Yellow F:ver Prophylaxis, 1.
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able to arouse people to action.

In spite of certain ob

structions initially posed by the Italian segment of the
population, the crusade against the yellow fever mosquito
in the midst of the 1905 epidemic reflected a remarkable
display of energy and enthusiasm by the people of New
Orleans.

The crusade was preached from pulpit and press,

at indoor and outdoor educational mass meetings, and in
several different languages.

It was encouraged by of

ficial and unofficial circulars containing advice and
information and given legal sanction by city ordinances.
The State and City Boards of Health, the United States
Public Health and Marine Hospital Service, the Orleans
Parish Medical Society, citizens ward volunteer groups,
women's organizations, and Negro leagues all cooperated
in the fight against yellow fever.

Armed with the knowl

edge of the mosquito as transmitter, the crusaders were
able to employ effective weapons against the disease; the
final conquest was at hand.
In 1905 the New Orleans population numbered about
375,000, with less than a fourth immune to yellow fever by
previous attack.

In the preceding four or five years,

numerous Italian immigrants had swelled the population,
settling in the old portion of the city near the water front,
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It was later believed that yellow fever had slipped past
the quarantine station sometime late in May by means of
an infected passenger or an infected mosquito, probably
from Central America.

The fever spread first among the

Italians, who were clannish, unfamiliar with both yellow
fever and the English language, and reluctant to call in
medical aid.

Hence, the disease gained a foothold in that

portion of the city, and not until July 13 were the first
suspicious cases brought to the attention of the health
authorities.

Meanwhile, many Italians from the infected

area had moved to other sections of the city and the
state, carrying the fever with them and thus facilitating
its spread.

By July 21, when the first public announce

ment came from the authorities, it was estimated that at
least a hundred cases and twenty deaths had already
occurred.G
Organization of the anti-fever campaign started
almost immediately after the discovery of the disease in
New Orleans,

Even before the public announcement. Dr.

Kohnke had begun the work of fumigation in the infected

^Rudolph Matas, "A Yellow Fever Retrospect and Pros
pect,*' Louisiana Historical Quarterly, VIII (July, 1925),
462-63; Picayune, July 31, October 15, 1905.
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area.

On July 21 the State and City Boards of Health,

representatives of the United States Public Health and
Marine Hospital Service, health officials from neighboring
states, and members of the Orleans Parish Medical Society
met in conference to discuss the problem at hand.

The

next day, July 22, the medical society created a special
committee to work with the health authorities.

On the

same day several prominent citizens, the Mayor, and the
chairmen of the State and City Boards of Health conferred,
made plans for halting the spread of infection, and organ
ized a Finance Committee to collect funds for the campaign.
On July 23 the newspapers published an address to the
citizens of New Orleans signed by Dr. Kohnke of the City
Health Board and Dr. J. H. White of the United States
Public Health and Marine Hospital Service, and approved by
the special committee of the Orleans Parish Medical Society.
The message proclaimed the existence of an emergency "which
demands the attention of every individual, with the view
to limiting and preventing the spread of epidemic disease."
The statement declared the mosquito as the only means of
yellow fever's transmission and recommended to the citizens
the following measures;

screening and oiling cisterns and

cesspools or privies, empyting all receptacles of stagnant
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water » sleeping under mosquito nets, and screening doors
and windows,^
On Sunday, July 23, the Reverend Dr. Beverley
Warner, rector of Trinity Church, spoke out for the crusade
from his pulpit.

In the following weeks other clergymen of

all denominations would follow his example.

On Monday,

July 24, the Fourteenth Ward of the city organized to
clean all streets, yards, and gutters In the area, and to
have every cistern screened,

ffore than a hundred citizens

attended the organizational meeting and made liberal
financial contributions to Institute the program.

They

divided Into committees and planned to begin work on the
following day.

To facilitate the work they advertised for

bids to screen some 250 cisterns.

Within a day or two

other wards followed their example, and by July 26 the
health authorities decided to establish a central head
quarters for the ward groups with Dr. Beverley Warner as
chairman.

His task was to coordinate the ward activities,

report to the city board, and thereby eliminate duplication

^Boyce, Yellow Fever Prophylaxis, 18, 20; Picayune,
July 23, 1905.
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of work.
On Wednesday, July 26, campaign procedure was being
developed all over the city.

In addition to appointing Dr,

Warner superintendent of ward work, the City Board planned
its own activities.

It established a sanitary force of a

hundred men to locate fever cases, fumigate and screen
infected premises, and deal with each new focus of disease
as it developed.

Another force of 250 men was assigned to

work in the field, and house-by-house, ward-by ward, to
make war on the mosquito.

The officers of all the Italian

societies in New Orleans assembled that day to discuss the
yellow fever problem.

They appointed special committees

to make house-to-house visits among the Italians, urging
them to report all cases of disease and to comply with
official measures,^

A yellow fever isolation hospital

established by the city health authorities in the infected
district opened on July 26 and received its first patients.
Under the supervision of Dr, Hamilton Jones, who had also
directed the yellow fever hospital in 1897, every precaution

^Boyce, Yellow Fever Prophylaxis, 18, 20, 27, 28;
Picayune, July 25, 27, 1905,
9Boyce, Yellow Fever Prophylaxis, 20, 27; Picayune,
July 27, 1905,
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was taken to keep mosquitoes away from the patients.
Within less than a week after the first public
announcement of yellow fever's existence in the city, sys^
tematic measures had been taken by the health authorities,
the medical society, and the citizens of New Orleans to
create the working machinery necessary for an all-out war
of extermination against the disease-bearing Aedes aegypti.
The machinery of organization would fail in its mission,
however, unless supported by public understanding and
enthusiastic cooperation.

To stimulate the New Orleans

populace, an educational campaign was a vital necessity,
and in waging that campaign, all the forces of organization
came to the fore.

Contributing its full support to the

educational drive, the New Orleans press published notices
and circulars, described the activities of the health
authorities and ward committees, and provided editorial
propaganda for the cause.

The Picayune editor assured the

people of New Orleans that yellow fever could be transmitt
ed only by the mosquito and that it was easily prevented
"by the adoption of the strictest safeguards against the

lOAugustin, History of Yellow Fever, 885; Boyce,
Yellow Fever Prophylaxis, 19.
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pestiferous insect,"

Day after day New Orleanians were

urged to oil and screen cisterns and to sleep under mos
quito nets.

Recognizing that the yellow pestilence no

longer was "the vague terror, borne on the hot winds in
waves or disseminated in unknown and mysterious fashion,"
the editor of the New Orleans Times-Democrat urged the
citizenry to keep up the good fight against the scourge.
Throughout the epidemic the Orleans Parish Medical
Society rendered a valuable service in sending out notices,
circulars, and pamphlets.

The members of the Society tried

to impress upon all physicians the absolute necessity of
reporting immediately all cases of fever, even doubtful
ones.

Further, they worked hand in hand with the health

officials in the educational campaign, and were among the
first to advocate the transfer of the yellow fever crusade
from the direction of local authorities to the United
States Public Health and Marine Hospital Service.

When

the federal authorities took charge of the campaign, the
medical society continued to cooperate in the fight
against yellow fever.

Pamphlets containing instructions

llpicayune, July 23, 1905; Times-Democrat, August
28, 1905; Boyce, Yellow Fever Prophylaxis, 52-53.
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and advice to physicians and nurses were prepared by Dr,
Rudolph Matas, renowned physician and surgeon of New Orleans.
These pamphlets were distributed by the medical society
and paid for by the United States Treasury Department.

To

propagandize the anti-mosquito crusade, physicians lectured
in churches, in factories, and in school rooms throughout
the Crescent City, and in other parts of the state as
well.

12

Almost every night during the epidemic someone

lectured somewhere in New Orleans on the subject of the
yellow fever mosquito.

Dr. Kohnke was tireless in his

efforts to convince the people of New Orleans that all
activities should be directed against that one species of
mosquito.

Night after night he lectured, describing the

life cycle of the mosquito with the aid of lantern slides,
recommending the use of oil on cistern water to kill the
"wiggle-tails" already there and to hinder mosquitoes from
laying more eggs on the water.

He assured the people that

oil could not hurt their drinking water.
mended sulphur fumigation of all houses.

Further, he recom1?

Thousands of

l^Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 1066-77; Boyce,
Yellow Fever Prophylaxis , 21-27.
^^Picayune, July 25, 27, 1905; Boyce, Yellow Fever
Prophylaxis, 28, 59.
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people heard the lectures of Dr. Kohnke and other speakers
and thereby were converted and enrolled in the campaign.
The Citizens Ward Committees, centralized under Dr.
Warner of Trinity Church, sent in daily reports of work
accomplished:

houses inspected and fumigated, cisterns

oiled and screened.

With Dr. Warner acting as coordinator,

the city health authorities could then check the wards to
see what else had to be done.

The Ward Organizations also

participated in the education campaign.

They issued

notices, set up posters in prominent places, and sponsored
educational mass meetings to inform people that extinction
of mosquitoes meant freedom from yellow fever in the
future.
In addition to supervising the ward work. Dr. Warner
also participated actively in the educational campaign.

In

a circular letter he made a special appeal to the clergy
of all religious denominations to preach the anti-mosquito
c r u s a d e .

Dr, Warner and Dr, Kohnke addressed groups of

New Orleanians almost every night during the epidemic, and

l^Boyce, Yellow Fever Prophylaxis, 28; Picayune,
July 28, 29, August 4, 1905,
ISpicayune, July 31, 1905,
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both were instrumental in organizing the Negroes of New
Orleans to aid in the great war on yellow fever.

In late

July Dr. Warner addressed the first gathering of Negroes
and explained that yellow fever was no longer the "bugbear
it had been in former years."

He mentioned the old belief

that Negroes possessed immunity to the disease, but express
ed his opinion that if an infected mosquito stung a Negro,
it would be "just the same as though a white man had been
stung."

The prominent Negro men present at that first

meeting, including doctors, lawyers, and ministers, organ
ized the Central Sanitary Association and made plans to
establish branches among the Negroes in the various wards
of the city.^G
On August 16 Dr. Warner and several other speakers
addressed a mass meeting of Negroes at the Second Baptist
Church.

Regarding the possibility of racial immunity, one

Negro speaker declared:

"Suppose we were immune, all per

sons are not, and we must help them.

We are a part of the

community, and our prosperity depends upon their prosperity."
Furthermore, he added, "When the white people get stirred
up like this there is sure something doing.

They don't

IGlbid., July 29, 1905.
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raise a big fuss like this over nothing.
kill this stegomyia [Aedes aegypti]

Let's help them
Another large

assembly of Negroes met in the First Street A.M.E. Church
on the night of August 22 to hear short lectures by a mem
ber of the Woman's League, several Negro ministers, and Dr,
Kohnke,

A considerable number of Woman's League members

attended that meeting, and many other white persons were
scattered about in the audience.

Dr. Kohnke encouraged

the Negroes to organize and assist in the crusade.

"There

is no difference between white and black," he said.

"We

live the same way, we get sick the same way, we get well
the same way, we die the same way."

Emphasizing the

equality theme, he continued, "There is no distinction of
color with the stegomyia mosquito.
bite you as he is to bite me."

He is just as ready to

If the mosquito happened

to be an infected one, a Negro would take yellow fever
just as a white man.

Hence, it was necessary for them to

follow the same precautionary measures as the whites.

Dr.

Kohnke then gave his usual lecture on the life cycle of
the mosquito with stereoptico.n illustrations.

When the

17lbid., August 17, 1905. Stegomyia was the term
previously applied to the Aedes aegypti mosquito.
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Negro minister dismissed the meeting, he urged all persons
to go forth and fumigate their houses and oil and screen
1A
their cisterns, °
Interestingly enough, although susceptible to yellow
fever, Negroes did exhibit a striking tendency toward re
covery.

Although, as Dr, Kohnke stated, the stegomyia did

not recognize the color line, obviously the people of New
Orleans did, for the Negroes were not invited to join the
ward organizations, but were encouraged to form "separate
but equal" associations instead.

Nevertheless, some of the

initial educational sessions among the Negroes were inte
grated, at least to some degree.
In the campaign another segment of the New Orleans
population, the women, worked actively with the health
authorities and with the regular ward organizations although
set apart in their own separate organizations.

Especially

active was the Home and Education Department of the Woman's
League under the chairmanship of Mrs, W, J, Behan.

That

group participated wholeheartedly in the work of sponsoring
popular lectures in public meeting places throughout the
city.

They had started something of an anti-mosquito

IGlbid., August 23, 1905.
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campaign even before the outbreak of the epidemic of 1905,
but like Dr. Kohnke, apparently had met with little success.
These civic-minded women not only organized and sponsored
lectures but also established Ward Clubs and undertook a
house-to-house campaign, urging householders to oil and
screen their cisterns and to fumigate their houses.
Another “progressive** women's organization, the Ladies of
the Era Club, worked diligently throughout the campaign.
The members visited homes and informed housewives of the
yellow fever mosquito and measures to eliminate it.

Under

the leadership of these women's groups and perhaps others,
women in the different wards of the city formed associations to cooperate with the other volunteer forces.

IQ

One thing more should be noted in connection with
the women's activities in the crusade, which reflects the
early twentieth-century striving for female equality.

In

mid-September the New Orleans Health Association was organ
ized to work for the benefit of the city's future health,
to bring about changes in sanitary legislation along the
lines of recent scientific discoveries, and to work for
the enforcement of those laws.

When Dr. Warner suggested

l^Boyce, Yellow Fever Prophylaxis, 59; Picayune,
August 3, September 3, 1905.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

244
to the members of the Woman's League that they form a
"women's auxiliary" to the Health Association, they de
clined.

They agreed to cooperate with the new organization

while continuing their own work, but if they could not be
accepted as members of equal standing in the society, they
refused to have any second-class connection with it,^®

In

1905, then, not only Negroes but also women found them
selves relegated to segregated organizations, cooperating
with, but not a part of, the central corps of white men.
In mid-August a new feature was introduced at one
of the educational mass meetings sponsored by the Woman's
League:

Dr. Felix Formento agreed to deliver a speech in

Italian.

Many persons of that nationality attended the

lecture and seemed willing to accept Dr. Formento's advice.
He explained to them the relationship of the mosquito to
the disease and described the work of the United States
Public Health and Marine Hospital Service, which had taken
over the campaign early in August.

Furthermore, he told

them why they could not be allowed to "throw obstacles in
the way of the public health and safety" and requested

ZOpicayune, September 16, October 6, 1905.
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that they cooperate with the health authorities.21

The

speeches of Dr. Formento and others in the Italian language,
the influence of the prominent Italian citizens of the com
munity working through their associations, and the influ
ence of the Catholic clergy finally won the confidence and
the cooperation of many previously obstructionist Italians,
As the educational campaign began to win converts
and the ward workers and city authorities went into action,
the Citizens' Finance Committee ordered 25,000 lapel but
tons bearing the words "My Cisterns are all right; How are
Yours?" around an image of the Aedes aegypti.

For the pur

pose of further propagandizing the movement, these badges
were to be worn by persons who had already attended to the
screening and oiling of their cisterns.^2

Reflecting a

clever imagination, a unique advertisement appeared in the
Picayune shortly after the cistern-screening movement was
initiated:

"STEGOMYIA WIRE, in all size rolls, is one of

our specialties.

If you don't know what a Stegomyia is,

ask Dr. Kohnke,"2^

21lbid,, August 15, 1905
22ibid,, July 28, 1905.
23ibid,, July 25, 1905.
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Promoted by many diverse groups in the city with
Dr. Kohnke, Dr. Warner, and the Woman's League in the van
guard, the city-wide educational campaign was carried into
the factories and the school roans.

In early September Dr.

Warner made arrangements with about half the factories in
the city for thirty-minute sessions with the employees.
Physicians and laymen volunteered to handle the discus
sions and undoubtedly influenced thousands of persons in
these forums who had not been reached o t h e r w i s e . D u r i n g
one week in October, Dr. Warner and various New Orleans
physicians visited some fifty-one schools and talked to
43,000 children, distributing among them printed instruc
tions for fumigation and other measures against the yellow
fever mosquito in the hope that the children would do
"their missionary work at home."^^
At various times during the epidemic, certain dates
were designated as General Fumigation Days when all
citizens were urged to fumigate their homes by burning
sulphur.

The ward organizations provided the sulphur free

of charge to those unable to purchase their own.

Z^ibid., September 3, 1905.
25lbid., October 5, 13, 1903.
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Citizens Volunteer Groups culminated their work on October
14 and 15 with one day of general cleaning to clear away
all bottles and cans where mosquitoes might breed and one
day of general fumigation to clear the houses of the
pests.
In spite of the general enthusiasm and cooperation
among the citizens of New Orleans, it was still too much
to expect unanimity of purpose in a city of that size.
Some persons simply would not screen their cisterns volun
tarily or follow other recommendations made by the health
authorities unless absolutely forced to do so.

Hence, it

soon became clear that an anti-mosquito ordinance was
absolutely vital to provide legal support for the crusade.
An ordinance was introduced in the City Council on July 25
which authorized the Board of Health to treat water with
oil when the receptacles had not been properly screened.
Further, it required that cisterns, tanks, barrels, or
other water containers be screened or otherwise covered
in a manner satisfactory to the Board of Health.

For any

single violation, the ordinance provided a fine up to $25

26%bid., August 17, 21, 25, September 30, October
5, 1905.
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or imprisonment up to thirty days, or both.

The failure

to comply with any provision of the ordinance was con
sidered a separate violation for each day of noncompliance
after notification by the health authorities.

The measure

passed the Council unanimously on August 1 and with the
Mayor's signature became law on August 2.

The property

owner or agent bore the responsibility for oiling and
screening cisterns.

Cheese cloth could be used as a tempo

rary cover until October 1, by which time it had to be
replaced with a certain kind of screen wire.

Several

thousand copies of the ordinance were printed and distrib
uted throughout the city, and every property owner was
ordered to comply with the ordinance within forty-eight
hours after its announcement or suffer the penalty.

It

was left to the Board of Health to decide if the cistern
also needed oiling after its screening.

By mid-August a

number of persons had been fined and jailed for refusing
to screen their cisterns, evidencing the serious intent
of the city authorities to enforce the measure.

In

September the Orleans Parish Medical Society urged that
the October 1 deadline for permanent screening be post
poned until a later date because of the danger of releasing
mosquitoes imprisoned within the cisterns.

Accepting the
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society's advice, the City Council passed a new ordinance
on September 26 to become effective on January 1,

Present

screens were to be retained; if wire screens were installed,
they had to be placed over the cheesecloth without removing
it.27
In early August an important change was effected in
the administration of the anti-fever campaign:

the trans

fer of command from the local authorities to a federal
force.

In a conference held on August 4, the mayor, the

President of the Orleans Parish Medical Society, represen
tatives of the City and State Health Boards, and repre
sentatives of New Orleans commercial bodies decided to
request that the United States government take over the
yellow fever campaign in the Crescent City.

Accordingly,

Governor Newton C. Blanchard sent a message to President
Theodore Roosevelt requesting that the federal government
assume control of the situation in New Orleans.

At the

same time Mayor Martin Behrman wired the President declar
ing the general desire of New Orleans that federal autho
rities take over the task of eradicating yellow fever.

27Boyce, Yellow Fever Prophylaxis, 27; Picayune,
July 26, August 2, 3, 18, September 22, 27, 1905.
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Noting the success of the federal health officers in com
bating yellow fever in Havana and elsewhere, the mayor
appealed for "executive interposition in behalf of the
people of New Orleans."

President Roosevelt immediately

directed the Surgeon-General of the United States to
attack the problem in the Crescent City.

In a public

announcement, Dr. Quitman Kohnke informed the citizenry
that the transfer of command to the federal government
was no indication that the epidemic had become more
serious, nor that the local authorities were unable to
handle the situation.

"Outside communities will have

greater confidence in the United States Public Health
authorities," he said, "than they appear to have in the
local State officers."

It was hoped that quarantines

might ease up with New Orleans under federal health super
vision.

No radical administrative changes occurred;

essentially the same men continued to carry on the work.^8
From the onset of the epidemic. Dr. J. H, White of
the United States Public Health and Marine Hospital Serv
ice had worked with the local authorities.

On August 7

28picayune, August 5, 1905; Boyce, Yellow Fever
Prophylaxis, 35.
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he took charge of the campaign and proceeded to develop a
more systematic and authoritative approach to the work
already started by the local officials.

Within a few days

Dr. White had established a central headquarters, and with
a staff of forty surgeons of the federal service he created
subdivisional headquarters in each ward.

Each ward center

had a supply of materials for fumigating, oiling, and
screening.

House-by-house, block-by-block, gangs of work

men in each ward proceeded each day to inspect, oil, screen,
and fumigate.

Whenever a case of fever was reported to

ward headquarters, a squad of workmen was dispatched im
mediately to attend to the necessary screening of the
patient and fumigation of the house.

Sometimes the patient

was removed to the emergency yellow fever hospital; after
ward, his house and others in the neighborhood were thor
oughly fumigated to kill any infected mosquitoes.

The new

command coordinated the activities of the voluntary ward
groups and made a systematic survey of every ward to see
where further work was

n
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Dr, White went to great pains to convince the

Z^Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 882-84; Boyce,
Yellow Fever Prophylaxis, 37-44; Picayune, August 8, 1905.
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citizenry that it was vitally necessary to obey the rules
based on the principle of mosquito transmission.

Further

more, he assured them that house quarantines would not be
invoked.

In a letter to every doctor in the city, he

urged the immediate reporting of all cases, not only posi
tive cases of fever, "but also any case you may be unable,
even at your first visit, to say is not yellow fever,"

Dr,

White made every attempt to obtain the complete coopera
tion of the medical profession "in the checking of the
multiplication of new foci of infection, and the early
destruction of those already existing."^0
The attempt to halt a yellow fever epidemic which
had been slowly developing for almost two months before
coming to the attention of the authorities was a task of
gigantic proportions, even with the knowledge of the
insect vector.

In a city the size

thousands upon thousands ofcisterns,

of New Orleans with
and millions of mos

quitoes, such a task was not easy to accomplish.

For the

campaign to be effective it

had to be complete.

disease had obtained a head

start, it was impossible to

stamp it out immediately.

Since the

Nevertheless by early October

30Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 886.
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the number of new cases developing daily had declined con
siderably, and on October 9 Dr, White ordered that the
official ward forces gradually be cut down.

By October 16

out of nearly 1,300 men previously employed in the sub
headquarters, only 400 remained at work, and that number
was decreased steadily.

The high point of the epidemic

had occurred in mid-August after which its force had
declined.

Still, a few cases continued to occur daily

throughout October and early November.

31

The epidemic of

1905 lasted about as long as epidemics ordinarily did, but
its decline came early in the season, and the number of
cases definitely was held down.to a figure far below what
it might have been if no fight had been waged.
The New Orleans Picayune had not been pleased with
the transfer of control to the federal authorities, fearing
that it would result in "Federal domination."

Recalling

the old fight against the National Board of Health to pre
serve the "sovereignty and rights of the State" from "ab
sorption by the Federal Government," the editor remarked:
"Now we rush into the arms of Uncle Sam, and are only too

^^Boyce, Yellow Fever Prophylaxis, 51; Picayune,
October 11, 16, 1905,
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happy if we can trade our out-of-date Democratic State
sovereignty trumpery for relief from the responsibility
of a plain duty, and for money enough for a temporary
sanitation of the city.

Truly times change,"

Neverthe

less, once the change had been effected the editor felt
it the duty of the citizens to support the federal autho
rities "so that the very best result may be obtained, a
result that may be worth thousands of valuable lives and
countless millions in values,
The Yellow Fever Crusade was an expensive venture,
but worth every cent expended in terms of benefits obtain
ed at the time and in the future.

From the very beginning,

a Citizens Yellow Fever Fund Committee was organized with
Charles Janvier as chairman to collect money from the
citizens of New Orleans and to handle the disbursement of
the funds.

When the federal forces assumed control,

Surgeon-General Walter Wyman insisted that New Orleans
supply the labor and materials for the campaign while the
government would provide the medical officers, supervision,
and inspection services on railroads and in detention
camps.

The State appropriated $100,000 for the work; the

32picayune, August 5, 23, 1905.
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City Council, $50,000; and the citizens of New Orleans
contributed $160,000.

Of the State appropriation, at

least $20,000 went to aid the fight in the infected towns
of Louisiana outside of New Orleans.

In addition to the

expenditure of the local funds, the federal authorities
spent approximately $50,000 for salaries and expenses of
the officers, for the maintenance of detention camps, and
for inspecting and fumigating railroad freight cars.
Additional funds collected by the volunteer ward groups
and used for cistern-screening and oiling amounted to
$30,000.

Hence, in New Orleans alone, the crusade cost

well over $J00,000, not including the expenditures of all
those individuals who screened their own cisterns and
houses.

Thousands of additional dollars were spent in

other portions of the state as the campaign was extended
to those areas where yellow fever spread.

The unused

balance of the New Orleans funds, approximately thirty or
forth thousand dollars, was set aside as an emergency
hospital fund for future use.^^

S^Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 884-85;
Picayune, August 6, 7, 11, October 15, 18, 22, 29, 1905;
Boyce, Yellow Fever Prophylaxis, 60-62.
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The first announcement of yellow fever in New
Orleans had set off the usual chain reaction of interstate
and intrastate quarantines.

For the first time, a quaran

tine barrier was erected against New Orleans by Havana,
Cuba, a yellow fever center so frequently quarantined in
the past by New Orleans and other port cities.

The Pica

yune called the Havana quarantine "one of the revenges of
fate," but felt that Havana's success in eradicating
yellow fever should give encouragement to New Orleans.
One big obstacle to the work was popular skepticism regard
ing the mosquito as a transmitter of the fever.

Pointing

to the lesson to be learned from the anti-mosquito cam
paign in that Cuban center, the Picayune editor said,
"let us no longer be old fogies," but attend to the prob
lem immediately.34
In late July as the news of fever in New Orleans
spread around the state and to neighboring states, restric
tions were established against passengers and baggage from
the Crescent City, but through-traffic and freight met
with fewer obstructions than in previous years.

After a

conference with Dr. Edmond Souchon, President of the State

3'^Picayune, July 24, 1905.
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Board of Health, and representatives of the Illinois
Central, Texas Pacific, New Orleans and Northeastern, and
Southern Pacific Railroads, Dr. White of the United States
Marine Hospital Service proceeded to establish detention
camps on all railroad lines so that after five days of
detention, persons might secure health certificates to
pass through quarantine lines.
On July 28 the Louisiana State Board of Health pro
claimed quarantine for the entire state against unauthoriz
ed passengers from New Orleans and other infected localities.
Further, the Board forbade all railroad and transportation
companies to sell tickets to any point in Louisiana from
New Orleans or other infected points, under penalty of
law.36

Only those persons from detention camps who had

received health certificates from the federal health autho
rities were permitted to travel from infected areas.

Some

parishes, although protected by the State Board regulations,
continued to create even more stringent blockades.

In

early August when St. Landry Parish tried to exclude
freight from New Orleans, Dr. Souchon, President of the

35New York Times, July 28, 1905; Picayune, July 23,
24, 1905.
36picayune, July 29, 1905.
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State Board, reminded the parish board of the Act of 1898,
That act gave the State Board power of supervision over
all local 'quarantine regulations and provided that no
local board of health could establish a rule in conflict
with those set forth by the State Board.

Dr. Souchon de

clared that the St. Landry Parish health board had acted
illegally in quarantining freight cars which had been fumi
gated and inspected by the United States Public Health and
Marine Hospital Service since the State Board considered
such freight not liable to quarantine.

Still many local

boards tried to halt the passage of trains through their
territory and otherwise interfered with the transportation
of mail, freight, and passengers approved by the State
Board and United States health officers.

Such violations

of the Act of 1898 led the State Board to issue a proclama
tion declaring that those persons who continued to ignore
State Board regulations might be liable to civil action
for interference with interstate commerce.

Furthermore,

the Board firmly expressed the intention "to reform by
persuasion, if possible, but forcibly if necessary, the
present chaotic condition of quarantine matters in Louisi
ana."

If the local boards continued to pose unreasonable,

as well as illegal restraints to commerce, the Board
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threatened to ask the Governor to call out the state
07

militia to remedy the situation.
The United States Post Office Department took
action against the quarantines by abolishing the post of
fice in .Vinton, Louisiana (Calcasieu Parish) when that
town refused to accept mail.

All mail directed to Vinton

was to be returned to the sender or sent to the dead
letter office.

The post office authorities stated that

Vinton would not enjoy the benefits of a post office for
many weeks, perhaps even months, and threatened similar
action against any town refusing to accept the United
States

m a i l .

38

obviously many persons outside New Orleans

were hard to convince that yellow fever could be carried
only by the mosquito and not by parcels, letters, or other
fomites.
One of the most intense conflicts in relation to
the quarantine problem arose between the sovereign state
of Louisiana and the sovereign state of Mississippi, a con
flict in which the two states reached a point just short

3?Louisiana State Board of Health, The Sanitary
Code, 1899 (New Orleans, 1899), 8; Picayune, August 6, 9 ,
1905.
38picayune, August 10, 1905,
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of war.

On July 26 Governor James K, Vardaman of Missis

sippi accused the health authorities of Louisiana of having
attempted to conceal the existence of yellow fever from
neighboring states.

Governor Newton C, Blanchard of

Louisiana vehemently denied the charge.

Several state

ments regarding the charge of evasion and concealment
passed back and forth between the two governors, while
tempers gradually reached the boiling point.
a New Orleans newspaper ran this headline:
Mosquito Fleet Invades Louisiana Waters.”

On August 2
"Vardaman

It seems that

one of the Mississippi quarantine boats, patrolling the
coast, had entered Lake Borgne.

It not only interfered

with Louisiana fishing boats in that body of water, but
also tried to stop boats from entering Lake Borgne from
Lake Pontchartrain and from the Lake Borgne Canal.

Accord

ing to the newspaper account, the Mississippi quarantine
schooner had entered the lake in Louisiana territory and
had "proceeded to act as if the Louisiana lake were a
Mississippi puddle in the backyard of Governor Vardaman."
Furthermore, it was reported that armed quarantine guards
from Mississippi had crossed Pearl River into Louisiana
territory and had taken their positions on the Louisiana
shore.

This "armed invasion" of Louisiana provoked an
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immediate protest to Vardaman from Governor Blanchard.

In

addition, the Louisiana Governor ordered the Louisiana
Naval Brigade to arm a fleet of patrol boats and proceed to
Lake Borgne to deal with the invaders.

On August 3 Varda

man wired an ambiguous reply to Blanchard’s protests,
stating that he had ordered the Mississippi boats to stay
out of Louisiana waters and the guards to refrain from
entering Louisiana territory; but, he said, ”I am going
to also see to it that the people of Louisiana are not per
mitted to violate the quarantine regulations of Missis
sippi,”

Upon investigation, it was discovered that the

Mississippi boats still patrolled Lake Borgne.

At this

point Governor Blanchard ordered the Louisiana Naval
Brigade to take action to protect Louisiana interests in
Lake Borgne, the Rigolets, and Pearl River.

The sheriffs

and district attorneys of Orleans and St. Bernard parishes
were directed to accompany the Louisiana fleet and to
seize those armed vessels illegally patrolling Louisiana
waters, arrest the crewmen, and bring them before the
grand jury of the appropriate parish.

Justifying his

course of action. Governor Blanchard stated:

"It is not

my intention to invade the waters of Mississippi or take
an aggressive course against the citizens of that State.
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But it is my intention to employ all the means at my com
mand to protect the interests of the fishermen, oystermen
and boatmen of Louisiana,"

He felt that the rights of

Louisianians had been threatened by an unwarranted invasion,
and "if those who were guilty of this interference put them
selves in the way of the civil and military authorities of
this State they must accept the consequences."

Reading the

newspapers, one might think that Louisiana and Mississippi
were actually at war.

The Rigolets was termed "the base

of operations" in a bombastic description of an "encounter
between the war vessels of the States of Louisiana and
Mississippi,"

Reduced to its simplest terms, the "encount

er" went something like this:

the Mississippi boat ap

proached the Louisiana boat and demanded its credentials
and destination; when it was found to be a boat of the
Louisiana Naval Brigade, the Mississippi vessel fled the
scene.

The highlight of the farcical war was the capture

of one Mississippi quarantine vessel by the Louisiana Naval
Brigade and the jailing of its crew in St, Bernard Parish.
By August 6 the "War of the Waters" was over.

When the

United States Public Health and Marine Hospital Service
took charge of the coastal area, the conflict between the
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two states subsided,
Modified quarantine regulations continued to prevail
in neighboring states and uninfected areas in Louisiana
until the latter part of October,

On October 21 the Louisi

ana State Board of Health removed the restrictions on
travel from New Orleans and other infected towns in the
state.

The Board resolved that local health authorities

might continue quarantines against persons, but prohibited
them from interfering with the passage of trains and boats
and from excluding freight

s h i p m e n t s ,

^0

Early in November

as the fever died out completely in New Orleans and else
where and as cold weather arrived, even the most cautious
could no longer justify their quarantine regulations.

The

last barrier in the state fell on November 10 when La
fourche Parish removed its embargo against infected points
inside and outside the parish.
According to the report of the State Board of
Health, the fever of 1905 had spread in Louisiana to

39lbid,, July 29, August 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 1905,
40lbid,, October 22, 1905,
4^Thibodaux Lafourche Comet, November 16, 1905,
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twenty-eight
cases and
alone

p a r i s h e s ,

9 8 8

resulting in a total of

deaths within the state.

cases had occurred, of which

3 , 4 0 2

9 , 3 2 1

In Orleans Parish
4 5 2

died.

In some

manner which the Board was unable to determine, the fever
had entered the state and established itself in a number of
widely dispersed foci before the health authorities became
aware of its e x i s t e n c e . I t a l i a n immigrants played a
significant role in concealing the early cases from the
health officials, thus allowing the disease to gain a foot
hold in New Orleans.

Likewise, they contributed to the

spread of the pestilence throughout the state by moving
from the original focus of infection to Italian settle
ments in various communities throughout Louisiana.

Crowd

ed together in the slum areas of the Crescent City, espe
cially in the neighborhood of the French Market, the
Italians suffered the first cases of fever as it erupted
in the city.

They tended to avoid contact with local phy

sicians and medical authorities, and for six or eight weeks

42gee Chart, “Yellow Fever in Louisiana,
the end of this chapter.

1 9 0 5 , “

at

43Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for
1 9 0 4 - 1 9 0 5 ,

7,

4 5 ,

4 8 .
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yellow fever developed without hindrance,
Even after the epidemic came to light and the antifever campaign got under way, the Italians continued to
pose obstructions to the health authorities by concealing
cases and refusing to comply with official regulations.
One New Orleans physician blamed "Italian ignorance" for
the "supposed high death rate" in the epidemic.

Many of

the fever cases had received no medical treatment at all,
he said.

Unaware of the dangers of heavy foods, some

patients continued to eat "bananas and macaroni until in
the last stages when a physician is notified, or the de
partment gets word of it,"

The Picayune reported that

mosquito nets had been distributed among the Italians in
the infected districts, but noted that the authorities
found it almost impossible to persuade them to sleep under
the nets or even to keep one over a p a t i e n t . U n d e r the
circumstances it is not surprising that the disease con
tinued to run its course in spite of the great crusade.
In a conference of New Orleans commercial interests,
one argument set forth in favor of transferring control to

^^Boyce, Yellow Fever Prophylaxis, 3-5.
45picayune, August 3, 1905,
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the federal government involved the difficulties encount
ered by local officials in dealing with Italians*

The

Picayune summarized the problem in a statement reflecting
a considerable amount of prejudice, as well as an impatience
that is readily understandable:
They [the Italians] do not speak the English
language in the first place. It is impossible
to reason with them. They are not submissive to
modern medical treatment. When attacked with
the fever they have been obstreperous, refractory
and uncontrollable in many instances. When mos
quito bars are placed over them they refuse to
allow them to remain, tearing and cutting the
bars down. When convalescent, Italian patients
again and again have eaten freely of macaroni,
bananas, etc., which has resulted in death al
most immediately. They have slipped through
quarantine lines and spread disease in spite of
every effort to check the infection.46
By mid-August through the educational campaign and the ef
forts of clergymen and prominent Italian leaders of organ
izations, the people of that nationality in the Crescent
City gradually became more cooperative and "amenable to
reason," but some still exhibited a tendency to conceal
fever cases from the authorities.47
In Patterson, Louisiana, where the fever raged
severely, the Italians again provided serious trouble for

46lbid., August 5, 1905.
47ibid., August 14, 1905.
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the health officials.

The physician in charge reported

to Dr. Souchon of the State Board that the Italians in
Patterson were threatening riot and that he expected an
attempt to burn the yellow fever hospital.

Several Ital

ians had died of the fever and their compatriots believed
the doctors responsible.

The Governor of Louisiana dis

patched arms and ammunition to the

frightened community

so that the citizens might protect themselves and the hos
pital.

On the night of September 2 a large number of

citizens assembled at the hospital and organized to patrol
the town.

They also planned to invite the Italians to a

meeting to hear speeches by "prominent Italio-American
citizens," the Italian Consular agent, a Catholic priest,
and others able to speak the Italian language.

Meanwhile,

armed citizens patrolled the streets at night and guarded
the hospital, and all nurses and doctors were armed in
case of an assault on the hospital.

The planned assembly

of Italian people was prevented by rain, but some of the
leading Italian citizens and the priest met on September 3
and planned to talk with every Italian in the town and try
to win their cooperation.^®

48lbid., September 3, 4, 1905.
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The educational campaign paid off; within a short
time the situation had calmed down and many of the Italians
agreed to allow the fumigation of premises and the trans
fer of patients to the hospital.

Through the combined

efforts of the health officials, Catholic priests, and a
few Italian leaders, the situation was explained to the
panic-stricken people and their fear and distrust of the
officials partially removed.

The Very Reverend Abbot

Paul Schaeuble, O.S.B., who spent several weeks in Pat
terson during the epidemic and worked diligently to
alleviate the existing frictions, displayed a great deal
of patience, sympathy, and understanding in dealing with
the problem,

"The Italians are good people," he declared,

"but the trouble lay in their simplicity and ignorance and
in their inability to speak the English language."

With

the coming of the fever to Patterson, they had succumbed
to sheer terror,

"They mistrusted everything that was being

done to help them," Father Schaeuble explained, "and
believed that the medicines prescribed were poisons for
the purpose of ridding the locality of the sick

p e o p l e .

Nevertheless, opposition to screening and fumigation

49lbid., September 12, 1905.
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together with the failure to report all cases kept the
fever going in Patterson throughout October.

After investi

gating the situation there, a federal health officer
called it the "worst fever-ridden town in the State" and
reported that in the absence of full cooperation on the
part of the residents, the disease undoubtedly would con
tinue until the arrival of cold weather stamped it out.^O
The State Board of Health and officers of the United
States Public Health and Marine Hospital Service provided
some assistance to local authorities in parishes through
out the state for their anti-fever campaigns.

Some com

munities began educational campaigns and anti-mosquito
crusades before yellow fever approached them, while others
failed to meet the challenge even with the fever in their
midst.

Shreveport belonged to the more active category.

The city instituted rigid quarantine measures, careful
inspection of trains, fumigation of mail and freight, and
detention of all passengers without proper health certifi
cates.

Inaugurated by a citizens educational campaign, a

city-wide anti-mosquito crusade was made compulsory by
ordinances requiring the screening of cisterns and

SOlbid., October 14, 1905.
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fumigation of houses.

Several fever cases occurred at the

detention camp outside of Shreveport, but the city itself
escaped the disease.

51

Outside of Orleans, the parishes hardest-hit by the
pestilence in terms of cases and mortality were Lafourche,
Jefferson, and East Carroll, with the twenty-four other
parishes visited by the fever suffering to a lesser de
g r e e . P r a i s i n g the country doctors who fought the fever
in 1905, the editor of the New Orleans Medical and Surgical
Journal observed:

"It was a different condition in the

country, with infrequent trains and without necessary drugs
or sulphur, or with scanty resources or supplies and lack
ing trained assistants."

Sometimes one doctor alone carried

the burden in a large area.

Such a condition was quite

different, said the editor, from that in New Orleans,
"where the fight was made with the aid of the United
States Government and almost unlimited money,
In the last days of the epidemic as the fever was

5Ishreveport Journal, July 22, 27, August 1, 2, 15,
26, 29, September 1, October 30, 1905; Picayune, October
15, 1905,
52picayune, October 15, 1905.
0,

& Surg. Jour., LVIII (March, 1906), 751.
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rapidly fading in New Orleans, President Theodore Roose
velt made a dramatic appearance in the Crescent City in
defiance of advice and warnings from many quarters.

Tour

ing the South in the last two weeks of October, he arranged
his itinerary so that New Orleans would be the last stop
and he could return to Washington by boat to avoid any
quarantine difficulties.

New Orleanians presented him

with an enthusiastic welcome, complete with parade, speechmaking, banquet, and all the trimmings,

The President

responded to Mayor Behrman's public welcoming speech with
a laudatory message to the people of New Orleans for their
heroic fight against the pestilence, "and he declared with
emotion that at any moment, if he had been asked to do so,
he would have come in person to assist in this fight that
was being so gallantly made."^^
have been:

What a battle that might

T,R, in combat with the Saffron Scourge, the

Aedes aegypti, and the Italians in New Orleans!
The campaign waged against the New Orleans yellow
fever epidemic of 1905 stood forth as a shining example of
what might be accomplished by the application of energy
and scientific knowledge, and as such deserved the high

54picayune, October 3, 27, 1905,
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praise it received.

Sir Rubert Boyce of the Liverpool

School of Tropical Medicine, who had observed the crusade
in person declared:

", , . the measures which the people

of New Orleans took to stamp out the epidemic . . , consti
tute . . , the most brilliant demonstration upon a most
extensive scale of the application of modern sanitary teach
ing to the arrest and prevention of Yellow Fever."

He

felt that the people of New Orleans had set a precedent to
be followed by every area within the yellow fever zone so
that the dreaded pestilence might be entirely eradicated.^5
George Augustin, the yellow fever historian, who was also
on hand at the time, wrote:

"The epidemic of 1905 is

memorable in many ways, but what has stamped it indelibly
in the minds of the great thinking public of the entire
civilized world, is the grand victory which science, with
the modern weapon intelligently wielded, has achieved
against a disease which is foreign to this country, and
which," he added, "we sincerely hope, has been forever
ostracised from our shores."56
The experience of the epidemic of 1905 settled once

55Boyce, Yellow Fever Prophylaxis, 6,
S^Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 881.
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and for all the widespread doubts about the role of the
Aedes aegypti and transformed the mosquito theory into the
mosquito doctrine.

The

1 9 0 5

Report of the Board of Adminis

trators of Charity Hospital stated that the experience with
yellow fever patients in Charity had "confirmed in every
respect, the soundness of the dogma of the mosquito being
the sole transmitory agent in propagating yellow fever."
In handling about a hundred cases of yellow fever during
the epidemic, the Charity Hospital authorities had taken
great care to use mosquito bars and to screen the fever
wards.

Not one case developed among the other patients,

physicians, nurses, students, or Sisters of Charity.^7
Regardless of the experience of

1 9 0 5

and the posi

tive validation of mosquito transmission, at least one
prominent New Orleans physician continued to oppose what
he called "The Mosquito Craze."

Dr. Charles Faget the

younger wrote a lengthy article for the New Orleans Medical
and Surgical Journal in October of

1 9 0 6 ,

expressing his

skepticism regarding the mosquito theory and upholding the
nineteenth-century view of the fever's transmission by

5?Report of the Board of Administrators of the
Charity Hospital to the General Assembly of the State of
Louisiana for 1 9 0 5 (Baton Rouge, 1 9 0 6 ) , 3 9 .
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fomîtes.

He recommended that articles of clothing and

merchandise still be watched very carefully and disinfected
as in previous years.

Although admitting the possibility

of mosquito transmission, he considered it the exceptional
or the experimental case and not the normal avenue of
transmission.

Dr, Faget knew of many cases which he could

not account for by the mosquito and of other cases where
mosquitoes had been present but the fever failed to spread.
Furthermore, he considered the compulsory screening pro
cedure, the fumigations and refumigations to kill mos
quitoes, and the hasty removal of patients to crowded
hospitals not only annoying but actually dangerous to the
lives of patients.

"Such practices,” he declared, "remind

one of the bear who, wishing to deliver his sleeping master
of an obnoxious 'mosquito,' crushed his head with a huge
rock.

"58

Fortunately, Dr. Faget's views represented the

exception and not the rule.
In 1906 Dr. C. H. Irion, new President of the Louisi
ana State Board of Health, provided for over one hundred
educational institutes in the areas infected by yellow
fever in 1905,

At these sessions the mosquito doctrine was

58n . 0, Med. & Surg. Jour., LIX (October, 1906), 253-
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set forth in a series of illustrated lectures in English,
French, German, and Italian.

The anti-mosquito campaign

initiated by the lectures resulted in the widespread fumi
gation of houses and the passage of compulsory screening
ordinances in many towns of Louisiana.^9
The yellow fever campaign of 1905 indirectly pro
duced a number of significant results.

According to Dr,

Rudolph Matas, the victorious crusade brought a renewed
confidence in the future of the Crescent City and the
entire American Gulf coast by demonstrating the means of
eradicating the pestilence.

"It put a new spirit and a

new faith in a once apathetic plague stricken, discouraged
population," he said.

Furthermore, the episode shocked

the community into an awareness of the obsolete methods of
sanitation, or rather "insanitation," which. Dr. Matas
maintained, "had long ceased to be fit even for a colonial
regime."

The experience of 1905 persuaded many that cis

terns, open gutters, unpaved streets, and other "perpetual
culture media" for mosquitoes had to go.

The situation

clearly called for immediate attention to a system of
water supply, drainage, sewerage, and street paving that

S^Augustin, History of Yellow Fever, 1188,
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the city needed for the "hygienic existence and security
of its population."GO
Under the impetus of the yellow fever outbreaks in
the late 1890's, arrangements had been made for the in
stallation in New Orleans of city-owned systems of drain
age, sewerage, and water-supply.

The drainage system was

in partial operation by 1900, but active work on the
sewerage system did not begin until 1903, nor on the water
system until 1905.

The epidemic of 1905 provided the

necessary pressure for the completion of the drainage,
sewerage, and water supply systems, all of which were in
full operation by 1909.

A historian of New Orleans called

the installation of these systems "the most significant
incident in the history of New Orleans" during the first
quarter of the twentieth century.

After 1905 cisterns in

the Crescent City were inspected annually to see that they
were oiled and screened properly--until 1918 when all cis
terns in the city were ordered removed,G1
In August of 1906 when one case of yellow fever

60Matas, "A Yellow Fever Retrospect and Prospect,"
loc. cit., 468.
G^Kendall, History of New Orleans, II, 525-26, 559,
575-79.
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occurred in New Iberia, Louisiana, the State 3oard of
Health immediately took charge in that community and pro
moted a thoroughgoing campaign of fumigating and screen
ing.

The patient recovered and no other cases occurred.

The State Board was never able to determine the source of
infection.62

Perhaps that case may be accounted for by an

infected Aedes aegypti which survived the winter and enjoy
ed an unusually long life; or perhaps the ailment was
dengue fever rather than yellow fever.

Whatever the expla

nation for the New Iberia case, the state was otherwise
free of the disease in 1906, and since the unprecedented
campaign of 1905 it has continued to enjoy a freedom from
yellow fever which the nineteenth-century man would never
have believed possible.

The last yellow fever epidemic in

the Crescent City, in 1905, was also the last yellow fever
epidemic within the United States.

Actually, there was no

excuse except skepticism, official neglect, and public
apathy for the outbreak of yellow fever in New Orleans and
elsewhere in 1905.

Finally, under the lash of the Saffron

Scourge, masses of persons aroused themselves from the

62&eport of the Louisiana State Board of Health for
1906-1907, 21, 26-27.
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normal state of apathetic resignation to fight and to con
quer the pestilence and furthermore to take the necessary
precautions to avoid its future recurrence.
The necessary precautions included adequate quaran
tine based on the principle of mosquito transmission, to
gether with the attempt to eliminate the yellow fever
mosquito in Louisiana and elsewhere.

In spite of the pro

tests of adamant states-righters, federal control of mari
time quarantine came on the heels of the 1905 outbreak.
As for the Aedes aegypti, although controlled to a high
degree, the pest is still with us.

Yellow fever has been

banished from the country and is kept in permanent exile
through the vigilance of federal quarantine authorities
and the careful supervision of travel to and from yellow
fever areas which still exist in Latin America and Africa.
Such public health protection in this day and age is taken
for granted; people for the most part are blissfully un
aware of the dangers lurking beyond the confines of pro
tective barriers.

As common through much of the nineteenth

century as "cancer” is now, as much talked about, feared,
and even less well understood, yellow fever today is about
as unfamiliar to the man on the street as bubonic plague.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

279

YELLOW FEVER IN LOUISIANA, 1905

Cases

Deaths

Orleans Parish
All other parishes

3,402
5,919

452
536

Totals in Louisiana

9,321

988

TWENTY-EIGHT PARISHES AFFECTED:

Acadia
Avoyelles
Ascension
Assumption
Calcasieu
Caddo
East Baton Rouge
East Carroll
Iberia
Iberville
Jefferson
Lafourche
Lafayette
Madison
Natchitoches
Orleans
Plaquemines
Rapides
St. Charles
S t . John
St. Bernard
St. James
S t . Tammany
St. Mary
Terrebonne
Tangipahoa
Tensas
Vernon

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER VII

THEORY AND CONTROVERSY:

NATURE, CAUSATION, AND

TRANSMISSION OF YELLOW FEVER

For well over a century the mystery surrounding
yellow fever's nature, causation, and transmission plagued
every medical philosopher who attempted to formulate an
explanation.

The sudden appearance of the epidemic

disease in a community, its irregular spread, revolting
symptoms, and fatal effects created a terrifying situation
which demanded explanation.

Yet in terms of the epidemio

logical concepts available in the eighteenth and nine
teenth centuries, an adequate interpretation proved impos
sible.

Transmitted by the yet-unsuspected mosquito, yellow

fever until after 1900 exhibited an enigmatic quality
always just beyond the grasp of the theorists.
Nevertheless, theorists abounded, and in the dark
arena of yellow fever philosophy each contender chose his
weapons and dogmatically took up the combat with those
defending opposite viewpoints.

Once an individual had

280
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committed himself to a position, it became rather like an
extension of his personality, and he felt compelled to
defend it even as his honor.

Sometimes the intense per

sonal antipathy resulting from a controversy actually led
one physician to invite another to a meeting on the duel
ing field.

On one occasion, two doctors in Jamaica

terminated their debate on the nature of yellow fever with
a duel in which both men were killed.1

Most of the

battles, however, were waged on the field of the printed
page, by means of scathing book reviews and rejoinders,
journal articles contradicting other journal articles, and
letters to editors.

The quantity of literature produced on

the subject of yellow fever therefore increased to a
tremendous volume.

Of all the medical questions of the late

eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, probably none other
provoked a greater consumption of ink and paper.
Debated, modified, and amplified into countless
variations by the determined yellow fever philosophers,
epidemiological concepts in the late eighteenth and through
much of the nineteenth century were scarcely different from

^N. 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., Ill (September, 1846),
165.
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those which had been employed ever since the cime of
Hippocrates.

For centuries three fundamental ideas had

been used to explain disease;

epidemic constitution of the

atmosphere, local miasmatic influences, and contagion.
Some diseases were obviously communicable through direct
contact or association and hence recognized as contagious.
Other diseases were much more difficult to explain before
the knowledge of germs, human and animal carriers, and
insect vectors became available in the latter nineteenth
century.

Those maladies requiring unknown intermediary

influences mysteriously seemed to travel from person to
person and place to place.

Laymen through the ages tend

ed to support the doctrine of contagion as a primary force
in the spread of almost all diseases, while physicians
frequently opposed that view.

Medical men emphasized

atmospheric and local conditions to explain the causation
and transmission of those epidemic diseases which seemed
to depend on something other than direct contact.%
Defending the position of pre-modern medical think
ers, a twentieth-century medical historian has contended
that ”We cannot dismiss the resistance of the medical

^Winslow, Conquest of Epidemic Disease, 181-82.
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profession to the doctrine of contagion as merely an evi
dence of hidebound conservatism.
for this attitude."

There were sound reasons

The layman intuited the general out

line of contagion in the progression of any epidemic dis
ease as he observed its spread from one locality to
another.

The medical man, however, who knew the details

and the erratic course of certain diseases understood that
the theory of contagion as then formulated could not
account for all the facts,

Contagion was conceived by

medical philosophers to be the direct transmission of some
"chemical or physical influence" from a diseased person
to the next victim by means of personal contact, or breath
ing the infected air around the patient, or contact with
materials infected by the patient.

Some diseases clearly

exhibited this tendency to spread on direct contact.

But

the medical philosopher also knew that all diseases did
not operate in this manner.

Cases frequently occurred

without direct exposure to prior cases; furthermore,
direct exposure to a patient often failed to produce the
disease in the person exposed.

Hence, the facts relating

to the origin and spread of many epidemic diseases simply
could not be explained by the narrow concept of direct
transmission in the days before the role of living
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microorganisms, carriers, and insect vectors was under
stood.^
Those widespread diseases which could not be account
ed for by the theory of contagion could seemingly be more
adequately explained by two other abstract but plausible
concepts.

These concepts as formulated in the second cen

tury A.D, by Galen, a Graeco-Roman physician, dominated
medical thinking until the validation of the germ theory
by Louis Pasteur and others in the latter nineteenth cen
tury.

Although recognizing certain maladies as communi

cable by direct contact (contagion), Galen explained
widespread epidemics in terms of local miasms and the con
dition of the atmosphere, both rather nebulous conceptions.
Miasms included all those pestilential emanations supposed
ly arising from decaying animal and vegetable materials,
swamps, stagnant water, and filthy living conditions in
general.

Presumably, such noxious effluvia polluted the

air and when inhaled or otherwise absorbed into the system
resulted in disease.

Epidemic constitution of the atmos

phere is a somewhat broader concept and even more elusive.
It refers to an atmospheric condition produced in part by

3lbid.
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miasms, but also influenced by the weather, that is, by
excessive heat and dampness.

Sometimes even astronomical

influences such as comets and meteors were believed to
play a role in creating an appropriate atmospheric medium
for the widespread occurrence of a particular disease.^
In addition to local disease-bearing effluvia and
an atmosphere influenced by climatic and other forces,
another factor had to be included in Galen's scheme:

indi

vidual predisposing causes, which were necessary to explain
why the external causes in a given area affected some but
not all persons.

Within a contaminated atmosphere, those

persons accustomed to an inactive and intemperate exis
tence and suffering a "general obstruction of the pores"
would be more prone, said Galen, to inhale and harbor the
seeds of disease than would the active, temperate, whole
some individual.5

Through the centuries Galen's epidemio

logical constructs persisted as physicians applied the
vague but then plausible explanations to various epidemic
diseases, modifying the component causes to fit the situa
tion at hand.
The severe yellow fever attacks along the Atlantic

4lbid., 72-73.

5Ibid., 74.
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coast of North America in the latter eighteenth century,
and particularly the Great Epidemic of 1793 in Philadel
phia, occasioned the application of existing epidemiolo
gical opinions to explain the behavior of the Saffron
Scourge,

In the 1790's two important American epidemio

logical thinkers, Benjamin Rush and Noah Webster, set
forth the ideas regarding yellow fever which persisted in
American medical thought throughout most of the nine
teenth century.

Dr. Benjamin Rush, a Philadelphia

physician, was one of the most influential medical philoso
phers of his time, not only in relation to yellow fever
but to the subject of disease and therapeutics in general.
And in an age before medical knowledge was far removed
from other fields of thought, Noah Webster, famed Connecti
cut journalist and lexicographer, also delved into
epidemiology and in 1799 published a two-volume History of
Epidemic and Pestilential Diseases.

This work of

Webster's recently has been evaluated as the best suammry
of epidemiological thought at the beginning of the nine
teenth century, as well as one of the best digests of
earlier opinion on the subject.&

Gibid., 196, 215.
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Both Rush and Webster first toyed with the idea of
contagion as a possible secondary factor in the spread of
yellow fever, but both eventually came to deny altogether
the influence of contagion in that disease.

Ultimately

insisting that yellow fever definitely was not contagious.
Rush and Webster also denied that the disease was imported
into the country, and hence opposed quarantine measures.
Instead they declared yellow fever a product of local
miasms generated by decaying animal and vegetable matter
and influenced by heat and moisture.

Therefore, they

favored sanitary measures for the removal of local causes.^
Both men believed in the influence of the epidemic
constitution of the atmosphere, but Webster emphasized
this factor more strongly than Rush.

Webster treated the

pestilential condition of the atmosphere as a primary
force which spread over many parts of the world at one
time, interacting with epizootics (animal epidemics),
earthquakes, volcanic action, and comets.

While Rush

noted the presence of mosquitoes in large numbers, the
abundance of dead cats, and the occurrence of a meteor as
signs of an essentially unhealthy atmosphere, he gave more

7Ibid., 196-235.
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attention to the Influence of local miasms In the produc
tion of yellow fever.

Furthermore, he believed that Indi

vidual "predisposing" and "exciting" causes, such as
fatigue. Intemperance, fear, and grief, supplemented local
effluvia In the development of yellow fever,®
In the writings of these two men one finds all the
component elements which would be juggled about Into
varying combinations by countless nineteenth-century phy
sicians In the attempt to describe those conditions which
produced a yellow fever epidemic.

Those who accepted

contagion. Including many more laymen than physicians,
ordinarily favored quarantine to halt the importation of
the disease.

Those who believed In local and atmospheric

Influences generally denied contagion and Importation and
thus opposed quarantine; Instead, they promoted sanitary
measures designed to eliminate pestilential effluvia
deriving from filth and decay.
During the decade In which Rush and Webster were
writing on yellow fever. New Orleans experienced Its first
great epidemic of that disease.

According to Baron Joseph

X, Pontalba, the people of New Orleans and many of the

8lbld.
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physicians identified the epidemic disease of 1796 with
the yellow fever of Philadelphia and believed it had been
brought into New Orleans by the Americans.

On the other

hand, Pontalba himself, as well as Attorney-general Don
Gabriel Fonvergne, blamed noxious effluvia for contaminat
ing the atmosphere and creating the pestilence in New
Orleans.9
As yellow fever continued to appear almost annually
in New Orleans after 1796, the doctrine of local miasms
gradually took precedence over the importation theme.
Travelers in New Orleans and Louisiana in the early 1800's
invariably commented on the yellow pestilence for which
New Orleans was rapidly acquiring a notorious reputation.
Almost without exception, the commentators attributed
yellow fever to morbific effluvia in the atmosphere,
deriving from filth and acted upon by the excessive heat
of the climate.

Most of them emphatically denied that the

disease was personally contagious.10

9pontalba to wife, September 6, 11, 19, 24, 1796,
loc. c i t ., 274, 284, 300, 312; Gayarré, History of Louisi
ana, III, 375; Records of the City Council of New Orleans,
Book 4079, Document 259, October 21, 1796.
lOprançois Marie Perrin du Lac, Voyage dans les Deux
Louisianes . . . en 1801, 1802 et 1803
. (Paris, 1805),
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The observations and cmnments of the travelers
indicate that the theory of local causation was coming to
predominate over contagion in both the medical and the lay
mind.

Nevertheless, the question was still a debatable

one throughout the country wherever yellow fever appeared.
For example, The Medical Repository, published in New York
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,
filled its pages with articles, reviews, and notices con
cerning yellow fever visitations in various American port
cities.

The journal articles dealt with recurring contro

versial issues involving yellow fever's contagious or noncontagious nature; its imported or local origin; its pre
vention by quarantine or sanitation--all issues which
would persist for many decades.

While some physicians

advocated the doctrine of contagion, the majority of
medical writers opposed that view and supported instead
the influence of miasma
One of the most obscure abstractions advanced in the

trans. as Travels Through the Two Louisianas . . . in 1801,
1802, & 1803 (London, 1807), 7; Amos Stoddard, Sketches^,
Historical and Descriptive, of Louisiana (Philadelphia,
1812), 171; Berquin-Duvallon, Travels, 115,
l^See The Medical Repository (New York), 1797-1809,
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nineteenth century to explain the origin and causation of
pestilential yellow fever appeared in a pamphlet by an
unnamed author, reviewed in The Medical Repository in
1803,

Accepting the ancient doctrine of the four basic

elements which composed all things (earth, air, fire, and
water), the author added two more elements from his own
creative imagination, electrical fire and a universal
agent which he termed ' " M o t h e r T h i s

last named metaphy

sical entity, "Mother,” was described as "the great agent
of vegetable and animal life."

Ordinarily, "Mother in

habited the earth's surface, but under certain circumstan
ces (undefined), it was forced far down into the earth,
eventually to rise again to the surface of its own power.
Usually, "Mother" emerged in a pure state, but sometimes
on the way up to the surface it became polluted by combin
ing with putrefying elements, particularly in hot weather.
Under those circumstances "Mother" became "vitiated and
venomous" and in its transformed condition rose upward
and Pdefile[d] the earth and the water through which it
pass[ed]."

The reviewer called this theory "an old woman's

story" and dismissed the work as sheer nonsense.

IZlbid., VI (1803), 417.
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Unquestionably, the "Mother” notion was one of the more
extreme among the many metaphysical constructions in the
realm of epidemiology.

But it should be noted that the

concept of epidemic constitution, although widely accepted
and taken seriously, was no more open to analysis and des
cription than "Mother,"

One might almost suspect that the

pamphlet was conceived as satire on the epidemiology of
the age but for the numerous other conceptions produced at
the time which are equally absurd today.
While American medical thought became more and more
involved in elaborating the patterns of local and atmos
pheric influences, an English physician, Colin Chisholm,
published a work in 1809 to correct "the pernicious doc
trine" so popular among American physicians regarding
pestilential yellow fever.

Arguing strongly against local

causation by miasmata, heat, moisture, and putrefaction,
he supported personal contagion and transmission through
clothes or other fomites.

If of local origin, why had

yellow fever suddenly gone on a rampage in North America
in the latter eighteenth century?
filthier overnight?

Had the cities become

Dr. Chisholm did not think so.

As

evidence in favor of contagion and importation, he cited
many examples of cases which had occurred after direct
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contact with persons or Incoming vessels.

Furthermore,

Chisholm dismissed the mystical epidemic constitution of
the atmosphere along with the supposed connection of dis
ease with eclipses, comets, volcanoes, and earthquakes as
mere superstitions, coincidental factors but not causal,
Nevertheless, the "pernicious doctrine" continued
to find favor among American physicians, particularly in
New Orleans where the annual appearance of the fever from
1817 onward provided ample experiential data about which
to theorize.

In the midst of the New Orleans epidemic of

1817, the Louisiana Courier published an article entitled
"The Prevailing Fever" signed by "Philanthropy."

Although

a citizen with "no pretentions to medical knowledge"
except that obtained from practical observation, the writer
offered his conclusions to the public for consideration.
His observations had convinced him that the fever resulted
from local causes and was not contagious at all.

Common to

13See Colin Chisholm, A Letter to John Haygarth
. . . from Colin Chisholm . , . author of An Essay on the
Pestilential Fever ; Exhibiting Farther Evidence of the
Infectious Nature of This Fatal Distemper in Granada,
during 1793, 4, 2» and 6, and in the United States of
America, from 1793 to 1803 : in order to Correct the Per
nicious Doctrine Promulgated by D r . Edward Miller, and
other American Physicians . . , (London, 1809).
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the south Atlantic and the southwest states, the disease
varied in malignancy not only because of variations in
soil and climate from place to place and time to time, but
also because of the predisposing influences within those
persons residing in the area of contamination.

In spite

of the different degrees of virulence, he believed this
"inflammatory bilious fever," wherever it occurred, was
caused by "miasma1 exhalations produced by the ardent rays
of a vertical sun, striking against the earth’s surface,
and operating on putrescent vegetable matter.
Also in 1817 in a similar vein, Dr. Jabez Heustis,
practitioner in New Orleans, summarized his views of
yellow fever, delineating three types of causes.

The

remote cause consisted of "marsh miasmata"; the predispos
ing cause, the constitution of an individual not accustomed
to the climate; the exciting cause, a state of intoxication
or exposure, perhaps to excessive heat or rain.

Sometimes

miasmata alone might be potent enough to produce a serious
attack, he believed, even without the other influences.

A

confirmed non-contagionist, Heustis claimed he had never
seen a case of yellow fever transmitted from one individual

14Louisiana Courier, September 10, 1817,
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to another.
Drs, Gros and Gerardin in reporting to W

Société

Médicale on the New Orleans epidemic of 1817 concluded that
the fever had been caused by the "peculiar topography'* of
New Orleans, the abundant rains and excessive heat of the
summer, and the influx of numerous strangers to the city.
The disease had not been contagious, they declared, but
under certain circumstances they believed it might assume
the quality of contagion.

The committee appointed by La

Société Médicale to investigate the yellow fever epidemic
of 1819 reached similar conclusions.

They attributed the

fever of that year to the burning heat of July, August,
and September, frequent rains, and stagnant water in the
swamps.

The committee described the New Orleans fever of

1819 as neither contagious nor imported, but rather in
digenous, that is, of spontaneous origin,
In 1820 when the Physico-Medical Society of New

15Jabez W, Heustis, Physical Observations and Medi
cal Tracts and Researches, on the Topography and Diseases
of Louisiana (New York, 1817), 113-14,
Jones, Medical and Surgical Memoirs, III, pt. 1,
cxlii.
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Orleans, the organization of American physicians, appoint
ed a committee to investigate the yellow fever outbreak of
that year, the committee decided to avoid the controversy
over contagion and non-contagion and simply noted in their
report that the earliest and latest cases had appeared on
board ships at the wharves.

Further, they suggested that

the filthy condition of the vessels together with the ac
cumulated filth of the city bore some relationship to
causation.17
In addition to the reports of medical societies,
the writings of physicians in New Orleans reflect the in
creasingly firm medical opinion in favor of local causation.
Dr. Jean Louis Chabert, physician from France who practiced
medicine for a time in New Orleans, published a work on
yellow fever in 1821 in which he set forth his opinion that
the fever was not caused by a specific contagion trans
mitted from person to person, but instead by deleterious
miasms intensified by heat and humidity.1®

Another French

l^Report of the Committee of the Physico-Medical
Society of New Orleans, on the Epidemic of 1820 (New Orleans.
1821), 5.
18Jean Louis Chabert, Reflexions Médicales sur la
Maladie Spasmodico-Lipyrienne des Pay Chauds Vulgairement
Appeleé Fiivre Jaune (Nouvelie-Orleans, 1821), iii.
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physician, Dr. Pierre F. Thomas, on observing yellow fever
in New Orleans in 1822, also attributed the pestilence to
"les miasmes délétères" emanating from the putrefaction of
stagnant waters and vegetable and animal matter.

He saw no

need to demonstrate the proposition of non-contagion, a
proposition almost universally accepted by physicians who
had observed several epidemics. As far as he was concerned,
there was no room for argument; that yellow fever was not
contagious seemed a clear truth.
The non-contagious nature of yellow fever might
have been clear to Dr. Thomas, and by this time to the
majority of the medical profession as well, but it was by
no means clear to all observers of yellow fever epidemics
in New Orleans,

In his address to the Louisiana legis

lature in January of 1818, Governor Jacques Villeré, a
determined advocate of contagion and quarantine, urged the
passage of laws to establish safeguards against the pesti
lence.

The Governor was not alone in his contagionist

views; the Louisiana legislature in March of 1818 provided
for the establishment of a quarantine station on the Missis
sippi River and a Board of Health to administer the

19Thomas, Essai sur la Fièvre Jaune d'Amérique, v,

65.
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regulations.

The appearance of yellow fever in the summer

of 1818 seemed to discredit the efficacy of quarantine and
with it the doctrine of contagion, and in March of 1819
the quarantine act of 1818 was repealed.^0
In the summer and autumn of 1819 New Orleans experi
enced another dreadful visitation of yellow fever, even
worse than the epidemic of 1817.

Again in 1820 the

scourge carried off a considerable number of victims.

In

November of 1820 Governor Villeré, still arguing the cause
for contagion, urged the legislature to pass new quarantine
laws.

Realizing that the medical profession of New

Orleans generally subscribed to the opinion that yellow
fever was not contagious, the Governor still contended
that the disease was both imported and contagious and not
an indigenous product.

21

In his inaugural méssage in December of 1820,
Villeré's successor. Governor Thomas Bolling Robertson,
also recommended the passage of quarantine legislation
against yellow fever.

Finally, in February of 1821 the

20Jones, Medical and Surgical Memoirs, III, pt, 1,
cxliv.
^^Ibid., cxliv-cxlvi.
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Louisiana legislature again passed an act establishing
quarantine on the Mississippi River and creating a Board
of Health for New Orleans.

That summer and autumn passed

with only a few cases of fever and the quarantinists
gained a point; but the following August, 1822, witnessed
the outbreak of the most devastating epidemic up to that
time, and the local causationists were quick to call
attention to the futility of quarantine against a disease
so obviously indigenous.

After the epidemic of 1822,

Governor Robertson was ready to admit that the efforts at
legislating against the fever had been in vain.

"It is an

idle waste of time for me to inquire into the causes,
origin and nature of this dreadful malady," declared the
Governor.

"The State resorted to quarantine, under the

expectation that it would add to the chances of escape
from this dreadful visitation.

If this hope be fallacious,

if no good effect has been produced . . , then should it
be abandoned, and our commerce relieved from the expense
and inconvenience which it occasions
In spite of the failure to prevent an epidemic in
1822, the Board of Health expressed continued faith in the

22%bid., cxlvi-cxlviii.
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doctrine of contagion and the potential value of quaran
tine, but the Board's arguments were not very convincing.
On January 23, 1823, a large meeting of New Orleans citizens
resolved that the quarantine regulations, proved useless by
the late epidemic, were not only ineffective but also
"oppressive and injurious to the commerce of this city."
Those citizens addressed a memorial to the legislature re
questing that the act of 1821 be annulled.

When the House

Committee on Quarantine Laws reported in 1823, it admitted
that in spite of "the strictest compliance" the measures
had thus far proved ineffective against yellow fever.
Nevertheless, the committee recommended that quarantine be
continued in force "because it had not been tried suffi
ciently long, and because other States had similar regula
tions,"

Hence, for two more years Louisiana lawmakers

took no action on the matter.

The year 1823 was relatively

healthy; but in 1824, although the fever did not rage on a
grand scale, a sufficient number of yellow fever cases and
deaths occurred to undermine still further the contagionist-quarantine position and give weight to the arguments
of the local causationists.

Ultimately, in February of

1825 the Louisiana Legislature abolished its second experi
ment with quarantine barriers, and not until 1855 did the
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State of Louisiana again provide for such restrictions,^^
For about three decades then the local causationists were
in the ascendency.

The pro-contagion and quarantinist

viewpoint remained in abeyance until the widespread epi
demics of the 1850's once more provided sufficient evi
dence to shake the foundations of the miasmatic position.
Although the majority of the medical profession
adhered to the theory of local causation, there was never
a time when contagion was completely without supporters.
The severe epidemics of the 1840's stimulated a renewed
clash of opinion as heretical contagionists sought to dis
sent from the prevailing medical doctrine.

The establish

ment in 1844 of the first medical journal in Louisiana and
the South, the New Orleans Medical Journal, undoubtedly
stimulated the philosophical jousting by providing a ready
medium of expression for the contenders.

The first two

issues of the journal contained at least six or seven
lengthy articles on yellow fever.

In the second issue the

editor expressed the hope that "we shall not fatigue our
readers with the subject of Yellow Fever; [but] it is the
great disease of our City and region, and in as much as

23ibid., cxlviii-cxlix.
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very discordant opinions in relation to it seem to prevail,
we think it deserves a patient, and thorough investiga
tion,”^^
In the July, 1844, issue of the New Orleans Medical
Journal Dr. P. H, Lewis of Mobile reviewed two papers which
had been read before the Mobile Medical Society in June,
both advocating the contagious nature and foreign origin
of yellow fever.

The ideas set forth in the two works

indicate the persistent strength of contagionism; the tone
of Dr. Lewis's reviews and the rejoinder to one of those
reviews is representative of the extremely personal nature
of the nineteenth-century controversies and goes far in
explaining how bitter antagonisms were developed.

In one of the papers, "Observations on the Epidemic
Yellow Fever, of the South West," Dr. J, W. Monette of
Washington, Mississippi, supported the view of yellow
fever's contagious nature.

Furthermore, he maintained that

the disease was indigenous to the West Indies, but not to
New Orleans nor to Mobile, where it only occurred when
imported.

According to Dr. Monette, the infection was

transported from place to place in certain porous goods,

Z^New Orleans Medical Journal, I (July, 1844), 94.
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blankets, and feather beds, and was rendered more virulent
by the heated atmosphere within the holds of vessels which
transported those goods.^5
Point by point. Dr. Lewis disagreed with Monette,
frequently destroying his position by reductlo ad absurdum,
"As for the importation of porous goods and blankets,"
stated Lewis, "It Is a thing very improbable.

We are con

stantly importing sugar, coffee, rum, and molasses from
the West-Indles, but I never heard that those Islands ex
ported manufactured goods to the U.S."
vein, he jibed:
objectionable.

Continuing In this

"The feather bed theory Is particularly
Who ever heard of a feather bed being

brought from the West-Indles In the warm season.

If such

a thing has ever occurred, I would ask If It Is possible
any one could have slept upon It In July or August?"
Ridiculing Monette still further, Lewis objected to his
"anxiety to account for every thing. , . . The general
outlines [of Monette's paper] would have done very well,
but Its particularity had destroyed the force of the whole
Instrument."

Undoubtedly, If the case had been otherwise,

Dr. Lewis would have criticized Its generality since he

25lbld.,

31,

35.
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basically disagreed with all of Dr. Monette*s premises.
In short, Lewis denied the doctrine of contagion altogether
and cited many instances of close contact with fever
patients which failed to produce new cases of the

d i s e a s e .

Dr. Lewis also reviewed "Sketches from the History
of Yellow Fever, Showing its Origin, together with Facts
and Circumstances, disproving its Domestic Origin, and
demonstrating its Transmissibility," by Dr. W. M. Carpen
ter, professor in the Medical College of Louisiana in New
Orleans.

First of all, Lewis expressed his regrets that

Dr. Carpenter should have been the author of such a work.
Having looked forward to Carpenter's study, he was disap
pointed to find that "it only contains a collection of
questionable facts and errors, which have for many years,
been considered by the ablest Reviews of the world, as
not worthy of notice."

Noting the basic similarity of

the views advanced by Carpenter and Monette, Lewis con
sidered both papers equally unacceptable.

Carpenter, how

ever, believed yellow fever to have been imported
originally to the West Indies from Africa (a thesis
generally accepted today), while Monette maintained that

26ibid., 31-41.
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the disease was indigenous to the West Indies.

Except for

this difference the papers followed a similar line of
thought.27
The arrogant Dr. Lewis of Mobile summed up his dis
dainful opinion of the two works under review with these
remarks:

"It is to be regretted that the labour and

talent employed on these works should have been so mis 
directed.

Systems, doctrines and theories when embraced

with zeal, imperceptibly bias and derange the judgment."
Adding the final blow, he declared, "If we desire to enter
the boundless field . . .

with a spirit of true philosophy,

anxious to sift truth from the immense and ill digested
mass of so called medical literature that encumbers our
path, we must lay all these aéide.

Then, and not till

no

then, will the truth be evolved."
Had Dr. Lewis not been a considerable distance from
New Orleans and Washington, Mississippi, when the July
issue of the medical journal came off the press, he might
have had two challenges to deal with.

Under the circum

stances, however. Carpenter apparently ignored the denunci
ation and Monette resorted to the printed page in rejoinder

27ibid., 42-43.

^Sxbid., 44.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

306
to Dr, Lewis,

In the October issue of the New Orleans

Medical Journal Dr, Monette acknowledged his respect for
the Mobile Medical Society and all its members and their
investigations of yellow fever, but stated that he failed
to see "that this [Lewis's] review has thrown much light
upon the difficulties , , . nor can I believe that the
style of the article, or its mode of investigation, will
ever become a model for the liberal and enlightened of
the medical profession,"

He felt that "no display of wit

or of ridicule itself" could ever substitute for "enlight
ened research, or ingenuous argument, in confuting our
errors, or in illuminating the path of truth."

Noting

that the subject of yellow fever, in spite of all pre
vious investigation, was still shrouded in uncertainty.
Dr. Monette saw no other path to the truth except through
observation, without prejudice or preconceptions, but with
a liberal and open spirit of inquiry.

Furthermore, he pro

ceeded to correct Lewis's misinterpretations of his paper,
claiming that he had not advocated the "unconditional con
tagious nature of yellow fever" and denying other extreme
views attributed to him by Dr. Lewis.

29ibid., I (October, 1844), 178-79,
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In retaliation for the harsh treatment of his work,
Monette suggested that Lewis failed to comprehend the tr.iin
of his argument.

Otherwise, "the critic, would not deem

it so strange, that I should have attempted to explain, or
illustrate ^

many particulars ; and he might see the im

propriety of hastily making general conclusions from
isolated facts; a mode of reasoning so opposite to that
laid down by the immortal Bacon."

In conclusion, the

Mississippi doctor rested his case with the medical profes
sion at large, "believing that the intelligent and dis
criminating will award to me such judgment as is right and
proper."30

Such caustic controversy, illustrated so well

by the Lewis-Monette encounter, was common throughout the
nineteenth century.

Highly articulate medical thinkers

wielded their pens in venomous combat with each other,
fighting within a rationalistic framework over fragmentary
abstractions and partial truths, and, in the process,
needlessly creating bitter enemies.
Even if one accepted the orthodox miasmatic theory,
there were countless ways to arrange the various possible
factors into different combinations, thereby multiplying

30lbid., 179-80.
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the theories and opening the way to further disagreement.
In 1843 Dr. P. A, Lambert read an essay on yellow fever in
French before the Louisiana Medico-Chirurgical Society in
which he set forth a slightly different formulation of the
miasmatic view.

In May, June, and July, he declared, under

the influence of the burning sun, the stagnant waters
around New Orleans evaporated, and in ascending, the parti
cles saturated the air and later fell as rain.

Thus the

miasms were transported into higher regions of the atmos
phere in the acquaeous vapor and later in descending as
rain, scattered disease over many regions.

As further

evidence, he contended that the coming of frost terminated
a yellow fever epidemic by condensing the deadly particles.
"It is impossible," he admitted, "in the present state of
science, to determine the nature of these miasms, and to
say what are the material causes and conditions of their
development."

Their existence was known only by their

effects, he affirmed; otherwise, nothing was clear.

Varia

tions in the quantity of miasms probably accounted for the
different degrees of yellow fever's virulence.

Further

more, Dr. Lambert believed that miasms were clearly
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influenced by meteorological conditions.
In addition to those miasms arising from putre
faction in stagnant water, he postulated as additional
miasm expelled from the system of the yellow fever patient
in his excretions and his breath.

"This being premised,"

said Lambert, "we can understand how Yellow Fever may be
communicated to unacclimated persons, by means of the
miasm which is exhaled from a large number of persons, con
gregated in small and badly ventilated apartments."

With

few exceptions, he believed the infection was acquired
through "pulmonary a b s o r p t i o n . H e n c e ,

Dr. Lambert

made room for a kind of "contingent contagion" within the
framework of the miasmatic explanation.
In March of 1847 in the New Orleans Medical and
Surgical Journal, Dr, John Harrison, professor of physiology
and pathology at the Medical College of Louisiana, publish
ed his "Speculations on the Cause of Yellow Fever," advo
cating his own particular formulation of local causation.
In a lengthy demonstration he arrived at this conclusion:
Under certain meteorological conditions, from the accumula
ted filth of large cities (mainly the animal matter of

31lbid., I (July, 1844), 4-5.

32lbid., 13.
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urine and feces), a "poison” is generated, "which, either
in the form of a volatile oil, or other organic matter,
held in solution by ammonia, floats in the atmosphere; is
inhaled during respiratory movements ; is taken into the
circulation and poisons the system.”

For remedial measures,

he suggested the removal of filth from streets, gutters,
private yards and lots, the emptying of privies at least
once every three months, the paving of streets, and the con
struction of an effective system of drainage and waterQO

works.
Dr. Harrison performed extremely well the task that
most medical writers attempted, that is, the exercise of
Aristotelian logic in the delineation of his argument.
Like some latter-day scholastic, he lined up the possible
alternatives to the question at issue and posed objections
which destroyed each proposition in turn except one.

Then

he proposed the possible objections to that proposition
and answered them one by one, thereby disposing of the
objections and leaving the victorious principle undisturbed
and supposedly established as sound doctrine.

In the

33n . 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., Ill (March, 1847), 580,
591-92.
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process he cited many cases as evidence and quoted liberal
ly from "authorities."

Unfortunately, such dabbling in

metaphysics failed to solve the concrete problem of yellow
fever.
When the severe epidemic of 1847 stimulated still
further speculating and writing on yellow fever, the
editor of the New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal com
mented that it might seem useless to write anything more on
the subject;

"We really believe that the archives of the

Profession already contain every thing that need be said
on the subject; and yet the world is but little wiser in
regard to it than it was half a century ago,"

All the

questions regarding the cause, nature, transmission, and
treatment of the disease remained undecided, and no real
agreement existed on any aspect of the subject.

The

editor observed that "Medical are very much like religious
controversies:

in either case, when men have formed and

expressed opinions, they seem to shut their eyes against
all farther light, and hold on to them with like perti
nacity,"

Then why should anything further be written on a

subject already so fully discussed?

Not with the vain idea

of changing those who had already formed opinions, the
editor asserted.

Nevertheless, he felt it necessary to
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pass along all observations to those who would come later
with the hope that someday someone might be able to
analyze the information, "winnow the grain from the chaff,
and establish the truth by facts and logic,"

The late

epidemic of 1847 had provided many interesting facts,
which, said the editor, "would give rise to deductions
which would probably vary according to the diversity of
intellect by which they were e x a m i n e d , I n dealing with
so many unknown variables, every man was his own yellow
fever philosopher.

Such relativism in history, religion,

or philosophy may be unavoidable, and although perplexing,
its concomitant damages are confined largely to the intel
lectual sphere; in medicine, it is more a matter of life
and death.

Yet the clues which would dissipate the cloud

of relativism surrounding yellow fever long remained hidden
from the human intellect.
In 1849 the New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal
described one venture into the field of quasi-scientific
activity which attempted to find a substitute for the vague
action of malaria (polluted air) in the production of fever
epidemics.

Sir James Murray of Edinburgh, a distinguished

34ibid.. IV (January, 1848), 537, 540.
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physician and ’’elegant scholar,” had recently advanced a
theory on the electrical cause of epidemic disease which
excited some interest in America.

In attempting to re

place miasmata with electricity, however, the Scottish
doctor simply exchanged one intangible for another.

Des

cribing the widespread influence of the new "mysterious
agent,” he affirmed:

"It is able to separate and again

unite the elements of water; to tear metals from their
oxides; to shake the clouds in thunder ; and to operate in
developing the evolutions of crystals.”
still further powers:

But it possessed

”In the form of currents, it con

torts the muscles of lifeless animals; and it flies, in
its condensed form, instantaneously, through a circuit of
many persons, producing a manifest shock in them all.”
Admitting that he was only hypothesizing a connection
between electricity in the atmosphere and pestilential
fevers, Sir James Murray promised to follow up his experi
ments with further research.

The editor of the New Orleans

medical journal suggested that the idea was worthy of
further investigation.^5
Apparently, it would take more than electricity to

35lbid., V (May, 1849), 779.
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shake the faith of Southern medical men in the wondrous
powers of pestilential miasmata.

In an article published

in the New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal in 1852,

Dr, J. C. Massie of Houston, Texas, set forth his observa
tions and deductions regarding the "circumstances which
conspire . , . to produce a pestilence,”

Among the com

ponent factors, he listed irregular weather and local
impurities, including putrefying animal matter, marsh ef
fluvia, accumulations of human secretions and excretions,
and vegetable matter decaying in stagnant water.

Although

an anti-contagionist, Massie admitted that a filthy
vessel might convey a disease from place to place and that
the infection might in a filthy area "find an affinity in
the atmosphere" and "act as a spark to ignite the whole
material,"

He considered it a great error, however, to

blame contagion for the work of effluvia from accumulated
filth and putrefaction.

Hence, Dr. Massie was one of the

medical thinkers who had decided that yellow fever, although
non-contagious, might be carried from place to place, that
the characteristics of contagion and transmissibility need
not be inseparable.

Regarding contagion itself, he said,

"I hold that it is not a necessary incident to any disease
of this [epidemic] class,"

Further, he denounced that
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doctrine as a product of the "Romish Church."

According

to Dr. Massie, in 1545 when Pope Paul III wanted to remove
the Council of Trent to Bologna, he seized upon the pre
vailing epidemic at Trent as a means to his own ends, pro
claimed the disease contagious, and persuaded some phy
sicians to support this view.

Thus by authority of the

Church, said Massie, the belief in contagion had been
established and sustained through the ages.

Even the

traditional forty-day period of quarantine, he supposed,
had been designed to correspond with the forty days of
Lent,

At least nine-tenths of the medical profession, he

conjectured, would agree with him in saying that scientific
investigation had failed to lend support to the doctrine
of contagion in epidemic fevers.
If not nine-tenths, at least a preponderant majority
of the medical profession would have agreed with Massie in
1852 on the non-contagious nature of yellow fever.

But

the Great Epidemic of 1853 would attract a number of sup
porters to the contagionist camp, for the extraordinary
malignancy and widespread extent of that epidemic provoked
a new outburst of speculation.

Although some physicians

36ibid., IX (July, 1852), 35-40.
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were converted to contagionism by the experience of 1853,
many others found even more evidence to bolster their
faith in miasmata.

Dr. Erasmus Darwin Fenner of New

Orleans, for years a staunch exponent of local causation,
fell back as usual on the traditional combination of filth
and the epidemic constitution of the atmosphere to explain
the disaster of 1853.

By itself, putrescent effluvia

could not be the "sole cause" of epidemic yellow fever, he
maintained, or New Orleans would suffer an epidemic every
single year.

Therefore, a combinative action of miasma

and a "peculiar constitution of the atmosphere" was re
quired to produce the pestilence.

To account for the

spread of the fever in 1853 to many places never touched
before, Fenner believed the "epidemic constitution" cover
ed a more extensive region than ever before.

Within the

boundaries of this peculiar atmospheric condition, wher
ever local causes were also present the two influences
combined to generate the disease.

Fenner did not say that

yellow fever was never communicated from one person to
another ; he admitted that sometimes the disease might
exhibit the quality of contagion.

Although he himself had

never seen a case caused by contagion, reliable testimony
indicated that such cases had occurred.

The majority of
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the medical profession agreed that yellow fever seldom, if
ever, spread by infected ships, goods, or persons.

There

fore, if the disease were so rarely communicated by con
tact or association, independent of other influences, such
communication might be considered the exception to the
rule.

Thus Dr. Fenner dismissed the doctrine of contagion

in yellow fever.^7
At the close of the epidemic of 1853 a sanitary
commission was created by the city government to investi
gate the facts of the late siege.

In his portion of the

final report, Dr. Edward H. Barton, chairman of the com
mission, concluded that yellow fever was not contagious
and that the disease was only communicable within a foul
atmosphere; that is, the disease could be propagated by
an individual or a vessel only in an atmosphere favorable
to its spread.

Sporadic cases of fever might be produced

by miasms from filth, but the meteorological element, or
the unusual constitution of the atmosphere, also had to be
present, he asserted, for the production of a full scale
epidemic.

Like Dr. Fenner, Barton believed that the

conjunctive action of both influences, local and atmospheric.

37penner, Epidemic Yellow Fever, 72-75.
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was required for the development of an epidemic.

Heat and

moisture constituted the two most important elements in
the climatic influence; malaria or miasmata included all
impurities of the air resulting from filth and decomposi
tion, such as street and kitchen offal and the refuse of
stables, vacheries, soap and tallow factories, privies,
cemeteries, swamps, hospitals, and crowded tenements.
Whatever factors contaminated air, food, and water. Barton
proposed to list among the local or terrene causes.38
Further, to explain the spread of yellow fever over
a vast portion of the South in 1853, Dr. Barton postulated
that some "vast influences" or "apparent irregularity" had
developed within the ordinary state of the atmosphere "that
was at war with its being."

He described the epidemic con

stitution as a combination of terrene and meteorological
constituents arranged in some manner different from the
normal condition.

"We have no proof of anything specific,"

he said, "beyond this combination, and this is two-fold,
the meteorological part probably forming the predisponent
i« innocuous without the other . . . the second is the

38Barton, Cause and Prevention of Yellow Fever, k,
XV, 70, 134.
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local circumstances and Influence--the tx^e localising or
fixing power."39
The "false fact" of contagion had arisen. Barton
declared, when a case of fever transported into an impure
atmosphere was followed by other cases; but within a pure
atmosphere other cases would not have developed.

The

defining characteristic of true contagion, he maintained,
was its independence of climate, season, place, or atmos
phere— its action under all circumstances.

He considered

the concept of contingent contagion a "medical misnomer."
To say that yellow fever might become infectious under
certain contingencies was to say only that it might be
propagated in an impure atmosphere by the Impure air
introduced by persons, ships, clothing, or otherwise.
Independent circumstances then accounted for the "seem
ingly contagious quality.
Finally, Dr. Barton felt that his facts and logic
had demonstrated four postulates as clear truths:

(1)

that a close combination of meteorological and terrene
conditions was absolutely necessary to the origin and
transmission of yellow fever, (2) that all the terrene

3 9 i b i d . ,

4 9 - 5 1 .

^ O l b i d . ,

5 2 ,

6 1 - 6 2 .
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conditions might be removed by human effort, thereby (3)
rendering the atmospheric element innocuous, and (4) that
the "irrestibie corollary” followed "that yellow fever is
an evil, remediable and extinguishable by human agency.”
He hoped that a great sanitary reform movement might be
instituted throughout the South.

The idea that man could

not alter the course of epidemic disease was positively
un-American, he announced, and entirely out of step with
the progressive spirit of the age.

But he was convinced

that sanitary measures to eliminate the local terrene
influences would banish once and for all the scourge of
epidemic yellow fever,
Regardless of what Fenner, Barton, and many others
might have thought about the causative powers of filth,
one New Orleans physician during the epidemic of 1853
advanced a startling theory regarding the influence of
filth.

Dr. J, S. McFarlane, practitioner in New Orleans

for some thirty years, addressed a letter to Mayor A, D.
Crossman, which was published in the New Orleans Daily
Delta on July 28, 1853.

Observing that many physicians

considered filth a factor in the production of yellow

41lbid., 5-8.
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fever, he stated, "That so far from believing that the
filth, offal and impurities around and about us have any
thing to do with the formation of what physicians desig
nate an epidemic constitution of the atmosphere, I believe
that these very impurities , . . to a certain extent • « •
are calculated to retard its formation.
This theory, like every other, found some support
ers, but for the most part McFarlane was much criticized
for his heretical doctrine by the newspapers and many of
his colleagues.

In a tirade denouncing Dr. McFarlane*s

extraordinary notion, the editor of the New Orleans
Crescent sarcastically remarked that if filth were a pro
tective influence. New Orleans was undoubtedly the Wealth
iest city in the world.

On another occasion, that editor

suggested that a public laboratory be established to
manufacture all sorts of nauseating fumes and that the
citizenry be supplied with nose-bags containing these
noxious vapors so highly praised by Dr.

M

c
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^3

To defend himself against the bitter denunciations
of his fellow physicians, McFarlane attempted to make his

4%De Bow's Review, XV (December, 1853), 599-600,
43New Orleans Daily Crescent, August 2, 8, 1853.
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theory more explicit and intelligible in an article in De
Bow*8 Review in May of 1854.

In short, he believed that

the pestilential atmosphere conducive to the production
of intermittent, remittent, swamp, and congestive fevers
served as a counteracting force to the development of a
yellow fever atmosphere.

As evidence, he pointed out that

portions of the swamps behind New Orleans, into which the
filth of the city drained, had been cleared of trees,
partly drained, and bared to the burning heat of the sun
during several years preceding 1853.

In those years, the

fumes emanating from filth exposed to the sun produced
various forms of fever, but almost no yellow fever had
occurred.

In the summer of 1853, frequent rains and the

interruption of the draining machines had left the filthy
swamp covered with water which prevented the exhalations.
Then intermittent and remittent fevers disappeared, and
"yellow fever established his dread empire over our
devoted city."

Dr. McFarlane asked, "what extravagance

could there be in describing the foul drainage and perco
lations, vegetable and animal, of the city of New-Orleans,
when combined with the perishable deposit of the swamp
. . . and declaring it as my opinion, that to a certain
extent we might be protected from yellow fever by an
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atmosphere teeming with their exhalations?"

After his com

plicated explanation, he restated his firm opinion that
miasmata from filth and swamps, when exposed to the burning
sun, created an atmosphere productive of other fevers, but
basically antagonistic to that required by yellow fever.
In a pamphlet published in 1853, Dr. McFarlane
admitted that thus far nothing was known regarding yellow
fever because "We are . . .
hold of science.”

as yet not even at the thresh-

He then summarized his own "opinions"

with force and vigor and an acid pen.

He concluded that

yellow fever was neither contagious nor produced by filth
or decomposing matter.

He considered quarantine, drainage,

and sanitation futile efforts.

Finally, McFarlane believed

that yellow fever would eventually wear itself out in New
Orleans and disappear, even as it had done in so many
other places.

In the midst of all the medical philosophers, one
physician in New Orleans more closely resembled a modern
scientist in his approach to the yellow fever problem.

44De Bow's Review, XVI (May, 1854), 463-66,
45j. S. M'Farlane, A Review of the Yellow Fever,
Its Causes, e t c ., and an Interesting and Useful Abstract
of Mortuary Statistics (New Orleans, 1853), vii, xii.
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Dr. J. L. Riddell, a member of the Sanitary Commission of

1853, had reached conclusions slightly different from those
of Dr. Barton.

He agreed with Barton that yellow fever

had not been personally contagious in 1853.

But more

,

chemist and scientist than philosopher, and not satisfied
with the intangible properties of epidemic constitution.
Dr. Riddell had attempted to delve more deeply into the
causative forces.

Previously, he had devised experiments

to measure the amount of "organized matter" in the atmos
phere while yellow fever was prevailing in New Orleans,
From his investigations Riddell had discovered "myriads
of microscopic motes" in the air and was convinced that
the atmosphere contained countless other forms of organic
life so minute as to elude observation even with the aid
of the microscope.

More important, he believed that the

"living motes" in some manner produced the "miasmatic
m a ladies."46

By his interest in microscopic and ultra-

microscopic organisms. Dr. Riddell was on the path which
ultimately would point the way to the germ theory.
In his conclusions regarding the yellow fever of

4&N. 0. >fed. & Surg. Jour., VII (September, 1850),

172-76.
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1853, Riddell attributed its infectious coranunicability to
"poisonous matter (doubtless some of living organism)
maturing its germs or spores . . . surrounded by confined
or impure air; which germs became diffused in the impure
atmosphere."

Among the various conditions favorable to

the development of the infection, he included emanations
from putrefying matter, consisting of gaseous, liquid,
and solid particles ("the pablum . . .

of cryptogamie

growths") and the "presence of the specific organism whose
perfected spores constitute the material cause of yellow
fever,"

In calling attention to minute cryptogamia (plant

life which propagates by spores) and in referring to a
"specific organism" as yellow fever's "material cause,"
Riddell had obviously formed the conclusion that a speci
fic microorganism, plant rather than animalcule, was the
vital principle in the disease.

With that conception, he

was far ahead of his colleagues who were still dealing with
the intangible compound essences of miasmata.
Writing in the 1850's. Dr. M, Morton Dowler of New
Orleans assumed a rather negativistic position on the sub
ject of yellow fever, rejecting all the various theories

^7Ibid., X (May, 1854), 813-14.
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proposed over the years.

In rejecting the idea that filth

promoted the development of yellow fever. Dr. Dowler was,
at least to that extent, in agreement with McFarlane, but
every other notion he denounced.

As for the filth theory,

promoted by Fenner and Barton, Dowler declared that al
though he was no advocate of filth, it was "neither a
basilisk nor a Gorgon's head; nor is it the cause of
yellow fever."

He considered the erratic spread of yellow

fever sound evidence against the filth theory, since
yellow fever exhibited no "special predilection" for loca
tions characterized by excessive heat, moisture, or animal
and vegetable putrefaction.

"The ship-hold and gutter-

philosophers desire to claim sway," he maintained, "and in
their crusade against filth, on the yellow fever basis, go
for expending millions of the public money, and devouring
the commerce of New Orleans."

He was of course referring

th the increasing demand for sanitation and quarantine
regulations.

Not only did Dowler oppose the filth theory,

but he also rejected Dr. Riddell's cryptogamie theory
which he thought had been deduced primarily from the filth
idea.

"Strange fungi I strange gases! strange poisons!

strange foundation have the advocates of these theories!
A strange pretense for all the extravagant systems of
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disinfection, quarantines, and Quixotic schemes of drainage,” exclaimed the iconoclastic Dr. Dowler.

4.8

On another occasion Dr. Morton Dowler made some
interesting observations on the whole problem of yellow
fever causation.

In dismissing all the theories thus far

advanced, he declared, "Whoever discovers the objective or
external cause of yellow fever, must look beyond the crude
dealings in gases, animalculae, cryptogamia, quarantine,
filth, and meteorology which are now being exhibited
before the world,"

Demonstrating considerable insight,

he asserted, "It may or may not be in the power of man to
grasp the secret, but if ever that is done new laws must
be investigated and new problems solved.

A higher

scientific era will have been inaugurated."49
According to Dowler, few persons in the medical
profession would deny that almost nothing was known about
causation.

But, he observed, almost all medical writings

on the subject presented a fine display of causes.

"The

writers cautiously make out these by giving a little
'meteorology,' a little 'medical topography,' a little

48%bid., XI (July, 1854), 43-44, 47-50.
49ibid., XI (November, 1854), 429.
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'geology,' a little 'putrefaction and exhalation,' to
gether with a very circumspect reference to the organic,
microzoic, cryptogamie, electric, calorific, gaseous, and
filth theories, and so forth."

In this fashion a "very

specious appearance" of knowledge and impartiality was
created, and all the medical reader could determine was
that no positive knowledge existed regarding causation.
Sardonically, Dowler remarked, "It does not comport with
the dignity of authorship or professorship to say,
don't know.'

'I

It must be said gradually, and with the

appearance of knowing everything."

After having been a

practitioner and a student for some twenty years, and
having read and reflected so long on the subject of yellow
fever, Dowler claimed he had never discovered any explana
tion of causation worthy of attention or belief.50
In 1855 Dr. Dowler propounded a doctrine of hope for
the eventual spontaneous cessation of yellow fever, not
unlike McFarlane's suggestion in 1853.

Although he re

jected all theories as well as the proposed sanitation and
quarantine programs, Dowler insisted that he was not paint
ing a hopeless picture for New Orleans.

On the contrary.

SOlbid., 430.
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he proposed a "doctrine of hope and consolation."

When

the population became stabilized and acclimated by fever
attacks, he believed the disease would disappear of its
own accord.

Since yellow fever fed on strangers and a

shifting population, when European immigration slowed
down and finally ceased, the fever would lack new victims.
Furthermore, widespread occurrences of the disease, as in
1853, would immunize many persons throughout the United
States who might later move to New Orleans.

Observing

that yellow fever had been "emphatically a German and
Irish disease," Dowler believed a halt to immigration
would remove one source of the fever's fuel.

The "unfea

sible expedients" of sanitary reformism would bring
nothing but "disappointment and heavy taxation," he main
tained, but if allowed to run its course, ultimately the
disease would burn itself out.^l

Such a fatalistic,

laissez-faire policy toward the pestilence found little
favor with those who refused to believe the situation lay
beyond the power of man.
Nevertheless, in the 1850's while the sanitationists
preached reform, there were many others who failed to see

Sljbid., XI (January, 1855), 503-505.
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in filth all the demons supposedly lurking there.

In 1859

Dr. Edward Jenner Coxe, visiting physician at Charity
Hospital, agreed with Drs. McFarlane and Dowler that filthy
streets and gutters could not account for the development
of yellow fever.

Many localities filthier than New Orleans

had never experienced yellow fever at all, he declared.
But Coxe hastened to state that the denial of yellow
fever's origin in filth was no argument in favor of filth,
since clean streets and gutters were certainly desirable
on other grounds.
Even the recently created State Board of Health
noted in its report for 1857 that filth alone was appar
ently not sufficient to generate yellow fever.

According

to the Board, "If refuse organic matter in any of its
forms . . . [has] any agency in the production of yellow
fever, its attributes were fairly put to the proof this
past summer on a scale of grandeur that would be shocking
to the eyes of one accustomed to the filth of Constanti
nople or Cairo."

For weeks the streets had remained u n 

cleaned, while two of the city's largest hotels poured
the refuse from their privies into one of the main streets.

52ibid., XVI (March, 1859), 173-74.
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The refuse from Charity Hospital supplemented "the stifling
current."

Although gutters and canals were "seething and

bubbling with their putrid waters," the several yellow
fever cases which appeared in New Orleans, with few excep
tions, remained in an unusually clean portion of the city.
"If infectiousness were a property resulting from filth and
putrescent organic matter," the Board of Health contended,
"the whole city was a laboratory for its generation, unsur
passed in magnitude and extent. . . ."

Yet the yellow

fever of 1857 did not assume epidemic form.^3
While the filth theory was debated pro and con, the
questions of yellow fever's portability and local or
foreign origin engaged the attention of others, especially
since the epidode of 1853.

In the report of the Sanitary

Commission of 1853, Dr. Edward H. Barton had firmly denied
the allegation of foreign importation, which "has proceeded
from a patriotic, but mistaken impulse, which is pretty
universal, as well among savages, as those more civilized,
viz:

never to acknowledge the paternity of a pestilence I"

He was positive that the epidemic of 1853 had originated

S^Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for
1857, 23.
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in New O r l e a n s , O n

the other hand, Dr. J, L, Riddell

had concluded that the yellow fever afflicting various
towns and plantations throughout the South in 1853 had
been transmitted fran New Orleans.

Although he conceded

that the disease might sometimes originate in New Orleans,
he believed the germs of the 1853 epidemic had been intro
duced from Latin America.

Hence, Riddell advocated

quarantine measures to detain and to fumigate filthy per
sons, clothing, and ships, as well as all goods from the
West Indies, South America, and Mexico.
Another Southern physician stimulated by the epi
demic of 1853 to re-explore the questions of yellow
fever's transportability and the highly controversial
doctrine of contagion, was Dr. J. C. Nott of Mobile, Ala
bama.

The extraordinary spread of the pestilence in 1853

reopened the "long neglected idea of contagion" which Nott,
like the majority of the medical profession, had con
sidered obsolete.

Believing the behavior of yellow fever

too irregular to be explained by gaseous effluvia in the
atmosphere, he saw the need to search for a more plausible

S^Barton, Cause and Prevention of Yellow Fever, 67.
55 n . 0. M e d . & Surg. Jour., X (May, 1854), 814.
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thesis.

Dr. Nott inclined toward the Idea that the cause

of yellow fever "exists In an organic form and possesses
the power of propagation and progression by organic laws,"
Attempting to distinguish between two questions so often
confused; transportability and contagion, he maintained
that a disease need not be communicable from one person
to another like smallpox In order for Its germ to be
transported from place to place In vessels or baggage.
Earlier epidemics had provided evidence against contagion,
but the conflicting facts of 1853 left Dr. Nott In a state
of Indecision on the subject, although he admitted his In
clination to believe In the contagiousness of the disease.
Transportability, he asserted, rested on an even firmer
foundation than contagion since the fever had traveled to
the various points along the coast and rivers which were
frequented by vessels and railroad trains.
In 1848 Dr. Nott had published an article advancing
the anlmalcular hypothesis as a better explanation of the
"erratic habits" of yellow fever than any other theory yet
set forth.

Coming closer to the truth than any other medi

cal thinker In the mid-nineteenth century. Dr. Nott had

56ibld., X (March, 1854), 571, 577-79.
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also suggested the possibility that insects, the mosquito
among others, might be related to the transmission of dis
ease.

But many objections were posed to the insect and

anlmalcular hypothesis.

One opponent said that none of

the known animalculae (animal microorganisms) were poison
ous; he had swallowed water on numerous occasions contain
ing minute animal life without the least effect.

Pointing

out that one might also swallow viper's poison without
perceptible effect. Dr, Nott declared, "By what various
means the poison of insects or animalculae might be com
municated through the air or directly to individuals, we
know not."57

In attempting to break with tradition and

for postulating something other than the customary miasms.
Dr. Nott deserves special recognition along with Dr.

Riddell of New Orleans.
Like Dr. Nott, Dr. T, A, Cooke of Washington, Louisi
ana, supported the idea of yellow fever's transportability,
as well as the anlmalcular theory, but denied that yellow
fever was personally contagious.

Convinced that the fever

of 1853 had been transmitted from New Orleans to other
points where it prevailed, he believed the "morbific

5?Ibid,, IV (March, 1848), 563-601; X (March, 1854),
581.
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cause** had been conveyed ÿy effluvia from sick persons as
well as by fomites.

Fomites, however, carried the cause

itself and if accumulated in a sufficient quantity would
produce the disease in all persons "predisposed" to it.
On the other hand, emanations from the sick were harmless
unless the surrounding atmosphere was appropriate to
allow for the propagation of disease germs coming from
the body of the patient.

"The facts in proof of the

importation of the disease through the medium of such
persons, and of merchandize,** Dr. Cooke asserted, "are as
numerous as the leaves on the trees, at least in the
opinion of most country people destitute of prejudice, or
a taste for metaphysical disquisitions."

Believing in the

foreign origin and importation of the disease to New
Orleans and its transmission from that center to other
Louisiana communities. Dr. Cooke along with many other
"country people" strongly favored quarantine measures to
prevent the future importation of the disease.58
Although as factors in the chain of causation he
listed a crowded population, summer heat, and an extra
ordinary condition of the atmosphere, in addition to the

58ibid., X (March, 1854), 606-608.
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imported morbific influence. Dr. Cooke apparently had
serious doubts about the validity of the traditional
causes.

He had observed that miasms, heat, dryness or

moisture, emanations from filth, organic or inorganic
poisons, and meteorological conditions, alone or combined
into any possible arrangement, always encountered contra
dictions and therefore failed to provide an adequate
explanation for the disease.

Referring to the animalcular

theory proposed several years before by Dr. Nott, Cooke
declared, "I have long been inclined to the opinion that
the time is fast approaching, when most febrile diseases
will be attributed, and justly, to a similar cause— to an
animalcular origin.”

On the subject of contagion, however.

Dr. Cooke recognized that the yellow fever poison was es
sentially different in its action from contagion, which
operated by personal contact without regard to zone,
climate, season, or other influences.

Somehow yellow

fever was different; exactly in what manner it operated he
could not

say.

During the 1850's more and more people came to
believe in the transportable nature of the disease, first

59lbid., 608-12.
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from Latin America to New Orleans, then from the Crescent
City inland or along the coast.

Many laymen, particularly

in the interior, were convinced by the epidemics of the
1850's that yellow fever was both transportable and con
tagious.

More and more physicians came to accept the trans

mission of yellow fever from place to place by infected
goods, but to most medical men the doctrine of personal
contagion still remained unacceptable.
evidence to the contrary.

There was too much

Contagious diseases like small

pox and measles followed certain discernible laws; yellow
fever did not.

Sometimes cases appeared to result from

contact with a patient, but too frequently no traceable
connection between cases could be discovered.

To account

for the discrepancies in the facts, the concept of "con
tingent contagion" was advanced--that is, the idea that
under certain contingencies, which could not be defined,
yellow fever might become contagious.

But few considered

this a satisfactory explanation.

The opponents of contagion, and they were many, had
ample evidence to cite against that doctrine.

Over the

years many physicians had experimented with the saliva,
perspiration, and even the black vomit of yellow fever
patients.

They had swallowed, inhaled, and inoculated
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themselves with those materials and yet experienced no ill
effects.

A physician in Philadelphia in the early nine

teenth century fed dogs and cats on black vomit for weeks,
inoculated the animals and himself many times, rubbed the
matter into his eyes, drank a large amount in diluted and
in pure form--all without harmful result.

On one occasion,

a surgeon in the British Army "swallowed a wine-glass full
of fresh black vomit and felt no more effect from it than
if so much water had been taken into the stomach.

It did

not impair his appetite for dinner."^®
In further experimentation, physicians had slept in
beds where yellow fever victims had recently died and also
had worn the victims* supposedly infected clothing without
contracting the f e v e r . T h e o d o r e Clapp, Unitarian minis
ter in New Orleans, told of a man who, during the epidemic
of 1822, had slept in the same bed with a friend who was
dying of yellow fever.

On one occasion he had been

"absolutely inundated by a copious discharge of the

GORistory of the Yellow Fever in New Orleans, during
the Summer of 1853, with Sketches of the Scenes of Horror
which Occurred during the Epidemic . . . by a Physician of
New Orleans, 38-39.
61#. 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., VII (November, 1850),
362.
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vomlto."

Even after his friend's death, the man continued

to occupy the same room and enjoyed the best of health.

Dr,

Clapp said he knew of many other similar cases.
In 1855 in the midst of the increasing fyror over
contagion, René La Roche, of the College of Physicians of
Philadelphia, published a fourteen-hundred page, two-volume
compendium of information on yellow fever, which demon
strated, among other things, that there was more to be said
against contagion than for it.

His forty-five page biblio

graphy, listing approximately a thousand items, is indica
tive of the voluminous quantity of writing on the disease
by the mid-nineteenth century.

Volume One comprises a his

torical sketch of yellow fever, its symptoms, pathology,
complications, diagnosis, prognosis, incubation, and other
medical aspects.

Volume Two deals with acclimation,

second attacks, predisposing factors, facts and arguments
for and against contagion, contigent contagion, nature of
the poison, treatment, and other related problems.

In one sense, this treatise represents a kind of

62i)uffy (ed.), Parson Clapp, 84.
G3see René La Roche, Yellow Fever, Considered in
its Historical, Pathological, Etiological and Therapeuti
cal Relations (2 vols., Philadelphia, 1855).
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Stmma of yellow fever philosophy up to the mid-nineteenth
century.

Yet it is by no means a synthesis, but perhaps

more like a medical Sic et Non, quoting the various autho
rities and presenting facts and arguments for this side,
that side, and all sides without any real attempt to
reconcile the conflicts.

In dealing with the contagion

issue, however. La Roche devoted about ten times more
pages to the facts and arguments opposing contagion than
to those favoring the doctrine.

He noted that the pre

vailing medical sentiment supported non-contagion and
indicated his own inclination toward that idea.

Other

wise, his encyclopedic coverage of the subject was restric
ted largely to a description of the many controversial
opinions, theories, and conflicting evidence relating to
yellow fever.
Reviewing the work of La Roche for the New Orleans
Medical and Surgical Journal in January of 1856, Dr.

Bennet Dowler observed that almost one-fourth of the "huge
volumes" had been devoted to the contagion question.

But,

he felt that even this "massive logic though wrought out
with the patience of Job, will not convert the contagionists against their will."

Pointing out the merits of the

work as well as its defects and arguing vigorously over
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certain points of disagreement, Dowler was neither extreme
ly unkind nor intensely personal like many other reviewers
with particular axes to grind,
In a penetrating criticism of La Roche's digest of
yellow fever, Dr. William Holcombe, homeopathic practition
er in New Orleans, conceded that it was probably the most
extensive and valuable monograph thus far contributed to
medical literature.

Yet in spite of Dr. La Roche's inde

fatigable efforts in compiling fact and opinion, Holcombe
felt that "his mind lacks the analytic, generalizing and
constructive power, which is necessary for true philoso
phic induction."

The author had simply paraded forth

arguments for all theories and all sides of the issues and
then assumed a "negative, conservative, indefinite amalgam
of opinion" or no opinion at all,

"There is nothing

positive and definite in all this pile of literary lumber";
said Holcombe, "not one proposition which others have not
scouted, not one affirmation which many others have not
denied,"65

And he was right.

But even if La Roche had

64n , 0, Med. & Surg. Jour., XII (January, 1856),
555-74.
^ % i l l i a m H. Holcombe, Yellow Fever and Its Homeo
pathic Treatment (New York, 1856), 61-65.
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set out to attempt a philosophical synthesis of the count
less conflicting positions and even if he had succeeded in
formulating concepts to reconcile the contradictory ideas,
in the absence of the germ theory and the mosquito doc
trine, he could not have created an abstraction in conform
ity with reality.

Although he provided a gigantic reference work on
yellow fever. La Roche settled no issue, ended no argument.
His volumes appeared at the very time that yellow fever
theories were being debated more furiously than ever and
many old concepts were beginning to break down under the
mass of conflicting evidence provided by the succession
of epidemics in Louisiana and the South in the 1850's.
Local causation came under severe attack from many
quarters, and traditional views underwent gradual modifi
cation.

Laymen, together with a small portion of the

medical profession, began to advocate quarantine as well
as Sanitary measures to fight the disease.

Even if yellow

fever were not contagious in the commonly accepted sense
of the term, a patient laboring under the disease was
obviously associated in some manner with the spread of
yellow fever to other persons and places.

And in 1855 for

the first time in thirty years, the Louisiana legislature
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once again passed an act providing for quarantine and a
State Board of Health.
In its report for 1856 the new Board of Health sug
gested that some unknown essence emanated from a patient's
body and was communicated to others in a yet unknown manner
Admitting that meteorological and terrestial causes un
doubtedly acted as contributing influences, the Board felt
that neither alone nor both together could produce the
disease.

Great quantities of evidence and testimony col

lected since 1853 indicated "that a material virus, origin
ating in the body of the sick man, is also a potential
means and perhaps the most so, under favorable circum
stances, of all the others."

But atmospheric and terrene

influences must also be essential, the Board concluded,
since the "morbific poison" from the patient's body,
whether in the form of exhalations or transferred to
fomites, did not always and invariably transmit the dis
ease to susceptible individuals on

e x p o s u r e .

Discussing the same problem in the Report for 1857,
the Board of Health observed that the prevailing opinion
prior to 1853 had considered yellow fever not infectious.

^ R e p o r t of the Louisiana State Board of Health for
1856, 7-9.
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But the experience of 1853, 1854, and 1855 had necessitated
a reconstructed view.

According to the Board's Report,

"The common sense of the people, unskilled in the refine
ments of scientific hypotheses, solved the problem, by a
process quite as logical as, and certainly far more practi
cal than the conjectures of the learned,"

To the layman,

a yellow fever patient was in some unknown manner a source
of disease.

Yellow fever, if not directly contagious, was

somehow infectious and communicable.

Hence, came the

general sentiment in favor of quarantine.

"The policy [of

quarantine] was then inaugurated," the Board Report stated,
"not in obedience to the judgment of the medical community,
but in spite of i t I n

this instance the popular belief

in yellow fever's contagious nature overrode the opposition
of the medical profession.
Although the medical profession continued to oppose
the doctrine of direct contagion, with good reason, more
and more physicians began to question some of the other
traditionally accepted concepts.

Several Louisiana phy

sicians, writing on yellow fever theory after the epidemics
of the 1850's, listed the usual contributing influences--

G^Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for
1857, 4-5.
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miasmatic poison, filth, heat, humidity, and predisposing
causes--but they admitted that essentially nothing was
known of yellow fever's etiology.

More clearly than ever

before, they realized that something basic was lacking in
Co

all previous explanations.
One French Louisiana physician. Dr. D. Durac,
raised this important question:

exactly what is a miasm?

Observing that the majority of medical writers had long
agreed that yellow fever resulted from miasmatic influences,
he pointed out that science had not yet determined any
means for analysing that mysterious something called a
miasm.

Perhaps the operative factor in miasmatic poison

might be animalcules, he suggested, such as the ones black
vomit exhibited under microscopic observation.

Like

Riddell, Dr. Durac felt that miasmata required further
analysis.

Nothing, absolu ely nothing, had been settled

about the yellow pestilence, he insisted, and although
many causal factors had been assigned to the disease, he
felt there were others yet undiscovered:

"Nous dirons.

68a , J. F. Cartier, W Filvre Jaune de la NouvelleOrléans (Paris, 1859), 46-47; D. Durac, De la Fièvre Jaune
et des Épidémies de 1853, 1854 et 1858 dans la paroisse
Lafourche (Nouvelle-Orléans, 1863), 20-24, 65-72; Delery,
Précis Historique de la Fièvre Jaune, 52, 147.
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nous, que nous croyons à l'existence d'autres causes,
causes cachées & l'homme jusqu'ici et que Dieu peut-être
un jour dévoilera 1 sa c r é a t u r e . ("We declare that we
believe in the existence of other causes, causes thus far
hidden to man, and which perhaps someday God will reveal
to his creature,")
Disturbed by the theoretical conflicts since the
1840's, on numerous occasions Dr. Bennet Dowler had tried
to keep open to further investigation a path which was
rapidly becoming cluttered with a proliferation of dogmatic
abstractions.

He characterized the "alleged causes" of

yellow fever as completely inadequate in spite of, or
because of, the "hundreds of inconclusive and contradictory
volumes, filled with special pleadings, diluted logic,
theoretical biases, and irrelevant facts."

Dr. Dowler

believed it was "better to acknowledge ignorance than to
advocate an error," better to leave all questions open than
dogmatically to close the door to further investigation.70
Medical philosophers generally assumed a cause with
out ample proof.

When the effect appeared without that

69ixirac, De la Filvre Jaune, 65, 67, 69, 24.
7®Duffy (ed.). Parson Clapp, 105.
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cause they subtly substituted some closely related circumstance.

When their cause existed without any accompanying

effect; a counteracting contingency was assumed.

Dowler

compared this kind of sophistry to the story of a French
man who, observing that an Englishman recovered from an
illness after eating a red herring, fed one to a fellow
Frenchman with the same disease.

When the sick Frenchman

died, the would-be empiricist noted that a red herring
would cure an Englishman of a fever, but the same treat
ment would kill a Frenchman.^^
As for the epidemic constitution of the atmosphere,
Dowler considered that assumption useless except as "a
cloak to ignorance’* and suggested that it "might as well
be called an epidemic d e c e p t i o n , T h e

Board of Health

in 1858 struck another blow against the concept of the epi
demic constitution.

In the opinion of the Board, suf

ficient evidence existed to demonstrate that yellow fever
patients served as one clear means of diffusing and propa
gating the poison of the disease.

Although many cases

occurred without traceable connection either to sick

7In. 0, Med. & Surg. Jour., Ill (September, 1846),
174.
72lbid., XII (November, 1855), 322.
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persons or to fomites, the Board considered the "tradition
al and hackneyed solution" so long employed to account for
yellow fever's irregularities--epidemic constitution of
the atmosphere— a completely inadequate explanation.

The

Board contended that "the assigning of an unknown cause
. . . [was not] a whit more rational and satisfactory,
than an unqualified denial of any causation whatever for
the event,"73
And so the disagreement and uncertainty continued.
Yankee quarantine and sanitation measures in New Orleans
during the Civil War, based on General Butler's yellow
fever philosophy (effluvia from both animal and vegetable
decomposition plus an imported "seed"), was accompanied
by a period of freedom from the disease.

This phenomenon

provided convincing evidence to many persons that either
yellow fever was an imported disease which could be
screened out by strict quarantine, or that the fever was
indigenous but could be prevented by thoroughgoing sani
tary measures.

Still nothing was settled.

In 1870 Dr, Stanford E, Chaille remarked that a

73Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for
1858, 19-20.
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considerable extension of scientific boundaries was yet
required "before the wearisome discussions of doctors can
confer any substantial benefits on the p u b l i c I n

sum

marizing the several theories competing for ascendancy in
1870, Dr. Chaille listed three basic conceptions, together
with a fourth representing the various possible modifica
tions:

(1) Yellow fever is both contagious and portable,

spread by persons as well as fomites.

(2) Yellow fever is

portable but not contagious, that is, communicable by fo
mites but not by persons.

(3) Yellow fever is neither

portable nor contagious, transmitted by neither persons
nor fomites, but the poison is present at times and under
variable conditions in the atmosphere of certain localities.
(4) Yellow fever may be produced by two different poisons,
or by the same poison producing different results, depend
ing on individual or atmospheric conditions.

Therefore,

at various times, the disease may be contagious or port
able or both or neither.74

Throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century
confusion and controversy still characterized the field of

7^N. 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., XXIII (July, 1870),
568, 597.
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theory, but several significant modifications occurred.
When a number of years passed in the 1880's and 1890's
without a single case of yellow fever in New Orleans, it
became harder to believe that the disease was indigenous.
Naturally, the quarantinists took the credit for having
protected the city and the state from the malady.

As the

germ theory gained acceptance from the 1870's onward, the
position of those who would deny portability as well as
contagion became less tenable, and the concepts of the
spontaneous miasm and epidemic constitution gradually
faded away.

Although the formulation and validation of

the germ theory in the second half of the nineteenth cen
tury cleared away the miasmatic and atmospheric fallacies,
the basic question of how persons contracted yellow fever
germs remained a mystery.

Direct contagion still had more

opponents than advocates, but few in the latter nineteenth
century would deny the transmission of infection by germ
laden fomites.

The connection between a case of fever

and the specific source of infection was not always clearly
discernible, but fomites provided the most plausible
answer until the discovery of the insect vector.

In addition to the controversies regarding causation
and transmission, another question which confounded the
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theorists until the latter nineteenth century involved the
very nature of yellow fever;

was it a disease sui generis

or was it simply one among a class of interrelated fevers?
For centuries physicians had encountered diagnostic dif
ficulties in dealing with diseases which manifested super
ficially similar symptoms.

Some ailments, of course,

exhibited marked characteristics which differentiated them
from all others, such as smallpox, bubonic plague, venereal
diseases, and others.

Many other maladies not so readily

defined included those producing high fever together with
respiratory, intestinal, or nervous disorder in the system,
but without characteristic skin eruptions or other clearly
observable qualities to set them apart from all others.
The inherent difficulty already present in the field
of diagnosis was crystallized into a methodology and pro
vided with a theoretical basis by Dr, Benjamin Rush, the
most widely known American physician of the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries.

Dr, Rush believed that the

multiplication of diseases was "as repugnant to truth in
medicine, as polytheism is to truth in religion."

The

physician who considered every different bodily disorder
as a distinct disease, according to Dr. Rush, resembled
"the Indian or African savage, who considers wàter, dew.
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ice, frost; and snow, as different essences; while the
physician who considers the morbid affections of every part
of the body (however diversified . . ,) as derived from one
cause, resembles the philosopher, who considers dew, ice,
frost, and snow, as different modifications of water."

To

Dr. Rush, yellow fever was simply the most malignant form
in the hierarchy of fevers produced by marsh miasmata.
His lexicographer-epidemiologist contemporary, Noah Web
ster, also concluded that yellow fever was nothing more
than a high grade bilious

f

e

v

e

r

.

^5

The idea of yellow fever as the most malignant
degree of a fever which assumed many interchangeable forms
prevailed throughout the first half of the nineteenth cen
tury.

Writing in 1817, Dr. Jabez Heustis described yellow

fever as a "more aggravated degree of intermitting and re
mitting fever," which represented "the grand climax of
malignity, analogous in its origin and nature [to the other
forms], and standing at the top of the same scale."

All

those fevers, he maintained, were only modifications of the
same basic disease, differing only in degree of force.
Furthermore, the forms were interchangeable; one type could

75winslow, Conquest of Epidemic Disease, 200, 214.
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develop Into another or assume another form during an epi
demic .

Any observer who had ever witnessed this phenome

non and yet doubted the identity of fevers, said Dr.
Heustis, *hnust be a skeptic in physics, and a disbeliever
in the demonstrative evidence of his own senses.
It was generally believed by both laymen and phy
sicians that during the course of an epidemic all forms of
fever tended to merge into the most malignant grade and
assume the form of yellow fever.^7

By the 1840's some

persons had concluded that yellow fever was a specific
entity, separate and distinct from all other fevers,7®
but the opposite opinion prevailed until the middle of
the century.
In 1844 Dr. P. A. Lambert of New Orleans undertook
the task of classifying the forms of yellow fever epidem
ics as well as the various types of yellow fever.

Forms

of epidemics, he said, included inflammatory, bilious,
bilious inflammatory, mucous, putrid, and nervous, depend
ing on the dominant symptoms characterizing the fever

76Heustis, Physical Observations, 114.
77Picayune, August 21, 1841.
78New Orleans Medical Journal, I (October, 1844),
219.
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during an epidemic.

As types of yellow fever, Dr. Lambert

listed continued, remittent, and intermittent, categories
based on the pattern of fever activity in an individual.
He announced that it was not his intention to devise "an
algebraic formula" for the solution of problems regarding
the theory of types since the variations were too subtle
to allow for precision.
Dr. Erasmus Darwin Fenner was among the outstanding
exponents and defenders of the philosophy of interrelated
fevers.

Reflecting this view, he wrote, "the terms of

bilious remittent, yellow and typhus, applied to the fevers
seen in New Orleans, in the months of August and September,
more properly designate certain conditions of the system
produced by a common cause, or rather, certain stages of
some general disease, than they do the existence of dis
eases altogether separate and distinct. . . . "

In one

case he had witnessed all the various types of fever
exhibited in one individual during one illness.®®
Dr. Fenner disagreed with Rush and others who had
classified yellow fever as the highest grade of bilious

79ibid., I (July, 1844), 7-11, 23-24.
80 n . 0.

& Surg. Jour., VI (July, 1849), 48.
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fever, for he had observed occasions when ordinary bilious
fever displayed an even more malignant quality than yellow
fever without exhibiting the hemorrhagic tendency which
characterized the yellow form.

To attribute the varied

forms of fever to modifications of one basic cause was,
in his opinion, "certainly a more rational supposition
than to attribute the various types of concomitant fever
to the 8imultaneous action of separate distinct and speci
fic c a u s e s Addressing himself to those who considered
yellow fever a distinct disease, Fenner asked, "If you
maintain that one of these types (yellow fever) is a dis
ease sui generis, why not contend for the same in respect
to intermittent, typhus, typhoid, remittent, bilious, con
gestive, malignant, pernicious, ephemeral, continued,
gastric and solar fever . . .

In the Sanitary Commission Report on the epidemic
of 1853, Dr. Edward H. Barton stated that bilious, inter
mittent, and yellow fevers had been observed to "run into
each other" and that the blending of symptoms' had occurred

SlErasmus Darwin Fenner (ed.). Southern Medical
Reports (2 vols.. New Orleans, 1849-1850), I, 111-13.
GZlbid., II, 85.
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frequently in the same individual.

Many cases began with

the symptoms of intermittent or remittent fever, he de
clared, and ultimately assumed the yellow fever form and
terminated in black vomit and hemorrhagic activity.

Other

cases which early exhibited the signs of yellow fever
terminated favorably as intermittent fever.

Barton at

tributed the convertibility of fevers to the varying con
centration of the same basic cause as well as the differ
ing degrees of individual susceptibility.

The epidemic of

1853 had settled once and for all, as far as he was con
cerned, the disputed question of the identity of bilious
and yellow fever.
The issue might have been settled for Dr. Barton,
but it was by no means settled for all others.

Several

medical men writing in the 1850's indicated a belief in
yellow fever's separate and distinct nature.

Dr. A. J. F.

Cartier, in a study of yellow fever in New Orleans, called
attention to what he considered certain fundamental differ
ences between yellow fever and the intermittent fevers:
Yellow fever conferred lasting immunity after one attack;

83Barton, Cause and Prevention of Yellow Fever,
113-14.
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the others did not.

Although it seemed that the diseases

sometimes intermingled, yellow fever always disappeared as
winter approached, while the other fevers did not seem to
be so clearly affected by the season.

Yellow fever ex

hibited a different pattern of chills and fever, a continu
ed type rather than intermittent.

It was clearly evident

to Cartier that yellow fever was distinguished from all
other fevers by its own essential characteristics, includ
ing yellowness, passive hemorrhage, and black vomit,
symptoms not occurring together in any other fever known.
Others in the 1850's who argued that yellow fever
constituted a specific disease with a specific cause,
separate from all the others, were Drs, T. A. Cooke of
Washington, Louisiana,85 W. J. Tuck of
James Jones of New
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Dr. Cooke maintained that

"the time is approaching when many diseases now assembled
into one group or family, considered mere modifications of

84cartier,

Filvre Jaune de la Nouvelle-Orleans.

2-5.
85 n . 0. M e d . & Surg. Jour., X (March, 1854), 625.
86ibid., XI (September, 1854), 175-84.
87Ibid., XV (July, 1858), 500-17.
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a type, having a presumed identity of causes and similarity
if not idéntity of nature, will take separate and distinct
places in nosology.”®®

In foreseeing the ultimate break

down of symptom-complexes into distinct diseases with
specific causes. Dr. Cooke was in the stream of modern
medical science.
From the mid-nineteenth century onward, as medical
science advanced with every-increasing rapidity, the ap
proach to an investigation of yellow fever became more
methodical, quantitative, technical, and concrete--less
argumentative, dogmatic, speculative, and abstract.

In

stead of wandering through the maze of nebulous concepts
and loose generalizations, some medical thinkers began to
delve into the particulars.
For example. Dr. Joseph Jones undertook a number of
painstaking post-mortem examinations of yellow fever victims
in Charity Hospital in the early 1870's.

With the aid of

the microscope, he made intensive studies of the blood,
black vomit, urine, heart, brains, lungs, liver, spleen,
and kidneys of the patients who died.

He filled a research

notebook with close descriptions of the cases, their

®®Ibid., X (March, 1834), 623.
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symptoms, comparative results of autopsies, and urinalyses,
as well as.drawings of the various organ tissues under
microscopic view.89
Dr. Jones felt that a systematic investigation of
this nature was necessary to extend the boundaries of
knowledge relating to "this terrible scourge of tropical
and sub-tropical America."

Not until crude observations

and hasty generalizations had been replaced by careful,
accurate, quantitative and comparative analysis could
yellow fever's effects on the various organs of the body
be understood.

Realizing the importance of this kind of

research, Jones set out on the path of scientific investi
gation and inquiry which was attracting more and more
interest and attention in the latter nineteenth century.90
From his study of specific pathological features, he con
cluded that yellow fever "differs essentially from the
different forms of Malarial fever. . . ."9^

Since the

89«Yellow Fever Research Notebook, 1870-1872,"
Joseph Jones Papers (Louisiana State University Archives,
Baton Rouge); N, 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., New Series, IV
(September, 1876), 159-165.
90”Composition and Character of the Urine in YellowFever," Joseph Jones Papers.
91"Yellow Fever Research Notbeook, 1870-1872," Joseph
Jones Papers, 5-6.
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diagnostic confusion of fevers resulted mainly from the
similarity of superficial symptoms, a probing beneath the
surface disclosed certain positive symptomatic differences
and thereby provided a basis for differentiating one dis
ease from another.

.

Another Louisiana physician, Jean Charles Faget,
Investigated the specific action of yellow fever In rela
tion to the patient's pulse and temperature, and In the
early 1870's set forth the principle which came to be known
as "Paget's Law,"

That principle Is still cited today In

modern medical works as a basic diagnostic sign of the dis
ease.

In the New Orleans epidemic of 1870 and the Memphis

epidemic of 1873, Dr. Faget studied the behavior of the
pulse and temperature In a great number of cases and found
that the pulse rate did not speed up with the ascent of
the temperature, as In other fevers, but Instead gradually
fell as the temperature rose.

This phenomenon, he con

tended, was one of the best diagnostic signs for detecting
yellow fever In Its early stages.

Faget also argued that

this peculiar sign demonstrated the specific nature of
yellow fever as a disease separate and distinct from all
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Other observers had noticed the diver

gence between the pulse rate and the temperature (that is,
g o

the falling pulse in conjunction with the rising fever),
but until Faget no one had systematically charted the rela
tion between the two indications or formulated a clear
principle to be followed in diagnosis and prognosis.

His

work represents a forward leap in scientific observation
as well as a lasting contribution to medical theory and
practice.

Faget's distinguishing principle also provided

convincing evidence in favor of the specificity of yellow
fever.

In 1878 the members of the Orleans Parish Medical
Society voted on several long disputed questions regarding
the yellow pestilence.

Although no unanimity existed on

any one position, the majority agreed that yellow fever
was a specific disease caused by a microorganism and hence

92Jean Charles Faget, Monographie sur le Type et
la Spécificité de la Filvre Jaune, Etablis avec l'Aide de
la Montre et du Thermomètre (Nouvelle-Orleans, 1875); N,
0. Med. & Surg. Jour., New Series, I (September, 1873),
145-68.

93i)urac, De 1^ Fièvre Jaune, 65; Cartier, ^ Filvre
Jaune de la Nouvelle-Orléans, 7; N. 0. Med. & Surg. Jour.,
LI (July, 1898), 56.
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not Interchangeable with any other fevers.*4

As the germ

theory became more and more widely accepted, the abandon
ment of the monistic theory of fevers followed as a natural
corollary.
behind.

Nevertheless, there were always some who lagged

In an address before the New Orleans Academy of

Sciences in December of 1879, Dr. U. R. Milner paraded
forth all the traditional conceptions of yellow fever's
nature, causation, and transmission.

Neither imported nor

contagious, the fever was indigenous to the area, he insist
ed, and spread by "infectious gases" generated from animal
and vegetable effluvia.

Further, Dr. Milner asserted,

"The true yellow fever is the topmost grade in a regular
ascension from the simplest intermittent. . .
Not until yellow fever had been banished from the
land by the great crusade of 1905 and by other preventive

9^N. 0. M e d . & Surg. Jour., New Series, VI (Septem
ber, 1878), 240-55.
95u. R. Milner, Yellow Fever, not imported, nor Con
tagious , but Indigenous, and Intrinsically Identical with
our Paludal Fevers. Preventable by Well Determined an?
Wisely Executed Local Sanitary Measures. Quarantine a
Wide-spread Calamity and Should no longer be Tolerated. A
Lecture before the Academy of Sciences of New Orleans . . .
1879 (Miscellaneous Publications on Yellow Fever in Louisi
ana and Adjoining States, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library,
New Orleans), 3-18, 22, 26.
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measures based on the mosquito doctrine, not until then
was there anything resembling universal agreement on the
nature, causation, and transmission of what was probably
the most controversial disease in all medical history.
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CHAPTER VIII

THEORY AND CONTROVERSY;

SUSCEPTIBILITY,

ACCLIMATION, AND IMMUNITY

As if the questions regarding yellow fever's nature,
causation, and transmission were not enough to confound
and perplex the truthseekers frcnn the late eighteenth cen
tury until the early twentieth century, several other
issues arose in connection with the activity of that seem
ingly unpredictable disease.

Why did certain persons and

groups exhibit greater and lesser degrees of suscepti
bility to yellow fever than others?

Did acclimation, that

is, becoming accustomed to the climate of the extreme
South, carry with it immunity to the Saffron Scourge?

Or

could immunity be acquired only by living through an
attack of the disease?

What roles did age, race, sex,

nationality, or economic class play in determining degrees
of susceptibility?

As usual, with so many variables and

unknowns involved in the problem, it was exceedingly dif
ficult to settle upon one precise equation which would
invariably account for all the facts,

364
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Beginning with the first recorded yellow fever epi
demic in New Orleans in 1796, observers noticed the
obvious preference cf the disease for newcomers to the area.
In the many epidemics which followed, the Creole (that is,
native) inhabitants as well as those persons who had re
sided in New Orleans for a number of years always seemed
less liable to attack, while the strangers were repeatedly
swept off in great numbers.

Both Baron Joseph Xavier

Pontalba and Governor William C, C, Claiborne in writing
about the early epidemics in New Orleans continually re
iterated the extraordinary susceptibility of strangers to
the disease.

Undoubtedly, the tendency of the time to

relate climate and disease, together with the obvious sus
ceptibility of persons recently having moved from a cooler
climate into the subtropical heat and humidity of New
Orleans, led to the belief that the "unacclimated strang
er" was more prone to yellow fever attack than the native
or the acclimated simply because he was not yet accustomed
to the climate.
In discussing the scourge of New Orleans, BerquinDuvallon, French traveler in Louisiana in 1802, observed
that among the inhabitants of New Orleans the Americans
were yellow fever's principal objects of attack, while
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the French were less susceptible and the Spanish almost
not at all.

He noted that the Spaniard was accustomed

already to a warm climate, but the American, coming from
a colder climate, had his veins "copiously" filled with
blood and therefore suffered from the intense heat which
rendered him more "susceptible of inflammation and cor
ruption."

Furthermore, Berquin-Duvallon asserted that

the Spaniard lived a more temperate existence than the
American who "revels on succulent meats, and spices, and
has often the bottle or glass to his mouth."

These

reasons, he believed, would go far in determining why the
disease proved so fatal to Americans, only slightly dis
turbed the French, and gave the Spanish almost no trouble
at all.l
After the purchase of Louisiana by the United
States in 1803, more and more Americans poured into the
Crescent City; and as yellow fever paid its annual visits
and periodically raged in epidemic form, the recently
arrived Americans continued to furnish the great preponder
ance of victims.

In 1817 Dr. Jabez Heustis, like Berquin-

Duvallon, noted that yellow fever occurred more frequently

^Berquin-Duvallon, Travels, 116.
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among the Americans than among the French,

To account for

this phenomenon, he emphasized the difference in their
attitudes toward temperance and sobriety.

While the French

drank wine, the American consumed great quantities of dis
tilled spirits, on the incorrect assumption, said Heustis,
that hard liquor was necessary "to preserve them against
the fogs, damps, and sickly vapours of the climate."

Dr.

Heustis also attributed American susceptibility to their
excessive use of animal food, especially when it was
likely to be in a partially spoiled condition.^
As the population of New Orleans became increasing
ly American in the first few decades of the nineteenth
century and as the tide of European immigration began to
flow into the population, yellow fever continued to ex
hibit a marked tendency to attack those persons, whether
American or European, who had only recently arrived in
New Orleans.

Sometimes yellow fever was even called the

stranger's disease or the acclimating disease, and the
term acclimation itself acquired a rather ambiguous mean
ing.

Apparently, a person might be considered acclimated

if he were a native or long-resident New Orleanian,

^Heustis, Physical Observations, 113.
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supposedly adjusted to the climate without ever having
experienced an attack of the disease; or one might become
acclimated by surviving a case of yellow fever.

Summarizing current opinion on susceptibility, ac
climation, and immunity to yellow fever in the 1840's,
Dr. John Harrison, Professor of Physiology and Pathology
in the Medical College of Louisiana, stated that yellow
fever attacked "only strangers, those born in the city
being perfectly exempt from the disease, though it is
still a question whether they do not pass through it in
infancy."

Creoles living outside New Orleans and unac

customed to the disease, he declared, were as liable to
attack as Northerners or Europeans when coming into an
area where yellow fever prevailed.

On the other hand,

persons coming to New Orleans from localities where yellow
fever was common seemed to enjoy immunity.

Those who

lived through a violent epidemic without contracting the
disease were considered "fully acclimated," but, he assert
ed, passing through a mild epidemic without being affected
was no guarantee of immunity.

And persons recovering from

a case of fever were said to be acclimated, that is, im
mune to further attack; however, he maintained that even
such immunity acquired through an attack was not always
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positive since second attacks, although rare, had been
O

known to occur.

Dr. Harrison also pointed out that yellow

fever in Negroes and in children was ordinarily mild and
seldom fatal,^
Although the explanations advanced by different phy
sicians to account for the observed phenomena were often
contradictory, the broad outlines of susceptibility and
immunity were fairly clear and largely agreed upon by both
physicians and laymen in nineteenth-century New Orleans.
Nevertheless, there were always exceptions to the general
rules.

In the absence of certainty, it was necessary to

fall back on degrees of probability.

A stranger from the

North or from Europe might reasonably fear for his life; a
native or long-resident New Orleanian who had not, to his
knowledge, experienced the disease, but who had lived
through several yellow fever epidemics, might feel rela
tively safe; but the most secure individual of all was the
person who had passed successfully through an attack of

^Actually, the idea of second attacks was only a
product of mistaken diagnosis; in one of the two supposed
cases a physician had confused some other fever with the
yellow pestilence, because one case of true yellow fever
confers life-long immunity.

^N, 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., II (September, 1845),
130,
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the disease.
Characterizing the confident, self-assured "accli
mated man" in the midst of the dreadful epidemic of 1853,
the editor of the New Orleans Weekly Delta declared:
can tell this man the moment you see him.

"You

He walkb along

the street with a tremendously bold swagger."

Unaffected

by the offensive odors from the filthy streets and gutters,
that brave individual "turns up his nose at nothing but
the unacclimated man . . .

[who goes about] timidly and

nervously recounting the mortality of the previous twentyfour hours.”

To the acclimated fellow, yellow fever was a

'*mere nothing"; in fact, it was "rather a pleasure to have
it than not, it results in such a splendid appetite when
you get over i t U n d o u b t e d l y ,

the confidence which came

from acclimation, in the sense of Immunity, helps to ex
plain the New Orleanian's tendency to discount the severity
of epidemics and to insist that New Orleans was not really
an unhealthy city.
Seemingly, many persons believed that a case of
yellow fever, if one lived through it, conferred certain
praiseworthy advantages.

In July of 1853 Clarissa Town

5n o w Orleans Weekly Delta, August 7, 1853
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of West Baton Rouge Parish wrote in her diary that although
there were many cases of yellow fever in New Orleans, "It
is not as much feared in the City as Congestive Typhus, or
shipfever, for it only requires gentle medicines and good
care, when taken in time to insure recovery, and then the
system is invigorated by it and the health is usually
better after than b e f o r e . A member of the New Orleans
Howard Association in 1853 also maintained that a yellow
fever patient, if cured of the disease, then enjoyed "im
munity not only from all fevers, but from the rheumatisms
and complaints generally of the nervous system," Believing
this principle confirmed by his years of observation, he
comforted a sick friend with the thought that "a success
ful issue was a safeguard against all other ills indigenous
to a southern l a t i t u d e . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , over 8,000
persons in the New Orleans epidemic of 1833 did not sur
vive to enjoy those supposed benefits of good health and
an invigorated system.

^Clarissa E. Leavitt Town, Diary (Louisiana State
University Archives, Baton Rouge), July 21, 1853, p. 202,
^Robinson, Diary of a Samaritan, 61, 88; see also
New Orleans Weekly Delta, July 24, 1853.
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Persons coming to the Crescent City to live must
have looked forward with some measure of dread to the
"acclimating fever," yet at the same time they hoped that
they might have an attack, recover, and settle the matter
once and for all.

A young man in New Orleans wrote his

Philadelphia cousin in September of 1847, "It is with
great pleasure that I am able to tell you with certainty,
that both [brother] Dick & I are acclimated,"

The epi

demic had been severe that summer, he remarked, and "I
knew that we were running some risk by remaining here dur
ing the sickly season, but as we expect to reside here
altogether, it was much better to get through with it at
once, . ,

Further, he mentioned that they had not been

extremely fearful of death from the disease, since yellow
fever when treated in time was not as deadly as many
believed.

Already weakened by a previous attack of "the

Chills & Fever" (malaria), his brother had "a very hard
time of it," but "My attack was just sufficient to answer
all purposes of Acclimation," he said, and "I feel strong
as ever."®

®Isaac H, Charles to John Edward Siddall, September
18, 1847, Isaac H, Charles Letters (Louisiana State Uni
versity Archives, Baton Rouge).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

373
This letter must have provoked a sharp response
from the cousin in Philadelphia regarding the subject of
health in New Orleans, for young Isaac Charles, the newly
acclimated New Orleanian, felt it necessary in his next
letter northward to defend his adopted city with as much
patriotism as any native.

"As for our Fevers Ned, I must

beg of you to speak of them in a more respectful manner.
You seem to place your 'City of Brotherly love,' against
or rather before, our beloved 'Crescent,' as regards
health--But there I think you are wrong," he contended.
Actually, the Philadelphian was right; New Orleans suffer
ed an annual mortality rate far above that in the City of
Brotherly Love.

Nevertheless, Isaac Charles, like all

good New Orleanians, proceeded to set forth the usual
pattern of argument.

Within a six-year period, he declar

ed, from 1842 to 1847, only one yellow fever epidemic had
occurred, and he believed the total mortality for that sixyear period in New Orleans was probably no greater than
that in Philadelphia during the same time.

Furthermore,

New Orleans suffered a sickly season only about once every
six or seven years; "And besides--the Yellow Fever is not
so terrible a disease after all."

At this point, young

Charles introduced a line of defense which recurs
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throughout the period of yellow fever's prevalence in
Louisiana, a notion involving some degree of class con
sciousness.

He admitted that the disease carried off great

numbers of persons, "but by far the greater part of the
victims are the Irish & the Dutch, who have just arrived
from a country where the Climate is totally different to
ours -- And if you could accompany me thro' some parts of
this place," he continued, "& see the miserable, filthy,
loathsome manner in which the lower orders live, you would
not be at all surprised, that when a fever once broke out,
that it should spread & become as malignant as it does
here.”

He then described a portion of the citÿ with its

^long ranges of one story frame houses" which gàve off
such a "stench" that one could hardly stand to walk near
the area.

This section of New Orleans, he declared, was

crowded with "the lower order of men, women & children--a
set of rumdrinking, fighting people,"

After closing his

letter, the snobbish young New Orleanian decided to write
an additional page describing the better aspects of the
city such as the areas "inhabited by very respectable
people."9

This inclination to blame the high mortality

9lbid., November

18,

1 8 4 7 .
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rate from yellow fever in New Orleans on the lower orders
of society, particularly the recently arrived European im
migrants, was a typical theme in the writings of many
observers.

Some New Orleanians seem to have considered epi
demics as providential instruments for keeping down the
numbers of undesirables in the population.

In a discussion

calling attention to the pressing need for sanitary reform
in the Crescent City, the editor of the New Orleans Medical
and Surgical Journal in 1845 declared that he was "aware of
the opinions of some narrow-minded and selfish individuals,
that our city is already too healthy, and that nothing but
frequent and severe epidemics can keep off the million who
are eager to come here, and who, they say, would divide
and fritter away the business of the place until it would
be worth nothing to any one,"

Nevertheless, the editor

did not believe these opinions were held by "the liberal
and philanthropic members of the medical profession, nor,
we trust of our enlightened councilmen."

On the contrary,

he suggested that business and prosperity would grow with
an increasing population.^®

IOn . 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., II (November, 1845),
397-98.
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Those who favored the periodic occurrence of epi
demics to clear away a portion of the unwelcome strangers
and lower classes probably constituted a very small minor
ity in New Orleans.

But almost every commentator on yellow

fever, whether a newspaper editor, a physician, or a layman
writing a letter, associated the origin and prevalence of
the disease and its most fatal effects with the lower
orders of society and their filthy living habits.

Even

when the disease leaped across the socio-economic bound
aries and attacked members of all classes, the chances for
recovery seemed to increase in proportion to one's status.
One observer of the epidemic of 1847 wrote, "It [yellow
fever] attacks indiscriminately but proves fatal to but
few except the dissipated and filthy -- Nine tenths of the
funerals that have been seen by the writer within a fort
night were Irish.

These die as a matter of course.

Dr. Erasmus Darwin Fenner pointed out that the poor
classes suffered more than others, not only from yellow
fever, but from all kinds of fevers.

In a superior tone

reflecting the attitude of his social order. Dr. Fenner

^Bartlett for Smith & Bro. to T. Smith & Co.,
August 12, 1847, T. Smith and Company Papers (Louisiana
State University Archives, Baton Rouge).
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declared, "No one aware of the stupid imprudence and
negligence of the laboring classes can be surprised at the
mortality amongst them.

They receive high wages for their

labour, and having no Idea of economy. It too often causes
their ruin."

On the other hand, the better classes In the

city, according to Fenner, suffered only slightly from any
kind of fever,

After a limited outbreak of yellow fever In 1849,
the editor of the New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal
noted that the disease that season had been "confined
almost exclusively to the laboring and lower class of the
community."

Few In the upper "walks of life" who attended

to the usual "hygienic precautions" suffered an attack.
Did the difference In living habits account for "this pre
ference of the disease for a particular class of persons?"
the editor asked.

Believing this to be the case, he sug

gested that if the social and moral condition of the lower
class could be "ameliorated and raised to a level with the
better class of our citizens, the yellow fever would seldom
visit our city."

As additional evidence for his argument,

the editor observed that even among the unacclimated

12n , 0. M e d . & Surg. Jour., V(July, 1848), 52-53.
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strangers having recently arrived in the city, the "respect
able portion" of that group had been relatively untouched
10

by the disease.
Defending New Orleans against the charge of insalu
brity, one New Orleans physician. Dr. J, S, McFarlane,
became rather vehement in blaming the situation on the
strangers.

Except during epidemic seasons, which did not

affect the residents at all, he claimed. New Orleans
enjoyed unusually good health.

Not only were the strang

ers responsible for New Orleans' reputation for bad
health, but also its reputation for immorality.

"Every

evil with which we have to contend," declared Dr, McFar
lane, "is introduced by strangers.

Go and survey the

seats of impurity, -- who are their conductors?
their occupants?
quenters?

who

who their supporters, and who their fre

Strangers; who periodically visit this city."

It was the "floating population," the temporary residents,
that he blamed for swelling the lists of crime and disease
in the Crescent City and for causing the smear on the
city's good name.

Dr. McFarlane felt it was high time

that New Orleanians "fix the charge of vice and insalubrity

13lbid., VI (November, 1849), 407-409.
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where it properly belongs— on those who, coming temporarily
among us . . . indulge . . .

in every evil propensity and

passion, until they are overtaken by those retributive dis
eases which have been ordained as the punishment of vice
and immorality."14

whether he came with the intention of

residing temporarily or permanently, whether his filthy
living habits and his intemperance provoked the fever by
natural law, or his ungodliness and immorality brought
down divine retribution upon his head, the stranger, the
newcomer to New Orleans, most frequently received the
blame for the high mortality and severe epidemics which
blackened the city's reputation.
Richard Shryock in Medicine and Society has noted
that the public reaction to any disease varies according
to the nature of the disease as well as the class of persons
most generally affected.

Those ailments mainly affecting

the poor, particularly the endemic diseases, were largely
taken for granted and aroused little public concern.

But,

according to Shryock, an epidemic disease like yellow
fever which spread in a mysterious manner with terrible
and fatal effects, and which affected the upper classes as

^4m *Farlane, A Review of the Yellow Fever, viii.
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well as the lower, and whites even more than Negroes, was
certain to create a strong public r e a c t i o n . I n areas
where yellow fever was not an annual occurrence, the dis
ease was particularly terrifying and caused a great up
roar among all classes whenever it did strike.

New

Orleans, however, represents an exceptional situation.
For many years in that city yellow fever was so common an
occurrence that it was taken for granted.

Furthermore,

circumstances provided some basis for the view that it was
a disease of the lower classes.
While yellow fever never became fully endemic
because of the winter season which temporarily curtailed
the activity of the yellow fever mosquito and broke the
chain of causation, for over a half-century the disease
seems to have been re-introduced every single year, so
that it became the next thing to an endemic malady.

Under

these circumstances the children of New Orleans had ample
opportunity to contract a case of the fever and recover
from the mild unrecognized attack with lifetime protection
of full immunity.

Hence, in the Crescent City yellow

ISRichard Harrison Shryock, Medicine and Society in
America, 1660-1860 (New York, 1960), 93-94.
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fever did not present the same pattern of indiscriminate
activity that it did in areas where it was less common,
and native or long-resident New Orleanians always enjoyed
a noticeable exemption from the disease which mowed down
the newcomers.
As yellow fever almost always raged first in the
slum areas along the waterfront after its introduction in
the shipping, it seemed logical to relate that disease to
the unhygienic living conditions of the lower classes
living in those run-down areas.

Sometimes the pestilence

crossed the social boundaries and spread among the wellto-do; but even when this situation developed, the fever
seemed less severe among the upper strata of society,
undoubtedly because the wealthier patients sought medical
attention immediately and obtained the best possible nurs
ing care, while the daily laborers forced themselves to
continue the business of earning a living until it was
often too late for any treatment to suffice.
At any rate, the well-established New Orleanian,
generally confident of his immunity to the yellow pesti
lence, tended to dismiss the scourge of New Orleans as the
disease of strangers and the laboring classes.

This at

titude probably accounts for the years of disinterest in
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preventive measures.

In the latter half of the nineteenth

century when the Crescent City enjoyed a number of years
of complete exemption from the disease and the pestilence
became a less familiar phenomenon, the native born indi
vidual, having missed the opportunity to acquire immunity
through a mild case in childhood, found himself in young
adulthood as susceptible as the immigrant.

Then the New

Orleanian began to take more cognizance of the disease
which was discovered after all to be no respector of
persons.
That New Orleans Creoles exhibited an apparent im
munity to yellow fever was a clearly observed phenomenon;
why they did so was not a matter of certainty.

In the

1850’s and 1860's the question of Creole immunity flared
into a full-fledged controversy.

Before the epidemic of

1853 the New Orleans medical profession almost unanimously
believed that persons born in New Orleans and gradually
acclimated to the meteorological influences were not liable
to yellow fever.

But a few medical men had come to

believe that Creole children did experience the disease in
cases so mild as to escape diagnosis.
During the epidemic of 1858 the editor of the New
Orleans Medical News and Hospital Gazette declared that
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the Idea of Creole exemption from yellow fever was .a
fallacious notion which should have been set aside after
the considerable number of cases and deaths among Creoles
in 1853.

But that doctrine was still generally accepted,

he observed; and although Creole children were dying
daily of fever exhibiting yellowness, black vomit, and
the other obvious symptoms of the disease during the
epidemic of 1858, the malady among those children was
called pernicious fever simply because of the firm belief
that Creoles could not have yellow fever,
That epidemic disease among Creole children in
1858 set off a lively discussion among the French phy
sicians in New Orleans, with Dr. Charles Faget and Dr.
Charles Delery representing the two opposing views.

Dr.

Faget insisted that both Creoles and Negroes were immune
to yellow fever and that the fever among them, sometimes
incorrectly diagnosed as yellow fever, was actually
"fievre paludeene.”

On the other hand, Dr. Delery con

tended that neither Creoles nor Negroes were ipso facto
exempt from the disease.

The discussion of the issue grew

^^N. 0. Med. News & Hosp. Gaz., V (October, 1858),
553.
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more and more heated in tone, with physicians throughout
the city joining one side or the other and writing spirit
ed articles in the medical journals and the newspapers.
Eventually, the personal element in the debate between the
leading contenders became so intense that Delery challeng
ed Faget to a duel.

Declaring himself a Christian, Faget

refused to accept the challenge.

If the average man had

turned down a fight to the finish on such grounds, he
might have been considered a coward, but not Dr. Faget,
who was noted for being religious to the point of fanaticism.
Still the controversy persisted.

After the epi

demic of 1867, the next severe visitation after that of

1858, Dr. Delery wrote a book with the intention of des
troying the prejudice in favor of Creole immunity.

His

opposition to the traditional view in 1858 had only been
reinforced by further observations.

Explaining how the

tradition had begun, he pointed out that time after time
in epidemics, while strangers had borne the chief burden
of the pestilence, attacks among Creoles had been exceed
ingly rare.

Finally, the conclusion had been drawn that

l^Edward Larocque Tinker, Pen, Pills, and Pistols,
A Louisiana Chronicle (New York, 1934), 7.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

385
Creoles were ioxmune.

Therefore, when a disease resembling

yellow fever occurred In Creole children, IC was called
malignant, putrid, or ataxic fever--anything else but
yellow fever.

The tradition had long been sustained by

prejudice, he contended, a powerful prejudice which made
of the Creole families a privileged class.

And, he under

stood why It was extremely difficult to destroy a belief
so dear to those among the supposedly privileged class.
But Dr. Delery described a number of cases, carefully
bolstered his argument with Irrefutable facts, and once
again concluded that, contrary to the opinion of Dr.
Faget, yellow fever did occur among Creole children.^®

In 1880 Dr. Stanford Challle wrote an article for
the New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal In which he
discussed the problem of Creole immunity, and with ad
ditional evidence obtained In Cuba, argued that yellow
fever attacked native born children as well as newcomers
in an area where the disease occurred endemlcally or
regularly.

By 1880 this view was generally accepted by

l®Françols Charles Delery, Mémoire sur l'ËpIdémIe
de Fl&vre Jaune, qui a Régné à
Nouvelle-Orleans et dans
les Campagnes pendant l'Année 1867 (Nouvelle-Orléans,
1867), 111-lv, 7-10, 94.
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the medical profession in New Orleans, except for Drs.
Charles Faget and Armand Mercier who still clung to the
traditional belief in Creole immunity by virtue of birth.
C h a î n é explained the change of opinion in this manner :
. until 1858, New Orleans was ravaged by almost bien
nial epidemics, while since 1858 there have been only two
serious invasions, in 1867 and 1878.

The longer the

intervals between epidemics, the larger necessarily must
be the number of those who have failed to acquire immunity,
and the more glaring becomes their liability to the dis
ease."

Wherever the fever occurred only occasionally, the

Creoles seemed as open to attack as anyone else; but where
the fever occurred regularly, Creole adults seemed gener
ally exempt from the disease, obviously because they had
acquired immunity by mild attacks in childhood.

In con

clusion, Dr. Chaille rejected once and for all the old
notion that becoming accustomed to the climate conferred
any degree of immunity.

He felt it was "an abuse of

language" to refer to yellow fever immunity as acclimation
--two different things altogether
Another question relating to susceptibility arose

0, Me d . & Surg. Jour., New Series, VIII
(August, 1880), 11, 114, 122.
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in regard to the noticeable preponderance of yellow fever
deaths among men over those among women.

Naturally, these

circumstances led some to believe that women possessed a
kind of Inherent resistance to yellow fever simply on the
basis of sex.

One explanation suggested that while women

were confined largely to their homes, men by their dally
occupations were exposed to the harsh elements of the
weather and to more numerous opportunities for contracting
the yellow fever poison as they circulated about the city
and experienced dally contacts with ^ variety of persons.
Furthermore, It was postulated that men were more sus
ceptible to the fever than women because they were univer
sally more reckless and Intemperate In their living
habits.20
In the 1850's Dr. Elisha Bartlett In his History of
the Diagnosis and Treatment of the Fevers of the United
States noted that yellow fever destroyed more males than
females, but felt that further Investigation was required
before one could state definitely that the sexes really
possessed a different degree of susceptibility.

That more

men than women died In yellow fever epidemics proved

20picayune, September 9, 1867.
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nothing regarding a partial immunity of females, he con
tended,^ since the number of males exposed to the disease
was always greater than females.

The major portion of the

mortality always occurred among the stranger population in
a city, and among immigrants, men always greatly outnumber
ed women.

And although the incidence of male deaths from

yellow fever in the port cities exceeded the female mor
tality, in several large inland cities, away from the coast
and with fewer strangers and sailors, the female fatalities
from yellow fever had at times been the greater,

Bartlett

did not deny absolutely that women were by nature less
susceptible to the disease; he merely wanted to indicate
that mortality figures alone could not warrant such a con
clusion.21

By 1880, on the basis of his research. Dr.

Chaille had concluded that what seemed to be a lesser
degree of susceptibility among women might well be explain
ed by the circumstances of exposure, and that the supposed
resistance of females was thus more apparent than real.

22

Throughout the history of yellow fever the question

2lElisha Bartlett, The History, Diagnosis, and Treatment of the Fevers of the United States (4th ed., Philadel
phia, 1856), 509.
22n , 0, Med. & Surg. Jour., New Series, VIII
(August, 1880), 101-36.
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of the Negro's reaction to the disease has perplexed the
medical profession.

The contrast between yellow fever's

activity in the white and Negro races was so great that
for the first half of the nineteenth century, many
believed that Negroes enjoyed an almost complete immunity
from the disease.

From time to time, however, exceptions

occurred and Negroes did contract observable cases of the
fever, but its effects were almost always exceedingly
mild.

Dr. Erasmus Darwin Fenner in writing of the epi

demic of 1853 stated, "It is a well established fact that
there is some thing in the negro constitution which
affords him protection against the worst effects of Yellow
Fever; but what it is I am unable to say,"

He observed

that the Negro came down with the fever as readily as the
white man, but its action was seldom fatal.

Fenner believ

ed that "the least mixture of the white race with the black
seems to increase the liability of the latter to the
dangers of Yellow Fever; and the danger is in proportion
to the amount of white blood in the mixture.
In 1853 Dr. Samuel A. Cartwright, exponent of a
specialized medical practice designed for the peculiarities

23penner, Epidemic Yellow Fever , 56.
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of the Negro constitution, advanced a rather strange
theory regarding yellow fever in relation to the white and
Negro races.

Classifying the yellow pestilence as a form

of tropical typhus, he was convinced that it resulted from
the violation of nature's laws,

’’Nature scorns to see the

aristocracy of the white skin--the only kind known to
American institutions--reduced to drudgery work under a
Southern sun, and has issued her fiat," Dr. Cartwright con
tended, "that here at least, whether of Celtic or Teutonic
origin they shall not be hewers of wood or drawers of
water, or wallow in the sloughs of intemperance, under
pain of three fourths of their number being cut off."
Furthermore, he insisted, "Until this immutable law, which
has made the white race rulers . . .

be properly respected,

the deaths arising from its violation will continue to
swell the bills of mortality, and to lead the world into
the error that New Orleans is a most sickly location."
Who were the prime sufferers from yellow fever?

None

other than Northern emigrants, said Cartwright, who fell
prey to an artificial complaint of their own creation.
They produced the disease by their intemperate living
habits and their "drudgery" labor in the hot summer sun.
The annual cases of yellow fever in the Crescent City,
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Cartwright claimed, occurred for the most part among those
"unacclimated persons who attempt to jostle the negro from
his stool, and to take from him those outdoor, laborious
employments in the sun, wisely given to him as a precious
inheritance to lift him up from brutish barbarism upon the
platform of civilization, by forcing him to expand his
lungs and oxygenate his blood,
When in 1853 the New York Tribune suggested that
yellow fever was a consequence of slavery, introduced from
Africa by the slave trade, and continually tormenting those
areas where slavery prevailed, the New Orleans Weekly
Delta, in a Cartwrightian vein, countered with the medical
pro-slavery argument and pointed to the extraordinary
exemption of the Negro from the disease.

Considering the

tremendous death rate among the white laboring classes,
the editor wondered at the disastrous results which might
be expected if slave labor were completely replaced by
members of the white race.^^
In August of 1853 the Delta had published an article
signed "Tuckahoe," which might have been written by Dr.

Z^N, 0. Med, & Surg. Jour., X (November, 1853), 31213.
25New Orleans Weekly Delta, October 2, 1853.
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Cartwright himself.

The author intended to correct the

belief then finding support in many quarters that even the
states of the extreme South were "not too hot to be culti
vated by white labor."

He maintained that the large

majority of yellow fever fatalities occurred among that
class of people which put into practice a popular aboli
tionist theory; that is, the white laborers who violated
the laws of nature "in making negroes of themselves by
doing the work in hot noon-day summer sun that negroes
ought to do,"

Such practices were roundly denounced as

"rank poison abolitionism,"

Admitting that those persons

who had Negroes"to perform drudgery work and to fan them"
were not entirely exempt from yellow fever, "Tuckahoe"
contended that they were almost certain to recover from
an attack.

"Slaves and masters rarely die; if they do

it is because they have been practicing on the abolition
theory," which consisted in the masters exposing themselves
to the hot sun and the slaves slipping away from white
supervision.

The lesson to be learned was that Negro

slavery was not a curse, but rather a blessing to both
races in the South.

Finally, "Tuckahoe" suggested that

the most effective quarantine against the yellow pesti
lence would be to prevent the practice of abolitionist
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theories.26

if the "Tuckahoe" article was not authored by

Dr. Cartwright himself, the writer was at any rate ideolo
gically very close to that physician.
Although the epidemic of 1853 affected more Negroes
than any yellow fever epidemic ever had before, Cartwright
continued to support his peculiar theory.

The yellow fever

fatalities among New Orleans Negroes in 1833, he explained,
resulted more from panic than from the disease itself.
"A negro never dies with it [yellow fever] in any locality,
when treated with regard to his ethnical peculiarities;
. . . even under mal-practice," he insisted, "death is the
exception--and recovery, the rule,"2?
In 1854 Dr. M, Morton Dowler attacked Cartwright's
view of a special medical methodology adapted for the
treatment of the Negro.

In his practice during the epi

demic of 1854, Dowler had dealt with five cases of yellow
fever among Negroes.

"I treated them without reference

either to free-soilism or the ultraism of . . . Dr. Cart
wright, who, whatever he may expect from the laity, cannot
expect any medical man, be he fire-eater, unionist or

26lbid., August 14, 1853.
27 n . 0. M e d . & Surg. Jour., XV (March, 1858), 150.
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abolitionist, to swallow his paradoxes with regard to
negroes."

Describing one case of yellow fever in a Negro

woman whom he had treated "on the same principles I would
have treated a golden-haired daughter of Japhet," he
claimed that she had responded rather well and had exhibit
ed no ill effects from "white folks' diet" or the other
OQ

usual treatment for Caucasians.
When in the epidemic of 1867 a considerable number
of Negroes experienced yellow fever attacks, the editor of
the New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal commented on
that phenomenon as an unusual characteristic of the epi
demic, "following the solitary precedent of 1853,"
Further, mixing a bit of politics with pathology, he
declared, "We infer that this is one of the civil rights
conferred on that fortunate class by the late enlightened
Congress, of which they are already availing themselves."^9
Whether the mildness of yellow fever exhibited in
Negroes was based on a genuine or only an apparent im
munity was a question which continued to intrigue the
medical thinker.

After the epidemic of 1905, Dr. Charles

28ibid., XI (November, 1854), 375.
29ibid., XX (September, 1867), 286.
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Chassalgnac of New Orleans concluded that the evidence of
that epidemic clearly indicated that Negroes were as sus
ceptible to the disease as whites, although as a rule they
experienced only a mild form of the fever.

He cited the

mortality statistics from the vicinity of Tallulah, Louisi
ana, to support his conclusion.

In that area, of ninety

white cases, eighteen died, or about twenty per cent; of
950 Negro cases, only five died, or about one-half of one
per cent.

In the neighborhood of Patterson, Louisiana, of

about 500 white cases, fifty-one died, but of the 200
Negro cases, only one died.

Attempting to account for the

racial difference, Dr. Chassaignac set forth the possibi
lity of a greater resistance, by the Negro to the yellow
fever poison after it entered the system; but he was more
inclined to believe that the Negro actually received a
lesser dose of the infection in the first place because he
was bitten less by the mosquito.

"This may be due to his

tougher skin," the doctor speculated, "or to the strong
musky smell coming from his surface which may keep the
mosquitoes away in a way analagous to that of pennyroyal
and other strong scents which are used with that end
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in vleWo’*^®
Even in the mid-twentieth century the existence of
a partial Immunity based on race has not been settled
absolutely.

It has been suggested, however, that the

Negro's reaction to the disease is what one might expect
to develop in a race exposed to yellow fever for countless
generations.

In fact, the mild and seldom fatal form of

the disease in the Negro is one point in the argument for
Africa as yellow fever's place of origin.

During the

course of any yellow fever epidemic, the disease has
always evidenced a considerable amount of variation in the
severity of its effects on individuals, regardless of the
race factor.

The reasons for this variability cannot be

explained completely even today.
At any rate, there was an obvious susceptibility
on the part of immigrants recently having come into the
yellow fever locality, not because they were unaccustomed
to the climate, but because they had not been previously
exposed to the malady.

Native or long-resident inhabitants.

^Ocharles Chassaignac, "Some Lessons Taught by the
Epidemic of 1905," in Augustin, History of Yellow Fever,
1054-55.
S^Trent (ed.), "The Men Who Conquered Yellow Fever,"
loc. cit., 85.
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on the other hand, exhibited a striking immunity by con
trast, not because they were acclimated, but because many
or most had experienced mild, undiagnosed cases at some
previous time, probably as children.

The connection be

tween the lower classes and the prevalence and severity of
the disease so often proposed by yellow fever theorists
had a very real basis, but not for the reasons generally
assumed by the upper class medical and lay philosophers-not because the Saffron Scourge was a class-conscious dis
ease , nor because the Almighty sent down the plague upon
the unclean, intemperate, and immoral portions of the
population.

But the slum areas were located near the

waterfront, and the laboring classes who worked on the
docks were most likely to contract the first cases of
yellow fever after its initial introduction by vessels
coming from Latin America.

Also, the laborers were more

likely to ignore the beginning symptoms of illness and to
keep working until the disease became so far advanced that
by the time they sought medical aid, it was frequently too
late.

Nevertheless, those of the well-to-do classes of

New Orleans, if not immune by prior attack, were just as
susceptible to yellow fever when bitten by an infected
mosquito as the lowest man on the socio-economic scale.
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Although the pattern of yellow fever’s activity at
times seemed to bolster the Creole's idea of himself as a
member of a privileged immune class, and to tie in with
pro-slavery, class consciousness, and opposition to im
migration, the erratic behavior of the disease may be
attributed primarily to circumstantial factors, in addition
to the likelihood of a racial resistance on the part of the
Negro.

But to the nineteenth-century theorist, the related

problems of susceptibility, immunity, and acclimation
simply furnished more issues to be debated.

As in all

other questions relating to the disease, some evidence
seemed to indicate a general pattern, but sufficient evi
dence always existed on the opposite side of every issue
to taunt the intellect in its search for the rules of
consistency.
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CHAPTER IX

IMPACT OF EPIDEMIC YELLOW FEVER ON THE
LIFE OF THE COMMUNITY

Directly or Indirectly, epidemic yellow fever
affected virtually every aspect of human affairs within a
conamunity under its influence.

The inexorable march of a

death-dealing epidemic malady against which medical science
seemed helpless could scarcely be ignored by any suscepti
ble individual within its path, and many Louisianians
(particularly in New Orleans) lived and died under the
shadow cast intermittently by the yellow pestilence for
more than a century.
Reactions to the crisis precipitated by an epidemic
in New Orleans and in the interior towns were different in
some respects and similar in others.

In 1854 Dr, T, A.

Cooke of Washington, Louisiana, commented on the differ
ence between city and country attitudes:

"The effect of a

fatal pestilence in towns of the country cannot well be con
ceived by those who have not witnessed it.

It spreads

alarm; the people are panic-stricken; and every death adds
to the consternation, which sweeps over the land."
399
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Ultimately, "every house becomes a barricaded castle," he
said; "then ensues a disruption of the bonds which hold men
together, and for the time society is dissolved."

An epi

demic in the country was not so easily forgotten as in the
city,

"In the country the dead were known to all," Dr.

Cooke declared, "and the remembrance of virtue and merit
is not buried with the mortal remains of the dead."

On the

other hand, the city, after the termination of a destruc
tive visitation, was "like the sea, more tranquil after
the tempest had subsided and the surge ceases to roll."
While the country folk long retained an intense memory of
pestilential terrors and suffering, the large populace of
New Orleans rapidly fell back into the "coldest apathy" and
the past was soon forgotten.^

In the interior rural com

munities, the large majority of victims lost to the pesti
lence were known personally to nearly all the survivors;
in New Orleans, while many persons grieved over lost
friends and family, the thousands of fatalities could
represent little more to the individual than an impersonal
item of mortality statistics.
There were a number of reasons for this difference

^N. 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., X (March, 1854), 603.
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between the Crescent C ty's attitude and that of the
interior communities.

In the first place. New Orleans

experienced frequent visitations of yellow fever, and
fairly early in the nineteenth century had come to accept
the disease as a customary foe.

Many New Orleanians, im

mune to the fever by childhood attacks, or at least
believing themselves "acclimated," felt relatively secure.
But the country towns only suffered occasional outbreaks;
hence, when yellow fever did strike, almost everyone was
fully liable to attack.

The fear of the disease outside

the Crescent City, then, was greatly intensified because
of yellow fever's unfamiliar status.

Furthermore, the

ravages of the fever had a greater personal impact within
the close-knit relationships of families and friends in
rural communities.
Throughout the literature on yellow fever in nine
teenth-century New Orleans, one can find expressions of
this passive acceptance of periodic epidemics.

Probably

this indifference was felt mainly by those who could afford
to be apathetic--the so-called "acclimated" native-born
residents or those who had already experienced an attack of
the fever.

Undoubtedly, there were those remaining in the

city who feared the disease; certainly there were many who
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fled in terror at the approach of an epidemic, as well as
those who journeyed elsewhere each summer before the coming
of the fever.

But those persons who always provided the

bulk of yellow fever's vietims--immigrants, particularly
poor ones--unfortunately were not among the articulate and
active business and civic community.

Therefore, one can

only speculate as to their relative fear or indifference
regarding the pestilence.

Perhaps they were generally

unaware of the scourge of New Orleans, and hence could
suffer no anticipatory terrors.

Perhaps they considered

yellow fever simply one more gamble along with countless
other risks in the uncertainty of their existence.

At any

rate. New Orleans continued to attract large numbers of
immigrants from Europe and other parts of America, and in
spite of its reputation in the early nineteenth century as
the Necropolis of the South, its population increased by
leaps and bounds.
According to one nineteenth-century Louisiana his
torian, yellow fever had no more terrors for New Orleanians
"than had for the ancients the skull which used to figure
among the roses and other luxuries that adorned their
banqueting tables."

Some inhabitants of the Crescent City

even "felt friendly to the scourge," believing that "it
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checked that tide of immigration which, otherwise, would
have speedily rolled its waves over the old population,
and swept away all those landmarks in legislation, cus
toms, language and social habits to which they were fondly
attached."

2

Describing this general indifference displayed in
New Orleans, another nineteenth-century Louisiana writer
noted that the Creole, who as a rule enjoyed immunity,
worried little about the strangers victimized by the
yellow pestilence.
to New Orleans,

After all, nobody asked them to come

As for the American in the Crescent City,

his primary interest was the immediate gain derived from
commercial activity.

And even if the summer brought the

Saffron Scourge, nevertheless, the winter brought trade
O

and prosperity!

In the words of another historian, "the

community was too busy with gainful pursuits to concern
itself much about the fever, which was looked on rather as
an established institution."

Minimizing the importance of

the disease, influential New Orleanians insisted over and
over that the city was an unusually healthy place and

^Gayarre, History of Louisiana, IV, 636.
3Cable, The Creoles of Louisiana, 292,
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that their epidemic fevers affected only the indigent im
migrant and the intemperate,^
During the violent epidemic of 1858, the editor of
the New Orleans Daily Delta remarked that the outsider un
doubtedly would be interested to know that in New Orleans
"Everywhere he would find but comparatively little atten
tion paid to the scourge on the part of the great body of
citizens."

The first announcement of yellow fever in the

city resulted in panic among the unacclimated, and those
able to do so fled the scene.

But, claimed the editor,

the acclimated (in this case, those accustomed to the
climate) felt no fear.

In fact, "they seem to take the

matter as cooly as if it was something expected annually,
and about which it were idle to become alarmed."

That

editor also remarked that it was strange to observe how
quickly those among the unacclimated unable to leave the
city fell into "this prevailing state of indifference.
On one occasion, a Crescent City minister allegedly
commented, "I like the people of New Orleans; they are not
afraid of epidemics, and when they die, do not whine about

^Kendall, History of New Orleans, I, 132-33.
^New Orleans Daily Delta, September 10, 1858.
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it.”

Such a sentiment about such an attitude illustrates

the apathy resulting from the frequency of yellow fever
epidemics during the first half of the nineteenth century.
Pestilential visitations were common, ordinary, expected,
and accepted as apparently unavoidable disasters,^
In spite of the divergent attitudes and reactions
toward the Saffron Scourge exhibited in the Crescent City
and the other towns of Louisiana where the disease was less
common, all epidemics produced certain common effects
regardless of where they occurred.
died everywhere.
cared for.

People suffered and

The sick and their families had to be

The normal channels of trade, travel, and

transportation were disrupted.
ment followed.

Hard times and unemploy

Because of the close economic relationship

between New Orleans and its hinterland, an epidemic in the
Crescent City, whether or not the disease spread inland,
interrupted the flow of crops to New Orleans and supplies
to the interior.
That epidemic yellow fever had serious economic
consequences is unquestionable, although it is impossible
to calculate in terms of dollars and cents the losses

^N. 0. Med. 6t Surg. Jour., New Series, XIV (June,
1887), 920.
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sustained by the business and laboring community.

Almost

every commentator noted the impact of the pestilence on
commercial activity whenever and wherever it occurred.
During severe epidemic visitations, business in New Orleans
slowed to an almost complete standstill.

Many commercial

establishments closed down entirely, or remained open only
during a portion of the day.

Motivated by dread of the

fever, thousands of persons left New Orleans during the
summer, whether or not an epidemic occurred.

Thousands

more fled with the approach of the disease in epidemic
form.

Persons in the interior were afraid to go anywhere

near the plague-stricken city until the coming of frost,^
Official or unofficial quarantine, which inevitably
resulted, hindered the shipment of products to and from
New Orleans,

Most country merchants and planters refused

to accept goods from New Orleans while yellow fever raged
in the city.

Furthermore, the spread of disease to the

^Latrobe, Impressions Respecting New Orleans, 147;
Crescent, June 22, 1853; Picayune, October 8, 1833; PriceCurrent , August 20, 1853; Cable, The Creoles of Louisiana,
298-99; Smith and Son Company to Smith Company, September
3, October 3, November 14, 1839, October 17, 1840, October
22, 1841, T, Smith and Company Papers; Thomas W, Compton
to Charles Mathews, July 4, 1856, Charles L, Mathews
Family Papers (Louisiana State University Archives, Baton
Rouge); Anonymous Letter, September 18, 1871, Miscellaneous
Papers, ibid.
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interior interfered with the harvesting of crops, causing
severe losses, or at least resulting in a period of delay
in the process of economic exchange.
In late August of 1853 the New Orleans Price-Current
reported that the dreadful epidemic had completely deranged
all business operations.

Little produce of any kind was

sent to New Orleans from the interior.

Shipments of cotton

were halted because of sickness in the port city and the
river towns.

In early October that journal again lamented

the disruption of "the whole machinery of our commerce"
and predicted that many weeks would be required for the
process of readjustment.

The epidemic, asserted the

editor, had almost completely suspended intercourse with
interior communities.

Moreover, it had prevented northern

and European vessels from coming to New Orleans, and many
ships loaded with goods found it necessary to postpone
their departure from the Crescent City because of strict
Q

quarantine regulations in northern ports.
Voicing a sentiment which was becoming more and
more prevalent during the 1850's, the editor of the New
Orleans Bee commented in 1858:

"Everyone is aware that

Bprice-Current, August 20, 27, October 1, 1853.
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the prevalence of yellow fever in our city is the chief
drawback to our prosperity; that but for this haunting
apprehension our summer population would not be materially
reduced, nor would the tide of business recede from our
shores."

Since the progress of the Crescent City would be

at least ten times greater "if our city were absolutely
free from the terrors of the epidemic," the editor consider
ed it the duty of New Orleanians, for the good of humanity
as well as for the city's commercial interest, to inquire
into the possibility of combating the pestilence.^

The

Great Epidemics of the 1850's had brought about a greater
concern regarding the customary foe and the possibility of
doing something to solve that chronic problem, as much on
economic grounds as any other.
The epidemic of 1867, like every other, disturbed
the operations of commerce, and Crescent City newspapers
reported daily the usual difficulties attendant upon the
presence of the Saffron Scourge.

In mid-September one

editor remarked that business was "in a state of stagna
tion" because of the obstacles to trade and travel result
ing from the unhealthy condition of the city.^O

^Bee, October 22, 1858,
lOlbid., September 15, 1867.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Another

409
editor in early October complained of the business dead
lock and the scarcity of money.

Payment was due on notes

held by northern firms for goods purchased several months
before by New Orleans merchants.

In ordinary times, the

editor declared, such notes would have been paid off
promptly; under the circumstances, however, he hoped the
northern creditors would appreciate "the difficulties and
stagnation caused by the dreadful scourge paralyzing the
arm of trade” and would agree to wait until the coming of
frost and the renewal of trade before demanding payment.
A series of letters from Thomas C, Porteous, a New
Orleans merchant, to a Paris business associate during the
epidemic of 1878 illustrates the serious concern felt by
businessmen during epidemic seasons.
wrote:

In early August he

"I regret very much to say that the health of the

city continues to give much uneasiness as to its effect on
the fall trade. . . ."

Even in ordinary times August was

the dullest month of the year for trade, but in 1878 "the
yellow fever panic has driven nearly all our customers
away and caused a rigid quarantine to be enforced all
around us, which must almost paralyze the general trade

llpicayune, October 11, 1867.
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of New Orleans while it lasts,”

12

Several days later Porteous complained that the
streets of the Crescent City seemed almost deserted.

Quaran

tine had been imposed by every little village in every
direction from New Orleans, and "in the store we are having
the dullest time I ever remember, no cash sales & collections almost impossible."

11

Because of the shortage of

cash receipts, he continued to worry about the financial
situation of the business.

And even if the fever died out

within a few weeks, Porteous was afraid that quarantines
would not be raised nor would families return to the city
until October, "so that our trade will be bad in September
as well as August."

To this businessman, the situation was

a "great drawback & a bitter disappointment . . .

as I

anticipated a fair business in August & September, based
upon the fine condition of the crops & good prospects of
our planters.
Every letter from the pen of this unhappy merchant
described the progress of the epidemic and its disastrous

12Thomas C. Porteous to I. Levois, August 3, 1878,
Thomas C, Porteous Letter Book (Louisiana State University
Archives, Baton Rouge).
l^Ibid., August 6, 1878.
l^ibid., August 9, 1878.
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effects upon commerce.

In mid-August Porteous declared

that "the present state of affairs is fairly killing busi
ness in New O r l e a n s , O n August 23 when the disease
raging in the Crescent City had spread to many other places
as well, he wrote his associate:

"At present everything is

excessively dull, the city seems dead & one does not know
what to do, I fret myself that here with a store full of
goods & with prices advancing in New York, we cannot sell
anything. , , ."

To make matters worse, he continued,

"with plenty of good accounts on the books, which I examine
every day, we cannot get any money, almost all our city
people are away & with the quarantine we do not know if
our letters to the country reach their destination,"^^
Continuing his complaint that retail trade was almost at a
standstill, Porteous noted that few persons ventured out
on the streets or into stores, "so there is no opportunity
to push s a l e s , I n

early September one of his salesmen

and one of his business associates came down with the
fever.

ISlbid., August 13, 1878,

l^Tbid,, August 23, 1878,

l^Ibid,, August 30, 1878,
IBlbid., September 3, 10, 1878,
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Finally, by October 15 when the epidemic began to
subside, business activity gradually increased, as "ladies
who have been staying in doors a great deal for the past 2
or 3 months, now begin to venture out & visit the stores &
though not yet asking for fine goods, buy small articles
which they s e e T r a d e

continued to improve and cash

sales were increasing daily by early November.

By late

November, there was "no longer any sickness here & our
absentees are returning daily by the hundreds, all we want
now is a little cool weather & our trade will become quite
active. . .
Even when New Orleans escaped a widespread epidemic
and suffered only a few sporadic cases of yellow fever, the
fear and alarm on the part of the inhabitants of the inte
rior sometimes resulted in rigid quarantines.

Those

barriers affected business in almost the same manner as if
a bad epidemic had occurred, by limiting the exchange of
goods and postponing for several weeks the usual brisk
21

trading activity based on the late summer harvest.^

19lbid., October 15, 1878.
ZOlbid., November 2, 5, 15, 22, 1878.
Zlporteous to R, Heydenreich, July 18, August 1,
September 12, 1879, Thomas C, Porteous Letter Book; Porteous
to E, Bourbon, July 22, September 2, 23, 1879, ibid.
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Particularly in the latter nineteenth century, intra
state and interstate quarantine restrictions established
against New Orleans and other infected (or supposedly in
fected) points throughout the South entangled trade and
transportation to such an extent that contact between many
areas was cut off altogether.

New Orleans merchants and

the railroad interests complained bitterly about losses due
to the paralyzing effects of unreasonable quarantines.

As

for maritime quarantine, the commercial interests of the
Crescent City were almost always at odds with the Louisiana
State Board of Health over the cost and delay resulting
from ship quarantine and disinfection.

The Board, however,

invariably countered with the argument that the direct and
indirect losses suffered because of a yellow fever epidemic
were so great that business interests should be willing to
support quarantine and disinfection measures as the best
insurance against an outbreak of the highly expensive dis
ease .
Yellow fever epidemics invariably resulted in
severe economic distress among the laboring classes of the
population by interfering with the normal working of the
economic system.

The more widespread the epidemic, the

greater the destitution among the laboring poor.
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economic hardship, for example, occasioned by the extensive
spread of the pestilence through the South in 1878 neces
sitated an appeal for relief to the "Chambers of Commerce
and the Charitable of the Chief Cities of the Union.”
This appeal was signed by the president of the New Orleans
Chamber of Commerce and by several other persons on behalf
of the afflicted areas in Mississippi and Alabama.

Re

questing a comprehensive system of relief, the appeal
suggested that a central headquarters, to receive donations
of supplies, medicines, and clothing, be established in a
number of large cities around the country.

Transportation

lines had volunteered to ship all provisions without charge
to New Orleans, from which location the relief could be distributed to other desperate towns,

22

"All business is entirely suspended," the appeal
declared.

"It is estimated that in the suspension of

business on the Mississippi River, south of Memphis, over
fifty steamboats are tied up and their crews discharged."
All those laborers who had been engaged in handling the
freight were out of work.

Moreover, four railroad lines

had ceased to function, leaving their employees idle.

22picayune, September 12, 1878,
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Wherever the fever prevailed, almost all business opera
tions had ceased, and their employees joined the ranks of
the unemployed.

All those persons completely dependent

on their labor for a living found themselves in destitute
circumstances.

It was estimated that at least

1 3 , 0 0 0

heads of households were unemployed in New Orleans,

8 , 0 0 0

in Memphis, and several thousands in scattered small towns,
representing a total of over 100,000 persons in dire need.
"For them there is no labor, no wages, no bread--nothing
but death, or starvation; and this condition must last at
least for fifty days . . . until frost,"
people had to be fed.

Somehow these

In addition to the provision of

bare subsistence, funds were also required for necessary
clothing, medicines, care of the sick, and burial of the
d

e

a

d

.

23

Not only in

1 8 7 8 ,

but in every other severe

epidemic which devastated New Orleans and other southern
communities, contributions poured forth from generous
individuals, businesses, and communities all around the
country.
In terms of human lives and property, the cost of
epidemic yellow fever to New Orleans, the State of

23ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

416
Louisiana, and the South during a hundred-year period
incalculable.

Including such factors as the potential

economic worth of human lives, the value of labor diverted
from productive endeavor by illness or care of the sick,
the cost of medical attendance, supplies, burials, charity,
crop spoilage, investment losses, and the general dis
turbance to business conditions, the cost of one epidemic
--that of 1878--to the Crescent City alone was estimated
at twelve to one hundred million d o l l a r s F r o m 1796
through 1905 New Orleans experienced no less than thirty
serious epidemics--and many more if one included all
those outbreaks which were mild only in comparison with
the violent ones.

Thousands upon thousands of lives,

millions of dollars, and untold and immeasurable quantities
of intangible human suffering, anxiety, and grief were
expended in tribute to the pestilence before the ultimate
triumph of medical science and public health in banishing
the Saffron Scourge from the shores of the United States,
The field of life insurance provides another
example of yellow fever's influence on the various aspects

^^Proceedings of the Board of Experts Authorized
by Congress , , , 1878, 31-35,
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of business arrangements.

In 1848 De Bow's Review pro

tested against the ignorance of the North regarding the
health of southern states:

"Their insurance companies

exact a higher premium if the party, being a southerner,
remain at home during summer . , , yet permit him to spend
his winter in New-England, where, perhaps, his chances of
life would be diminished one-half!"

Furthermore, complain

ed that southern journal, "For New-Orleans many of the com
panies refuse to insure altogether!
these.

"25

Sapient statisticians

gut there was ample evidence to justify the

policy of the Yankee companies.

A New Orleanian, unless

he could supply evidence of his having survived an attack
of yellow fever, was definitely a bad risk.
The increased demand for certain goods during an
epidemic always encouraged some shrewd and unscrupulous
businessmen to take advantage of the situation.

Examples

may be cited in regard to three items in great demand
during a yellow fever outbreak:
cines,

coffins, ice, and medi

In the midst of the epidemic of 1839, the New

Orleans Picayune editor angrily reported an incident relat
ing to traffic in coffins,

"Speculations in wooden

25De Bow's Review, VI (September, 1848), 226.
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nut-megs, bass-wood hams and horn flints we look upon as
'fair business transactions,*" he asserted indignantly,
**but the man who can look complacently forward to a season
of epidemic and mortality, and prepare to turn a time of
death and mourning to profitable account, we view as a
soulless, unsympathising scoundrel; with a heart--if he
have one at a 11--as black as the plumes of a hearse."
Early that summer a New York speculator had made a large
shipment of coffins under a false bill of lading to a New
Orleans mercantile house.

The coffins, of assorted sizes,

had been packed one inside another into nine cases and
labeled "Pianos--With Care."

The New Yorker's letter to

the New Orleans business establishment regarding the
"piano-fortes" stated:

"As the taste for music appears to

be making rapid strides in the South, and as instruments
such as 1 send you, must inevitably increase in value, I
would advise, that at present you merely take them into
your warerooms, permitting them to remain in the cases,
subject to my future directions. . . ."

According to the

Picayune, the New Orleans merchants involved in the trans
action, on discovering the true nature of the merchandise,
had become so enraged by the "endeavor to make them a tool
in so disreputable a 'commission business'" that they sold

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

419
the coffins to the Charity Hospital for one dollar each,^^
Unfortunately for the New Yorker, he chose the wrong firm,
or the wrong method, and failed in his scheme to profit
from the harvest of the pestilence.
Others had better luck in profiteering.

The exces

sively high price of ice in New Orleans during the epidemic
of 1878 became a matter of concern to the Board of Health
as well as the city government.

Monopolizing the importa

tion and sale of ice in New Orleans, the Crescent City Ice
Company set the price beyond the reach of many persons
while the yellow fever epidemic was in progress.

When the

mayor and the Board of Health began to make inquiries about
purchasing and transporting ice from several northern
cities, representatives of the ice company felt it neces
sary to call on the mayor to stave off such a drastic
measure.

Although their present supply of ice was small,

they explained, large amounts were then on the way to New
Orleans and there was absolutely no danger of an ice famine
in the city.

On behalf of the company, they promised to

reduce the price immediately to forty dollars per ton, and
when the new shipments arrived, the price would be reduced

26Picayune, August 31, September 1, 1839,
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still further.

Under the circumstances, the mayor decided

to take no further action on the matter.

Nevertheless, the

Picayune complained of the unreasonable prices set by the
monopolists who were obviously taking advantage of the
temporary ice shortage together with the increased demand
during the epidemic.

On the basis of figures showing that

ice could be purchased from a firm in Maine for two dollars
per ton and shipped to New Orleans for three dollars or
less, the editor felt there was no justification whatsoever
for the ice company's high charges exacted from a city in
t h e

t h r o e s

o f

a

d

i

s

a

s

t

e

r

.

^ 7

During New Orleans' worst epidemic of all times,
the visitation of 1853, there were numerous complaints
against druggists who charged extremely high prices for
medicines.

In ordinary times the drugs would have been

considered expensive at one-half or one-third the rate
charged during the crisis.

One Crescent City journal con

tended that no conscientious apothecary could possibly
engage in such unethical profiteering and expressed the
hope that the reports circulating about that practice were

Z^Ibid., July 26, 27, 28, 1878.
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gross exaggerations.

28

But not all apothecaries were as

conscientious as that journalist wanted to believe.
During the epidemic of 1853 the Howard Association
discovered several cases of collusion between physicians
and druggists to overcharge for prescriptions paid for by
the benevolent society.

To increase the drug bill for

each patient cared for by the Howards, the physician pre
scribed a greater quantity of medicines than the yellow
fever victims could possibly consume.

The druggist then

shared his increased profits with that physician.

But

when the Howards pointed out to certain apothecaries that
no man, sick or well, could have taken as much medication
as was claimed and suggested that the bill be inspected by
another druggist or physician, the fraudulent claim was
OQ

almost invariably reduced. ^

Certainly in every epidemic

there must have been instances of greedy individuals who
turned a calamity into an opportunity for unreasonable
profits.

For most businessmen, however. Yellow Jack

brought losses rather than profits.
Yet despite the adverse influence of epidemic yellow

28ibid,, August 17, 1853.
29Robinson, Diary of a Samaritan, 271-72
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fever upon New Orleans' economic affairs, the set-back each
time proved to be only a temporary one.

As cool weather set

in and the epidemic subsided, the business season opened
gradually, then very rapidly moved into full swing.

Ships

arrived and departed from the port of New Orleans, and the
crops of the interior poured into the city along with
orders for supplies and goods of every variety.

New

Orleans filled up with thousands of newcomers as well as
the returning summer absentees, and the gaiety of social
life along with serious business activity dispelled the
gloom of the previous months.

The previously desolate

city was transformed almost overnight into a gay, lively,
dynamic scene of feverish activity, and every memory of
the painful scenes of the summer and early fall months was
relentlessly shoved into the background.^®
Strangely, the menace of yellow fever did not seem
to discourage great hordes of persons who flocked to the
Crescent City annually, swelling the city's population
from 8,000 to nearly 300,000 in the course of the nine
teenth century.

In the last days of the epidemic of 1817,

one resident remarked that "New Orleans may be compared

Olbid., 297-98.
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to a Plate of Honey,

Thousands of insects come & satiate

themselves with the sweet food, and die--but where one dies,
a thousand visit the delicious repast.

So it is with men--

where their interests lie, they'll come to the place, tho'
death may stare them in the face,"

31

But, assuming that

the constant threat of the pestilence did hinder many per
sons who might otherwise have moved to New Orleans, and
taking into consideration the thousands who died there each
year (not only from yellow fever but from the many other
endemic and epidemic maladies present in that sickly city),
one can only speculate about what the growth of the Cres
cent City might have been without its unhealthy influences.
Not even the prospect of disease and early death
could interrupt "the forward march of the city" during the
first half of the nineteenth century; "even the memory and
grief of it were passing shadows," wrote Grace King in New
Orleans ; The Place and the People.

On the contrary, she

declared. New Orleans in that period enjoyed "more emi
grants, more imports, more exports, more trade, more cotton,
sugar, plantations, slaves; and to off-set, the more death.

31walter Prichard (ed,), "Three Letters of Richard
Claiborne to William Miller, 1816-1818," Louisiana His
torical Quarterly, XXIV (July, 1941), 739,
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the more life, the city's gayety, like the city's gold,
mounting in the flood tide over it."
Even in the midst of a paralyzing epidemic, such as
that of 1853, optimism remained the prevalent note among
some elements in New Orleans.

For example, in August the

editor of the Daily Crescent, maintaining a high level of
enthusiasm, discounted the notion that the epidemic would
ruin the city.

Many epidemics had come and gone and never

ruined New Orleans, he declared; furthermore, they never
would I

Instead of diminishing the population, the epi

demic would actually increase it as people flocked in to
seek those positions left vacant by yellow fever's victims.
The death of one man would attract two to fill his place,
and business would be more active than ever.

The pesti

lence did not drive people away, the editor asserted, but,
on the contrary, attracted those adventurers who would
brave any danger.

The editorial concluded with an optimis

tic, although at the same time rather callous, reflection:
"There is a good time coming for the fortunate who live

to

see it,"^^

32crace King, New Orleans; The Place and the People
(New York, 1895), 287-88.
33Çrescent, August 31, 1853.
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The attitudes and policies dominating the world of
journalism were intimately related to the outlook of the
business community.

Until the latter nineteenth century.

Crescent City journals failed to provide prompt or accurate
reporting on yellow fever in the city, always attempted to
discount the severity of an epidemic, and falsely praised
New Orleans as an extraordinarily healthy place.

These

characteristics of newspaper policy have been discussed to
some extent in earlier chapters.

It should be noted

further that the direct influence of commercial interests
often dictated that policy.
In 1819 Benjamin Latrobe asked a newspaper editor
why the journals avoided the subject of yellow fever's
prevalence in New Orleans when the knowledge was general
throughout the city.

The editor answered "that the princi

pal profit of a newspaper arising from advertisements, the
merchants, their principal customers, had absolutely for
bid the least notice of fever, under a threat that their
custom should otherwise be withdrawn. . . ."

Thus, said

Latrobe, the merchants and editors sacrificed "to commer
cial policy the lives of all those who, believing from the
silence of the public papers that no danger existed, might
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come to the city."^^
Before the news of the prevailing fever became
generally known in 1853, the Howard Association had already
begun their relief work among the indigent sick in the Cres
cent City.

The notice of the Howards' initial meeting

published in the city papers did not even mention the words
yellow fever.

In fact, they "were requested by editors

and merchants to withhold publication of our acts, as the
report of an epidemic--which might yet be checked--would
entail severe loss on merchants and shopkeepers,"^^
An article in De Bow's Review describing the des
tructive visitation of 1853 noted the reluctance of New
Orleans journals to report information regarding the
presence of yellow fever.

Not until the last possible

moment, when the daily mortality was too great to ignore
and alarm was general throughout the city, were the papers
willing to publish any reference to the disease.

Frequent

ly, the first news of fever in the Crescent City came to
its inhabitants through the country papers,

"New-Orleans

being an entirely commercial city, the love of money and

^^Latrobe, Impressions Respecting New Orleans , 146.
35Robinson, Diary of a Samaritan, 122.
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self-interest prevail there as much as in other commercial
communities,” the article stated; "and it is a standing
maxim in the commercial world that nothing must be said
that might injure trade,
In its report for 1873 the Board of Health declared
that as soon as yellow fever made its appearance in New
Orleans that year, a deputation of merchants called upon
the policy-makers of the Crescent City journals and re
quested that the weekly mortality reports supplied by the
Board of Health not be published.
editor of the German Gazette,

All agreed except the

Consequently, as the Board

had predicted, exaggerations spread throughout the country,
and no official information was readily available to
"control the public imagination."^7
While the newspapers sometimes refused to publish
information furnished by the Board of Health and almost
always set forth a distorted view of health in the city,
at the same time they went to great pains to correct the
so-called exaggerations and erroneous opinions appearing
in the journals of the interior, the North, and even

36pe Bow's Review, XV (December, 1853), 598,
37Report of the Louisiana State Board of Health for

1873, 74-75.
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England,

In April of 1852, for example, the Picayune com

plained of reports in northern papers to the effect that
the unfortunate Crescent City was anxiously "expecting the
near approach of the plague."

Sarcastically, the Picayune

editor remarked that "we of New Orleans are expected not
only to submit with resignation to any sanitary evils, but
actually to welcome them with unalloyed delight as a neces
sary accompaniment of our existence,"

The outsider's con

ception of life in New Orleans, according to that editor,
consisted of "cotton bales and yellow fever, balls, duels,
operas and cholera. . , .”

New Orleanians knew they had a

healthy city and should never be disturbed by nonsense set
forth by those who knew nothing of the true situation, the
editor reassured the citizenry.^8
In June of 1853 while yellow fever was steadily
gaining ground in New Orleans with no paper as yet discuss
ing its presence, the Delta editor undertook to explain how
"by accident" a report from Charity Hospital found its way
into that journal’s columns "without the supervision we
usually give to such matters."

The report had listed two

cases of fatal black vomit, and the editor feared that such

88picayune, April 8, 1852.
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an isolated fact, without explanation, might produce an
erroneous impression in the city and elsewhere.

But those

two cases had been imported from Havana, he contended, and
hence there was nothing to fear.

Reminding the proud

citizens that New Orleans was "one of the healthiest cities
of the Union," he maintained that the Crescent City had
suffered too long from "traditionary vileness and bug-bear
stories" propagated by outsiders.

Therefore, the Delta

editor felt it necessary that "nothing calculated to mis
lead persons abroad or citizens at home, should have
publicity
During the epidemic of 1867 the New Orleans Bee
criticized several northern newspapers for reporting that
the New Orleans authorities and the journals were in col
lusion to withhold information regarding the severity of
the pestilence.

Such a statement, declared the Bee editor,

was nothing less than an "abominable lie,"

He was not

surprised, however, that such a notion could gain credence
in the North, "for they are ready to believe anything un
favorable about us."^^

S^New Orleasn Weekly Delta, June 12, 1853
40Bee, September 4, 1867.
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On countless occasions the New Orleans press pro
tested bitterly against the so-called exaggerations in
country newspapers on the subject of yellow fever in the
city.^1

People in the hinterland soon learned not to trust

the New Orleans journals on the health of the Crescent
City.

They listened instead to reports supplied by émigrés

passing through, or relied on information furnished by cor
respondents in New Orleans.

Naturally, the city news

papers attempted to discredit the reports of disease
advanced by the journals of the interior--whether or not
they were true.
Sometimes even the English press received a share
of criticism for "distorting" the picture of health in New
Orleans,

In 1853 the Picayune lashed out at several

English journals for their allegedly unfair treatment of
the disease-ridden city.

"They find the ordinary sanitary,

physical and moral condition of New Orleans to be horrid,"
the Picayune editor stated.

He thought it strange indeed

that outsiders always professed to know so much more about
the affairs of the city than those present on the

scene.

41picayune. July 26, August 19, 1853; New Orleans
Daily Delta, August 10, 1858,
42picayune, September 29, 1853,
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The problem was that New Orleanians did not always tell,
or even admit, all that they knew.
Finally, in the latter nineteenth century as im
proved means of transportation and communication knit the
country ever more closely together, it became completely
impossible to conceal the presence of disease in the Cres
cent City, especially after the United States government
began to take a greater interest in fighting the introduc
tion and spread of epidemic disease.
epidemic of

1 8 9 7

In the midst of the

the editor of the New Orleans Times-

Democrat declared that the old policy of not reporting on
yellow fever until it had become fully epidemic had
"brought New Orleans to the verge of ruin."^^

In a

similar declaration the Picayune editor maintained that
the concealment of disease was not only unwise but also
impossible and could result only in ultimate exposure and
harsh criticism for the deception.
Along with many other economic and social activities
and institutions affected by the disruptive influence of
epidemic yellow fever, educational institutions also felt

'^^Times-Democrat, September
44picayune, October

13,

7,

1 8 9 7 .

1 8 9 7 .
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the impact of the pestilence.

Yellow fever epidemics

ordinarily erupted in July or August and lasted until some
time in October, November, or even early December.

Hence,

during epidemic years, it was usually necessary to post
pone the opening of the public schools until the disease
had subsided, causing a delay of at least a month or more
after the regularly scheduled opening date.^S
The colleges and the medical schools also found it
necessary to postpone the beginning of their regular
s e s s i o n s . I n addition to the problem of sickness and
death from yellow fever itself, which claimed the lives of
some faculty members and students and discouraged the
attendance of others, quarantine barriers in the later
period also hindered the arrival of out-of-town students.
In fact, the epidemic of 1905 and the resulting quarantine
entanglement all but ruined Tulane’s football season.
Since the players were scattered over the state, quarantine
restrictions made it virtually impossible to gather them

45pe Bow's Review, XV (December, 1853), 626;
Wharton Diary, August 28, October 1, 7, 1858; Picayune,
August 29, 1858, September 4, 1867, October 3, 1905.
46picayune, October 28, 1905; N. 0. Med. & Surg.
Jour., LI (October, 1898), 213,
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together and whip them into shape before the end of the
season, 47'
Another instance in which yellow fever influenced
educational institutions in New Orleans involved its
"retarding effect" upon the growth of the Charity Hospital
Training School for Female Nurses, established in 1894.
In her report for 1905, Sister Agnes, Directress of the
Training School, stated that the epidemic not only had dis
couraged many applicants, but also had raised the question
of the "advisability" of accepting non-immunes.

Of some

300 application forms sent out on request that season,
only fifty-two had been returned.

According to J. M.

Batchelor, Chairman of the Training School Faculty, the
largest class thus far was graduated in 1905; but, he
noted, the school had not yet reached its full capacity.
Although an increase in the number of trainees had been
contemplated, "owing to circumstances over which we had
no control, and which forbade entrance of non-immunes into
this city, our intentions were not fulfilled."^®
Sometimes during epidemic seasons in New Orleans,

47picayune, October 13, 1905.
48Report of the Board of Administrators of the
Charity Hospital , , , for 1905, $0, 52,
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public school buildings served as temporary yellow fever
hospitals and orphan asylums under the direction of the
Howard Association, the Board of Health, or the Charity
Hospital

a
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s
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1905 the public schools, in

full operation by early October, provided one more theater
in the educational campaign against the Aedes aegypti
mosquito.

Children heard lectures on the deadly culprit

of transmission and carried home pamphlets containing
instructions for fumigating, oiling, and screening.
In the grim battle against epidemic yellow fever,
waged time after time in the communities of Louisiana and
the South, the medical profession, above all, bore the
greatest burden of responsibility.

For over a hundred

years physicians faced the task of combating a deadly dis
ease which spread from person to person and place to place
in a strange and unpredictable manner and which operated
in seeming defiance of all forms of therapy.

Some patients

lived and others died regardless of the varied treatment
employed.

From the late eighteenth century until the early

twentieth century, no doctor who practiced for any length

49pe Bow's Review, XV (December, 1853), 626;
Picayune, September 24, 1897.
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of time in New Orleans or certain other Louisiana com
munities could ignore the yellow fever enigma.

And among

medical riddles probably none other provoked so much con
troversy, diversity of opinion, and professional antagonism.
Yet the Saffron Scourge seems to have been one of
the principal forces in bringing together the French phy
sicians of New Orleans in their first professional organ
ization, W

Société Médicale de la Nouvelle Orléans, estab

lished in 1817.

The devastating epidemic of 1817, the

most violent up to that time, must have convinced the New
Orleans medical profession that it was necessary to pool
their intellectual resources in a cooperative effort
against the deadly scourge of the Crescent City.

One of

the first official actions of the society was the appoint
ment of a committee to inquire into the causes and treat
ment of the recent epidemic fever.

In 1820 when the

English-speaking physicians joined to form the PhysicoMedical Society, they too directed their initial efforts
toward a study of the yellow pestilence.

Alternately

active and inactive, these medical organizations and others
which developed in nineteenth-century Louisiana always
devoted a great deal of attention to yellow fever, a sub
ject which gradually led to a consideration of the vitally
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important question of public health.^®
In the course of service during the hundred years'
war against the pestilence, the medical profession of New
Orleans and elsewhere lost a considerable number of prac
titioners from its own ranks to the deadly foe, particular
ly among the "unacclimated" from other sections of the
country.51
in ^

Strangely like Camus' existentialist physician

Peste, many medical men labored on day after day,

week after week, month after month; operating in the dark
ness of seeming helplessness against the malady's ravages,
yet exerting all their energies toward alleviating the dis
comfort and anxiety of as many patients as possible;
frequently unable to effect a cure and seldom knowing
exactly why.

Describing the role of the medical man in

epidemic disasters, one observer wrote:

"I have always

sympathized with the physicians in New Orleans.

Their

duties in a sickly season are most arduous and responsible.
Often have I seen them in a few weeks reduced to their
beds by anxiety, toil, watchings, and disappointment, . , ."
And to make matters worse, he added, "multitudes, instead

50william Dosite Postell, "The Medical Societies of
Louisiana Prior to the War Between the States," New Orleans
Medical and Surgical Journal, XCIII (August, 1940), 69-72.
5^N. 0. Med. & Surg. Jour., X (September, 1853), 279.
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of thanking them, have cursed them, because they did not
at once expel the epidemic from the city, which they could
CO

no more control than they could raise the dead,”
In a similar vein Dr. Erasmus Fenner declared:
"There is, perhaps, no place in the world where more
charity service is done by the medical profession than in
New Orleans , , , but I am sorry to add, that I know of no
place where these benevolent services are more lightly
appreciated than here."

53

During pestilential visitations,

physicians often ran notices in the newspapers offering to
"attend gratuitously" to the indigent sick.^^
In general, the members of the New Orleans medical
profession throughout the period of yellow fever's des
tructive activities merited high praise for their generos
ity, humanitarianism, and tireless labors in attending to
the fever's victims.

As in all fields of human activity,

however, one can find examples of ignorance, greed, and
callousness.

A member of the Howard Association in the

mid-nineteenth century criticised those medical

52ouffy (ed.). Parson Clapp, 106,
53penner, Epidemic Yellow Fever, 70»
54picayune, August 23, 28, 1839; N. 0, Med, & Surg.
Jour., X (November, 1853), 387,
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practitioners who "wring the last dollar from suffering
humanity in advance of every service performed, and, when
no more can be exacted, abandon them for nature to do the
rest."

Some physicians offered their services to the

Howard Association, accepted the salary provided, then pro
ceeded to extort additional payment from the association's
patients,

"If they did not succeed in obtaining money from

our patients," complained one Howard Association member,
"they would divide with the apothecary the bill of expen
sive prescriptions."^5
Epidemic conditions, which supplied the regular
medical profession with more work than could easily be
handled, provided ample opportunity for the practice of
quackery by anyone who wished to pass himself off as a
doctor.

Yellow fever sufferers and their families seldom

demanded that the attending physician present his creden
tials, nor could they have evaluated his ability in any
case.56

Many forms of quackery prevailed.

During epidemic

seasons, numerous advertisements for yellow fever preventives

SSRobinson, Diary of a Samaritan, 79-80,
SGÇrescent, August 22, 1853; New Orleans Weekly
Delta, September 4, 1853; Robinson, Diary of a Samaritan,
80.
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and remedies appeared in the Crescent City newspapers-sometimes even before the journals had discussed the dis
ease editorially.

The preposterous claims, accompanied

by testimonials, endorsed by self-styled doctors, and
advanced to ensnare the gullible were only slightly less
subtle than the techniques of the twentieth-century "hidden
persuaders."

Brandreth's Vegetable Universal Pills and

Holt's Prescription and Remedies for Yellow Fever, along
with countless other preparations, could be purchased for
home treatment of the disease.

Dr. Radway's Ready

Relief, Regulating Pills and Resolvent were supposed to
prevent and cure not only yellow fever but also typhoid
and ship fever; fever and ague ; bilious, remittent or
intermittent fever; cholera, dysentery, flux, and
diarrhea; smallpox, measles, scarlet fever, croup; as well
as "all diseases or complaints incidental to the human
race."58

If one "carefully and constantly" used Duffy's

Pure Malt Whiskey, "A SCIENTIFIC REMEDY, NOT A BEVERAGE,"
according to the advertisement, "No disease germ can

57picayune, May 25, 1838, October 1, 1843.
58ibid., December 7, 1859.
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POSSIBLY remain lodged in the body, , ,

A sparkling

mineral water called Red Raven was also proclaimed as a
yellow fever prophylactic, "which cleanses the system and
is absolute death to g e r m s . T h e n there were also Dr.
J. N. Lee's invention of the Portable Hot-Air Bath Chamber
and the Thermal Wrap announced in the 1880*s, which he
insisted would serve to prevent as well as cure yellow
fever along with every other ailment known to man,^^
After the discovery of the mosquito vector, another
advertising angle came to light.

During the yellow fever

epidemic and anti-mosquito crusade of 1905, this restrain
ed, if slightly misleading, advertisement appeared in the
Picayune ;
TO THE PUBLIC:
Mosquito Bites Rendered Harmless
by the use of Dr. G, H.
_______TICHENOR'S ANTISEPTIC___________
rub in we11^2

S^lbid., September 21, 1888.
^^Ibid., August 7, 1905.
Glj. N. Lee, Life. The Philosophy of its Origin
and Preservation. A Brief Outline of the Fundamental
Principles of Scientific Medicine. The Nature of Endemic
Yellow Fever . . . with an Infallible, Preventive and
Cure for it, as well as the Epidemic Yellow Fever . . .
(New Orleans, 1883).
62 Picayune, August 6, 1905.
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Several other products were advertised more flamboyantly
and specifically as yellow fever preventives.

Disinfec-

tine, "the modern toilet Soap," which "opens and searches
the pores— destroys and removes the germs," was guaranteed
to heal mosquito bites and prevent yellow fever as well as
many other diseases.

Littell's Liquid Sulphur, taken

internally and added to the bath water, "absolutely" pre
vented mosquito bites and put the blood in such good con
dition that the consumer was promised complete immunity
"from all contagious or infectious d i s e a s e s , A s

in

every age, shrewd operators profited from the fear and
credulity of those persons, who for one reason or another
would not call on a physician.

It should be noted, how

ever, that the inadequacies of nineteenth-century medical
practice itself actually encouraged the development of
irregular medicine in the days before the medical profes
sion was truly a profession.
The clergyman, like the physician, was called upon
for an extraordinary performance of services during epi
demic seasons.

Protestant ministers and Catholic priests

were in constant demand day and night to "soothe the last

63lbid., August 4, 6, 1905.
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hours of the dying," to administer the last rites in the
case of Catholics, and to comfort the surviving members
of the family.

Amid the disorder of a raging epidemic, it

was impossible for the clergy to perform all services at
the grave.

Consequently, brief services were held in the

homes of the deceased or in the chapels.

Many were buried

without benefit of clergy; in some cases, laymen adminis
tered the final prayers over the grave.
Although some Protestant ministers fled the scene
in fear and trembling along with the other émigrés, they
seemed to represent the exception rather than the rule.
Many a clergyman, both Protestant and Catholic, fell prey
to the pestilence while performing his pastoral duties.
In addition to the arduous task of attending to last rites
and funeral services of the hundreds of yellow fever vic
tims, clergymen were constantly occupied in visiting the
sick and sometimes even acting as doctor and nurse, adminis
tering to the sickness of the body as well as that of the

64&obinson, Diary of a Samaritan, 119, 259-60.
65[A. Walker], "History and Incidents of the Plague
in New Orleans," Harper *s Magazine, VII (June-November,
1853), 806; Robinson, Diary of a Samaritan, 119, 259-60;
Joseph B. Stratton Diary, Joseph B, Stratton Papers (Louisi
ana State University Archives, Baton Rouge), November 22,
1853, January 18, 1854.
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soul.^G

And after an epidemic subsided, the work of the

clergyman was by no means over.

Destitute families, widows,

and orphans looked to the minister or priest for advice
and assistance.

In a small community, the distraught epi

demic-scarred populace sometimes turned to the clergyman
for leadership in the task of reorganization and readjust
ment.

His residence often served as a headquarters for

the collection and distribution of clothing and provisions
contributed for the relief of the needy.
Throughout the nineteenth century while the essen
tially mysterious nature, origin, and transmission of
yellow fever remained beyond the comprehension of medical
scientists as well as laymen, a particular religious
significance was attached to pestilential visitations.
Helpless in the face of an epidemic calamity, the people
of an afflicted community turned to God to beg forgiveness
and a cessation of his wrathful punishment.

During the

awful visitation of 1853, the Presbyterian ministers of

^ ^ a l k e r , "History and Incidents of the Plague in
New Orleans," loc. cit., 806; Stratton Diary, January 18,
1854.
^^Duffy (ed,). Parson Clapp, 102-104; Autobiography,
Emily Caroline Douglas Papers (Louisiana State University
Archives, Baton Rouge), 318, 320-22,
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New Orleans called for a "Union Meeting for humiliation
and prayer" to be held at 5 P.M. daily throughout the re
mainder of the epidemic.

They invited the members of all

churches "to unite with us in humbling ourselves before
our Maker and in acknowledging His Severeighty over us,
and in supplicating Him to deliver us from the pestilence
that now desolates our city."

Furthermore, they asked

that all Christians pray in behalf of New Orleans "that
God will be pleased to turn His anger away from us,"^®
A special prayer was prepared by Bishop Leonidas
Polk in 1853 and recommended for use in all the churches
in the Protestant Episcopal Diocese of Louisiana during
the prevailing epidemic.

The prayer acknowledged that

"we, thy servants" had "grievously sinned, by thought,
word and deed and that by our sins we have most justly
provoked thy wrath and indignation against us."

In a

long and eloquent petition Bishop Polk's prayer begged
for mercy and forgiveness and asked that God "turn from
us the ravage of the pestilence, wherewith for our
iniquities, thou art now visiting us."^^

Also in 1853

68çrescent, August 31, 1853.
^^Picayune, August 24, 1853.
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the Mayor of New Orleans set aside a special day "for the
general voice to rise in supplication to Almighty God, that
he may be pleased to lighten the heavy burthen of grief,
sickness and death."^0
At least one dissenting voice was raised in protest
against blaming God for the epidemic.

In a statement pub

lished in the Picayune, Theodore Clapp, Unitarian minister,
refused to accept the proposition that "the epidemic
ravaging our city is a display of God's anger."

Were New

Orleanians any more "deserving at present of Heaven's
wrath" than the people of London, Paris, Boston, New York,
or any other city?

Dr. Clapp did not think so.

The af

flictions of human life might be "a test of moral charac
ter," he declared, but to credit God with indiscriminate
wrath and vengeance poured out upon the faithful and the
wicked alike was to place God beyond all love and re-

spect.71
But Dr. Clapp and others like him remained in the
minority as long as the pestilence remained a mystery.
Even as a day of humiliation and prayer had been recommended

70xbid., August 31, 1853.
71lbid., September 2, 1853.
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by municipal or state authorities during and after epidemic
visitations in an earlier period, so during the widespread
epidemic of 1878 Governor Francis T. Nicholls proclaimed
October 9 as a day of "fasting, humiliation, and prayer,"
All Louisianians were asked to "join in a concert of devout
petition to the Almighty to stay his severe chastisement
and to spare an afflicted people."

72

In 1897 some persons still considered the wrath of
God a factor in pestilential visitations.

The Picayune

printed the full text of a sermon delivered by the minister
of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, in which he called the
epidemic a "chastisement" sent down upon New Orleans by
God "for wise purposes of his own,"

The mild scourge of

1897, declared the minister, should be considered "a warn
ing for our citizens to repent."

Advocating moral sanita

tion, he felt that the impure moral atmosphere of New
Orleans called for as thorough a cleansing as the streets,
gutters, and other filthy aspects of the city.

7

Also in

1897 the Picayune reprinted Bishop Polk's prayer of 1853,74

72see, November 3, 1841; New Orleans Democrat,
October 2, 1878; Picayune, October 3, 1878,
73picayune, October 7, 1897,
74ibid., October 25, 1897,
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In the epidemic of 1905, after yellow fever's trans
mitter had been positively identified, the New Orleans
clergy participated actively in the anti-mosquito campaign,
preaching frmn their pulpits the crusade against the Aedes
aegypti as if it had been the devil himself.

Apparently,

however, almost nothing was said about the wrath of God as
a factor in that last epidemic.
In spite of the constant exertions of the medical
profession and the clergy, severe epidemic conditions
required the labors of countless volunteer relief workers
and an extraordinary amount of charity.

The indigent sick

and their families had to be cared for, and the problem
became progressively acute as the population of New
Orleans increased.

On a number of occasions in the early

nineteenth century, the municipal government attempted to
provide some measure of assistance to the destitute victims
of yellow fever by appointing and paying several physicians
to attend to their needs and by providing funds for the
necessary medicines and food.^S

75proceedings of the City Council of New Orleans,
Vol. 3, Book 1, June 7, 1817 to December 29, 1818 (W.P.A,
typescript, New Orleans Public Library), 40, 48-50;
Louisiana Courier, September 8, 1819, August 28, 1820,
October 2, 1822; Picayune, September 7, 1837.
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In the course of the nineteenth century dozens of
societies were organized in the Crescent City and in other
communities visited by yellow fever to provide emergency
relief for their own members or for the indigent sick in
general.

Without such organized endeavors, starvation it

self would have added thousands to the mortality lists,
and countless yellow fever victims would have died without
attention of any kind.

The vast array of organizations

differed considerably in form and procedure, but all
engaged in the common task of ameliorating the distress
produced by epidemic yellow fever.

The Masons, the Odd

Fellows, the Young Men's Christian Association, labor
unions, and various other professional, social, and reli
gious groups established special relief committees to
minister to the needs of their members or to extend
charitable services to destitute fever patients and their
families.76
Other societies, especially among national groups
and laborers, were established in the 1840's and 1850's
for the express purpose of providing a form of mutual

76pe Bow's Review, XV (December, 1853), 629; Cres
cent, August 31, 1853; Picayune, August 29, 1858; Bee,
September 3, 1858; Baton Rouge AdvocateNovember 29,
1878.
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insurance for the members, such as the Ibera Benevolent
Association, the Portuguese Benevolent Association, the
Italian Mutual Benevolent Society, the German Benevolent
Association, the Jewish Benevolent Relief Association,
the United Laborers' Benevolent Association, and the Fire
men's Charitable Association.

Particularly significant

during epidemics, these organizations supplied financial
aid to any member who fell prey to sickness, and in the
event of his death, made seme provision for his widow and
orphans.

The Ibera Benevolent Association, for example,

was designed "to provide for and assist those of its mem
bers who through sickness or other , , . circumstances,
may become destitute, and also to inter with preper cere
monies, the bodies of such as demise,"

Only a native

Spaniard might become president, but anyone "of irreproach
able character" might join the society by paying an initia
tion fee of three dollars and monthly dues of fifty cents.
In 1878 the Mutual Benevolent Relief Association, a Negro
group in New Orleans, and Negro organizations elsewhere
attended to the destitute sick among their race,^^

77çardner & Wharton's New Orleans Directory, for the
Year 1858 . . . (New Orleans, 1857), 389-90; Picayune,
September 7, 14, 22, 1878; Bee, October 16, 1858; Baton
Rouge Advocate, November 29, 1878.
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Another mutual aid society called the Young Men's
Crescent and Star Benevolent Association was established
in 1867 by "the elite of the Second and Third Districts"
of New Orleans.

Membership requirements included "an un

stained character," a five dollar initiation fee, and dues
of one dollar per month.

The association promised to pro

vide medical attention and the necessary drugs to any sick
member, to pay seven dollars per week during the period of
his illness, to provide proper burial insurance, and to
furnish assistance to the widow and orphans of any deceased
78

member.

Women in New Orleans participated actively in the
work of epidemic relief through such organizations as the
Ladies' Benevolent Society, the Ladies' Physiological
Society, and Les Dames de la Providence.

They collected

and distributed funds and provisions; they called upon the
sick and supplied kindness and encouragement to the desti
tute families along with food, medicine, and clothing.^9

78Bee, October 20, 1867; Picayune, October 20, 1867.
79picayune, September 9, 1841, August 23, 1878;
Baton Rouge Advocate, November 29, 1878; Gardner & Wharton's
New Orleans Directory for . . , 1858, 389; Robinson, Diary
of a Samaritan, 194-95.
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Les Dames de la Providence, an association of
"married

ladies belonging to the most respectable class

of our Creole population," went about in groups of three
or four, attending to the needs of yellow fever patients
of their own sex, and liberally dispensing relief with
their funds collected from generous donors.

80

Among the

lot of female societies, undoubtedly there were some dogooders and busy-bodies who accomplished little of value.
But, in general, the women's groups seem to have con
tributed a creditable share in carrying out the overwhelm
ing task of relieving the distress occasioned by epidemic
yellow fever.

One other group of unusually active women

should be noted here--women whose tireless efforts in
nursing the sick was of unquestionable importance:

the

Sisters of Charity.®^
Probably the most notable of all the New Orleans
benevolent societies established specifically to relieve
the sick and the destitute in epidemic seasons was the
Howard Association, named after the eighteenth-century
English philanthropist, John Howard.

Not only was that

SORobinson, Diary of a Samaritan, 194, 266.
Sllbid., 194-93.
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association the first of its kind to be organized in the
Crescent City, but its activities continued throughout
the nineteenth century, and its work extended to many
other disease-ridden comnunities of the South.

Founded in

1837 as an informal group, the Howard Association was in
corporated in 1842 by the Louisiana Legislature and granted
a twenty-five year charter.

On the expiration of its

charter, the association was reincorporated in 1867, and
again in 1893.®^
With the appearance of epidemic yellow fever in New
Orleans, the Howards set to work to alleviate the unfor
tunate circumstances of the indigent sick and of those
families suffering deprivation because of the epidemic
situation.

The city was divided into districts, and each

member was assigned to work within a certain district.
Advertisements in newspapers and placards at the street
corners furnished the names and addresses of the Howard
Association members.

Before breakfast and before dinner

the member was supposed to be on hand at his residence to

82portier, Louisiana, I, 515: Report of the Howard
Association of New Orleans, of Receipts, Expenditures. and
Their Work in the Epidemic of 1878 , , , (New Orleans,
1878), 5-7; Stuart 0, Landry, "New Orleans' Predecessor of
Red Cross," New Orleans Times-Picayune Magazine Section,
December 19, 26, 1937.
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interview the applicants for relief who gathered there.
After making a record of the names and addresses of yellow
fever cases reported to him and of those persons request
ing special relief, he set out on his daily and nightly
rounds.

First delivering the list of new cases to the

physicians employed by the Howards, the member than pro
ceeded with his tasks, visiting old patients, checking on
persons requesting relief, visiting new cases, purchasing
and even administering medicine, hiring and assigning
Q O

nurses--and so on, day after day, night after night.
In addition to the house-to-house visits, the pro
vision of medical care, nursing, and medicines, and the
granting of outright relief to the poor, the Howard
Association also established and supervised temporary
yellow fever hospitals, convalescent infirmaries, and
QA

orphan asylums.
In 1847 the Howards attended to about 1,200 yellow
fever cases; in 1853, over 11,000 cases; and in 1878, more
than 21,000 cases in New Orleans and nearly 12,000 in other
communities.

Their expenditures in the extensive visitation

B^Robinson, Diary of a Samaritan, 72, 125-2$, 134-35.
84ibid., 166-67, 280-85.
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of 1878 totaled almost $400,000.

During every epidemic

which occurred, contributions poured Into the associa
tion's treasury from all sections of the country.

The

Howards of New Orleans then forwarded supplies, medicine,
nurses, and financial aid to other afflicted communities
In Louisiana and neighboring states as well.

Sometimes a

few members of the New Orleans association actually went
In person to the other plague-stricken towns and helped
to organize the relief work.

The Influence of the Cres

cent City's Howard Association led to the establishment
of Howard Associations In many southern towns for the
purpose of dealing with their own pestilential calami
ties.®^
Throughout the period of yellow fever epidemics In
Louisiana, although other organized groups performed
valuable services and shared In the work of relief, no
other single association engaged In as many different
activities as did the Howards of New Orleans.

Their work

®5penner. Epidemic Yellow Fever, 69-70; Robinson,
Diary of a Samaritan, 86, 321-22; Report of the Howard
Association of New Orleans, Epidemic of 1853 (New Orleans,
1853), 3, 23-26; Report of the Howard Association of New
Orleans . , . 1878, 17-24; Howard Association Memorandum
Books, Addendum, 1878, John B. Vlnet Papers (Louisiana
State University Archives, Baton Rouge).
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benefited thousands of persons in dozens of southern com
munities during more than a half-century of pestilential
visitations.

In an age before man had learned how to com

bat yellow fever, epidemics could neither be prevented nor
controlled.

They simply had to run their course until

cold weather arrived or until the supply of susceptible
victims gave out.

Under the circumstances, the only way

men could fight the pestilence was by attempting to
alleviate its effects--the suffering and distress which
resulted from the presence of widespread disease.

The

Howard Association deserves special recognition for its
persistent efforts toward that end.
The epidemic of 1878 directly and indirectly af
fected so many persons that a division of labor in the
relief work became necessary.

While the Howard Association

restricted its activities to the provision of physicians,
nurses, and medicines for yellow fever patients, the Pea
body Subsistence Association was organized to handle the
collection of food and supplies and to dispense those pro
visions to the destitute,®^
In 1905 when the city, state, and federal public

BGpicayune, August 31, September 5, 1878,
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health authorities assumed control of locating and isolat
ing yellow fever cases, the Howard Association's tradition
al medical aid services were no longer the vital necessity
they had been in an earlier period.

The need for charita

ble activities, however, persisted.

The Charity Organiza

tion Society was established that year in an attempt to
coordinate all such activities by means of a single
association which would receive and distribute all funds
and provisions contributed for the relief of those persons
affected by the temporary economic dislocation resulting
from the epidemic.^7
Nineteenth-century commentators repeatedly praised
New Orleans for exhibiting an extraordinary degree of
benevolence, unexcelled by any other community in the
world.

88

Certainly the activities of the Howards and the

numerous other benevolent organizations, as well as the
unceasing efforts of the physicians and clergymen, seem to
substantiate the judgment that the people of the Crescent
City displayed an unusual spirit of charity and a

87lbid., August 13, 1905.
®®N. 0, Med. & Surg. Jour., IV (September, 1847), 275;
Bee, September 16, 1841, September 4, 1847; Picayune,
September 12, 1858; Robinson, Diary of a Samaritan, 71;
Duffy (ed.). Parson Clapp, 109.
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willingness to minister to the needs of their suffering
fellowmen.

Such altruistic behavior in the midst of a

pestilential visitation, however, stands in striking con
trast to the callous, indifferent attitudes so often ex
pressed in regard to the fever:

Although periodically the

disease added thousands to the mortality lists, its princi
pal victims— the indigent immigrants— were expendable; New
Orleans would always attract more than sufficient new
comers to fill their places!
Many persons in the Crescent City were capable of
voicing such opinions which seemed utterly indifferent to
the loss of thousands of lives, and time after time the
city's inhabitants managed to suppress the unpleasant
memories of destructive epidemics.

But, when faced with

the grim reality of pestilential yellow fever, a consider
able number of New Orleanians manifested a benevolence of
action during the crisis which scarcely reflected those
views supposedly prevailing in the city.
In discussing the outstanding display of "Christian
philanthropy" in the Crescent City during epidemic out
breaks, Theodore Clapp noted that accounts of plaguestricken cities in ancient Greece and medieval Europe
described a situation in which complete demoralization
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accompanied the ravages of the disease, destroying the
customary bonds of friendship, moral responsibility, honor,
and religion.

Epidemics had ordinarily resulted in "wild,

frantic excesses, neglect of the sick and dying, the plun
der of houses, murder, and other atrocities too awful to
mention."89

That description of European plagues would

hardly apply to the epidemic conditions resulting in the
Crescent City, although numerous instances of drunkenness,
neglect, plunder, extortion, and profiteering undoubtedly
occurred in every yellow fever epidemic which New Orleans
suffered.
According to an article in D£ Bow's Review on the
New Orleans epidemic of 1853, "Crime was very prevalent,
if we may judge from the lengthened police reports in the
journals. , . ."

Outlining the various aspects of the

"moral epidemic," the author mentioned the "utter th sight
lessness and indifference to even the most horrid things
in life," such as the morbid curiosity of the crowds who
gathered about the cemeteries to watch the process of
interment and seemed undisturbed by the ghastly sights and
putrid fumes.

As additional symptoms of the "moral

B^Duffy (ed.). Parson Clapp, 110,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

459
epidemic,” he included the "songs and obscene jests of the
grave-diggers,” the presence of the "huxter-women vending
their confections" just outside the cemetery gates, and
the cursing and disrespectful whistling of the men who
drove the hearses,^®

Such illustrations of man's depravi

ty, however, could hardly compare with the "wild excesses"
occurring in other places, other times.
The state of confusion, disorder, suffering, and
despair engendered by any serious pestilential visitation
was greatly intensified in several particularly violent
outbreaks.

Probably the most unpleasant aspect of any

yellow fever epidemic in New Orleans, as well as the most
difficult problem to handle, involved the burial of the
dead; and in that most destructive of all the epidemics,
in 1853, carrying out the task of prompt interment became
almost impossible.

Within a period of about four months

in 1853, over 8,000 persons died in New Orleans of yellow
fever alone; within a single week over 1,300 persons fell
victim to the pestilence.
could be provided.

People died faster than graves

On one occasion, an accumulation of

coffins at a cemetery gate remained unburied for well

90oe Bow's Review, XV (December, 1853), 624.
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over twenty-four hours.

The chairman of the municipal

Committee on Cemeteries upon checking that graveyard found
seventy-one bodies "piled on the ground, swollen and burst
ing their coffins, and enveloped In swarms of flies."

In

order to speed up the process of Interment, long, shallow
trenches received the coffins which were packed In and
covered with a thin layer of earth.

As the dally rains

rapidly washed away the earth and exposed row after row of
coffins to the blistering sun, "The coffins, made of plain
pine corporation lumber, and but slightly put together,
allowed the putrefaction of the bodies to oope out, fill
ing the air, far and near, with the most Intolerable
pestilential odors,
One of the most graphic descriptions of the grave
yard situation appeared In the New Orleans Dally Crescent
of August 11, 1853:
At the gates, the winds brought Intimation
of the corruption working within. Not a puff
but was laden with the rank atmosphere from
rotting corpses. Inside they were piled by
fifties, exposed to the heat of the sun,
swollen with corruption, bursting their coffin
lids, and sundering, as If by physical effort.

9lR6blnson, Diary of a Samaritan, 151; De Bow's Re
view, XV (December, 1853), 620-21, 629; Crescent, August 9,
1853; Picayune, August 8, 1853,
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the ligaments that bound their hands and
feet. . . , What a feast of horrors! Inside,
corpses piled in pyramids, and without the
gates, old and withered crones and fat huxter
women . . . dispensing ice creams and con
fections, and brushing away , , , the green
bottle-flies that hovered on their merchan
dise, and that anon buzzed away to drink
dainty inhalations from the green and fester
ing corpses.
Under these revolting circumstances it was difficult to
keep enough gravediggers working to bury the bodies that
poured into the cemeteries.

Both Negroes and whites were

hired at five dollars per hour.

Even strong stomachs

required bracing with frequent draughts of potent spirits
to endure such sights and

smells.

9%

At the height of the scourge’s activity, death
claimed entire families, and corpses were
bed, in stores, and in the streets.

discoveredin

Many a grimscene and

tragic incident presented itself in the course of every
epidemic which occurred.

During the simultaneous epidemic

activity of Asiatic cholera and yellow fever in New
Orleans in 1832, for example, one of the hospitals, com
pletely filled with corpses and abandoned by all the sur
viving medical attendants, was burned together "with its

92çrescent, August 11, 1853.
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ghastly contents" by the order of the mayor.

93

During several yellow fever epidemics in New Orleans,
cannons were fired and barrels of tar burned in the streets
in an attempt to counteract the pestilential atmosphere.
Added to all the other horrors of black vomit and delirium,
death and funeral processions, the roaring cannons and the
rising columns of smoke made the city seem even more the
headquarters of the "King of Terrors."

Demonstrating its highly pervasive influence, yellow
fever even made its way into the arena of politics, at
least on the level of speculative discussion and contro
versy.

For example, in the convention assembled in 1845 to

revise the constitution of Louisiana, the question of a
suitable time for holding general elections became a matter
for debate.

Some delegates argued that the elections should

be held sometime during the period when yellow fever ordi
narily prevailed.

By so doing, it was contended, "the

birds of passage" (that is, the strangers who, fearing the
pestilence, left the city each sunroer) would be denied the
vote, which they did not deserve in any case, "having only
temporary interest and residence" in New Orleans.

Other

93Rendall, History of New Orleans, I, 134, 177-78.
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delegates argued that such a provision would prevent at
least half the "resident" population from exercising the
vote since so many natives and long-time residents also
were absent from the Crescent City during the sick&y season
Dr. Bennet Dowler referred to this particular debate as an
illustration of yellow fever's political implications.^^
Another instance in which the Saffron Scourge be
came a factor in a bit of political speculation occurred
during the Great Epidemic of 1853.

It was reported in one

Crescent City journal that the "vile whigs" were rejoic
ing at the "thinning of the ranks of the democracy by the
great leveller, death."

According to the Crescent editor,

the vast majority of those persons leaving New Orleans to
spend the suiraner at the Gulf shore watering places or in
the North belonged to the Whig Party; whereas, the majori
ty of inhabitants remaining in the city--including many
"unacclimated"-- were Democrats.

The editor judged it

"horrible . . . that men should cooly reason, in the midst
of a pestilence, on the probable good or bad fortune to
befall a political party in consequence of a terrible
mortality.

. .

94n . 0.

& Surg. Jour., XV (November, 1858), 733

95çrescent, August 18, 1853.
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But yellow fever was not merely a topic sometimes
alluded to in political conversation; on numerous occasions,
state and local authorities found it necessary to enact
measures in the fields of quarantine and public health,
mainly because of public pressures deriving from the im
pact of epidemic yellow fever.

That disease undoubtedly

had more influence on the development of public health in
Louisiana than any other single factor.
Even in the worst of the yellow fever epidemics
with all their calamitous and depressing aspects, there
were always those who added comic relief to the scene of
adversity--those persons who exercised a bizarre sende of
humor and contrived peculiar jokes or stories based on
extreme and ridiculous exaggerations of epidemic conditions.
One epidemic "tall tale" which circulated around New Orleans
in 1853 declared that "the fever was so bad at the St,
Charles Hotel, that as soon as a man arrived and registered
his name they immediately took his measure for a coffin,
and asked him to note down in which cemetery he desired to
be interred."

According to another story of the same

variety, "as soon as a man arrived on one of the steamboats,
the officers of the Board of Health immediately took his
name and entered it in their books as deceased, to save all
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trouble in calling upon him again,
Operating upon the creative imaginations of various
individuals, the Saffron Scourge stimulated the production
of a number of poems and at least one satirical novel.

In

a highly amusing narrative with a serious purpose, Doctor
Dispachemquic;

A Story of the Great Southern Plague of

1878, James Dugan of New Orleans satirized the attitudes
and activities of "so-called physicians" and some of the
benevolent associations.

The scene of the story was New

Orleans during the epidemic of 1878; the three principal
characters were Drs. Dispachemquic, Kwarantenus, and Kancurum.

Characterized by pomposity, pedantry, arrogance,

and superficiality. Dr. Dispachemquic hastened most of
his patients to their final destiny.

But, as he explained

it, the fatalities were neither his fault nor the fault of
the system, but simply nature's will.

Kwarantenus was Dis

pachemquic 's colleague, friend, and echo.

Dr, Kancurum, on

the other hand, had spent a lifetime studying yellow fever
and was rather skillful in treating his patients.

Observ

ing that many "nurses" hired by a certain benevolent

96History of the Yellow Fever in New Orleans, during
the Summer of 1853 with Sketches of the Scenes of Horror
which Occurred during the Epidemic • • • ^ a Physician of
New Orleans, 98-99.
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association were persons of low character and interested
only in easy money, who neglected their duties and instead
consumed the brandy and champagne provided for the yellow
fever patients, Dr. Kancurum commented at length on the
serious need for a nurses training school in New Orleans.
Indirectly criticizing the inadequacy of most medical educa
tion in that period, the author also directed a bit of
not-so-gentle satire at some of the ladies' benevolent
societies.

Active participants in the ridiculous narrative,

the "Ladies Good Samaritan, Christian Flower Mission and
Theological Association of New Orleans" visited the poor
and sick, offered gratuitous advice, and distributed
flowers among the lower classes for the purpose of culti
vating among them a love of beauty.

Dugan portrayed these

"charitable" ladies going about doing their duty, dis
tastefully, but determinedly, with their noses in the air.^?
After the epidemic of 1853, Dr. Bennet Dowler ex
plained that the "contrast between the beauty and repose
of nature and the march of death" had provided the in
spiration for "several poetical contributions" relating to

James Dugan, Doctor Dispachemquic; A Story of the
Great Southern Plague of 1878 (New Orleans, 1879).
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the pestilence.

Some of the poems had been cut short by

the very "pest-king" whose activities the poetasters were
attempting to describe as, Dowler related, "the muse , , .
[trailed] her fast-failing wings in the polluting streams
of blood and black

v

o

m

i

t

.

"*8

Dowler himself was capable

of devising rather graphic images, even in his medical
writing.
The destructive visitation of 1878 gave rise to
several long poetic works, among which were "Dorothy-Gift of God, A Ballad of the New Orleans Plague of 1878"
by Paul H. Hayne, "Andromeda Unchàined" by Henry Guy
Carleton, and "The Welded Link" by Judge J, F, Simmons.
Simmons, of Sardis, Mississippi, also wrote numerous
short poems based on epidemic themes, including "The
Little Faded Dress," "Minnie's Farewell," and "I am
Ready."99

Although none of these works even approach the

98])owler, "Tableau of the Yellow Fever of 1853,"
loc. cit. , 62.
99paul H, Hayne, "Dorothy--Gift of God. A Ballad
of the New Orleans Plague of 1878" (undated pamphlet in
Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, New Orleans); Henry Guy
Carleton, "Andromeda Unchained" (New Orleans, 1878, clip
ping in Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, New Orleans); J,
F. Simmons, The Welded Link, & Other Poems (Philadelphia,
1881).
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level of great (or perhaps even good) poetry, they are all
interesting as additional examples of yellow fever's
ubiquitous influence on man's intellect and imagination as
well as his more mundane social and economic activities.
In "The Welded Link" Judge Simmons maintained that
the generosity, charity, and kindness of the North toward
the South during its pestilential disaster of 1878 had
accomplished "what arms never could have done.

It con

quered the Southern people and the Southern heart.
Simmons was apparently not alone in subscribing to that
view.

The editor of the New Orleans Picayune had declared

in September of 1878 that the generous contributions from
the North went far in relieving "the Southern heart of its
bitterness and memory of its wrongs."

Furthermore, he said,

"In the name of that philanthropy which has overswept all
geographical and party lines, we declare that the war is
over, now at last and forever.
These descriptive lines by Simmons portray rather
effectively something of the impact of epidemic yellow
fever on communities which fell under its devastating
influence ;

^^^Simmons, The Welded Link, 13-14.
^Picayune, September 22, 1878.
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'Contagion' swept like wave of solid fire-Death in its train and desolation dire-O'er ho .es and hearthstones, towns and cities fair,
And left its countless sad mementoes there.
•

•

•

And over all, as with a leprous blight.
Spread gloom more dismal than the darkest night.
The busy hum was hushed on mart and street.
The latter pressed alone by hurrying feet
Of Good Samaritan or anxious nurse.
Or— their work ended--overladen hearse.
Devoted priest and pastor, hand in hand,
Gentile and Jew alike together band.
Some consolation, some relief, to bring
To stricken victims, or to sooth death's sting.
While Dugan's novel emphasized the callous, unscru
pulous, insensitive, hypocritical, and other deplorable
human traits, Simmons concentrated on the manifestations
of generosity, kindness, and altruism.

But, a more accu*

rate evaluation of epidemic circumstances was provided by
a New Orleanian writing on the visitation of 1853.

"There

are few events in history which afford more striking
illustrations of the good and bad qualities of humanity,"
he declared, or "which contain more of the 'romance of real
life'— and present more impressive and startling pictures
of virtue and vice, of sorrow and suffering, of generosity
and selfishness, of true courage and cowardice, of charity

^°^Simmons, The Welded Link, 24, 32.
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and meanness, than the visitation of a destructive
pestilence. . . ,*’^03

I03yjalker, "History and Incidents of the Plague in
New Orleans," loc. cit., 797,
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CHAPTER X

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

From 1796 through 1905 yellow fever visited New
Orleans almost every summer and on at least thirty occasions
developed into a full-fledged epidemic.

Frequently extend

ing from the Crescent City along the avenues of trade and
travel to other communities in Louisiana, the pestilence
disrupted the normal functioning of the economic system
together with every phase of human activity, and spread
death and destruction, suffering, anxiety, and grief all
along its path.
Between 1796 and 1850, New Orleans played host to
the fever every summer and suffered some twenty extensive
epidemics,

Each seemed more virulent than the previous

one, as succeeding epidemics first claimed hundreds of lives,
then thousands.

Mainly because of the Saffron Scourge, the

Crescent City acquired a reputation as the "Necropolis of
the South."

Still its population increased year after year

as immigrants poured in from Europe and other sections of

471
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the United States to take advantage of the economic oppor
tunities available in that port city so favorably located
for commercial activity.
Faced with the frequent occurrences of a death-deal
ing epidemic malady which sometimes seemed to appear spon
taneously without obvious connection to a prior case and
which spread in an erratic and mysterious fashion, perplex
ed physicians and laymen debated the nature, causation,
and transmission of yellow fever in their search for a
satisfactory explanation of its peculiar behavior.

lacking

a knowledge of disease-producing microorganisms, human
carriers, and insect vectors, they became hopelessly in
volved in the maze of existing etiological and epidemiolo
gical conceptions as they tried to apply those conceptions
to the activity of the yellow pestilence.

Theoretical

positions stood in direct relation to the method of action
suggested to combat the disease.

Those who believed yellow

fever to be a contagious and imported malady favored quaran
tine measures to prevent its introduction; those who believed
that it originated locally in filth and putrefaction pro
moted sanitary regulations.
Municipal boards of health designed to supervise the
work of sanitation in New Orleans were established on
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several occasions during the first half of the nineteenth
century, but they failed to function effectively, lacking
financial support and the power of enforcement.

Neither

the citizenry at large nor the governing authorities were
yet ready to accept strict regulatory legislation in the
interest of public health.

Several legislative experi

ments with quarantine measures (by city and state) were
also attempted.

But without a clear knowledge of yellow

fever epidemiology, neither the legislators nor the quaran
tine officials could close all the loopholes through which
the pestilence might enter.

The continued appearance of

yellow fever in New Orleans in spite of quarantine, to
gether with the vociferous opposition and pressure by com
mercial interests, led to the abandonment of quarantine
measures in 1825.

No further state legislation was passed

on that subject until the 1850*s--the decade of the Great
Epidemics.

The visitations of 1853 and 1854 again forced

the issue and stimulated a public demand for state action
against the destructive malady.
During that first half-century of yellow fever's
activity in New Orleans, many inhabitants of the Crescent
City developed an attitude of indifference toward the
scourge.

It was expected to appear each year and to claim
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at least a few hundred victims, perhaps more.

Those per

sons who had survived an attack of yellow fever or who
believed themselves "acclimated," and thus immune, by
virtue of birth or long residence in the city did not fear
the coming of the fever.

Persons who were afraid, if they

were financially able, fled the city during the sickly
season each summer, or at least left town on the approach
of an epidemic.

The newcomers, the indigent immigrants

among the working classes who always furnished the bulk of
yellow fever's victims, left no records by which one might
determine their relative fear or indifference; at any rate,
few could have left the city even had they so desired.
The articulate, vocal upper classes of New Orleans
failed to see their beloved city as the "Necropolis of the
South."

Far from considering New Orleans the unhealthy

city described by outsiders, the commercial interests,
newspapers, and physicians joined in defending their com
munity's good name against all outside criticism.

Further,

they praised New Orleans as one of the healthiest cities
in the Union--except during epidemic years.

But extensive

visitations occurred only once or twice in each decade,
they contended, and even then the disease ordinarily
limited its ravages to the intemperate, ignorant, unclean
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immigrant laboring classes.
Until a careful statistical study of New Orleans'
mortality records had been made and compared with the
records of other cities, the d.i'vçion regarding the city's
health continued to find favrr :

an article of faith among

its ardent defenders; throughout the century one can still
find expressions of this view.

But by 1850 several phy

sicians had begun to investigate the problem and had un
earthed and compiled enough statistical evidence at least
to challenge the deep-rooted belief.

The climax of yellow

fever's activity in New Orleans and Louisiana, which came
in the 1850's with four violent epidemics occurring in
rapid succession (1853, 1854, 1855, and 1858), further
stimulated an interest in mortality records and led many to
question the notion that New Orleans was basically healthy.
The indifference of previous years gradually began to give
way to an increasing interest in public health legislation.
The epidemic of 1853 was not only the most devastat
ing epidemic New Orleans ever experienced (claiming over
8,000 persons in about four months' time), but it was also
the most widespread visitation up to that time, spreading
to many communities throughout Louisiana and the South where
it had never appeared before.

Small towns unaccustomed
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to the pestilence (which was so familiar to New Orleans)
suffered even more, in a sense, than the metropolis.

With

in a population never before exposed to the disease, unlike
that of the Crescent City, every individual was susceptible
to attack.

In some small communities, with the inhabitants

falling sick one by one, day by day, there were scarcely
enough well persons left to attend to the patients and to
bury the dead.
At the close of the 1853 visitation, a number of com
munities clearly traced the source of their own outbreaks
to New Orleans.

Thereby convinced of the disease's trans

portability, they favored legislation to prevent its initial
introduction into the state.

Some New Orleans medical men,

believing that yellow fever had been introduced from Latin
America, began to advocate quarantine regulations, although
the majority of the medical profession still considered
yellow fever an indigenous product deriving from locally
generated miasms.

In spite of the prevailing medical

opinion and the opposition of commercial interests, after
another extensive yellow fever epidemic erupted the very
next year, 1854, the Louisiana legislators enacted a measure
in March of 1855 providing for quarantine regulations and
a State Board of Health to administer those regulations.
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Thus, epidemic yellow fever resulted in Louisiana's estab
lishing the first state board of health in this country.
Additional legislation during the latter nineteenth century
gradually expanded the Board's functions and increased its
powers until it finally evolved into an active, effective,
and vitally important state institution.

Following the epidemic'of 1858, yellow fever began
its gradual decline in frequency and virulence, before the
discovery of the mosquito transmitter and before the devel
opment of an adequate quarantine system--for reasons not
completely explicable even today.

Nevertheless, when the

absence of epidemic yellow fever in federally occupied New
Orleans during the Civil War coincided with General Butler's
stringent quarantine and sanitation regulations, which were
retained and enforced to some extent by his successor.
General N. P. Banks, many persons were persuaded that yellow
fever had been prevented by sanitation, or quarantine, or
both.
During the latter nineteenth century, yellow fever
appeared intermittently in New Orleans and Louisiana, claim
ing from one to sixty lives in some years and none at all
in others.

Five outbreaks occurred which might be consider

ed epidemic in extent, but in spite of the larger population
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with a preponderance of unacclimated subjects, only two
epidemics--in 1867 and 1878--could compare with earlier
visitations in terms of mortality.
The epidemic of 1878 stands forth as the most exten
sive yellow fever visitation ever to occur in the United
States.

Spreading throughout the South and the Mississippi

Valley, the disease claimed approximately 20,000 lives of
the 120,000 cases in the eleven states affected and cost
the country an estimated one hundred to two hundred million
dollars.

This destructive pestilence resulted in an inten

sified fear of the disease in an extensive area of the
country which persisted through the remainder of the cen
tury and motivated the shot-gun quarantines and the inter
ference with railroad transportation of freight, passengers,
and the United States mail during the outbreak of 1897.
Furthermore, the 1878 disaster led to an increasing
demand for national action in the field of quarantine and
public health, especially on the part of the interior
states which no longer trusted the Gulf states to adminis
ter an effective quarantine system.

As a result, in 1879

Congress created the National Board of Health to cooperate
with state and local health authorities in maintaining
strict quarantine regulations. Representing an initial
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attempt by the federal government to assume a more active
role in public health activities, that institution failed
within five years' time, partly because of inherent admin
istrative defects, partly because of obstacles posed by
defenders of states rights, chief among which was the
Louisiana State Board of Health headed by Dr. Joseph Jones.
Nevertheless, after the demise of the National Board, the
United States Marine Hospital Service, a long-established
federal agency originally designed to provide pre-paid
medical care to American seamen, received additional duties
and powers (in 1883 and 1893) in relation to quarantine and
public health.

This federal agency ultimately evolved into

the United States Public Health Service (1902 and 1912),
Following the yellow fever epidemic of 1905, the federal
government assumed full control of maritime quarantine by
an act of Congress passed in June of 1906.

Hence, it seems

that epidemic yellow fever not only influenced the develop
ment of public health institutions in Louisiana (and in
other states as well), but also served as a prime factor
in the evolution of a concept of national public health
and in bringing about federal action within that area.
In the epidemic of 1897, federal health officers in
cooperation with state and local officials performed such

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

480
valuable services as inspection of railroad freight and
passengers, fumigation of mail, establishment of detention
camps, and the issuance of health certificates in an attempt
to untie the transportation entanglement resulting from
intra-state and interstate quarantines.

In

1 9 0 5

the United

States Public Health and Marine Hospital Service actually
took charge of the campaign against the fever in New Orleans
at the request of the local and state authorities.

Sys

tematically employing measures based on the recentlyformulated mosquito doctrine (announced by the Reed Commis
sion in

1 9 0 1 )

, the federal officials worked side by side

with local and state public health authorities to curb the
spread of the pestilence.

Since the

1 9 0 5

outbreak, no

yellow fever epidemic has occurred in the United States.
In the realm of theory, an investigation of the ideas
relating to yellow fever's nature, causation, and trans
mission, and the gradual modification of those concepts
provides a good picture of one phase of nineteenth-century
medical thought in the process of evolution, as well as a
view of the great transitional period in medical science
itself.

From philosophical approach to scientific method,

from analogy and post hoc ergo propter hoc to microscopic
observations and controlled experiments, from miasms to
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germs, and from fomites to mosquitoes, the field of medi
cine ultimately emerged from its centuries-old cocoon of
confusion into a new kind of confusion--but with an everincreasing fund of knowledge which has been used success
fully in preventing the recurrence of yellow fever and
certain other epidemic diseases.
Many diverse non-medical elements may be observed
in close association with nineteenth-century ideas and
attitudes relating to yellow fever--such as a laissezfaire point of view and Social Darwinism, which seem to
have bolstered the opposition to regulatory measures con
cerning yellow fever, quarantine, and public health; pro
slavery and race prejudice in connection with yellow
fever's mild effect on the Negro; class consciousness in
placing the blame on the lower elements of society, par
ticularly foreign immigrants, for New Orleans’ high mortal
ity rate, and furthermore, writing off those lives as
expendable; sectionalism, exhibited in defending the diseaseridden South against criticism from the disease-ridden North;
and states rights arguments employed to strengthen popular
resistance to federal encroachment in quarantine operations.
Aside from epidemic yellow fever’s intellectual
implications, the disease exerted a profound Impact on
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community life and human behavior.

Its appearance in a

community resulted in an immediate flight of the panicstricken, after which many of those persons who remained
and escaped attack devoted their attentions to those who
were less fortunate.

The medical profession and the clergy

labored constantly in their appointed tasks.

Unemployment,

resulting from the interruption of commercial activity and
economic activities in general, added to the critical situ
ation produced by sickness and death.

To relieve in »ome

measure the destitution of the indigent sick and the unem
ployed, volunteer relief organizations sprang up in many
areas--but particularly in New Orleans.

The disorder and

desolation of a plague-stricken locality during particular
ly violent epidemics presented a picture which observers
later characterized as essentially indescribable.
For more than a century the Saffron Scourge was an
integral aspect of life (and death) in Louisiana, especial
ly in New Orleans.

For its destructive toll levied against

human life, energy, and property, this disease should be
considered a villain in the drama of Louisiana history.
Yet no one can deny its influence in promoting the develop
ment of public health, and for that significant contribu
tion at least the villain must be given some credit.
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